1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 833 of 2025 South Eastern Coalfields Limited, SECL Gevra Area, Through Hod (Legal), SECL Hqrs, Seepat Road, Bilaspur (C.G.) --- Petitioner versus  M/s Kaytin Transport Pvt. Ltd., (KTP) Through Its Director Lt. Col (Retd.) K.K. Khanna, S/o Late I.D. Khanna, Aged 88 Years, R/o 54, Rakshak Society, Aundh Camp, Pune (Maharashtra) --- Respondent with WP227 No. 836 of 2025 South Eastern Coalfields Limited, SECL Sohagpur Area, Through H O D (Legal) S E C L, H Q R S, Seepat Road, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner Versus  M/s Kaytin Transport Pvt. Ltd., (KTP) Through Its Director Lt. Col. (Retd.) K.K. Khanna, S/o Late I.D. Khanna, Aged 88 Years, R/o 54, Rakshak Society, Aundh Camp, Pune (Maharashtra) --- Respondent For Petitioner : Mr. V. R. Tiwari, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Ali Asgar, Mr. Uday V.S. Rathore along Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 Date of Hearing Date of Order : : with and Mr. A. Laxmidhar, Advocates 04.09.2025 22.09.2025 Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey CAV Order 1. In WP227 No. 833 of 2025, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10 a) Set aside the impugned order dated 30.06.2025, passed by the Learned Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) in Execution of Arbitral Award Case No. 04/2025 and all proceedings arising thereof and consequences thereto; and b) Hold and declare that the amount so calculated/computed by the Executing Court is contrary to the provisions of law and against the terms of the Arbitral Award dated 15.04.2014; and c) Hold and declare that the grant of interest on the delayed payment of interest pendent lite is contrary to the provisions of law and judicial precedents; d) Pass such other order(s) as may be deemed fit, proper, and just in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 2. In WP227 No. 836 of 2025, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.a) Set aside the impugned order dated 30.06.2025, passed by the Learned Commercial Court (District Judge Level), Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) in Execution of Arbitral Award Case No. 03/2025 3 and all proceedings arising thereof and consequences thereto; and b) Hold and declare that the amount so calculated/computed by the Executing Court is contrary to the provisions of law and against the terms of the Arbitral Award dated 15.04.2014; and c) Hold and declare that the grant of interest on the delayed payment of interest pendent lite is contrary to the provisions of law and judicial precedents; d) Pass such other order(s) as may be deemed fit, proper, and just in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts of WP227 No. 836 of 2025 are that the petitioner SECL had entered into a Hire Purchase Agreement & transport agreement with the respondent–Kaytin Transport Pvt. Ltd (for short KTP) in December 1983 for supply & transportation of 20 tipping trucks but only 12 vehicles were delivered, eight of which were second-hand, thereafter dispute arose between the parties and provision of arbitration contained in the agreement was invoked by the respondent. The Arbitral Tribunal vide award dated 15.04.2014 directed the SECL to pay a sum of ₹13,01,288.15 (comprising 5,55,666.19 towards hire purchase charges ₹ and 7,45,621.96 towards transport charges) along with interest. Both ₹ the parties challenged the award under Section 34 before the Commercial Court, Raipur and vide order dated 30.03.2017, the petition filed by the SECL was dismissed whereas the petition filed by respondent was partly allowed, granting pendente lite interest @ of 12% per annum on principal amount of Rs. 1,75,843.73. The parties challenged order passed by learned Commercial Court dated 30.3.2017 by filing two separate appeals and SECL appeal was dismissed vide order dated 6.7.2018 by the Division Bench & KTP appeal was partly allowed granting pendent lite @ 17.25 % on Rs. 7,45,621.96. The SECL challenged the High Court’s decision before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and vide order 4 dated on 19.04.2024, the judgment rendered by the High Court was affirmed. In compliance thereof, SECL deposited 44,45,069.85 before ₹ the Commercial Court on 15-02-25. However, in execution proceedings, the Commercial Court vide order dated 30.06.2025 directed the SECL to pay remaining amount of Rs. 45,24,710.18 @ 18% per annum from 15-02-25 till its realization. The SECL has challenged the impugned order of the Executing Court contending that post- award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is chargeable only on the principal sum awarded by the Tribunal, and not on interest components subsequently computed by courts. 4. The dispute in WP227 No. 833 of 2025 arises from an arbitral award dated 15.04.2014 relating to a coal transportation contract awarded to the respondent–Kaytin Transport Pvt. Ltd. under a rehabilitation scheme for ex-servicemen. Under the agreement dated 16.01.1987 with SECL (then WCL), the respondent was to transport coal from SECL pitheads to its railway sidings. Disputes having arisen, the matter was referred to the Arbitrator. The respondent had raised its claim under various heads with regards to transport agreement, escalation in respect of parts. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondent to the extent of Rs. 16,69,693.775 /- with interest @ 12% per annum & further refund of Rs1,50,000/- (SD). The interest part was computed Rs. 30,05,448.79. Thus total amount arrived at by the Tribunal was 48,25,142.565. The Tribunal had denied claim of respondent for pendente lite interest. It was clarified by the Tribunal that if SECL fails to make payment within period of 60 days the amount shall earn interest @ 18% per annum. Both the parties filed petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court, Raipur. By order dated 09.03.2017, the said Court dismissed the petition filed by SECL and 5 partly allowed the respondent’s claim by granting pendente lite interest @12% per annum on 16,69,693.775. ₹ The High Court dismissed appeals preferred by SECL as well as KTP vide common order dated 06.07.2018. The SECL further challenged the order passed in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court but SLP was dismissed vide order dated 19.04.2024. The SECL deposited a sum of Rs. 1,60,70,325 on 30-11-2025. However, in Execution Case No. 04/2025, the learned Commercial Court, by impugned order dated 30.06.2025, computed SECL’s remaining liability at 44,72,214.26 by ₹ applying post-award interest @18% on a consolidated (including pre- reference and pendente lite interest). The petitioner pleads that the Executing Court has misapplied Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration Act and binding precedent as post-award interest is payable only on the sum awarded by the Tribunal, i.e., 48,25,142.56, and not on amounts ₹ subsequently added by courts. By doing so, the Executing Court has effectively awarded “interest on interest,” traveling beyond the four corners of the arbitral award. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would make following submissions:- I. The present petition arises out of the order dated 30.06.2025 passed by the learned Commercial Court (District Level), Raipur, in Execution Case No. 03/2025 (WP 227 836/25), whereby the liability of the petitioner has been determined at Rs. 89,69,780.03. Out of the aforesaid liability, the petitioner has already satisfied a sum of Rs. 44,45,069.85 on 15.02.2025, the balance amount payable stands at Rs. 45,24,710.18. II. He submits that the subject execution proceeding traces its genesis to the arbitral award dated 15.04.2014, passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, whereby a sum of Rs. 13,01,288.15 (Rs. 5,55,666.19 under the head of Hire Purchase Agreement and Rs. 6 7,45,621.96 under the head of Transport Agreement) was awarded against the claims raised by the respondent, with a stipulation that if the said amount was not satisfied within 60 days, it would carry interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereafter. III. It is submitted the arbitral award was subjected to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned Commercial Court, Raipur. IV. The learned Court, while deciding the petitions preferred by both the parties under Section 34 of the Act, in para 37 of its order granted interest pendente lite on the escalation of spare parts on the principal amount of Rs. 1,75,843.73 at the rate of 12% per annum for the period from 11.01.2002 to 15.04.2014, while categorically observing that “the rest of the relief claimed by KTP is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” V. Thereafter, this Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court, while exercising powers under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, in para 22 of its order, further granted interest to the respondent at the rate of 17.25% on Rs. 7,45,621.96 under the head of refund of principal cum excess interest deducted by SECL. VI. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in appeal, was pleased to uphold the concurrent findings of the Courts below. VII. It is argued that the learned Executing Court, while computing the liability, has erroneously included the amount awarded towards interest pendente lite in the principal awarded sum of Rs. 13,01,288.15, and has further directed computation of post-award interest thereon. Such an approach is contrary to the settled principles of law. VIII. Mr. Tiwari, Senior Advocate would submit that the learned Executing Court ought to have restricted the computation of post-award interest strictly to the sum awarded by the learned Sole 7 Arbitrator i.e., Rs. 13,01,288.15 (Rs. 5,55,666.19 under Hire Purchase Agreement and Rs. 7,45,621.96 under Transport Agreement), and not on the enhanced figure which improperly clubs the interest pendente lite. IX. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that while exercising powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act of 1996, the Court is vested with the power to modify/alter an arbitral award by severing the invalid portion while leaving the valid portion intact. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further clarified that such modification does not amount to appellate jurisdiction and the doctrine of merger has no application; thus, it is contended that the learned Commercial Court and High Court consciously severed only that part of the award relating to non-grant of pendente lite interest, while leaving untouched the part wherein the learned Sole Arbitrator had, in his discretion, granted post-award interest only on Rs. 13,01,288.15. Consequently, the amount of interest pendente lite exists independently and cannot be merged with the awarded principal sum for the purposes of computing post-award interest. X. He further places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Morgan Securities & Credits (P) Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 602, wherein it was held that Section 31(7)(b) of the Act of 1996 vests discretion in the arbitrator to award post-award interest either on the whole sum or part thereof; thus, in the present case, the learned Sole Arbitrator, in exercise of such discretion, confined the post-award interest to Rs. 13,01,288.15 only, which remained unaltered by the Courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. 8 XI. He vehemently argued that the impugned order dated 30.06.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court is wholly unsustainable to the extent it clubs the pendente lite interest with the awarded sum for computation of post-award interest. Hence, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned order dated 30.06.2025, to the extent it clubs the pendente lite interest with the awarded sum for the purposes of computing post-award interest, or in the alternative, remit the matter to the learned Executing Court for fresh consideration in the light of the law laid down in the matter of Gayatri Balasamy (Supra) and Morgan Securities (Supra). XII. With regard to WP227 No.833 of 2025, learned Senior Counsel would submit that in Execution Case No. 04/2025 arising out of an arbitral award, the learned Commercial Court, Raipur, vide order dated 30.06.2025, has fixed the petitioner’s liability at ₹2,05,42,539.26. Out of the said amount, the petitioner has already discharged liability to the tune of 1,60,70,325/-, but ₹ the Executing Court failed to give due credit and has wrongly computed the balance. He argues that the learned Executing Court ignored the payments made in compliance with earlier directions and has resulted in an inflated figure of liability. It is submitted that execution proceedings cannot travel beyond the scope of the award and that the impugned order suffers from material irregularity, warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit as under:- 9 i. Mr. Ali Asgar & Mr. Rathore submits that the petitioner/SECL has repeatedly delayed this matter through various tactics since 1988, including delayed payments, late appointment of arbitrators, attempts to re-argue settled issues, and removal of arbitrators. ii. It is submitted that the contract in question commenced in the year 1983 for the transportation of coal under the DGR Scheme and concluded in 1988, inclusive of a six-month extension. Part payments were effected from 1983 onwards up to 1995, but the final bill remained unprepared, prompting the respondent (KTP) to invoke arbitration in 1996. iii. The Arbitrator was appointed in the year 2001, with proceedings commencing in 2002. iv. On 09.11.2003, the Sole Arbitrator rejected SECL’s claims and held KTP’s claims to be time-barred. The Arbitrator’s order was set aside by the District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act of 1996”) vide order dated 23.01.2006, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration. v. It is further submitted that pursuant to the remand, the matter was referred for mediation at the behest of SECL, which sought a negotiated settlement to avoid prolonged litigation and pursuant to a note sheet dated 25.08.2007, a committee was constituted for amicable resolution, wherein it was observed that the matter was exceedingly old, rendering it difficult for officers to respond adequately to the queries. SECL’s Senior Counsel advised negotiation to avert disputes on management liability. However, it took about three years for SECL to issue a letter dated 17.03.2010 to the Dy. CFM (CMC) directing submission of a report within 15 days. vi. It is also submitted that on 27.01.2011, KTP wrote a letter to the Sole Arbitrator requesting recommencement of proceedings, 10 apprehending that SECL’s intent was merely to delay rather than negotiate in good faith. vii. In a subsequent development, SECL sought to re-agitate the issue of limitation, notwithstanding the District Judge’s prior ruling in KTP’s favour. KTP protested vide a letter to the Director (P), objecting to the Arbitrator’s intent to rehear limitation despite the binding order of the District Judge and the Sole Arbitrator, Mr. S.P. Mathur, passed an interim order on 24.06.2011 permitting SECL to re-argue the issue of limitation, leading KTP to lose faith and an application for his removal was filed. Later on, Mr. S.P. Mathur withdrew as Sole Arbitrator vide note sheet dated 25.07.2011. KTP addressed letters to SECL on 18.11.2011, 25.11.2011, and 03.03.2012, pressing for appointment of a new Arbitrator and vide order dated 21.03.2012 SECL appointed Mr. C.I. Shrivastava, Ex- Director (T), as the Sole Arbitrator. Later on, vide order dated 02.06.2012 the SECL removed Mr. C.I. Shrivastava and appointed Mr. L.K. Shrivastava, Ex-Director (T), SECL, as the Sole Arbitrator, which caused delay. Mr. L.K. Shrivastava passed an interim order affirming that the issue of limitation had been conclusively dealt with by the District Judge and could not be re-opened. Against said order, SECL preferred an appeal before the District Court, which was dismissed. Thereafter, KTP its letter dated 27.08.2012, urged SECL to cease such dilatory tactics. The Arbitrator prepared the award in April 2014, but delivery was deferred to 15.04.2014 owing to non-payment of fees by SECL, awarding Rs. 13,01,288.15 (Rs. 5,55,666.19 under Hire Purchase Agreement and Rs. 7,45,621.96 under Transport Agreement), with 18% post-award interest if not paid within 60 days. (WP227 836/25) viii. It is submitted that the award was challenged before the Commercial Court, which passed orders in 2017, granting 11 pendente lite interest at 12% on Rs. 1,75,843.73 (escalation of spare parts) from 11.01.2002 to 15.04.2014, while dismissing other claims. On appeal under Section 37, this Hon’ble High Court in 2018 modified the award, granting 17.25% interest on Rs. 7,45,621.96 for excess deductions (SECL charging for new tippers instead of depreciated old ones). Against which, SECL preferred SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and vide order dated 19.04.2024 it was dismissed. Thereafter, KTP issued letters and held personal meetings requesting payment, but SECL instituted MJC proceedings before the Commercial Court for deposit as per its calculations (confined to Gevra area). KTP contested the calculations as erroneous and highlighted the omission of Sohagpur Area dues. The Court below directed a meeting to clarify computations. On 30.11.2024, SECL deposited Rs. 1.60 lakhs for Gevra Area, declining KTP’s claims. KTP initiated execution for the balance in Gevra Area and full dues in Sohagpur Area. On 15.02.2025, SECL deposited amount for Sohagpur Area according to its disputed calculations. ix. It is argued that the Execution Court passed the impugned order on 30.06.2025, upholding the computations. x. Time was taken by SECL on 07-07-25, 02-08-25, 12-08-25 & 19-08- 25 to comply with the order dated 30-06-25. Interestingly on 12-08- 25, an application was filed for permission to deposit entire amount before commercial Court and same may be disbursed on KTP submitting Bank Guarantee. The learned Court directed SECL to deposit in the KTP account directly. On 19-08-25, when the SECL failed to comply with the said order, Court below imposed Rs.20,000/- Rs. 20,000/- cost on SECL in both execution cases and directed its OIC to remain present before it on 21-08-25. xi. It is further contended that all petitions deserve to be dismissed. 12 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on file. 8. In WP227 No.833 of 2025, learned Commercial Court (District Judge Level)/Executing Court in Executing Case no.04/2025 has made the following calculation in terms of the award dated 15.04.2014 payable to the KTP by the SECL:- Sr. No. Particulars Increase in the cost of diesel and lubricants Refund of Security Deposit 1. Principal Amount ₹16,69,693.775 1,50,000 ₹ 2. Pre-reference Interest Amount ₹30,05,448.79 NIL 3. Awarded Amount ₹46,75,142.565 (As arrived at by the Tribunal) ₹1,50,000 (As allowed by the Tribunal) 4. Pendente Lite Interest (11.01.2002 to 15.04.2014 = 4477 days) 24,57,606.21 (Interest ₹ @12% on principal amount of 16,69,693.775 in terms ₹ of order dated 09.03.2017 of Commercial Court) NIL 5. Award including Pre- reference and Pendente Lite Interest (3 + 4) ₹71,32,748.78 1,50,000 ₹ 6. Consolidated Amount (5(ii) + 5(iii)) 72,82,748.78 ₹ 7. Post Award Interest accruing from 22.10.2014 (i.e., after ₹1,32,59,790.48 13 Sr. No. Particulars Increase in the cost of diesel and lubricants Refund of Security Deposit 60 days of date of award) calculated @18% up to 30.11.2024 (3692 days) 8. Total Amount (6 + 7) 2,05,42,539.26 ₹ 9. Amount deposited by SECL on 30.11.2024 1,60,70,325.00 ₹ 10. Remaining Amount to be paid by SECL as on 30.11.2024 (8 – 9) 44,72,214.26 ₹ 9. In WP227 no. 836 of 2025, learned Commercial Court (District Judge Level)/Executing Court in Executing Case No.03/2025 calculated the amount payable to the KTP by the SECL in terms of award dated 15.04.2014 as under:- Sl. No. Particulars Hire Purchase Agreement Transport Agreement Total / Consolidated 1. Principal Amount ₹1,75,843.73 ₹2,36,831.94 — 2. Pre-Reference Amount ₹3,79,822.46 ₹5,08,790.02 — 3. Awarded Amount (As per Tribunal) ₹5,55,666.19 ₹7,45,621.96 13,01,288.15 ₹ 4. Pendente Lite Interest (11.01.2002 to 15.04.2014 = 4477 days) ₹2,58,822.72 (Interest @12% on principal ₹1,75,843.73, as per Commercial ₹15,77,618.62 (Interest @17.25% on award ₹7,45,621.96, ₹18,36,441.34 14 Sl. No. Particulars Hire Purchase Agreement Transport Agreement Total / Consolidated Court order dated 09.03.2017) as per High Court order dated 06.07.2018) 5. Award Including Pre-Reference & Pendente Lite Interest ₹8,14,488.91 ₹23,23,240.58 31,37,729.49 ₹ 6. Consolidated Award Amount (5(ii)+5(iii)) — — 31,37,729.49 ₹ 7. Post-Award Interest @18% (after 60 days of award i.e., 22.10.2014 to 15.02.2025 = 3769 days) — — 58,32,050.54 ₹ 8. Total Amount (6+7) — — 89,69,780.03 ₹ 9. Amount Deposited by SECL on 15.02.2025 — — 44,45,069.85 ₹ 10. Balance Amount Payable (8–9) — — 45,24,710.18 ₹ 10. From the bare perusal of the above quoted calculations, it is apparent that the learned Executing Court determined the total liability at ₹89,69,780.03 (WP 227 836/25) . Out of this, the award-debtor SECL has deposited 44,45,069.85 ₹ on 15.02.2025, leaving a balance of 15 ₹45,24,710.18 . The Executing Court, vide its order dated 30.06.2025, further directed that this balance shall carry future interest at 18% per annum till realization. 11. The learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:- A. In the matter of Gayatri Balaswamy v. ISG Novasoft (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-38, 43 & 46 has held as under:- “38. This distinction lies at the heart of many arguments canvassed before us. The parties opposing the recognition a power of modification of the courts have strenuously contended that modification and setting aside are distinct and sugeneris powers. While modification involves altering specific parts of an award, setting aside does not alter the award but results in its annulment. Their primary concern is that recognizing a power of modification may invite judicial interference with the merits of the dispute—something arguably inconsistent with the framework of the 1996 Act. 43.Equally, Section 34 limits recourse to courts to an application for setting aside the award. However, Section 34 does not restrict the range of reliefs that the Court can grant, while remaining within the contours of the statute. A different relief can be fashioned as long as it does not violate the guardrails of the power provided under Section 34. In other words, the power cannot contradict the essence or language of Section 34. The Court would not exercise appellate power, as envisaged by Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). 46. Mustill and Boyd have observed that an order varying an award is not equivalent to an appellate process. 30 The authors suggest that a modification order would only be appropriate where the modification, including any adjustment of costs, follows inevitably from the tribunal's determination of a question of law. 31 This 16 approach would be beneficial, as it would reduce costs and delays. The courts need not engage in any fact- finding exercise. By acknowledging the Court's power to modify awards, the judiciary is not rewriting the statute. We hold that the power of judicial review under Section 34, and the setting aside of an award, should be read as inherently including a limited power to modify the award within the confines of Section 34.” B. In the matter of Morgan Securities & Credits (P) Ltd v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 27 held as under:- “27.The purpose of granting post-award interest is to ensure that the award-debtor does not delay the payment of the award. With the proliferation of arbitration, issues involving both high and low financial implications are referred to arbitration. The arbitrator takes note of various factors such as the financial standing of the award-debtor and the circumstances of the parties in dispute before awarding interest. The discretion of the arbitrator can only be restricted by an express provision to that effect. Clause (a) subjects the exercise of discretion by the arbitrator on the grant of pre-award interest to the arbitral award. However, there is no provision in the Act which restricts the exercise of discretion to grant post-award interest by the arbitrator. The arbitrator must exercise the discretion in good faith, must take into account relevant and not irrelevant considerations, and must act reasonably and rationally taking cognizance of the surrounding circumstances.” C. In the matter of D. Khosla and Company v. Union of India (2024) 9 SCC 476, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 28 & 29 held as under:- “28. A plain reading of the aforesaid award and decree reveals that interest awarded under the award has been dissected into two parts. The first part relates to the pre-award period from the date of the completion of the work till the passing of the award whereas the second part is the post-award period commencing from the date of the award till the satisfaction of the award. In the first part, simple interest @ 12% p.a. has been awarded 17 on the "amount awarded" whereas in the second part, interest @ 15% p.a. has been awarded referring to the "amount awarded". The amount awarded in both the situations have to be the same and cannot be two distinct amounts. 29. The "amount awarded" refers to the principal amount of compensation awarded, that is, Rs 21,56,745. The award and the decree nowhere specifically contemplate for awarding 15% interest per annum on the amount awarded including the interest component i.e. the pre-award interest. This could not have been done even otherwise as there is no provision to that effect under the relevant statutes or the contract. No material has been placed before us or as a matter of fact before any court below to show that the terms and conditions of the contract contained any such provision.” 12. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the following judgments:- a. In the matter of Interstate Construction v. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd, 2025 SCC Online SC 1127, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 43 & 44 held as under:- “43. Finally, in S.A. Builders (supra), this Bench after a thorough analysis of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7) (b) of the 1996 Act came to the following conclusion: 38. Natural corollary to the above analysis would be that the ‘sum’ so awarded by the arbitral tribunal which may include interest from the date when the cause of action arose to the date of the award, would carry further interest of 18 percent from the date of the award to the date of payment unless the arbitral award otherwise directs (referring to the pre 23.10.2015 position). Thus, the legislative intent is that the awarded sum whether inclusive of interest or not, in case included, then from the date of cause of action to the date of award, would carry further interest from the date of the award to the date of payment. “ “44. It has been held that the sum awarded would mean the principal amount plus the interest awarded from the 18 date of cause of action up to the date of the award. The sum awarded in Section 31(7)(a) would mean principal amount plus the interest awarded. Thereafter, as per Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act, the sum (principal amount + interest) would carry further interest at the rate of 2 per cent higher than the current rate of interest prevalent on the date of the award to the date of payment.” b. In the matter of Hyder Consulting(UK) v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “7. Thus, when used as a noun, as it seems to have been used in this provision, the word "sum" simply means "an amount of money"; whatever it may include "principal" and "interest" or one of the two. Once the meaning of the word "sum" is clear, the same meaning must be ascribed to the word in clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, where it provides that a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award "shall ….. carry interest..." from the date of the award to the date of the payment i.e. post-award. In other words, what clause (b) of subsection (7) of Section 31 of the Act directs is that the "sum", which is directed to be paid by the award, whether inclusive or exclusive of interest, shall carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum for the post-award period, unless otherwise ordered.” “9. The purpose of enacting this provision is clear, namely, to encourage early payment of the awarded sum and to discourage the usual delay, which accompanies the execution of the award in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court vide Section 36 of the Act.” “10. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the interest, the sum directed to be paid by the arbitral award under clause (b) of subsection (7) of Section 31 of the Act is inclusive of interest pendente lite.” “11. At this juncture, it may be useful to refer to Section 34 CPC, also enacted by Parliament and conferring the same power upon a court to award interest on an award i.e. post-award interest. While enacting Section 34 CPC Parliament conferred power on a court to order interest "on the principal sum adjudged" and not on merely the 19 "sum" as provided in the Arbitration Act. The departure from the language of Section 34 CPC in Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act is significant and shows the intention of Parliament.” “13. Thus, it is apparent that vide clause (a) of sub- section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, Parliament intended that an award for payment of money may be inclusive of interest, and the "sum" of the principal amount plus interest may be directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal for the pre-award period. Thereupon, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct interest to be paid on such "sum" for the post-award period vide clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, at which stage the amount would be the sum arrived at after the merging of interest with the principal; the two components having lost their separate identities.” “31. Coming now to the post-award interest, Section 31(7)(b) of the Act employs the words, "A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award...". Clause (b) uses the words "arbitral award" and not the "Arbitral Tribunal". The arbitral award, as held above, is made in respect of a "sum" which includes the interest. It is, therefore, obvious that what carries under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act is the "sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award" and not any other amount much less by or under the name "interest". In such situation, it cannot be said that what is being granted under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act is "interest on interest". Interest under clause (b) is granted on the "sum" directed to be paid by an arbitral award wherein the "sum" is nothing more than what is arrived at under clause (a).” c. In the matter of Gayatri Balaswamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (2025) 7 SCC 1 , the relevant paras are reproduced as under:- "1. Sanjiv Khanna, C.J. (for himself, Gavai, Sanjay Kumar and Masih, JJ.; Viswanathan, J. partly dissenting and partly concurring)- A three-Judge Bench of this Court, vide order dated 20-2-2024, directed that the special leave petitions in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft 20 Technologies Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1681], be placed before the Chief Justice of India for an appropriate order. The matter was to be examined to determine the need to refer the following questions of law to a larger Bench: (SCC OnLine SC para 3) "3. '1. Whether the powers of the Court under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will include the power to modify an arbitral award? 2. If the power to modify the award is available, whether such power can be exercised only where the award is severable, and a part thereof can be modified? 3. Whether the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act, being a larger power, will include the power to modify an arbitral award and if so, to what extent? 4. Whether the power to modify an award can be read into the power to set aside an award under Section 34 of the Act? 5. Whether the judgment of this Court in NHAI v. M. Hakeem [NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1: (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 437), followed in Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India [Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India, (2023) 15 SCC 472], and S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka [S.V. Samudram v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 623: (2024) 2 SCC (Civ) 291], lay down the correct law, as other Benches of two Judges [in Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. [Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd., (2019) 11 SCC 465: (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 724], Oriental Structural Engineers (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala 21 (Oriental Structural Engineers (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2021) 6 SCC 150: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 548], and M.P. Power Generation Co. Ltd. v. ANSALDO Energia SpA [M.P. Power Generation Co. Ltd. v. ANSALDO Energia SpA, (2018) 16 SCC 661: (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 662]] and three Judges (in J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd. [J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 444: (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 582), Tata Hydro-Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [Tata Hydro- Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 172] and Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger Cyprus Investment No. 3 Ltd. [Shakti Nath v. Alpha Tiger Cyprus Investment No. 3 Ltd., (2020) 11 SCC 685]) of this Court have either modified or accepted modification of the arbitral awards under consideration?’" "87. Accordingly, the questions of law referred to by Gayatri Balasamy [Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1681] are answered by stating that the Court has a limited power under Sections 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act to modify the arbitral award. This limited power may be exercised under the following circumstances: 87.1. When the award is severable, by severing the "invalid" portion from the "valid" portion of the award, as held in Part II of our Analysis; 87.2. By correcting any clerical, computational or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record, as held in Parts IV and V of our Analysis 87.3. Post-award interest may be modified in some circumstances as held in Part IX of our Analysis; and/or 22 87.4. Article 142 of the Constitution applies, albeit, the power must be exercised with great care and caution and within the limits of the constitutional power as outlined in Part XII of our Analysis." "70. Based on the above discussion, the argument that several countries like Singapore, Kenya, and the United Kingdom (Annexure B)-though originally following the Model Law-now allow courts to modify an award in limited cases, while the 1996 Act does not, is only linguistically correct. However, it is not convincing jurisprudentially or in principle. The limited power under Section 34 allows the Court to vary or modify the award. The effect thereof is that the award would be read as modified by the judgment/order." 13. In the present batch of cases, the arbitral award dated 15.04.2014 was modified by the learned Commercial Court on 09.03.2017 & 30.03.2017 and thereafter by Division Bench of High Court on 06.07.2018, and such modifications have attained finality after affirmation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 19.04.2024. 14. In the matter of Gayatri Balasamy (supra), a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred the issue to a larger Bench to finally settle whether the power of modification is available under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that though Section 34 of the Act, 1996 does not expressly empower courts to modify or vary an arbitral award, yet such authority exists in a limited contract as an inherent judicial power. It is held that whether an arbitral award contains portions that are invalid or beyond the scope of arbitration, Courts are empower to severe the offending portion and uphold the remainder of the award. It is also held 23 that in absence of limited power to modify the arbitral award the Courts will be compelled to set aside such awards in its entirety thereby necessitating fresh arbitration proceedings and incurring additional cost. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the power may be exercised only to rectify clear and obvious errors, including computational error, clerical or typographical error or any other error apparent on face of the award. It is also observed that where the modification is sought is straightforward, an error is apparent on the face on record, the Court may itself carry out the necessary corrections. However, if the issue is complex and not amenable to simple correction, then the award should be remitted back to the tribunal. The Court also opined that these powers extend equally to an appellate court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also touched the issue with regard to award of interest under Section 37(1)b of the Act, 1996. The courts have authority to modify post award interest granted under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration Act in cases where the award is silent towards the interest amount. Thus, it is manifest from the judgment in the matter of Gayatri Balasami (supra) that the Courts may alter or modify the clerical, computational or typographical mistakes, if they are on face of award. The interest part awarded according to the provisions of Section 37(7)b can be declared and modified. 15. In the present case, the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator was affirmed by the Commercial Court in a proceeding under Section 34 of the Act and by the High Court in appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. The SLP preferred by the petitioner was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus, the original award passed by the Arbitrator got merged with the orders passed by the Commercial Court, High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, there is no scope to interfere 24 with the findings recorded in the award. With regard to the interest part, awarded by the learned Executing Court, it has been computed by the learned Executing Court pursuant to the award passed by the Arbitrator, award passed by the commercial Court and subsequent in appeal by the High Court and there is no apparent error in computation, therefore, the petitioner cannot get the benefit of the judgment passed in the matter of Gayatri Balasami (supra). 16. In the matter of Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is only in circumstances where the arbitrator does not award post award interest that the mandate of Section 37(1)(b) of the Act will apply. The judgment in Hyder Consulting (supra), did not restrict discretion of the arbitrator to award post award interest on part of the sum (i.e., just the principal amount) merely because it held that interest may be awarded on the principal sum and pre award interest. The Court also held that phrase ‘unless the award otherwise directs’ in Section 31(7)(b) only qualifies the rate of interest. 17. In the matter of D. Khosla (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in first part of award simple interest at the rate of 12 % per annum was awarded on award amount, whereas, in the second part, interest @ 15 % per annum was awarded on the said amount. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the amount awarded in both the situations has to be the same and cannot be two distinct amounts. 18. In the present case, the sole Arbitrator awarded post-award interest @ 18% per annum; the learned Commercial Court awarded interest @ 12% per annum on the awarded sums of 1,75,843.73/- (in WP227 No. ₹ 836 of 2025) and 46,75 ₹ ,142.56 (in WP227 No. 833 of 2025) as pendente lite interest, and said order was affirmed in appeal. The High Court awarded pendent-lite interest @ 17.25% per annum on Rs. 7,45,621.96 and the 25 orders passed by the learned Commercial Court and High Court have been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, the issue raised is not available to the petitioner. 19. In the matter of Interstate Construction (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Arbitral Tribunal can exclude a period from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date on which the award is made for the purpose of grant of interest. It can grant interest for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date on which the award is made. There can be one rate of interest for the whole period or one or more rates of interest for the sub-divided periods. The sum awarded in Section 31(7)(a) of Arbitration Act would mean principal amount plus the interest awarded. 20. In the matter of Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the word “sum” simply means a particular amount of money. It may include “principal” and “interest. The term “sum”, used in Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, includes interest directed to be paid by an arbitral award. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that the clause (b) of Section 37(1) of the Act, 1996, directs as with ‘sum’ which is directed to be paid by the award shall carry interest whether exclusive or inclusive, shall carry interest @ 8% per annum for the post award period, unless otherwise ordered. It is also held that the sum directed to be paid by the arbitratral award is an inclusive pendente lite. 21. In the light of the judgment passed in the judgments of Interstate Construction (supra) & Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. (supra), it is quite apparent that the post award interest shall be computed on the consolidated sum, including pre reference and post award pendente lite and contention in this regard raised on behalf of SECL is squarely answered against the SECL in the above quoted decisions. 26 22. In view of above discussed binding precedents, the plea of SECL that post-award interest can run only on the principal sum is misconceived. As the learned Executing Court has acted strictly in accordance with the statutory framework and in conformity with the mandate of Section 31(7)(b) of the Act, 1996. the learned Executing Court has complied with the award, and order passed by the High Court in appeal. 23. In the present case, the award and subsequent modifications have attained finality, the only task before the Executing Court was to compute the decretal liability in terms of the award. 24. With regard to the factual matrix, in WP227 No.833 of 2025, the Executing Court has correctly determined the outstanding liability of SECL to the tune of 44,72,214.26 as on 30.11.2024, carrying further ₹ interest at 18% per annum till realization. Similarly, in WP227 No.836 of 2025, the Executing Court has rightly computed the balance payable to the tune of 45,24,710.18 as on 15.02.2025, with further interest at 18% ₹ per annum. The calculations are based upon the directions contained in the original award as modified by competent courts, and thus, there are no infirmity or mistake on the order impugned. 25. Accordingly, both these petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be and are hereby dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim