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2025 DAILYLAW 4100 (HP)

Girja Nand Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-12-04

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 12.04.2013 and order of sentence dated 16.04.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment dated 18.12.2008 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.1, Shimla, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) was set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the present revision are that the police filed a challan against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal (IPC). It was asserted that informant Deepak Bhardwaj (PW-1) was working in his office on 1st April, 2006, when the accused G.N. Verma, DTO Headquarters, entered his room, caught hold of his Jacket, threatened and abused him. The other officials came to the room after hearing the commotion and rescued the informant. The informant made a complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW5/A). HC Rajinder Singh (PW-6) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW6/A). He seized the appointment and posting orders (Ext.PW3/A and Ext. PW3/B) vide memo (Ext.PW-2/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353 and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Deepak Bhardwaj (PW-1) is the informant. Jagdish Sharma (PW-2) and Roop Singh (PW-4) are the eyewitnesses. Hari Nand (PW-3) witnessed the recovery. ASI Yodha Ram (PW-5) signed the F.I.R. HC Rajinder Singh (PW-6) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that a false case was made against him due to enmity. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's case was full of discrepancies. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that a false case was made against him due to enmity. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution's case was full of discrepancies. The incident occurred at 11:45 a.m., but was reported to the police at 4:30 pm or 5:00 p.m.The Police post at Kasumpti was located near the place of the incident. There was no explanation for the delay. The witnesses R.D. Sharma and Jagdish Sharma were subordinates of the informant. Therefore, they were likely to support him. The witnesses materially improved upon their previous versions. Investigating Officer admitted that he had examined the witnesses produced by the informant and did not examine any independent person. The dispute between the parties was a private dispute and not related to the office being held by the informant. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 353 and 506 of the IPC. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the informant’s statement was duly corroborated by Jagdish Sharma (PW-2). Roop Singh (PW-4) also stated that files were scattered in the room. The office is not the place to settle the private dispute between the public servants. The principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus did not apply to the prosecution's case. A person can be convicted on the basis of the testimony of a single witness, and the testimony of the informant was reliable. There was no requirement to obtain the prosecution sanction. None of the prosecution witnesses stated the actual words used by the accused; therefore, the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC was not made out. However, it was proved on the record that the accused had used criminal force on the informant when he was discharging his official duties. There was no requirement to obtain the prosecution sanction. None of the prosecution witnesses stated the actual words used by the accused; therefore, the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC was not made out. However, it was proved on the record that the accused had used criminal force on the informant when he was discharging his official duties. Hence, the learned Appellate Court set aside the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and convicted the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 353 of the IPC and sentenced him as under: Offence Sentence imposed Section 353 of IPC Fine of Rs. 25000/- and in default of payment of the fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Learned Appellate Court misread and misconstrued the evidence. The informant had not mentioned the names of witnesses in his complaint, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. The contradictions in the statements of witnesses were ignored. The learned Appellate Court did not consider the delay in reporting the matter to the police. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by M/s Tek Chand and Tarun Garla, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Lovenessh Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner/accused, submitted that the Learned Appellate Court did not advert to the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court before reversing the judgment of the learned Trial Court. The delay was not considered, and the material contradictions were ignored by stating that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply in India. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused on flimsy grounds. Learned Appellate Court re-appreciated the evidence and concluded that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 11. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused on flimsy grounds. Learned Appellate Court re-appreciated the evidence and concluded that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court, hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. Learned Appellate Court was deciding an appeal against an acquittal. The principle of deciding the appeal against acquittal were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 and it was held that the Courtcan interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 :(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 :(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with anappeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of hisinnocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8..…8.1. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8..…8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court infavour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12.It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. Learned Appellate Court did not advert to the parameters to be considered while deciding an appeal against the acquittal and reversed the judgment as if it were deciding the matter as an original Court. Learned Appellate Court was supposed to demonstrate that the judgment of the learned Trial Court was perverse and no reasonable person could have taken the view taken by the learned Trial Court. The mere possibility of another view was no reason to upset the judgment of the learned Trial Court. Thus, the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court is unsustainable on this short ground alone. 15. The informant Deepak Bhardwaj (PW-1) stated in his cross-examination that he had filed a written complaint at Police Station Chhotta Shimla on 01.04.2006 at 4:30 p.m.- 5:00 p.m. He has not assigned any reason for not making the complaint immediately after the incident. Learned Trial Court was justified in holding that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which would make the prosecution's case suspect. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but dangeralso creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante- timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 16. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 17. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. , (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 18. Hari Nand (PW-3) stated in his cross-examination that his office was located in the same building where the incident had taken place. He was sitting adjacent to the room of the informant. He was present at the time of the incident, but no incident had taken place in his presence. Hari Nand (PW-3) stated in his cross-examination that his office was located in the same building where the incident had taken place. He was sitting adjacent to the room of the informant. He was present at the time of the incident, but no incident had taken place in his presence. He was put forward as a witness of truth, and there is no reason to disbelieve his testimony. His statement made it doubtful that the accused had entered the informant’s room, abused and manhandled him. 19. Roop Singh (PW-4) stated in his examination-in- chief that he heard some noise from the informant’s room. He went to the room and saw that the accused Girja Nand, Rameshwar Sharma and Jagdish Sharma were present in the room. The accused was abusing and threatening the informant. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused manhandled the informant. He denied that he had rescued the informant from the accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 20. Learned Appellate Court held that his testimony corroborated the informant’s testimony; however, he had specifically denied that the accused had manhandled the informant. He did not say that the accused had made any gesture or any preparation, intending or knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation would give rise to an impression in the informant’s mind that the accused was likely to use force. Thus, his testimony does not establish the necessary ingredients of Section 353 of the IPC. 21. Jagdish Sharma (PW-2) stated that he heard the noise and went to the room. The accused was abusing the informant. He (Jagdish Sharma) saw that the files were scattered and the accused had caught hold of the informant’s jacket. He rescued the informant from the accused. 22. Statement of this witness corroborates the version of the informant that the accused had caught hold of the informant’s jacket, but that was not sufficient to reverse the acquittal because it is fairly well settled law that when two versions are appearing on record, the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred rather than the version in favour of the prosecution. The learned Trial Court had accepted the version in favour of the accused, which cannot be said to be perverse, justifying the reversal of the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 23. The learned Trial Court had accepted the version in favour of the accused, which cannot be said to be perverse, justifying the reversal of the judgment of the learned Trial Court. 23. The informant stated in his cross-examination that R.D. Sharma and Jagdish Sharma came together in the room within half a minute. Jagdish Sharma saw the accused catching hold of the jacket of the informant. The other persons came subsequently. The accused remained in the room for 1 minute and 15 seconds. Jagdish Sharma (PW-2), on the other hand, stated that the incident continued for 2-3 minutes, and he remained in the room for 2-3 minutes. 24. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the statement of the witnesses regarding the duration of the incident, which will assume significance because it would make the presence of Jagdish Sharma (PW-2) in the room suspect. 25. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that thirty employees worked in his office. HC. Rajinder Singh (PW-6) stated in his cross-examination that he had recorded the statements of witnesses who were called by the informant.He had not made any inquiry from any other person sitting on that floor. Learned Trial Court had rightly heard that the investigation was not fair, and the Investigating Officer should have independently made inquiries from the persons present in the office. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case. 26. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, which could have been taken based on the evidence produced before it, and the learned Appellate Court was not justified in reversing the judgment. 27. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the learned Appellate Court cannot be sustained and is ordered to be set aside. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 353 of the IPC. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it shall be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 28. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it shall be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ?50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 29. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 30. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.