APHC010162512025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH Thursday, the thirtieth day of October two thousand and twenty five The Honourable Civil Revision Petition Between: E. Jayasree Gopal and G. Venkata Ranga Reddy Counsel for the petitioner: 1. Y. Balaji Counsel for the respondent: 1. K.Sita Ram The Court made the following: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) the thirtieth day of October two thousand and twenty five Present The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi Civil Revision Petition No.1082 of 2025 Venkata Ranga Reddy ... etitioner: espondent: The Court made the following: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3311] the thirtieth day of October two thousand and twenty five Bhanumathi ...Petitioner ...Respondent 2 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 ORDER: The Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India against the order dated 25.02.2025, dismissing the I.A.No.87 of 2025 in O.S.No.557 of 2014 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kurnool, filed under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C., r/w Rule 28 of the Civil Rules of Practice to permit the petitioner / plaintiff to amend the plaint. 2. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is as follows: a. The plaintiff instituted the suit for the relief of permanent injunction against the respondent / defendant. The plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property vide registered sale deed bearing No.787/2007, dated 29.11.2007, took its possession and has been enjoying the same without any interruption from anybody. As the things stood thus, on 01.09.2014, the defendant and his followers tried to enter into the schedule property to grab the schedule property. The plaintiff initially obtained an ex parte decree on 13.02.2015. Thereafter, the defendant filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. It was dismissed. The appeal filed by the defendant was allowed setting aside the ex parte decree, dated 13.02.2015. The defendant filed written statement and set up a title in himself claiming that he purchased the site in plot Nos.8 & 9 from Bheemisetty Venu Gopal under a registered sale deed, dated 19.05.2009 vide document No.2275/2009. The defendant also claimed that he had also purchased the site in plot Nos.18 & 19, which were purchased by the husband of the plaintiff, from Bheemisetty Ravindranath on 19.05.2009. Thus, the defendant claims that he purchased the site in plots Nos.8, 9, 18 & 19. In fact, these plots were in the possession of the plaintiff and her husband as they have jointly constructed a compound wall and a room. 3 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 b. The defendant illegally constructed a structure during the existence of the ex parte decree. As the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff and also forcefully took possession of the schedule land in her absence, the plaintiff is left with no other option except to seek declaration of title and consequential delivery of possession. Under these circumstances, there is necessity to amend the plaint. The proposed amendment is not against the averments in the plaint seeking permanent injunction and further, it prevents multiplicity of proceedings. Further, no prejudice would be caused to the defendant if the plaint is amended for the relief of declaration and possession along with the relief of permanent injunction. 3. The respondent / defendant filed counter opposing the petition and contending as follows: The plaintiff filed the suit by suppressing the true facts and misleading the Court. In fact, the defendant did not receive the suit summons. Through substituted service by way of paper publication, the defendant was set ex parte. The defendnat had no knowledge of the paper publication. Thus, an ex parte decree came to be passed on 13.02.2015. Thereafter, the defendant filed written statement along with the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C. The defendant and his predecessors in title have purchased the plaint schedule properties, i.e., plot Nos.8 & 9 and also plot Nos.18 & 19 before the vendors of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and her vendors have no title, possession and enjoyment of the plaint scheduel property as on the date of the filing of the suit. The defendant constructed a building in the property and a compound wall around the four plots and has been paying the property tax. The proposed amendment seeking declaration of title and possession is barred by limitation and will change the nature of the suit. 4 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 Such amendment is not permissible. The proposed amendment, if allowed relates back to the date of institution of the suit and hence, the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction exceeds the jurisdiction of the Court. The present petition is only to drag on the proceedings. There are no grounds to amend the plaint. The petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. The proposed amendments and the consequential amendments sought read as follows: 1. Add the following as Para No.5A, 5B & 5 C after para No.5: “5A. It is submitted that, originally, the plaint schedule property which includes two plots was initially an agricultural land, having an extent of Ac.2.85 Cents, which was purchased through a registered sale deed by one Dada Saheb on 20.04.1939 vide regd. Doc.No.603/1939 for valid consideration from Abdul Kareem Saheb. It is further submitted that Sali Bee, has acquired the land in Sy.No.661/B with an extent of Ac.2.85 cents under relinquishment Deed, dt.07.04.1979 from (1) Allabaksh Miah (through first wife of Dada Saheb), (2) Chinna Allabaksh Miah, 93) Miah Sab, 94) Gouse Miah, (5) Mahaboob Basha, (6) Bakshan Bee, (2 to 6 are through second wife of Dade Saheb). It is submitted that above extent of Ac.2.85 cents in Sy.No.661/B is divided into house plots and Sali Bee has sold the house plots to various persons. It is further submitted that, my vendor one 5 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 C.Rajasekhar Reddy has purchased the plot Nos.8 & 9 on 04.10.2007 from Smt. S.Sali Bi and S.Daba Basha vide regd. Sale deed doc.No.75/2007, dt.04.10.2007 and she was in possession and enjoyment. Plaintiff have purchased the plaint schedule property, which is plot Nos.8 & 9 from C.Rajasekhar Reddy on 29.11.2007 vide Regd. Sale deed doc.No.787/2007 of SRO, Kalluru and since the date of purchase, the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment. At the time of purchase, plaintiff has taken precaution of examining the encumbrance and SRO, Kalluru has issued nil encumbrance pertaining to the plaint schedule property. Thereafter, plaintiff has also paid vacant land tax on 10.07.2015 and thereafter, plaintiff and her husband have put up a compound wall around plots 8 & 9 of the plaintiff and plots 18 & 19 of her husband. A room was also constructed. It is submitted that, the defendant and his predecessors in title have fabricated the sale deeds, as if Sali Bee has executed the plaint schedule property in their favour. The sale deed in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri vide regd. Sale deed No.4431/1979, dt.23.11.1979, the rectification deed vide doc.no.5788/1984, dt.27.08.1984 in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri and the sale deed 5982/1984, dt.05.09.1984 in the name of Bheemisetty Venu Gopal and subsequent sale in favour of the defendant vide regd. Sale deed 6 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 doc.No.2275/2009 dt.19.05.2020 are void documents and are not binding on the plaintiff.” 5B. It is submitted that, the plaintiff has obtained ex parte decree against the defendant and subsequently, the defendant came on to the property illegally and forcefully occupied the same with the help of political leaders and plaintiff have learnt that, one of the local political leader himself has attended the ground breaking ceremony of the defendant for the structure erected by him.” 5C. It is submitted that the defendant, having succeeded in creating registered documents as submitted above, though he has no right whatsoever. Hence, in order to remove the cloud on the title of the plaintiff to the plaint schedule property, and in order to recover their possession, the plaintiff is constrained to file this suit for declaration of her title and for delivery of possession by holding that (1) The sale deed in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri vide regd. Sale deed no.4431/1979, dt.23.11.1979, (2) the rectification deed vide doc.no.5788/1984, dt.27.08.1984 in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri and the (3) sale deed 5982/1984, dt.05.09.1984 in the name of Bheemisetty Venu Gopal and (4) subsequent sale in favour of the defendant vide regd. Sale deed doc.no.2275/2009, dt.19.05.2009, as not binding, and consequential permanent injunction restraining 7 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 the defendant, his men and agents from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.” 2. Add the following in Para No.8 as continuation. “It is further submitted that, cause of action for the suit arose in the year 1939 when Dada Saheb purchased an extent of ac.2.59 cents in Sy.No.661B of Kalluru village and in the year 1979 when a relinquishment deed was executed in favour of Sali Bi and in the year 2007 when Rajasekhar Reddy purchased the plaint schedule property and in the same year when plaintiff purchased plot Nos.8 & 9 and on all dates when plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment and on all dates when defendant tried to trespass and illegally occupied during the period when an ex parte decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff and on all dates when defendant and his predecessors have created documents to create cloud over the plaint schedule property and continues to date.” 3. Add the following at Para No.10 by replacing the existing Para No.10. “a) for the relief of declaration of title by holding that (1) Sale deed vide regd. Sale deed No.4431/1979, dt.23.11.1979 (2) Rectification deed vide doc.No.5788/1984, dt.27.08.1984 (3) Sale deed 5982/1984, dt.05.09.1984 and 8 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 (4) Regd. Sale deed doc.no.2275/2009 dt.19.05.2009 as to the plaint schedule property are not binding on plaintiff and delivery of possession and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men or anybody on his behalf from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property valued at: (i) Market value of plot No. 8 is: Rs.21,99,960/- ¾ of it : Rs.16,49,970/- C.F payable thereon u/S 24(b) of: Rs. 18, 547/- APCF & SV Act (ii) Market value of plot No. 9 is: Rs.21,99,960/- ¾ of it : Rs.16,49,970/- C.F payable thereon u/S 24(b) of : Rs. 18, 547/- APCF & SV Act (b) For mandatory injunction for demolition of the existing structure on the plaint schedule property : Rs. 10,000/- C.F payable thereon u/S 26(c) of : Rs. 786/- APCF & SV Act The value of the suit for the purpose of Court Fees and Jurisdiction is Rs.33,09,940/- (i.e., Rs.32,99,940/- + Rs.10,000/-) and a Court Fees of Rs.37,880/- (i.e., Rs.18,547/- + Rs.18, 547/- + Rs.786/- ) is paid under Sections 24(b) and 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act.” 9 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 4. Add the following at prayer by replacing the existing prayer: It is, therefore, prayed that the Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff and as against the defendant: (a) For the relief of declaration declaring the plaintiff as absolute owner of the plaint schedule property, by holding, registered documents of defendants, viz., (1) The sale deed in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri vide regd. Sale deed no.4431/1979, dt.23.11.1979, (2) The rectification deed vide doc.no.5788/1984 dt.27.08.1984 in favour of Syed Ali Akbar Basha Khadri (3) Sale deed 5982/1984, dt.05.09.1984 in the name of Bheemisetty Venu Gopal and (4) Subsequent sale in favour of the defendant vide regd. Sale deed doc.no.2275/2009, dt.19.05.2009 as not binding on plaintiff. (b) Directing the defendant to deliver possession of the plaint schedule property within the time to be granted by the Hon’ble Court failing which to permit the plaintiff to obtain possession through Court process; (c) For mandatory injunction for demolition of the structure constructed by the defendants on the plaint schedule property, failing which permit the plaintiff to do the same through process of the court within the time granted, Alternatively 10 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 The plaintiff alternatively prays for valuation of the structures constructed by the defendant by authorized valuer of the properties appointed by the Hon’ble Court, and for consequential directions for set off of the value of the structures from damages that would be awarded, (d) For costs of the suit; and (e) For such other relief as the Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 5. Add the following documents to existing list of documents: Sl. No Date Document Remarks 1. 09.11.2024 Market value Certificate for Plot No.8 Original 2. 09.11.2024 Market value Certificate for Plot No.9 Original 3. 28.09.2007 Encumbrance certificate Original 4. 23.10.2007 Encumbrance certificate Original 5. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition was filed by the plaintiff / petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the petition has been erroneously dismissed on the ground of limitation under the view that the period is only three (3) years for seeking the relief of declaration, whereas in case of a suit seeking reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, it can be filed within twelve (12) years from dispossession, and therefore, in the present case, since the petition for amendment to seek both the reliefs was filed within twelve (12) years after the institution of the suit and according to the plaintiff, the dispossession is only after filing of the suit, mere non- mentioning the date of dispossession does not debar the amendment of the reliefs on the ground of limitation. 11 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 7. Insofar as the other ground stated by the trial Court that delivery of possession and perpetual injunction cannot be simultaneously asked, he submitted that the relief of perpetual injunction would operate only after delivery of possession and therefore, at the stage of permitting the plaintiff to seek both the reliefs, it cannot be objected and in case if it cannot be granted, it can be decided at the time of final adjudication. 8. Insofar as the observation of the trial Court that the plaintiff ought to have asked for demolition of the structure in the suit property and delivery of vacant possession instead of mandatory injunction, he submitted that it is not the stage to decide what kind of relief the plaintiff is entitled to and it is only an application to amend the plaint. It is also submitted by him that the nature of the suit would not be altered as the basic facts pleaded regarding the title remain the same. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and Another1, wherein it was held at paragraphs Nos.9 to 11 as follows: “9. Order 6 Rule 17 CPC confers jurisdiction on the court to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as may be just. Such amendments as are directed towards putting forth and seeking determination of the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be permitted to be made. The question of delay in moving an application for amendment should be decided not by calculating the period from the date of institution of the suit alone but by reference to the stage to which the 1 (2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 559 = 2002 Law Suit (SC) 881 12 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 hearing in the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments are allowed more liberally than those which are sought to be made after the commencement of the trial or after conclusion thereof. In the former case generally it can be assumed that the defendant is not prejudiced because he will have full opportunity of meeting the case of the plaintiff as amended. In the latter cases the question of prejudice to the opposite party may arise and that shall have to be answered by reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for amendment. 10. An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation-back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date on which the application seeking the amendment was filed. (See observations in Siddalingamma & Another v. Mamtha Shenoy [(2001) 8 SCC 561] . 11. In the present case the amendment is being sought for almost 11 years after the date of the institution of the suit. The plaintiff is not debarred from instituting a new suit seeking relief of declaration of title and recovery of 13 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 possession on the same basic facts as are pleaded in the plaint seeking relief of issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction and which is pending. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits it would be a sound exercise of discretion to permit the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession being sought for in the pending suit. The plaintiff has alleged the cause of action for the reliefs now sought to be added as having arisen to him during the pendency of the suit. The merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment. However, the defendant is right in submitting that if he has already perfected his title by way of adverse possession then the right so accrued should not be allowed to be defeated by permitting an amendment and seeking a new relief which would relate back to the date of the suit and thereby depriving the defendant of the advantage accrued to him by lapse of time, by excluding a period of about 11 years in calculating the period of prescriptive title claimed to have been earned by the defendant. The interest of the defendant can be protected by directing that so far as the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, now sought for, are concerned the prayer in that regard shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the application for amendment has been filed.” 14 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 9. In Mallavva and Another Vs. Kalsammanavara Kalamma (since dead) by legal heirs & others2, it was held at paragraphs Nos.31 & 32 as follows: “31. It is well settled that when there are several reliefs claimed in a suit, the limitation period would be that of the main relief, the limitation for ancillary relief being ignored. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants herein is not sustainable in law as it proceeds on the assumption as if old Article 142 of the earlier Limitation Act was in force wherein the plaintiff who based his case on title had to prove not only title but also possession within twelve years of the date of the suit. The said provision of law as observed aforesaid has undergone a metaphoric sea change as we find under the Limitation Act. Article 65 reads as under: “Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 65. For possession of Twelve When the possession immovable property years of the defendant becomes or any interest therein adverse to the plaintiff” based on title It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non- suited.[See: Indira Vs. Arumugam and Another reported in [(1998) 1 SCC 614]. 2 2024 INSC 1021 15 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 32. In C.Mohammad Yunus Vs. Syed Unnissa reported in AIR 1961 SC 808, it has been laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and ther would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.” 10. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the trial Court rightly dismissed the petition and placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Basavaraj Vs. Indira and others3, wherein it was held at paragraphs Nos.10 to 12 as follows: “10. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17CPC provides that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In the case in hand, this is not even the pleaded case of Respondents 1 and 2 before the trial court in the application for amendment that due diligence was there at the time of filing of the suit in not seeking relief prayed for by way of amendment. All what was pleaded was 3 (2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 705 16 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 oversight. The same cannot be accepted as a ground to allow any amendment in the pleadings at the fag end of the trial especially when admittedly the facts were in knowledge of Respondents 1 and 2-plaintiffs. 11. The relevant paragraphs of the application seeking amendment of the plaint are reproduced hereunder: “2. That, due to oversight and by mistake the plaintiff was unable to sought relief declaration of decree as null and void and unable to pay required court fee some unavoidable circumstances and the proposed amendment is very essential for deciding the matter in dispute. 3.*** 4. That, if the proposed amendment is allowed no prejudice will be cause to the other side, on the other hand if it is not allowed then the deponent will be put to great loss and will also leads multiplicity of litigations. Hence it is just and proper to allow the proposed amendment to meet the ends of justice.” (sic) 12. This Court in M. Revanna v. Anjanamma [M. Revanna v. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 338] opined that an application for amendment may be rejected if it seeks to introduce totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the suit. Order 6 Rule 17CPC prevents an application for amendment after the trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that despite due diligence the party could not 17 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 have raised the issue. The burden is on the party seeking amendment after commencement of trial to show that in spite of due diligence such amendment could not be sought earlier. It is not a matter of right. Para 7 thereof is extracted below : (SCC p. 335) “7. Leave to amend may be refused if it introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case, or challenges the fundamental character of the suit. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17CPC virtually prevents an application for amendment of pleadings from being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. The proviso, to an extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Therefore, the burden is on the person who seeks an amendment after commencement of the trial to show that in spite of due diligence, such an amendment could not have been sought earlier. There cannot be any dispute that an amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and under all circumstances. Though normally amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court needs to take into consideration whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide and whether the amendment causes such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money.” 18 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 11. In Sayanna and another Vs. Thimanna and another4, it was held at paragraph No.8 as follows: “8. In T.L. Muddukrishna v. Lalitha Ramchandra Rao, (1997) 2 SCC 611], the Supreme Court again dealt with the question of limitation where an application for amendment of plaint was filed and held: ………… it must be held that for the purpose of limitation, what is material is that the limitation begins to nut from the date the parties have stipulated for performance of the contract. The suit is required to be filed within three years from the date fixed by the parties under the contract. Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of three years, certainly it changed the cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. The suit for mandatory injunction is filed and the specific performance was sought for by way of amendment. The cause of action is required to be stated initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded. It was sought to be amended, along with an application for specific performance which, as stated earlier, was rejected. Under these circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, November 5, 1992, the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to permit the amendment of the plaint.” 4 2002 (5) ALD 419 19 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 12. In Faqir Chand (through L.Rs.) Vs. Lila Ram (through L.Rs.)5, it was held at paragraph No.17 as follows: “17. Although the question of limitation in the present case is of only now academic importance yet as the point has been argued in detail I would like to express my view on the said point as well. It is true that in the written statement no plea has been taken that the cause of action in respect of seeking relief of mandatory injunction stood time barred. It appears that before framing the issues the court had chosen to record the statement of defendant-respondent in which he categorically stated that the said tin-shed was an old construction and had been in existence since the time of the partition of the property. No issues were framed by the learned trial court with regard to the point of limitation. However, in evidence not only the plaintiff-appellant but his witnesses also admitted that this tin-shed was in existence for more than three years before the filing of the suit. The first appellate court taking resort to Section 3 of the Limitation Act held that as the fact stands admitted by the plaintiff- appellant the court has no option but to examine the point of limitation which was a question of law necessarily arising from the admission of fact made by the plaintiff-appellant.” 13. In Challa Srinivasa Rao and another Vs. Challa Subbarao and others6, it was held at paragraphs Nos.11 to 15 as follows: 5 AIR 1994 Del 161 20 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 “11. One of the primary requirements for an individual to file a suit is the existence of cause of action. The phrase ‘cause of action’ is a compendious expression, which takes in its fold a bundle of facts that confer right upon an individual to institute the proceedings. There cannot be any definite connotation of this expression. This much, however, can be said that the plaintiff in a suit must state the facts that prompted him to file the suit. The cause of action, once ascertained, would constitute the starting point in the context of reckoning of limitation. It would also become relevant to examine whether any proceedings were instituted on an earlier occasion on the same cause of action and if so, whether the result thereof would operate as res judicata. These are a few consequences that follow from the cause of action and there are many other. The effort is only to emphasize the importance of cause of action, in civil proceedings. 12. In a suit for recovery of possession, it is fundamental that the plaintiff must state the factum of dispossession from the property. Though under the Limitation Act, 1908, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to state the date on which he was dispossessed, to know whether the suit was filed within limitation, such a requirement is not there under the Limitation Act, 1963. All the same, unless the plaintiff states that he has been dispossessed, as a matter of fact, the very basis for institution of the suit becomes shaky. 6 2012 (3) ALT 148 (S.B) 21 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 13. It may be true that the very fact that the relief of recovery of possession is prayed for would indicate that the plaintiff in such a suit is not in possession of the property. The necessity to state the manner in which he lost the possession becomes relevant for the purpose of assessing his right to recover. Take for instance, a case where an individual was dispossessed from a property in accordance with law, such as tenant having been evicted by landlord by instituting proceedings or the owner of a piece of land having been dispossessed as a consequence of acquisition. Though in these cases also, the individuals are dispossessed from the property, they cannot seek the relief of recovery, since the dispossession took place in accordance with law. It is only when a person is dispossessed in violation of law and in abrogation of rights of the plaintiff, that the occasion would arise for granting the relief of recovery of possession. In the instant case, the respondents did not state a word as to dispossession. On the other hand, at one place in the plaint, they stated that they are in possession of the property ever since 1982. In para pertaining to the cause of action, it is stated as under: “The cause of action for the suit arose on 30.4.1987 when Challa Nageswara Rao executed the gift deed in favour of the defendants without having any manner of right, title to and possession and on 24.9.1987. When the defendants have filed OS No. 1872 of 1987 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif, Vijayawada and on 5.7.1991 when the suit OS No. 1872 of 1987 was 22 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 dismissed with costs and when AS No. 20 of 1991 was filed on 18.7.199.1 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge's Court and the said appeal was dismissed on 25.9.2000, and SA No. 172 of 2001 was filed on the file of the A.P. High Court, Hyderabad and the said second appeal was dismissed on 13.4.2001 at the admission stage and subsequently at Atkuru Village, G. Konduru Mandal, Krishna District, within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court”. 14. The word ‘dispossession’ does not find place in this entire paragraph. Unless the respondents were dispossessed, there was no occasion for them to seek the relief of recovery of possession. A substantial question of law, namely “whether a suit for recovery of possession can be instituted without stating the factum of dispossession and whether such a suit can be decreed at all” arises for consideration. In view of the discussion undertaken above, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the appellants. 15. Hence, the second appeal is allowed. The decree passed by the trial Court and upheld by the lower appellate Court, is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.” 14. In the case on hand, when the suit was filed, the plaintiff claimed possession over the plaint schedule property and now claims dispossession pending the suit without referring to any specific date of dispossession. The fact whether the plaintiff was not in possession even as on the date of filing of the suit is yet to be decided. If the 23 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 contention of the plaintiff that dispossession took place pending the suit is considered, since twelve (12) years have not completed as on the date of filing of the petition for amendment, at this juncture, without going into the question whether in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, the period of limitation is twelve (12) years or three (3) years, it is premature to reject the relief of amendment on that ground, in view of various decisions cited by the petitioner noted above. As such, since it is a mixed question of fact and law regarding limitation in the present case, on that ground petition cannot be rejected. Depending on the facts pleaded, an issue shall be framed to answer the question of limitation, both in respect of fact of dispossession and also the period of limitation, and answered. 15. Insofar as the mandatory relief is concerned, the question of entitlement of such relief cannot be decided in the application for amendment and since it is not absolutely prohibited, it is not a ground to reject the amendment. This point is also to be examined by framing appropriate issue. Therefore, rejecting the amendment on this ground is erroneous in the present case. 16. Insofar as the reliefs of recovery of possession and permanent injunction simultaneously sought by the plaintiff are concerned, the amendment need not be rejected on this ground and if the plaintiff is granted the relief of delivery of possession, the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to further relief of permanent injunction to take effect in future can be examined. As such, dismissing the petition on this ground is also erroneous in the present case. 17. In any case, where a party files a suit for mere perpetual injunction and later on seeks amendment of the reliefs of declaration of 24 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 title and recovery of possession, there would be change in the nature of the reliefs, but it need not always be change in the nature of the case. Moreover, such amendments are not impermissible and on the other hand, such amendments can be allowed to resolve the disputes on merits. 18. It is contended by the respondent that the petitioner failed to state the date of dispossession and the said amendment is fatal to the case of the plaintiff. It is not the proper stage to adjudicate the said contention keeping in view the scope of enquiry in an application for amendment of the plaint with regard to the reliefs, along with amendment of the pleadings. The effect of non-mentioning of the date of dispossession is a process of adjudication of the merit in the suit and it shall be decided in the suit, but not in the present petition, in view of the other facts already pleaded and sought to be amended. 19. Therefore, the impugned order dismissing the petition seeking amendments in the present case is erroneous and needs to be set aside. However, in view of the inconvenience caused to the respondent by filing petition with some delay, while allowing the petition on terms, costs can be imposed against the petitioner. 20. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order, dated 25.02.2025, in I.A.No.87 of 2025 in O.S.No.557 of 2014. Consequently, I.A.No.87 of 2025 is allowed subject to the condition that the petitioner shall pay the respondent a sum of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which the petition shall stand dismissed without any further orders. 25 BSB, J C.R.P.No.1082 of 2025 There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. __________________ B.S.BHANUMATHI, J 30-10-2025 RSD / RAR