1 2025:CGHC:48299 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 8967 of 2023 Md. Arshad Khan S/o Mohammad S. Khan Aged About 44 Years Post- Block Program Manager At Community Health Centre Kuokonda, District Dantewada, R/o Village Of Kuokonda, District Dantewada, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Health And Family Welfare, New Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Chief Medical and Health Officer Dantewada, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 3 - Mission Director National Health Mission, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Block Medical Officer Kuokonda Dantewada, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, Advocate For Respondents No.1, 2 and 4/State : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.3 : Mr. C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 19.09.2025 1. By filing the instant petition, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):- YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2025.09.26 11:07:18 +0530 2 “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record pertaining to the present case. 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may please to quash the impugned order dated 22-02-2023 (ANNEXURE P-1) Passed by the respondent no. 3, whereby the service of the petitioner has been terminated from his service. 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may please to quash the impugned order dated 29.09.2017 (ΑΝΝEXURE P-2) Passed by the respondent no. 3, whereby the service of the petitioner has been terminated from his service. 10.4 That this Hon'ble Court may please to direct the respondent authority to give the service of the petitioner on the post of the Block Program Manager At Community Health Centre Kuokonda District Dantewada. 10.5 That this Hon'ble court may further be pleased to pass any other order in favour of petitioner as it may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case with cost.” 2. Brief facts of the case, are that the petitioner was holding the substantive post of Block Program Manager and was posted at Community Health Centre, Kuokonda, Dantewada, District Dantewada. The petitioner challenges the termination order dated 29.09.2017 passed by the Mission Director, National Health 3 Mission, Raipur, whereby his service was terminated without departmental enquiry or opportunity of hearing, in violation of the principles of natural justice. Pursuant to the order of this Hon’ble Court dated 09.01.2023, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation on 07.02.2023 seeking relief against the termination; however, the same was rejected by the Mission Director on 22.02.2023 without properly considering the submissions. Both the termination and the rejection of his representation are arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to law, as he was not provided an opportunity of hearing, nor supplied with relevant documents, in violation of the terms and conditions of his appointment and the C.G. Civil Service (Contract) Rules, 1965, as well as the established principles of natural justice. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was holding the substantive post of Block Program Manager and was posted at Community Health Centre, Kuokonda, Dantewada. It is submitted that the termination order dated 29.09.2017 passed by the Mission Director, National Health Mission, Raipur, is illegal, arbitrary, and violative of the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was neither given an opportunity of hearing nor provided copies of any material or documents relied upon. Learned counsel further submits that pursuant to the order of this Hon’ble Court dated 09.01.2023, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation on 07.02.2023 seeking relief against the 4 termination. However, the same was rejected by the Mission Director on 22.02.2023 without properly considering the petitioner’s submissions. It is contended that the impugned actions of the respondents are contrary to the terms and conditions of the petitioner’s appointment, the C.G. Civil Service (Contract) Rules, 1965, and established principles of natural justice, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Senior Vocational Staff Masters Association & Ors., (2017) 9 SCC 379. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner has been denied his legitimate rights and the impugned orders are arbitrary, illegal, and unsustainable in law, warranting the interference of Court. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submits that the impugned termination order dated 29.09.2017 was passed in accordance with law and the relevant service rules. It is contended that the petitioner’s claim of denial of opportunity of hearing is not maintainable, as all procedural requirements under the C.G. Civil Service (Contract) Rules, 1965 were duly complied with. The rejection of the petitioner’s representation dated 07.02.2023 by the Mission Director on 22.02.2023 is also submitted to be valid and lawful, as the representation did not raise any fresh grounds warranting interference. It is therefore submitted that the writ petition filed by the petitioner lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. 5 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties at length and carefully considered their submissions. I have also perused all the material available on record, including the impugned orders, annexures filed by the parties, representations submitted, and relevant service rules. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2139 decided on 22.08.2024, in which the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is to the fact that even if for contractual appointment, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it is to be passed after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in WPS No. 4969/2015 in the matter of Digambar Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh and others decided on 22.08.2024 and in the said case also, this Court of the view that in order to pass a stigmatic or cumulative order, the concerned authorities are required to hold a departmental enquiry after giving due opportunity of hearing to delinquent/ employee. 7. The view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (supra) goes to show that before passing any stigmatic order for removal of any employee from service, a departmental enquiry is required to be done, which has not been 6 done in this case. In para 34 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: "28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572: (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms 7 of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673: AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the 8 service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank 9 or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant." 8. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and having 10 regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is apparent that the petitioner was not afforded a proper and meaningful opportunity of hearing before the impugned termination/stigmatic order was passed. 9. It is well settled that a contractual employee does not have an indefeasible right to appointment, it is equally settled that one contractual appointment cannot be arbitrarily substituted by another or terminated without adhering to the principles of natural justice, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Senior Vocational Staff Masters Association (supra). 10. In the present case, the petitioner’s contractual appointment was terminated on the ground of alleged irregularities which were reportedly revealed in an enquiry. In such circumstances, a stigmatic order affecting the petitioner’s service record cannot be passed without granting him a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be said to be justifiable or sustainable in law. 11. In view of the above, and taking note of the judgment in Swati Priyadarshini (supra) and other relevant pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, it is appropriate to direct the respondent authorities as follows: • Opportunity of Hearing: If the respondent authorities propose to pass any adverse or stigmatic order against the petitioner, he shall be provided with a reasonable 11 opportunity of personal hearing to present his case and clarify his position. • Consideration for Contractual Appointment: If there are any vacant contractual posts available, the petitioner shall be considered for such post, and if he fulfills all the requisite criteria, including his past work experience and performance record, he may be given preference in the grant of contractual appointment, subject to availability of post. 12. The respondent authorities shall complete the proceedings in accordance with the above directions within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. These directions are issued to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice and to prevent arbitrary action against the petitioner while preserving the legitimate administrative discretion of the respondents. 13. With these observations and directions, the instant petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh