- 1 - WP No.38939 of 2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No.38939/2018 (S-KAT) BETWEEN: 1 . KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, M.S.BUILDINGS, DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE-560001. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, M.S.BUILDING, BANGALORE-1. 2 . SRI.K.M. MANJUNATH, S/O SRI SHADAKSHARI, AGED ABOUT 12 YEARS, VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT, YEMMIGANURU VILLAGE, BELLARY DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. B. SUKANYA BALIGA, AGA FOR R1; SRI M. MADHUSUDHAN, ADVOCATE FO R2) Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - WP No.38939 of 2018 THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 10.5.2018 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BANGALORE IN APPLICATION No.2851/2017 AT ANNEXURE-A; THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 03.09.2025, THIS DAY K. V. ARAVIND J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND C.A.V. ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND) The Registrar, Karnataka Lokayukta, has approached this Court assailing the order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru, in Application No.2851/2017, whereby the Tribunal set aside the order dated 11.05.2017 (Annexure-A17) imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement and directed reinstatement of the respondent with consequential benefits of seniority, but without arrears of salary. - 3 - WP No.38939 of 2018 2. Brief facts are that, a complaint was lodged against respondent No.2, while serving as Village Accountant, Kallukamba Circle, Bellary Taluk, alleging that on 05.05.2009 he demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs.4,600/– for effecting change of katha, conducting a mahazar, and thereafter forwarding the same to the Revenue Inspector in respect of land measuring 2 acres 2 guntas in Survey No.64/C1 of Kallukambha village, Bellary Taluk and District. 2.1 On receipt of the complaint, a case was registered in Special Case No.66/2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Charges were framed against respondent No.2 for the said offences. Upon conclusion of the trial, the Special Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelled against respondent No.2 and consequently acquitted him of the said offences. 2.2 In the meantime, a departmental enquiry was initiated against respondent No.2 by appointing an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer, after recording the evidence of witnesses and considering the documents on record, submitted a report holding the charge as proved. Based on the said - 4 - WP No.38939 of 2018 report, the petitioner-Institution recommended the penalty of compulsory retirement. A show-cause notice was issued to respondent No.2, and upon consideration of his reply, respondent No.1 passed an order imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement from service. The said order was the subject matter of challenge before the Tribunal. 2.3 The Tribunal, having observed that the complainant had not supported the charge in the departmental enquiry and that the allegation of illegal gratification was therefore not established, proceeded to modify the penalty of compulsory retirement to one of reduction of salary to the minimum of the pay scale of Village Accountant for a period of three years, with a direction to reinstate the applicant with continuity of service and seniority, but without arrears of salary. 3. Sri Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that, the degree of proof required in departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution is different. While departmental proceedings require proof on the preponderance of probabilities, criminal prosecution demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that acquittal in a criminal case does not constitute a ground for - 5 - WP No.38939 of 2018 exoneration in departmental proceedings. Both proceedings are distinct and are to be assessed independently on the evidence available. In this context, it is contended that once the charge is held to be proved, the Tribunal cannot substitute the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. At most, the Tribunal can examine the decision-making process, but not the decision itself. 4. Learned counsel further submits that respondent No.2, having accepted the order of the Tribunal holding that the charge is proved and the penalty imposed, cannot now contest the matter on merits. It is submitted that where a charge of corruption is established against a delinquent, the prescribed punishment is dismissal and not a lesser penalty. It is contended that the Tribunal erroneously relied solely on the evidence of PW.1 to conclude that the complainant had not supported the disciplinary authority, while failing to consider the evidence of PWs.2 and 3, the shadow witness and the Investigation Officer. Learned counsel further submits that even if the complainant is hostile, such hostility, when corroborated by other evidence, is immaterial to the case of the disciplinary authority. - 6 - WP No.38939 of 2018 5. Sri M. Madhusudhan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, submits that the Government has not challenged the order of the Tribunal modifying the punishment. It is submitted that the Tribunal’s order has been given effect to and respondent No.2 has been reinstated. Learned counsel further contends that at this stage, it is not permissible to reverse the findings of the Tribunal. It is also submitted that the petitioner, being merely the Enquiry Authority, cannot assail the Tribunal’s order modifying the penalty imposed, particularly when the Disciplinary Authority itself has not challenged the same. Learned counsel additionally made submissions on the merits, seeking to contend that the Tribunal’s finding on guilt is not justifiable. At this stage, this Court notes that such a challenge to the Tribunal’s finding has not been raised by respondent No.2. 6. Smt B. Sukanya Baliga, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1, submits that the reinstatement of respondent No.2 was subject to the outcome of the present writ petition. Accordingly, it is contended that the reinstatement has no bearing on the determination of the present petition. - 7 - WP No.38939 of 2018 7. We have given due and thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, as well as to the material on record. 8. It is pertinent to note that there are two distinct proceedings with separate evidence. One set of findings emanates from the Enquiry Officer, who examined witnesses and considered the relevant documents in the departmental enquiry. The other set of findings arises from the criminal Court, which adjudicated the matter based on the charge-sheet filed by the Lokayukta Police, taking into account the testimony of witnesses and documentary evidence. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 contends that the acquittal in the criminal proceedings constitutes an honourable acquittal, rendered after consideration of the merits, and therefore, the findings of the trial Court are relevant for the purposes of the departmental enquiry. 9. The order of the trial Court in Special Case No.66/2010 forms part of the record. It is observed that the trial Court recorded the evidence of 11 witnesses and marked 36 documents. Noting the hostility of the complainant, and the - 8 - WP No.38939 of 2018 probability that neither a bribe was demanded nor accepted, the trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges leveled against the accused. Consequently, the Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 10. The enquiry report of the Lokayukta is based on the statements of 4 oral witnesses, 3 supporting the prosecution and 1 in favour of the defence and the marking of 13 documents by the prosecution and 5 documents by the defence. The Enquiry Officer, after noting that PW.1, the complainant, had not supported the case of the Disciplinary Authority, and upon considering the evidence of PW.2, held that the Disciplinary Authority had established that respondent No.2 demanded Rs.4,600/- from PW.1 and received the said amount as a bribe, thereby committing misconduct under Rules 3(1)(i) to (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966. 11. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 made submissions challenging the correctness of the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the Tribunal insofar as the charge against him was held to be proved. It is noted that respondent No.2 has not assailed the Tribunal’s finding confirming the - 9 - WP No.38939 of 2018 Enquiry Officer’s conclusion, and the Tribunal interfered only with the quantum of punishment. In that view, this Court is not inclined to entertain submissions relating to the merits of the finding regarding the proved charge. 12. The Tribunal appears to have been influenced by its observation that PW.1, the complainant, did not support the prosecution’s case. However, PW.2, the shadow witness, gave a detailed account of the incident and was extensively cross- examined by counsel for respondent No.2. Despite the suggestions and cross-examination, the testimony of PW.2 remained unshaken and establishes the demand and acceptance of a bribe by respondent No.2. The other evidence on record corroborates PW.2’s testimony. The cash seized from respondent No.2 remained unexplained, and its denominations correspond with the evidence on record. PW.3, the Investigation Officer, also provided a comprehensive account from the receipt of the complaint, conducting the trap, to filing the charge-sheet, and his evidence was not contradicted on cross-examination. The defence evidence offers no support to respondent No.2. Considering the above, the Enquiry Officer - 10 - WP No.38939 of 2018 rightly concluded that the charge against respondent No.2 is proved. 13. It is now for this Court to examine how the Tribunal has considered the evidence while passing the impugned order. The Tribunal, after setting out the factual aspects, noted that the Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary, after examining 11 witnesses and 36 documents, acquitted respondent No.2. The Tribunal further recorded that, in the departmental enquiry, the complainant had not supported the charge. The Tribunal referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Bhaskar Reddy v. Superintendent of Police ([2015] 2 SCC 365) and also to its own decision in T. R. Ramesh v. State and Others (Application No.7773/2015 dated 26.09.2016), wherein it set aside an order of dismissal and imposed the penalty of reduction of salary to the minimum of the pay scale of the post for a period of three years. Referring further to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari ([2017] 2 SCC 308), the Tribunal held that a writ Court must be slow to interfere with findings of fact recorded by a departmental authority based on evidence. Interference is justified only if the - 11 - WP No.38939 of 2018 findings are unsupported by evidence, or if no reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusion. The Tribunal further observed that interference is permissible where the enquiry is vitiated in violation of principles of natural justice, or where the authority has not applied its mind or failed to assign reasons for its conclusion, in which case the writ Court can examine the order of punishment. 14. The Tribunal, thereafter, without discussing the effect of the acquittal in the criminal case, without applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to above, and without examining the applicability of its earlier decision in T. R. Ramesh (supra), proceeded to set aside the penalty of compulsory retirement and imposed the penalty of reduction of salary to the minimum of the pay scale of Village Accountant for a period of three years. 15. We note that the Tribunal, while correctly recording the binding principles of law, failed to apply the same to the facts of the case. We agree with the Tribunal’s observation that a writ Court must be slow to interfere with findings of fact recorded by a departmental authority based on evidence, - 12 - WP No.38939 of 2018 except where the enquiry is vitiated due to non-application of mind or is short of reasons. In the present case, none of these exceptions are discernible to justify modification of the penalty. The Tribunal itself has failed to identify any such exception before proceeding to modify the penalty. 16. This Court, in W.P. No.1647/2020 dated 01.10.2024, in State of Karnataka and Others v. Smt. H.S. Kanthi, held as follows: "10. The vital question in the present writ petition is whether the Tribunal is justified in substituting punishment of dismissal by compulsory retirement for a proved misconduct of accepting illegal gratification or bribe. The Hon’ble Apex Court in MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, BAHADURGARH v/s KRISHNAN BEHARI reported in (1996) 2 SCC 714 has held that in cases involving corruption, there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Further, it observed that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. It also observed that the amount misappropriated may be small or large, it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant. Relevant paragraph 4 of the said judgment reads as follows: “4. It is obvious that the respondent has been convicted of a serious crime and it is a clear case attracting under proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In a case of such nature – indeed, in cases involving corruption – there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriate that is relevant. The Director had interfered with the punishment under a total misapprehension of the relevant factors to be borne in mind in such a case.” - 13 - WP No.38939 of 2018 11. As observed above, imposing punishment on proved charge vests with the Disciplinary Authority taking note of the nature and seriousness of the charge. It is for the Disciplinary Authority to impose appropriate punishment. In the instant case, since the charge of receiving illegal gratification/bribe is proved, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing punishment of dismissal. 12. The Tribunal is not justified in substituting punishment of dismissal to that of compulsory retirement by observing that lenient view is to be taken, following the judgment in GYAN CHAND CHATTAR (supra) and also observing that the applicant being a Lady having put in only 11 years and 8 months of service, she would put to great hardship and inconvenience. In GYAN CHAND CHATTAR case, the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 21 held that a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt and it cannot be proved on mere probabilities. But subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in STATE OF KARNATKA AND ANOTHER v/s UMESH reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 has clarified that observations in paragraph 21 of GYAN CHAND CHATTAR case are not the ratio decidendi of the case and those observations were made while discussing the judgment of the High Court. Paragraphs 16, 18 and 19 in UMESH case reads as follows: “16. The principles which govern a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary - 14 - WP No.38939 of 2018 enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 17. xxxxxxxxxx 18. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed reliance on the decision in Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed the punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the payment could be the expectation of a commission amount. The respondent placed reliance on the following passages from the decision : (SCC pp. 85 & 87, paras 21 & 31) “21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi- criminal nature was required to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities. *** 31. … wherein it has been held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal consequences.” - 15 - WP No.38939 of 2018 19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were made while discussing the judgment [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 548] of the High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh [State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491: 1977 SCC (L&S) 298:(1977)1 SLR 750] was reiterated : (Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78:(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129], SCC p. 88, paras 35-36) “35. … an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct. 36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and there has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non-existing material and failed to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.” (emphasis supplied) - 16 - WP No.38939 of 2018 On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with.” 13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in (2008) 5 SCC 569 in the case of CHAIRMAN & MANAGING DIRECTOR, V.S.P. AND OTHERS v/s GOPURAJU SRI PRABHAKARA HARI BABU, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment over-turn a legal order. Relevant paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the above judgment reads as follows: 20. The jurisdiction of the High court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra; SBI v. Mahatma Mishra; State of Karnataka v. Amreerbi; State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Urrar Haryana Bijli Vitram Nigam Ltd., v. Surji Devi.). 21. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See sangfroid Remedies Ltd., v. U ion of India). 22. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also - 17 - WP No.38939 of 2018 cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of proportionaility of punishment in CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD AND OTHERS v/s T.T.MURALI BABU reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has observed that proportionality or substitution of punishment would come into play, if the Court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court. 15. In the instant case, the Tribunal has not found and come to the conclusion that the charges are not proved against the respondent in the departmental enquiry. The Tribunal having observed that demanding and receiving bribe is a serious social morality and it needs to dealt with firmly, could not have substituted the punishment of dismissal with that of compulsory retirement. Further, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Tribunal without recording as to whether the punishment of dismissal for proved charge of accepting bribe is disproportionate or whether it shocks the conscience of the Court, could not have substituted the punishment. In other words, unless the Court records that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the gravity of charge, which shocks the conscience of the Court, the Court would not get jurisdiction to substitute the punishment." 17. The facts in the present case are identical to those in the aforementioned case. In view of the legal position, once the Tribunal accepts the finding of the Enquiry Officer that the charge is proved, it cannot modify the punishment without assigning any reasons. We find no discussion by the Tribunal justifying the modification of the penalty. - 18 - WP No.38939 of 2018 18. Learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bandreddy Raja Gopal Reddy v. High Court of Judicature Registrar Vigilance and Others (2025 SCC OnLine AP 1134) and Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Others ([2024] 1 SCC 175) in support of his submissions. We find that both judgments are of no assistance to respondent No.2. Further, as contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate, the reinstatement of respondent No.2 is always subject to the outcome of the present writ petition. 19. In the present factual scenario, the acceptance of the Tribunal’s order by the Disciplinary Authority/State is of little assistance, and it cannot be held that the petitioner has no right to challenge the Tribunal’s order modifying the punishment, particularly when the punishment was imposed on the recommendation of the petitioner pursuant to its enquiry. 20. Upon detailed analysis of the impugned order, we are of the considered view that the same is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the following: - 19 - WP No.38939 of 2018 O R D E R (i) Writ petition is allowed. (ii) The order in Application No.2851/2017 dated 10.05.2018 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru is set aside. (iii) The order dated 11.05.2017 at Annexure-A17 bearing No.PÀAE 35 ©r¦ 2012 imposing penalty of compulsory retirement is restored. (iv) No order as to costs. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE VBS