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2025 DAILYLAW 4132 (GAU)

Ms Alang Rujuju and Anr v. The State of AP

Crl.Petn./12/2025 · 2025-03-02

Mitali Thakuria

body2025

Judgment text

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Page No.# 1/6 GAHC040001492025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./12/2025 Ms Alang Rujuju and Anr Daughter of Shri Chantong Rujuju, resident of Panchali, Itanagar, PO and PS Itanagar, Papum Pare District, Arunachal Pradesh 791111 2: Pitam Jomoh Age: Occupation : Son of Shri Hano Jomoh a permanent resident of Jomoh Village PO and PS Seppa East Kameng District Arunachal Pradesh and presently residing at Nabam Namlo near Lekhi Law College PO and PS Nirjuli Papum Pare District Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of AP represented by the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : Ms. A. Talom Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Page No.# 2/6 BEFORE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA ORDER 03.03.2025 Heard Ms. A. Talom, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. L. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent. 2. This joint application is filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 praying for quashing and setting aside of Itanagar Women Police Station Case No. 71/2024, registered under Sections 140(3)/64(1)/62 of BNS. 3. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides and have also perused the materials available in the case diary. 4. It is submitted by Ms. Talom, learned counsel for the petitioners, that this is a joint petition for quashing the F.I.R. as the matter has already been amicably settled between petitioner No. 1 (victim) and petitioner No. 2 (accused), and they have entered into a compromise agreement dated 08.01.2025. She further submitted that both parties are live-in partners, and petitioner No. 1 had lodged the F.I.R. due to a misunderstanding. Subsequently, she approached the concerned police station with an application dated 08.01.2025 for the withdrawal of the F.I.R.; however, the same could not be withdrawn as the case had already been registered and the investigation is still under process. She further submits that since the matter has already been compromised between the parties, there is no possibility of conviction even if the charge-sheet is filed or the case proceeds. Therefore, allowing the proceeding to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 5. In addition to her submission, she relied on the decisions passed by the Co- Ordinate Bench in the following cases: i). Crl.Petn. No.132/2022 [Kara Nayum & Anr. Vs. The State of Arunachal Page No.# 3/6 Pradesh]; and ii). Crl.Petn. No.111/2023 [Smti. Rimin Tayang & Anr. Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh]. 6. In the aforesaid cases, the petitions for quashing were considered by taking into account the nature of the offence and the subsequent compromise between the parties. Accordingly, Ms. Talom, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that this is a fit case where the F.I.R. can be quashed by invoking the power under Section 528 of the BNSS. 7. In this context, Ms. Hage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the case has been registered under Section 140(3)/64(1)/62 of the BNS. She submits that considering the nature of the offence alleged against petitioner No. 2, which is heinous in nature, it cannot be compromised, and the F.I.R. should not be quashed based solely on the compromise agreement. She further submits that even if no material has been collected by the Investigating Officer, the petitioners can approach the learned Trial Court with a prayer for discharging the case. However, she submits that this is not a fit case for considering the present application for quashing solely on the basis of the compromise between the parties, given the nature of the alleged offence against petitioner No. 2. 8. She further relied on the decision made in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan, reported in 2019 (5) SCC 688, where it was held that a rape case cannot be quashed. In paragraph 15.2 of the said judgment, it was observed as follows: “15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Page No.# 4/6 9. Here in this case, it is seen that the dispute between the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 has arisen out of their live-in relationship and they have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves and they are now living peacefully and therefore, even if the proceeding is allowed to be continued, the chance of conviction is also very remote and bleak. 10. In the case of Kapil Gupta vs. State of NCT of Delhi, reported in 2022 (0) Supreme SC 1108, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 12 of the said judgment that: Para-12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, which read thus: “29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious 1 (2014) 6 SCC 466 offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash Page No.# 5/6 the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-- sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 11. Further in the Case of Shivashankar @ Shiva vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported in Criminal Appeal No.504 of 2018, it has been observed that “it is difficult to hold sexual intercourse between the parties which has continued for a considerable period, as rape”. 12. In view of above, ends of justice would be meted out if the petition is allowed. Further, since the matter has already been settled between the petitioners, it is Page No.# 6/6 unlikely that the petitioner No. 1 will depose against the petitioner No. 2, and in that event allowing the proceeding to continue before the learned Court below, it would be an abuse of the process of the Court. 13. Under the above facts and circumstances, and also considering the view expressed by the Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that this is a fit case where the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [528 of BNSS] can be invoked to quash Itanagar Women Police Station Case No. 71/2024, registered under Sections 140(3)/64(1)/62 of the BNS. Accordingly, the FIR stands set aside and quashed. 14. In terms of above, this criminal petition stands disposed of. 15. Return the Case Diary. JUDGE Comparing Assistant