1 2025:CGHC:31426 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FAM No. 21 of 2024 1 - Pranjal Shukla S/o Late Om Prakash Shukla Aged About 35 Years Resident Of Samta Colony, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur (C.G.) --- Appellant versus 1 - Registrar Public Trust, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Shri Hanuman Trust Gudyari Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) --- Respondents For appellant For respondent No. 1 : : Mr. Shrikant Kaushik, Adv. Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Adv. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Adv. (Hon’ble Mr. Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J) Order on Board 08/07 /2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 1/2024, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing instant first appeal (misc.). 2. This appeal under Section 27(3) of the Chhattisgarh Public Trust Act, 1951, has been preferred by the appellant challenging the order (Annexure A-1) dated 3-9-2005 passed by the 10th Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Raipur in MJC No. 21/2004. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, vide impugned order (Annexure A-1) dated 3-9-2005, the reference sent by the Digitally signed by AVANISH KUMAR PATHAK Date: 2025.07.09 16:58:29 +0530 2 Registrar, Public Trust, Raipur under Section 26 of the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Public Trust Act, 1951 was allowed and directions were issued in respect of appointment of trustees of “Shri Hanumanji Trust, Gudhiyari, Raipur”. Learned counsel further submits that Mahant Sudarshan Das was last Mahant of “Shri Hanumanji Trust, Gudhiyari, Raipur”. He executed Will dated 2-2-1984 in favour of appellant Om Prakash Shukla (father of present appellant), whereby he appointed Om Prakash Shukla as his successor/Sarvarakar of said trust, but without impleading Om Prakash Shukla, impugned order dated 3-9-2005 was passed. Om Prakash Shukla died on 15-8-2016. Prior to that, he suffered from paralytic attack in the year 2000, therefore, he could not challenge the impugned order dated 3-9-2005 (Annexure A-1) and subsequently, he died in the year 2016. Hence, delay of 6,869 days has occurred in filing instant appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that, delay in filing the instant appeal is bonafide in aforesaid situation, hence I.A. No. 1/2024 be allowed and delay may be condoned. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents jointly submit that, Mahant Sudarshan Das had no right to execute the Will in respect of affairs of “Shri Hanumanji Trust, Gudhiyari, Raipur”. Further, in other reference case bearing MJC No. 77/1984, Om Prakash Shukla (father of present appellant) was granted opportunity to present his case, but what happened on merit in MJC No. 77/1984 (Annexure A-4) has not been disclosed by the appellant. He further submits that, the delay occurred in filing instant FAM is of 6,869 days, which is inordinate delay. No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay in 3 filing instant appeal. Hence, I.A. No. 1/2024 may be rejected. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. By filing I.A. No. 1/2024, appellant is seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal challenging the order (Annexure A-1) dated 3-9-2005 passed by the 10th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Raipur in MJC No. 21/2004. Instant appeal has been filed after huge delay of 6,869 days. Cause shown for delay in filing the appeal is that, father of appellant had suffered paralytic attack and thereafter, he was not in a position to contest the case. After his death, appellant came to know about the order Annexure A-1 dated 3-9-2005, thereafter he filed instant appeal along with application for condonation of delay. As per death certificate (Annexure A-1), father of present appellant died on 15-8-2016, but, instant appeal along with application for condonation of delay has been filed on 15-10-2024. Appellant has also not filed any concrete medical document to show that, father of appellant was completely bed ridden and was unable to talk or go to one place to another place. Even otherwise, after death of Om Prakash Shukla, present appellant filed instant appeal after about more than 8 years from death of his father. Thus, there is huge inordinate delay in filing instant appeal and the cause shown by the appellant is not found to be sufficient or bonafide. 7. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 has held in paragraphs 21.9(ix) and 21.10(x) as under:- 4 “21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance or justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 8. In another case, the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 in paragraphs 25 and 26 has observed as under: “25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that 5 party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 9. Considering the facts of present case in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in above referred cases, as has been stated in preceding paragraphs, the appellant has not been able to show sufficient cause of huge delay of 6,869 days in filing the instant appeal and he has also not been able to make out a strong case for grant of condonation of delay in filing instant appeal. 10. In view of above discussion, I do not feel inclined to allow I.A. No. 1/2024, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the same is rejected. As a result, instant first appeal (misc.) is also dismissed. 11. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Pathak/-