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2025 DAILYLAW 4093 (HP)

Kushal Kumar v. State of H. P.

2025-12-09

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 23.06.2016, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharmshala, Circuit Court at Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.06.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was stated that the informant/victim, Vijay Kumar (PW3), was heading towards Majhera Bazar on 22.06.2010. He reached 150 meters before Majhera Bazaar at about 9:15 am when he saw that a tempo coming from Majhera Bazaar hit a motorcycle coming from Kachera. Atal Dev (PW1) was driving the motorcycle. His wife, Chandresh Kumari (PW4) and a child were riding the motorcycle as pillion riders. Vijay Kumar (PW3) picked them up and sent them to the hospital with Ashwani Kumar (PW5). The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the tempo because the road was narrow and there was a curve. The tempo driver neither sounded the horn nor applied the brakes. He did not leave any space for the motorcyclists to cross. The matter was reported to the police, and entry (Ext.PW9/A) was recorded in the Police Station. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) was sent for verification with Constable Surjit Kumar (PW7), HHC Uttam Chand (PW12), and Suresh Kumar. He recorded the statement of the informant Vijay Kumar (Ext.PW3/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW9/C) was registered. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) investigated the matter. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW3/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW9/B) was registered. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) took the photographs of the spot (Ext. PW11/X-1 to PW11/X4). He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/A). He seized the motorcycle and truck lying on the spot vide memo (Ext.PW7/A). Kushal Kumar produced the documents of the tempo, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW7/B). HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) took the photographs of the spot (Ext. PW11/X-1 to PW11/X4). He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/A). He seized the motorcycle and truck lying on the spot vide memo (Ext.PW7/A). Kushal Kumar produced the documents of the tempo, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW7/B). Dr Sanjeev Sharma (PW10) examined Chandresh Kumari (PW4) and found fractures of the left inferior pubic ramus and left greater trochanter. He issued the treatment summary (Ext.PW10/A). HC Rajinder Kumar (PW6) mechanically examined the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP56-2853 and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW6/A). Kanwar Singh (PW8) mechanically examined the tempo bearing registration No. HP68-1767 and found that there was no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW8/A). Documents of the motorcycle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Atal Dev (PW1) was riding the motorcycle. Pooja Thakur (PW2) is the owner of the tempo. Vijay Kumar (PW3) is the informant. Chandresh Kumari (PW4) is the wife of Atal Dev (PW1), who was riding the motorcycle with him. Ashwani Kumar (PW5) accompanied the injured to the hospital. HC Rajinder (PW6) mechanically examined the motorcycle. Constable Surjit Kumar (PW7) is the witness to recovery. Kanwar Singh (PW8) mechanically examined the tempo. HC Sampuran Singh (PW9) signed the FIR. Dr Sanjeev Sharma (PW10) issued the treatment summary. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) investigated the matter. HHC Uttam Chand (PW12) carried the rukka from the spot to the Police Station. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that the witnesses deposed falsely against him as they were residents of the same village. He was innocent. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW11) investigated the matter. HHC Uttam Chand (PW12) carried the rukka from the spot to the Police Station. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that the witnesses deposed falsely against him as they were residents of the same village. He was innocent. He initially stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence, but subsequently, a statement was made on his behalf that no defence evidence was to be led. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the place of the incident was a narrow curve. There was no space for the motorcycle to move. The motorcyclist was on his left side. The accused drove the vehicle towards the right side of the tempo, which led to the accident. Atal Dev (PW1) specifically stated that he had stopped the motorcycle after seeing the tempo, but the tempo hit the motorcycle, causing injuries to Atal Dev (PW1) and Chandresh Kumari (PW4). Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and was sentenced as under: 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III Kangra at Dharmshala, Circuit Court at Palampur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the tempo, which had hit the motorcycle. The accused failed to sound the horn or apply the brakes. He did not leave sufficient space for the motorcyclists to move. The minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. The learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the law and the facts properly. The prosecution failed to prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. Three people were riding the motorcycle, which showed the negligence of the motorcyclist. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the law and the facts properly. The prosecution failed to prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. Three people were riding the motorcycle, which showed the negligence of the motorcyclist. Atal Dev (PW1) stated that the injury was caused by the angle iron that was protruding out of the truck. Whereas his wife, Chandresh Kumari (PW3), stated that the motorcyclist collided with the truck. Hence, the manner of the accident is not established. Kanwar Singh PW (8) stated that no angle iron protruded out of the tempo, which falsifies the statement of Atal Dev (PW1) that the injury was caused by the angle iron protruding out of the tempo. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There were major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The statement of Atal Dev (PW1) that he was hit by an angle iron protruding out of the tempo was falsified by the mechanic, who did not find any such angle iron protruding out of the tempo. The motorcycle had hit the middle portion of the tempo, and the motorcyclist was negligent. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that the learned Courts below did not extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused, and that such a benefit be extended to him. He relied upon the judgments of this Court in Roop Lal vs. State of H.P. in Cr. Revision No. 95 of 2012, decided on 22.08.2019 and Roshan Lal vs. State of H.P. 2025 HHC 17303 in support of his submission. 11. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accident occurred on a narrow curve. Revision No. 95 of 2012, decided on 22.08.2019 and Roshan Lal vs. State of H.P. 2025 HHC 17303 in support of his submission. 11. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accident occurred on a narrow curve. The accused failed to provide adequate space for the motorcycle to move. The motorcycle was being driven towards the left side of the road, and the tempo had hit the motorcycle on the right side of the road for tempo. This showed the negligence of the accused. It was duly proved by the medical evidence that the motorcyclist and the pillion rider had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court. A deterrent view should be taken in cases of motor vehicle accidents because such offences are increasing, and it is necessary to prevent the recurrence of the accident. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 ], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Pooja Thakur (PW2) stated that she is the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP68-1767. She had employed Kushal Kumar (accused) as the driver. The accused was driving the tempo on the date of the accident. She stated in her cross-examination that her husband looks after the vehicle, and he engages the driver of the vehicle. Her husband would know about the drivers of the vehicle. She denied that she was making an incorrect statement. She was permitted to be re-examined, and she admitted that she had issued the certificate (Ext.PW2/A) regarding the accused being the driver. 20. The testimony of this witness shows that the accused was driving the vehicle on the date of the accident. She specifically stated this fact in her examination-in-chief as well as in her re-examination. She had issued the certificate to this effect immediately after the accident. Her statement in the cross-examination that her husband used to look after the drivers and only he would know about the drivers of the truck is not acceptable because she would not have given the certificate had she been unaware of the drivers of the vehicle owned by her. Her statement in the cross-examination that her husband used to look after the drivers and only he would know about the drivers of the truck is not acceptable because she would not have given the certificate had she been unaware of the drivers of the vehicle owned by her. Thus, the statement of this witness clearly proved that the accused was driving the vehicle on the date of the accident. 21. Atal Dev (PW1) specifically stated that the accused was driving the tempo at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he had seen the accused on the date of the accident. Similarly, Vijay Kumar (PW3) stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. This was not suggested to be incorrect in the cross-examination; rather, it was suggested to him that the driver of the tempo was driving it at a normal speed, and the motorcycle had hit the tempo. The facts which could not have been in the knowledge of the accused had he not been driving the tempo at the time of the accident. Thus, the cross-examination of the witness also does not make his testimony in the examination-in-chief doubtful that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 22. Chandresh Kumari (PW4) stated that the accused was driving the truck. Her testimony was not disputed in the cross-examination regarding this fact. Therefore, learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 23. Atal Dev (PW1) stated that he was riding the motorcycle with his wife and child. When he reached on a curve near the cattle shed of one Hira Lal at village Majahera, he saw a truck. He stopped the motorcycle. However, the truck driver drove the truck towards the wrong side and hit the motorcycle. He sustained injuries by means of an angle iron protruding out of the truck. His wife also sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, who was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 24. Kanwar Singh (PW8) examined the truck. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not found any angle iron protruding out of the truck. His wife also sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, who was driving the truck at the time of the accident. 24. Kanwar Singh (PW8) examined the truck. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not found any angle iron protruding out of the truck. It was submitted that the testimony of the mechanical expert makes the prosecution’s case suspect because he did not find any angle iron protruding out of the truck, and the statement of Atal Dev (PW1) that he was hit by the iron angle is falsified. This submission is not acceptable. The photographs (Ext.PW11/X3 and Ext.PW11/X4) show the angle iron on the side of the truck and motorcycle lying just below the angle iron. When Atal Dev (PW1) was referring to the angle protruding out of the truck, he was referring to the iron angle visible in the photographs (Ext.PW11/X3 and Ext. PW11/X4). Thus, the statement of a mechanical expert cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 25. Statement of Atal Dev (PW1) that the accused was driving the truck on the right side of the road is duly corroborated by Vijay Kumar (PW3), who stated that the truck driver drove the truck towards the right side of the road and hit the motorcycle. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of the accident had a curve and was a hilly area. He admitted that there was a big boulder towards the left side of the motorcyclist. He admitted that the tempo driver negotiated the curve and applied the brakes after seeing the motorcyclist. He corrected to say that the truck driver had not applied the brakes. The motorcycle was hit by the angle iron on the side of the truck. 26. Chanderesh Kumari (PW4) stated that she was travelling as a pillion rider on 12.06.2010. A truck came at a high speed. The motorcyclist stopped the motorcycle, but the truck hit the motorcycle. She sustained injuries and was taken to the hospital. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the truck. She stated in her cross-examination that there was a curve at the place of the accident. She volunteered to say that there was space towards the left side of the truck. She denied that the motorcyclist had not applied the brakes, and there was sufficient space for the motorcyclist to move. She stated in her cross-examination that there was a curve at the place of the accident. She volunteered to say that there was space towards the left side of the truck. She denied that the motorcyclist had not applied the brakes, and there was sufficient space for the motorcyclist to move. She denied that she was making a false statement regarding the negligence of the driver of the truck. The statements of these witnesses corroborate the statement of Atal Dev (PW1). 27. The site plan (Ext.PW11/A) shows the place of the accident. The unmetalled portion of the road on the left side of the road for the motorcyclists was 2 feet. A big boulder was lying ahead of the motorcycle. The tempo was towards the right side of the road. The total width of the road was 8.70 feet. Sufficient space is shown towards the left side of the tempo. The photographs (Ext.PW11/X1 to Ext. PW11/X4) show the tempo on the extreme right side of the road and no space for the motorcyclists to move on its left side. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that a big boulder was lying ahead of the motorcyclists, and he could not move ahead. Therefore, the statement of Atal Dev (PW1) that he had stopped the motorcycle after seeing the tempo has to be accepted as correct. The fact that the tempo was being driven towards the extreme right side of the road showed the negligence of the accused. 28. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 29. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar , 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 30. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj , 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922 and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 31. Thus, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which led to the accident, and the learned Courts below had rightly held him guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. 32. Dr Sanjeev Sharma (PW10) proved that Chandresh Kumari (PW4) had sustained a fracture. He stated in his cross-examination that the injuries could be caused by a motorcyclist hitting a stone. This is an alternative hypothesis, and no person has stated that the motorcycle had hit the stone. Therefore, this will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. 33. Thus, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the truck on 22.06.2010 at about 9:15 am towards the wrong side of the road, which led to the accident, causing injuries to Atal Dev (PW1) and grievous injuries to Chandresh Kumari (PW4). Therefore, the accused was rightly convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. 34. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should be granted to the accused. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Roshan Lal (supra), wherein such a benefit was extended after the accused stated that he did not want to press the appeal against the conviction. This submission cannot be accepted. 34. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should be granted to the accused. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Roshan Lal (supra), wherein such a benefit was extended after the accused stated that he did not want to press the appeal against the conviction. This submission cannot be accepted. The matter is squarely covered by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are binding upon this Court. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana , (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of the IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 35. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab , (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed:- 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 36. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held:- 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held:- 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 37. It was laid down in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi , (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that a deterrent sentence has to be awarded to a person convicted of negligent driving. It was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 38. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused, and a deterrent sentence was to be imposed. 39. In Roop Lal (supra), the Court had set aside the imprisonment and had imposed a fine. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not granted to the accused. Hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 40. 39. In Roop Lal (supra), the Court had set aside the imprisonment and had imposed a fine. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not granted to the accused. Hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 40. The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 338 of the IPC and three months each for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 and 337 of the IPC. Considering the manner in which the truck was taken towards the wrong side of the road leading to the accident and the injuries sustained by Chandresh Kumari, the sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court and upheld by the learned Appellate Court cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference from this Court. 41. No other point was urged. 42. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 43. The records of the learned Courts below be returned alongwith copy of the judgment of this Court.