IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI **** CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1607 of 2018 DERANGULA SANKAR, R/O.N.P.KUNTA VILLAGE AND MANDAL, ANANTAPUR DISTRICT. ...APPELLANT(S) AND STATE OF AP, rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the state of Telangana and the state of AP. ...RESPONDENT(S): DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 28.10.2025 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI 1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the order? : Yes/No 2. Whether the copy of order may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes/No 3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the order? : Yes/No ________________________ JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY ________________________________ JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI * THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1607 of 2018 % 28.10.2025 Crl.A.No.1607 of 2018 DERANGULA SANKAR, R/O.N.P.KUNTA VILLAGE AND MANDAL, ANANTAPUR DISTRICT. ...APPELLANT(S) Versus STATE OF AP, rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the state of Telangana and the state of AP. ...RESPONDENT(S): ! Counsel for Appellant : Sri D. Kodanda Rami Reddy learned counsel ^ Counsel for Respondent : Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor < Gist: > Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1) 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 2) (1970) 2 SCC 113: 1970 SCC (Cri) 328 3) (2001) 5 SCC 254 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 847 : 2001 4) 2016 (3) ALT (Crl.) 505 (DB) (A.P.) This Court made the following: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI TUESDAY, THIS THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE SPECIAL DIVISION BENCH PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY and THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1607 OF 2018 JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Subba Reddy Satti) The Sole accused in S.C.No.240 of 2016 on the file of the Court of Sessions Judge, Ananthapuramu, is the appellant. He was tried and convicted by the learned Sessions Judge for the charge under Section 302 IPC. 2. Gravamen of the charge is that on 06.09.2015, at about 6:30 P.M., when the first wife of the accused, Derangula Venkataramanamma (hereinafter referred to as „the deceased‟) refused to give money for consuming liquor, the accused intentionally poured kerosene on her and set her on fire, leading to her death, thereby committed offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. 3. The learned sessions judge convicted the accused and awarded life imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months. 4. The case of the prosecution, as per the evidence of prosecution witnesses, in brief, is that : (i) The deceased was the first wife of the accused, and their marriage was solemnised twenty-two years before the incident. They were blessed with two daughters. As the deceased did not give birth to a male child, the accused married P.W.1, the biological sister of the deceased. P.W.1 was also blessed with two daughters. The accused, along with his two wives and children, lived under the same roof. The accused was addicted to alcohol and used to harass the deceased for money to buy alcohol. On 08.07.2015, when the deceased refused to give money, the accused beat the deceased on her head with a stick, due to which the deceased sustained a bleeding injury. On the said incident, the deceased gave a report against the accused, in N.P. Kunta Police Station, and the same is pending before Kadiri Court. (ii) About ten days prior to the incident, Vanisree, the daughter of P.W.1, suffered from typhoid. The deceased and P.W.1 took her to Triveni Hospital, Tirupathi and spent Rs.20,000/- for treatment. On 06.09.2015, at about 6:30 p.m., while the deceased and P.W.1 were in the house, the accused came and demanded money to purchase liquor. Since the deceased refused to give money, the accused picked up a kerosene tin, poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. The deceased raised cries, and P.W.1 and others put off the flames. P.Ws.1 and 2 shifted the deceased to the Government Area Hospital, Kadiri. (iii) P.W.5, Head Constable, at the outpost of Kadiri Government Hospital, on receipt of hospital intimation, Ex.P7, recorded the statement of the deceased, Ex.P5, at 11:15 pm and took an impression of the left big toe. (iv) The duty Doctor sent intimation, Ex.P6, to the Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadiri, P.W.6. P.W.6 recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, Ex.P8. As per Ex.P8, the declaration commenced at 11:45 pm and concluded at 1:00 am. (v) P.W.7, Sub-Inspector of Police, N.P. Kunta Police Station, after receiving tappal from Government Hospital, Kadiri, on 07.09.2015, at about 5:00 am, registered FIR No.55 of 2015, initially for the offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. Ex.P9 is the F.I.R. At about 6:15 am, P.W.7 went to Kadiri Government Hospital and came to know that the deceased was referred to SVRR Hospital, Tirupathi. P.W.7 reached SVRR Hospital at about 9:30 am, examined P.Ws.1, 2 and the victim and recorded their statements. Thereafter, he secured the presence of V.R.O., P.W.3 and L.W.6, Raghunath at N.P. Kunta and proceeded to the scene of offence. He prepared a rough sketch of the scene of offence, Ex.P10 and seized M.Os.1 to 4 under the cover of Mahazar, Ex.P2. On receipt of credible information about the whereabouts of the accused, P.W.7, along with mediators, proceeded to the Kotha road cross and apprehended the accused. Later, P.W.7 prepared an arrest and confession mahazar and seized clothes, M.Os.5 and 6, in a plastic cover from the possession of the accused. He arrested the accused and produced him before the Court for remand after completion of all formalities and medical examination. (vi) On 12.09.2015, at about 8:00 am, P.W.1 came to the Police Station and gave a report that the deceased had died. P.W.7 re- registered F.I.R. under Section 302 I.P.C and informed the same to the Inspector of Police and sent express F.I.R., Ex.P11, the altered F.I.R. (vii) P.W.8, Inspector of Police, along with P.W.7 went to Kadiri Area Hospital. He served summons, Ex.P12, on P.Ws.1, 2 and L.W.3. He also served summons on P.W.3 and others under Ex.P3. He conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased. The photographs of the deceased were taken, which are marked as Ex.P13. Thereafter, he sent the dead body for postmortem examination and proceeded to the scene of offence. On 13.09.2015, P.W.8 recorded the statement of L.W.4, Rapuri Ramanjulamma. P.W.8 sent the property to RFSL under Ex.P14, a letter of advice, and after receipt of the RFSL report, Ex.P15, he filed a charge sheet. (viii) P.W.4, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Kardiri Area Hospital, conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and opined that the cause of death is due to septicaemia due to burns. The postmortem report is marked as Ex.P4. This court noticed that in the appendix of evidence, though the inquest report and postmortem report were marked separately, both were given the same exhibit number, i.e. Ex.P4. 5. In support of its case, prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 8, marked Exs.P1 to P15 and exhibited M.Os.1 to 6. 6. When the accused was examined under 313 Cr.P.C., he denied the incriminating evidence appearing against him. 7. Accepting the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant as aforesaid. 8. Heard Sri D. Kodanda Rami Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. Page 8 of 19 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the incident occurred on 06.09.2015 and the deceased succumbed to injuries on 11.09.2015. P.W.4, Doctor who issued Ex.P4, postmortem report opined that the cause of death is due to septicaemia. He would submit that due to lack of medical attention, the deceased succumbed to injuries. He would also submit that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind; hence, the dying declaration, Ex.P8, recorded by P.W.6, does not inspire confidence. He would also submit that the statement recorded by P.W.5 does not contain any endorsement from the Doctor regarding the coherence of the deceased to give a statement. He would submit that the learned Sessions Judge did not consider the evidence of D.W.1. Learned counsel, in the alternative, would submit that at the time of the incident, the accused was in a drunken state of mind and thus the offence was not done with any motive and hence the punishment under Sec 302 IPC may be converted to one under Section 304 Part-I. 10. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that P.W.1 and the deceased are natural sisters and they are wives of the accused. P.W.1 is the eyewitness to the incident. The evidence of P.W.1, coupled with Ex.P6, statement recorded by P.W.5 and Ex.P8, dying declaration recorded by P.W.6, proves the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. He would further submit that the accused poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. Proper medical treatment was provided; however, the deceased succumbed to injuries on 11.09.2015. He would submit that the evidence of P.Ws.5 and 6 is clear and categorical that the deceased is conscious and coherent when she gave statements. He would further submit that the appeal lacks merit. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the appeal. 11. We have carefully scrutinised the entire evidence on record. 12. As seen from the material available on record, the accused married the deceased about 22 years ago, and they were blessed with two daughters, Sulochana and Kavitha. Later, as there was no male child, the accused married P.W.1, the biological sister of the deceased, as they were not blessed with a male child. Out of the second wedlock, the accused and P.W.1 were blessed with two daughters, Vani Sree and Iswarya. The accused, PW1 and the deceased, along with children, resided under one roof. 13. P.W.1, the second wife of the accused, specifically deposed that the accused was addicted to alcohol and about three months prior to the incident, he beat the deceased on the head and caused bleeding injury, for which the deceased gave a complaint. Regarding the said incident, D.W.1, the daughter of the deceased and accused, deposed that the accused tried to beat P.W.1 and in that connection, the deceased intervened, and she received a blow from a stick on her head, and the deceased filed a case against the accused. Thus, this instance makes it clear that the accused beat the deceased on an earlier occasion, and the deceased lodged a complaint. 14. P.W.1 further deposed that on 06.09.2015, the accused came home and quarrelled regarding the amount spent for the treatment of the child of P.W.1 and picked up a kerosene can, poured kerosene on the deceased and set alight. Immediately, P.W.1, along with P.W.2 (brother of the deceased and P.W.1) shifted the deceased to the hospital at Kadiri. The evidence of P.W.1 is inspiring confidence, and nothing contrary was elicited during the cross-examination. 15. P.W.5, head constable, recorded the statement of the deceased on 06.09.2015 at about 11.15 pm. Thereafter, the Judicial Officer recorded the statement of the deceased, Ex.P8, at 11:45 pm, and the same was concluded at 1:00 am. No doubt, there is no certification by the Doctor in Ex.P5. However, in the later statement, Ex.P8 duty Doctor declared that the patient is conscious and coherent. Thus, the evidence of P.W.1 and Exs.P5 and P8 is consistent regarding the accused pouring kerosene on the deceased and setting her alight. The evidence of D.W.1 doesn‟t inspire confidence. 16. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased died due to septicaemia due to burn injuries, after five days of the incident, and hence, the conviction recorded by the trial Court needs to be set aside. We are not persuaded by the said submission in view of the judgment in Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh1, wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court highlighted a few broad principles and held as under at para 69 : a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC. b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished under Section 302 1 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 905 of the IPC. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia. d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant. e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries. f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases, first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide. g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course. i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.” 17. In the case at hand, the deceased died due to septicemia due to the burn injuries. The deceased suffered 80% burn injuries. Since the death occurred as a result of burn injuries, due to the pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased alight, though the death occurred after some days, the death is certainly due to the burn injuries. Thus, we don‟t find any merit in the argument of the learned counsel. 18. Regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant about the dying declarations Exs.P5 and P8 that they do not inspire confidence, let this Court deal with it. After the incident, the deceased was taken to the hospital. Initially, the deceased's statement, Ex.P5, was recorded by P.W.5, head constable. Thereafter, P.W.6, the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, recorded Ex.P8, dying declaration. The deceased consciously narrated in Ex.P8 about the accused pouring kerosene, as also the earlier incident. As seen from Ex.P.8, the learned Magistrate, on being satisfied regarding the coherence of the deceased, recorded the statement. The learned Magistrate had put some preliminary questions regarding the identity etc., and after the doctor certified that the injured was conscious, recorded dying declaration, Ex.P8. Nothing is forthcoming that the deceased was tutored or any other external influences at the time of recording of Ex.P8. Of course, both Exs.P5 and P8 are similar and there are no contradictions. Page 15 of 19 19. The statements of the deceased in Exs.P5 and P.8 are extracted herewith: Ex.P5 : …..“This day i.e. 06.09.2015 at about 6:00 pm, my husband quarrel and poured kerosene on me, which was available in my house and set fire. At that time, myself and my sister are in the house and children are sleeping.” Ex P.8 : “ Q. What happened today? Ans: Today night at 8.00 p.m. came and made a galata sir. Immediately he poured kerosene on me sir. After pouring the kerosene, he set fire. After setting the fire he went away sir. Q. who are there? Ans: Myself, my sister and my husband were present sir. My sister‟s children were present. But they were sleeping at that time sir. … Q. Can you tell anything more? Ans: Even two months prior to this incident, he beat on my head, due to which I got 8 stitches. I underwent treatment in this hospital Sir. I also lodged a complaint Sir. My husband poured kerosene and set fire sir. There is no one to look after my children. Save me sir. I want to live sir. After that she started weeping. Page 16 of 19 20. The effect of the dying declaration was considered by the Apex Court in Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab2 and it was observed as follows: “5. The dying declaration is a statement by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death and it becomes relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act in a case in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. It is true that a dying declaration is not a deposition in court and it is neither made on oath nor in the presence of the accused. It is, therefore, not tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused. But a dying declaration is admitted in evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence, on the principle of necessity. The weak points of a dying declaration just mentioned merely serve to put the court on its guard while testing its reliability, by imposing on it an obligation to closely scrutinise all the relevant attendant circumstances.” 21. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan3, considered the dying declaration and observed as follows: 6. Statements, written or verbal of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts under the circumstances enumerated under sub-sections (1) to (8) of Section 32 of the Act. When the 2 [(1970) 2 SCC 113 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 328] 3 (2001) 5 SCC 254 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 847 : 2001 statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question is admissible in evidence being relevant whether the person was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. Such statements in law are compendiously called dying declarations. The admissibility of the dying declaration rests upon the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath — nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire. Such statements are admitted, upon consideration that their declarations are made in extremity, when the maker is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. The principle on which the dying declarations are admitted in evidence, is based upon the legal maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire i.e. a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. It has always to be kept in mind that though a dying declaration is entitled great weight, yet it is worthwhile to note that as the maker of the statement is not subjected to cross-examination, it is essential for the court to insist that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court is obliged to rule out the possibility of the statement being the result of either tutoring, prompting or vindictive or a product of imagination. Before relying upon a dying declaration, the court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration was true, voluntary and not influenced by any extraneous consideration, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration as a rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence. 22. Thus, the statements in Exs.P5 and P.8 made by the deceased inspire the confidence of this Court, and this Court believes that the accused consciously poured the kerosene and set alight the deceased. 23. The alternative contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the accused was in an intoxicated state of mind and hence, the offence committed may be converted from 302 I.P.C. to 304-II I.P.C. We are not persuaded by said submission, given the facts and circumstances of this case. Having poured kerosene and lit the fire, the accused escaped from the place, which would indicate that he is conscious. In fact, as discussed supra, the accused, on an earlier occasion, beat the deceased, and it resulted in a criminal case. In fact, in Ex P.8, the deceased stated that one day before the incident, she, along with the P.W.1, hid due to the harassment of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge considered all these aspects and awarded the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 302 I.P.C. We do not see any ground to allow this appeal. 24. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Ananthapuram, in S.C.No.240 of 2016, dated 04.05.2018. As the appellant was released on bail, by order, dated 13.06.2023, in I.A.No.1 of 2023, in terms of the orders passed by the composite High Court in Batchu Rangarao and others v. State of A.P.4, he is directed to surrender before the concerned, to serve the remaining sentence of imprisonment, failing which, the learned trial Judge is directed to secure his presence by issuing warrants and commit him to prison for serving the remaining portion of sentence. It is needless to state that the period already undergone by the accused shall be given set off, as per the provisions of Section 428 Cr.P.C. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed. ________________________ JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY _______________________________ JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI Date : 28.09.2025 IKN 4 2016 (3) ALT (Crl.) 505 (DB) (A.P.)