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2025 DAILYLAW 41101 (AP)

SRI KARTHIKEYA SECURITY SERVICES v. MC LEAN INDIA LIMITED

WA/964/2025 · 2025-12-17

Dhiraj Singh Thakur, R Raghunandan Rao

body2025

Judgment text

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APHC010462682025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI WRIT APPEAL NO: 964 of 2025 Bench Sr.No:- [3446] Sri Karthikeya Security Services ...Appellant Vs. Mc Lean India Limited and others ...Respondents ********** Advocate for Appellant: Mr. G. Vidya Sagar, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing vice Mr. Kalepu Yashwanth Advocates for Respondents: Mr. D. Srinivas, Ld. Advocate General, Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao appearing vice Mr. Javvaji Sarath Chandra, Mrs. S. Pranathi, Ld. Special GP, GP for Medical Health FW CORAM : THE CHIEF JUSTICE DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO Reserved on: 12th September, 2025. Pronounced on: 18th December, 2025. Uploaded on: 18th December, 2025. PER DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ: The present Writ Appeal has been preferred against judgment and order dated 18.08.2025, passed in Writ Petition No.21232 of 2025. 2. The petitioner/respondent No.1 had challenged the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee, which had declared the petitioner as disqualified in the tendering process, upon evaluation of the technical bid. 2 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 3. The learned Single Judge, by virtue of the judgment and order impugned, while allowing the writ petition, directed the official respondents to process the bid of the petitioner, in terms of the findings rendered by the Court. With a view to understand the background, in the light of which the present controversy has arisen, it is appropriate to refer to some material facts in brief: 4. Bids were invited from eligible entities for procuring sanitation related services by the Andhra Pradesh Medical Services and Infrastructure Development Corporation (APMSIDC) on behalf of the Director of Secondary Health, Andhra Pradesh. The bid process involved a two-bid system i.e. a technical bid and the financial bid. 5. Clause 6.1 prescribed the Eligibility Criteria, the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: Sl.No. Eligibility Documents Required 3. Required general past experience:- A) The minimum General past experience (Area of Sanitation Work) is that, the bidder should have provided sanitation services for total square feet area of 5,00,000 in any one year during the last 5 financial years i.e., 2019- 20 to 2023-24 with institutions/facilities ranging from IT Parks, Hospitals, Institutional buildings (Govt. or private), Shopping Malls and Residential buildings or any other infrastructure or public use such as Railway stations, stadiums etc. (Institution of more than 25,000 Sq.ft The bidder should provide the certificate/completion experience certificate including areas from the client along with the work orders. In respect of private works experience the bidder should submit the following documents as a proof: i) Experience certificate issued by the private agency. ii) Proof of contract agreement / Work Order 3 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 each only will be considered)either in single contract or multiple contracts in the same year, with the following for sanitation staff. iii) Proof of payments for the services iv) Proof of payment of GST for the respective contract agreement. B) The bidder should have adequate manpower and resources with good experience and training in the Sanitation Services (Housekeeping) and should have on role experiences have 241 of the total man power required in any one year (or continuous 12 months) during the last five calendar years/Financial years i.e 2019-20 to 2023-24. The bidder should submit a certificate for having employed the specified number for Sanitation Services (Housekeeping services) in any one year (or continuous 12 months) of the last five calendar years/Financial years i.e 2019-20 to 2023-24along with EPF & ESI challans should be furnished. 4. Required specific past experience in Hospitals The bidder should have experience of providing sanitation services for total bed strength of at least 1500 beds with each hospital should not be less than 100 beds in any one year during the last five financial years i.e., 2019-20 to 2023-24. Govt., Experience: experience The bidder should provide the certificate/completion certificate including beds from the client along with the work orders. Private Experience: In respect of private works experience the bidder should submit the following documents as a proof: Experience certificate issued by the private agency. Proof of contract agreement Proof of payments for the services Proof of payment of GST for the respective contract agreement. 4 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 Clause 6.3(a) prescribed the conditions for evaluation of the technical bids based upon the criteria mentioned in the bid document and the documents furnished by the bidder in their technical bid. Clause 6.3(b) and (c) envisaged thus: “b) The bids will be initially examined to determine whether they are complete, whether required sureties have been furnished, whether the documents have been properly authenticated, and whether the bids are generally in order and without any material deviation, reservation or omission. A material deviation, reservation or omission is one that(i) if accepted would affect in any substantial way, the scope, quality or performance of the services specified in the contract (or) (ii) limit in any substantial way, inconsistent with the bidding document, the Purchaser's rights or the bidder's obligation under the contract (or) (ii) if rectified, would unfairly affect the competitive position of the other bidders presenting substantially responsive bid. c) If a bid is not substantially responsive to the requirements of the bidding document it shall be rejected by the purchaser and shall not subsequently be made responsive by the bidder by correction of the material deviation, reservation or omission.” Clause 6.14.3 envisaged that the bidders must upload the technical proposal in the proposed formats prescribed in the Annexures and further that failure to comply with the requirement would make the proposal liable to be rejected. Clause 6.15 envisaged seeking clarification from bidders as under: “6.15 Clarifications from bidder: 5 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 To facilitate evaluation of Proposals, the TIA may, at its sole discretion, seek clarifications from any Bidder regarding its Proposal. Such clarification(s) shall be provided within the time specified by the TIA for this purpose. Any request for clarification(s) and all clarification(s) in response thereto shall be in writing. If a Bidder does not provide clarifications sought under Sub- Clause mentioned above within the specified time, its Proposal shall be liable to be rejected. In case the Proposal is not rejected, the TIA may proceed to evaluate the Proposal by construing the particulars requiring clarification to the best of its understanding, and the Bidder shall be barred from subsequently questioning such interpretation of the TIA.” Clause 6.18(b) of the bid document, inter alia envisages that in case it is found during evaluation that one or more of the eligibility conditions have not been met by the bidder, the bidder would be disqualified forthwith, if not yet appointed as a Service Provider. 6. The petitioner considering itself eligible submitted its bid for two packages i.e. Package-V vide T.N.No.2-5/APMSIDC/Technical/2025-26 and Package-VI vide T.No.2-6/APMSIDC/Technical/2025-26, dated 22.05.2025. The technical bid of the petitioner was considered and not found responsive by the Tender Evaluation Committee and was held not to have qualified the technical bid on account of the following: i) Private hospital experience certificate (AIG, KIMS) are supported only by 26AS FY 2024-25, which is outside the required range (2019-23). 6 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 ii) Furnished form 16A for the period from December-2024 to April- 2025, but did not furnish for the period from April-2023 to March-2024. 7. The Technical Evaluation Committee, however, sent a mail to the petitioner to revert to it with objections, if any, on or before 31.07.2025. The petitioner is stated to have submitted its response to the mail in the form of clarification on 31.07.2025, wherein it claimed that it had provided the relevant documents reflecting experience for the period 2019-20 to 2023-24 as stipulated, as also GST receipts as proof of payment documentation from 2019-20 to 2023-24 and for subsequent years, 2024-25, on account of ongoing projects, it had submitted 16A. The petitioner also claimed that it had submitted from pages bearing number 1013 to 1192, the GST payment proof, for the period from 2021-22 to 2023-24, confirming the receipt of payment from AIG Hospital, Hyderabad and KIMS, Hyderabad. Not only this, in order to provide more clarity, the petitioner claimed that it was submitting supporting documents for GST received from the clients, reflected in the GST portal, and provided screenshots from the GST portal as there was no scope to download from the GST portal, the said documents. The petitioner also claimed that it had furnished the latest Form 16A issued by the clients for the year 2024-25 as also the agreements with AIG Hospital and KIMS Hospital, starting from 2019 till 2025. 7 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 8. The case of the petitioner was that notwithstanding the clarification so submitted by the petitioner and without considering the same, the Technical Evaluation Committee rejected the technical bid of the petitioner with a status „not qualified‟ 9. Being aggrieved of the rejection of the technical bid of the petitioner, Writ Petition bearing Number 21232 of 2025 was filed, which was allowed by virtue of judgment and order impugned. 10. The learned Single Judge held that, the very fact that the official respondents had communicated to the petitioner the shortcomings meant that, it gave to the petitioner an opportunity to attend to such deficiencies by treating the bids of the petitioner as substantially responsive. The learned Single Judge also held that the documents which were furnished with the explanation/objections were not submitted to introduce new documents much less could have led to materially giving any undue and unfair advantage to the writ petitioner. This, the learned Single Judge connected with the fact that it was only because the bid of the petitioner was substantially responsive, that the petitioner was informed to file objections, with a view to enable the rectification of the deficiencies by filing its objections, on or before 31.07.2025. The learned Single Judge also held that minor mistakes occurring in the bidding process, which are unintentional and had not substantially alter the material supplied by the bidder, at the inception, would not give any undue 8 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 advantage to such a bidder and should be permitted to submit the supporting documents. Reference in this regard was made to ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others1. Reliance was also placed upon the Apex Court judgment in Rashmi Metaliks Limited and another v. Kolkata Development Authority and others2. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr. G. Vidya Sagar, would urge that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge was unsustainable, inasmuch as the technical bid submitted by the petitioner had failed to be declared as responsive and that the opportunity given to the bidder to file objections could not be treated as an opportunity granted to the bidder to fill up the lacunae. The Tender Evaluation Committee, it was urged, having clearly noticed the shortfall in the submission of the technical bid, was not required to do anything more, and that even if the decision impugned, recorded by the Tender Evaluation Committee, dated 31.07.2025, was materially the same as the one which was notified for objections on the official website on 30.07.2025, would make no difference at all. 12. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. B. Adinarayana Rao, appearing for respondent No.1/petitioner, would urge that the decision to disqualify the technical bid of the petitioner was unsustainable, inasmuch as the petitioner 1(2025) 6 SCC 813 2(2013) 10 SCC 95 9 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 had submitted all the documents, which would clearly go to prove that payment has been received for services rendered during the relevant period to AIG Hospital, Hyderabad and KIMS, Hyderabad. It is stated that what was submitted by way of clarification to the respondents, post the invitation of objections, was additional material, only to support and buttress what was already placed on record, and therefore, it was suggested that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge would not be said to be in any manner unsustainable in law. 13. Learned Advocate General, Mr. D. Srinivas, appearing for the official respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the documents reflecting the payment receipts on account of Goods and Services Tax did not reflect the name of the entity availing the services of the petitioner at all, and that it was not incumbent upon the Tender Evaluation Committee to track the payment status on the GST website to ascertain whether such payments were, in fact, made for the services rendered by the petitioner of the nature required under the tender or otherwise. 14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. At the very outset, we are of the opinion that reliance placed by the learned Single Judge upon the aforementioned two judgments was wholly inapt and that they do not apply at all to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 In the case of ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd (supra), bids were invited for design and construction of a project that was estimated at a cost of Rs.1504.64 Crores. The appellant therein furnished a Bank Guarantee of Rs.15,04,64,000/-. However, when the financial bid was opened, appellant was ranked as L-1 bidder with bid price of Rs.1569/- only. According to the appellant, they had quoted a bid price of Rs.1569 Crores, however, due to a system error, the quoted amount appeared only as Rs.1569/- Although the mistake was held to be bald faced, the BRO insisted on accepting the bid of Rs.1569/- in spite of the letters from the ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd., wanting to withdraw from the said tendering process. A prayer was made that the Bank Guarantee of Rs.15,04,64,000/- be returned without any encashment. Unmoved, the BRO informed the appellant before the Apex Court that it had been declared a defaulter and that the bid security was to be forfeited and the Bank was directed to encash the Bank Guarantee and with a further direction to remit the amount to the BRO. It was in those circumstances that the Apex Court held that if a mistake was intentional, it ceased to be a mistake, but if it was unintentional, it may be unilateral or mutual. It was held that both have varied consequences in law. What was held by the Apex Court in paragraph 16 is reproduced herein below and this is what was in fact relied upon by the learned Single Judge in the judgment and order impugned. 11 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 “16. A mistake may be unilateral or mutual, but it is always unintentional. If it is intentional, it ceases to be a mistake.Mistakes or errors, though avoidable, are committed inadvertently. They have varied consequences in law. As per Section 20 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter "the Contract Act") whereby both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to matter of fact essential to an agreement, the agreement is void. The Explanation to Section 20 says that an erroneous opinion as to the value of the thing which forms the subject-matter of an agreement is not deemed to be a mistake as a matter of fact.” It was in the aforementioned circumstances that the Apex Court in ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. while agreeing that the appellant was at fault and had made a mistake, directed the appellant to pay Rupees One Crore to BRO as a consequence of their error. 15. Reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Rashmi Metaliks Limited and another(supra) also, in our opinion, is inapt, for the reason that the Apex Court in the case supra held that the requirement of filing the latest income tax returns, in the bid document, was a collateral term and that an income return would have assumed the character of an essential term, only if one of the qualifications prescribed was either the gross income or the net income, on which tax was attracted, which was a feature which Apex Court held was absent in that particular case. 12 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 16. The scope and extent of judicial review in contractual matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is no longer res integra. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd.,3 it was held that even if some defect was found in the decision making process the Court ought to exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with caution and to exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court emphasized that it is the larger public interest in mind to decide as to whether intervention was called or not. In paragraph 7, it was held: “7. ...The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great 3 (2000) 2 SCC 617 13 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene.” In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa4, the Apex Court held that power of judicial review of administrative action in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, and bias mala fides. It was held that if a decision relating to award of contract was bona fide and in public interest, the Court in exercise of power of judicial review would not interfere even if there was a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The tests which were prescribed were the following: “22. …(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority was mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR whether the decision made was so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) whether public interest was affected.” 4 (2007) 14 SCC 517 14 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 The said principles of law were reiterated subsequently in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka5, as also by a three-judge bench of the Apex Court in Tata Motors Ltd. v. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST)6. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.,7 the Apex Court held that „a mere disagreement with the decision making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional Court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision.‟ The Apex Court further held thus: “15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. 5 (2012) 8 SCC 216 6 2023 SCC OnLine SC 671 7 (2016) 16 SCC 818 15 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 16. In the present appeals, although there does not appear to be any ambiguity or doubt about the interpretation given by NMRCL to the tender conditions, we are of the view that even if there was such an ambiguity or doubt, the High Court ought to have refrained from giving its own interpretation unless it had come to a clear conclusion that the interpretation given by NMRCL was perverse or mala fide or intended to favour one of the bidders. This was certainly not the case either before the High Court or before this Court.” 17. We are unable to uphold the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that communication of deficiencies to the writ petitioner on 30.07.2025 was only to rectify the deficiencies and that would be possible only after treating the bid of the petitioner as substantially responsive. This view, in our opinion, is not supported by the terms and conditions of the bid document and in particular Clause 6.3(e) where a bidder could be requested to provide requisite information or documents „to rectify nonmaterial nonconformities‟ as the said clause envisaged that this could be done provided the bid was substantially responsive. 18. In the present case, however, the technical bid of the petitioner had already been held to be disqualified and therefore, the argument that the objections were more in the nature of seeking clarification, after treating the bid as responsive, is an argument which, in our opinion, is not convincing. 16 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 19. An omission on the part of the petitioner to submit the requisite documents as were otherwise required, if permitted to be produced at a later stage or at the time of filing of the objections, would certainly be impermissible where such documents are more in the nature of filling up lacunae rather than merely explaining the documents already placed on record. Inasmuch as, if additional documents were permitted to be placed subsequently after the opening of the technical bid, where such documents amount to filling up lacunae, would certainly violate Condition 6.3(b) of the tender document and fall within the category of a material deviation or omission, which, if accepted, would substantially affect the scope, quality or performance of the services, and which, if rectified, would unfairly affect the competitive position of other bidders who have submitted substantially responsive bids. 20. In the present case, what was required to be furnished along with the tender document, in terms of the eligibility criteria prescribed under Clause 6 of the said tender document, were an experience certificate issued by the private agency, proof of contract agreement/work order, as also proof of payment for services, and finally, proof of payment of GST for respective contract agreements. The aforementioned four elements were, therefore, required to be furnished. 21. As against the aforesaid conditions, it is not denied that the GST payment receipts, which were furnished to the Tender Evaluation Committee, did not reflect the name of the entity which had availed the services rendered 17 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 by the petitioner. This deficiency was sought to be cured by the petitioner by providing screenshots from the GST portal subsequently, along with the so- called clarification submitted by the petitioner. 22. The petitioner/respondent No.1 had also failed to submit proof with regard to the receipt of payment and the Forms, as the experience certificates furnished by AIG Hospital, Hyderabad, and KIMS, Hyderabad, were supported only by 26AS for the period 2024-25, which was outside the required range of 2019-23. Even the Form 16A was furnished only for the period from December-2024 to April-2025 and not for the period April-2023 to March-2024, as was otherwise required. 23. In our opinion, the decision of the Tender Evaluation Committee to reject the bid of the petitioner, therefore, neither suffered from any perversity nor any arbitrariness. 24. In a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash Asphaltings and Toll Highways (India) Ltd. v. Mandeepa Enterprises and others8, the Apex Court has yet again followed the established legal principle as propounded earlier in Jagadish Mandal's case that while judicial review is not excluded to assail administrative decisions in matters of tenders and contract, the Constitutional Courts should exercise utmost restraint in interfering with a tender process unless the threshold of judicial review is met. 8 (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1959 18 HCJ & RRRJ WA_964_2025 25. We are of the opinion that no interference whatsoever was warranted in the decision, which was impugned before the learned Single Judge, whereby the technical bid of the petitioner/respondent No.1, was rejected. We, accordingly, allow the present Writ Appeal and set aside the judgment and order impugned. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, in this case, shall stand closed. DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, CJ. R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J. SSN