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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 4095 (HP)

Vikram Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-12-09

Virender Singh

body2025
JUDGMENT : VIRENDER SINGH, J. 1. Applicant-Vikram Singh, apprehending his arrest, in case FIR No. 29 of 2025, dated 21.10.2025, registered under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’), (Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’) registered with Women Police Station, Nahan, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, has filed the present application, under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’). 2. By way of the present application, the indulgence of this Court has been sought to direct the Police/Investigating Officer of Women Police Station, Nahan, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, to release the applicant, on bail, in the event of his arrest, in the above-noted FIR. 3. According to the applicant, all the allegations, which have been levelled against him, by the prosecutrix, are false. 4. As per the applicant, the story, as narrated, in the FIR is false and fabricated one. The custodial interrogation of applicant is stated to be not required, in the present case. 5. The applicant has also given certain undertakings, for which, he is ready to abide by, in case, directions are issued, under Section 482 of BNSS, to the police. 6. According to the applicant, he and the complainant were friends; however, they did not have any contact with each other for the last three years. The applicant states that he was bedridden on the date of filing the application and that he is not in speaking terms with the complainant. 7. It is further case of the applicant that both of them had decided to marry with the consent of their family members, and in this regard, the applicant has retied upon the social media chats with the complainant. The applicant also asserts that he has no criminal antecedents. 8. On the basis of the facts, Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Advocate appearing for the applicant, has given certain undertakings, for which, the applicant is ready to abide by, in case, any direction under Section 482 of the BNSS, is issued to the police/Investigating Officer. 9. When put to notice, the police has filed a status report, wherein, it was disclosed that on 21.10.2025, the complainant (respondent No. 2), aged about 27 years, along with her mother, submitted a complaint, before the Women Police Station, Nahan stating therein, that she is resident of the address, as mentioned in the application. 9. When put to notice, the police has filed a status report, wherein, it was disclosed that on 21.10.2025, the complainant (respondent No. 2), aged about 27 years, along with her mother, submitted a complaint, before the Women Police Station, Nahan stating therein, that she is resident of the address, as mentioned in the application. According to her, she was in love affair with the applicant since 2021. In 2023, she discussed their relationship with her family members and also asked the applicant to speak with his parents regarding the same. 9.1. On 04 July 2021, as per the complaint, the applicant called her to a hotel at Gurudwara Wali Gali and promised her to marry. He had also applied vermilion (sindoor) on her forehead. Thereafter, applicant had physical relations with her. 9.2. On 07.11.2023, on the birthday of the complainant, she was again called to the same hotel, where, they again had physical relations. Thereafter, over the phone, the applicant promised her to marry. However, when the complainant later insisted the applicant to solemnize marriage with her, he refused. She also informed him that her family members had arranged her betrothal (sagai) ceremony with another boy, upon which, he threatened that if she will marry someone else, he would commit suicide. Thereafter, the applicant pressured the complainant’s parents to break her engagement by assuring them that he would marry her. As a result, she broke off her betrothal (sagai). 9.3. On 25.08.2025, the applicant again called the complainant to a guest house near Paonta Sahib Bus Stand and had physical relations with her. Thereafter, he allegedly had physical relations with her on 20–25 occasions and made promises to solemnize marriage with her. About two months prior to the date, when she filed the complaint, before the police, the applicant allegedly stopped talking to her. However, on 11th October 2025, he took her to a hotel near New Batapur, and assured her that he would solemnize the marriage, and again had physical relations with the complainant. Thereafter, he dropped her near her home. 9.4. The complainant has further stated in her complaint that the applicant later blocked her mobile number and informed her on phone that he would not solemnize marriage with her and would marry as per the wishes of his parents. 9.5. Thereafter, he dropped her near her home. 9.4. The complainant has further stated in her complaint that the applicant later blocked her mobile number and informed her on phone that he would not solemnize marriage with her and would marry as per the wishes of his parents. 9.5. On 12.10.2025, the complainant, along with her mother, had gone to his house; however, his family members refused to solemnize the marriage of the applicant with the complainant. On 13.10.2025, they had gone to Police Station Paonta Sahib. The applicant and his father were also called to the police station and in police station, they had assured that the matter would be settled. Later, the complainant’s party came to know that the marriage of the applicant had been fixed elsewhere, and has been scheduled to be held after two months. 9.6. Lastly, the complainant has stated that she is unable to talk to the applicant and is tensed, as the applicant has ruined her life. She could not solemnize the marriage with any other person, as the applicant had broken off her betrothal (sagai) at 2–3 places. 9.7. As such, the complainant has prayed that action be taken against the applicant. 10. On the basis of the above facts, the police registered the FIR and the criminal machinery swung into motion. On 21.10.2025, the complainant/prosecutrix was medico-legally examined by the Doctor, at Dr. Y.S. Parmar, Government Medical College & Hospital, Nahan, where physical evidence, so collected by the doctor, was handed over to the police. 11. On 22.10.2025, her statement under Section 180 of BNSS was got recorded. 12. On 24.10.2025, the complainant, identified the spot at Portico Hotel and Walia Guest House. Spot map was prepared. Relevant record was taken into possession from Walia Guest House, Paonta Sahib. As per the record, so taken into possession, from those places, on 23.07.2023, the applicant had booked Room No. 6. Similarly, he had booked a room on 11.08.2025 and on 25.08.2025. At the time of booking, documents, i.e., copies of the voter card and Aadhaar card of the applicant, which were submitted at the Guest House, were taken into possession. 13. On 24.10.2025, Sh. Gurpal Singh, owner of Pontika Hotel also produced the documents, which were allegedly provided by the complainant and the applicant for booking the room, in the hotel, and photocopies of the same were taken into possession. 13. On 24.10.2025, Sh. Gurpal Singh, owner of Pontika Hotel also produced the documents, which were allegedly provided by the complainant and the applicant for booking the room, in the hotel, and photocopies of the same were taken into possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 180 of BNSS. 14. On 25.10.2025, the complainant was produced before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, where, her statement under Section 180 of BNSS was recorded. At the instance of the complainant, the restaurant namely HR71, Food Junction, Santosh Gadh, Paonta Sahib, was visited, and spot map was prepared. The relevant documents were also taken into possession. 15. The applicant has joined the investigation on 27.10.2025. He was also medico-legally examined, and the physical evidence, so collected by the doctor, was taken into possession. 16. As per the status report, during the investigation, it was found that the complainant and the applicant came into contact with each other through Facebook in the year 2021. Thereafter, they started communicating with each other over the phone, and the relationship developed into a love affair. The applicant is serving in Indian Army. 17. Further investigation revealed that in 2021, the applicant took the complaint to Portico Hotel near Gurudwara Wali Gali, Poanta Sahib and applied vermilion (sindoor), and, despite resistance from the complaint, developed physical relations with her, by assuring her to solemnize marriage. 18. It has also been mentioned in the status report that the applicant has joined the investigation. No other case has been found to be registered against him, except the present one. 19. In this case, the complainant also filed objections, in which, she has mentioned that she apprehends that if relief is granted to the applicant, as sought in the application, it will give a wrong signal to the society. 20. Hence, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 21. As per the status report, the age of the complainant is 28 years, whereas, in the complaint, she has mentioned her age as 27 years. The applicant has given his age as 28 years. Both are mature. As per the stand taken by both of them, they came into contact with each other through social media. The applicant, in the application, has averred that for the last three years, he had no contact with the applicant. The applicant has given his age as 28 years. Both are mature. As per the stand taken by both of them, they came into contact with each other through social media. The applicant, in the application, has averred that for the last three years, he had no contact with the applicant. He has also taken the stand that now he is not in talking terms with the complainant. 22. Per contra, according to the complainant, on 4th July 2021, the applicant allegedly called her to a hotel near Gurudwara Wali Gali, where, he purportedly promised to marry her, applied vermilion (sindoor) on her forehead, and developed physical relations with her. The complainant further states that this was not an isolated incident. Subsequently, the applicant allegedly continued to have sexual relations with her under the pretext of marriage. 23. As per her stand, the first incident had occurred in July 2021, and, thereafter, the accused allegedly violated her consent, and made physical relations with her on the pretext of solemnizing marriage with her. When the applicant allegedly got her engagement broken off, he again called her to a hotel on 25th August 2025 and allegedly developed physical relations with her. 24. In view of the above, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, to the effect that even if the allegations are taken at face value, the alleged relationship, was consensual relationship, cannot be ignored at this stage. 25. The applicant is a young man of 28 years with no criminal antecedents, and the status report is completely silent about the necessity of custodial interrogation. Although, the FIR has been registered under Section 376 of the IPC (Section 69 of BNS), which is a serious offence, but, it cannot be ignored, at this stage, that occasion for lodging of the FIR could have arisen when the consensual relationship, turned sour. 26. In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case titled as Amol Bhagwan Nehul vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2025 INSC 782 , in paragraph 9, has held, as under:- “9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it to treat each breach of promise to marry as false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.” 27. It would be established during the trial that the alleged consent of the complainant for physical relations with the applicant was vitiated due to misconception of facts arising from the promise to marry. It would also be demonstrated during the trial that the applicant never had any intention to solemnize the marriage with the complainant from the inception of their alleged relationship. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case, titled as Pramod Suryhban Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra , (2019) 9 SCC 608 , has held that there must be a direct nexus between the complainant’s decision to engage in sexual act and the false promise of marriage. Relevant paragraphs 14 to 18 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, this Court held: “12. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, this Court held: “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana (“Deepak Gulati”): “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…” 15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh11 the accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the court observed: “10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent….” 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed: “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact” the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Uday v State of Karnataka the complainant was a college going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant’s statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant’s and accused’s families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the accused’s promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors: “25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married…” (Emphasis supplied) 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” 29. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” 29. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the applicant is able to make out a case, in his favour for making interim order, dated 24.10.2025 absolute. 30. Consequently, interim order dated 24.10.2025 is made absolute. Therefore, it is ordered that the applicant be released on bail, in the event of his arrest, in case FIR No. 29 of 2025, dated 21.10.2025, registered under Section 376 of IPC (Section 69 of BNS), with Women Police Station, Nahan, on his furnishing personal bonds, to the tune of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Investigating Officer. The bail is granted, subject to the following conditions: a) That the applicant will join the investigation of the case, as and when, called for, by the Investigating Officer, in accordance with law; b) That the applicant will not leave India, without prior permission of the Court; c) That the applicant will not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person, acquainted with the facts of the case, so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Investigating Officer or the Court; d) That the applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; 31. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as, these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present bail application. 32. It is made clear that the respondent-State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions, is found to be violated by the applicant.