JUDGMENT : JYOTSNA REWAL DUA, J. 1. Original petitioner-Sh. Rameshwar Singh was appointed as Panchayat Secretary on 23.08.1979 in Panchayat Samiti Rait, District Kangra. Services of the Panchayat Secretaries of Panchayat Samitis including that of the petitioner were taken over by the respondent-State vide office memorandum dated 15.06.1984 in the Panchayati Raj Department. Petitioner was absorbed in the Panchayati Raj Department. Later, the posts of Panchayat Secretaries were merged in the Rural Development Department and re-designated as Gram Panchayat Adhikari vide notification dated 15.10.1989. Accordingly, the petitioner also became an employee of the Rural Development Department. He was promoted in the year 2008 as Social Education and Block Planning Officer. Petitioner retired on 31.01.2011 on attaining the age of superannuation. Petitioner’s grievance is that he had rendered 31 years, 07 months and 08 days of service with the respondents, whereas, the respondents had granted him retiral benefits only for 27 years of service. The remaining service was not counted by the respondents. Petitioner seeks retiral benefits, viz. Gratuity, Leave Encashment as also Pension on the basis of 31 years, 07 months and 08 days of service rendered by him with the respondents. During the pendency of this writ petition, the original petitioner-Sh. Rameshwar Singh died on 06.08.2023. His legal representatives were brought on record vide order dated 08.11.2023 passed in CMP(M) No.1532 of 2023. 2. The above relief has been claimed by the petitioner on the strength of the decision rendered in State of Himachal Pradesh & others vs. Basheshar Lal, CWP No. 1802 of 2002, decided on 31.07.2008. In the said case, the petitioners were not being given the benefit of past service rendered by them in the Panchayat Samitis on the ground that such past services though had been considered for the grant of retiral benefits after absorption of the incumbents in the Rural Development Department, but the incumbents, who had been absorbed in the Panchayati Raj Department, their services as Panchayat Secretaries had not been taken into consideration. The ground was rejected by the Hon’ble Division Bench in Basheshar Lal, CWP No.1802 of 2002, decided on 31.07.2008 as under:- “In the reply filed by the State Government, they took up the plea that the applicant had not rendered qualifying service of 10 years. The ground was rejected by the Hon’ble Division Bench in Basheshar Lal, CWP No.1802 of 2002, decided on 31.07.2008 as under:- “In the reply filed by the State Government, they took up the plea that the applicant had not rendered qualifying service of 10 years. They also pleaded that the benefit of past service rendered in the Panchayat Samitis had been given to the persons absorbed in the Rural Development Department but these have not been granted to the applicant and similarly placed persons since they were absorbed in the Panchayat Department of the Government of Himachal Pradesh. xxx xxx xxx The only ground taken by the State of Himachal Pradesh was that since the petitioners were absorbed in the Panchayat Department of Government of Himachal Pradesh while others were absorbed in the Rural Development Department, therefore, the past services rendered have been considered by the Rural Development Department and not the past services rendered by the petitioner and others who have been absorbed in the Panchayat Department of the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The learned Tribunal had considered this plea and had observed that the past services rendered in the Panchayat Samitis have been considered by one wing of the State of Himachal Pradesh i.e. Rural Development Department while the another wing had denied this benefit of past services rendered by the Panchayat Secretaries though both these departments are part of the Government and surprisingly headed by the same Secretary. The learned Tribunal had made reference to some of the decisions including the one rendered by the Tribunal itself and had concluded that since the petitioners and others had also rendered the service in the same capacity under the Panchayat Samitis which benefit has been given to the persons absorbed in the Rural Development Department, it could not have been denied to the persons like the petitioners and others absorbed in the Panchayat Department of Government of Himachal Pradesh. No different treatment could have been meted out to the employees placed similarly and, therefore, the Tribunal had rightly directed the present petitioners to release all the retiral benefits in favour of the applicant/petitioners after counting the services rendered by them in the Panchayat Samitis. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality and calls for no interference by this Court. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal does not suffer from any illegality and calls for no interference by this Court. There is no merit in the petition filed by the petitioners which is dismissed accordingly alongwith costs quantified at Rs.3000/-.” Basheshar Lal (supra) holds that the petitioners (therein) and others had rendered the service in the same capacity under the Panchayat Samitis. The benefit of the service rendered by the petitioners and others in Panchayat Samitis had been given to the persons absorbed in the Rural Development Department. The same benefit ought to have been given to persons like the petitioners and others, who were absorbed in the Panchayati Raj Department of the State. Differential treatment to similarly placed employees could not be given in two wings of the State Government. Accordingly, the writ petition preferred by the State, assailing the order dated 08.05.2002 passed by the erstwhile learned H.P. Administrative Tribunal in favour of the petitioners in OA(D) No.283 of 1996, was dismissed. Reliance has also been placed for the petitioners upon Puran Chand Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, CWP(T) No. 5644 of 2008, decided alongwith connected matters on 13.07.2010. Puran Chand (supra) was allowed in view of Basheshar Lal (supra) as under:- “4. It is also jointly represented by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties that the present lis is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by the learned Tribunal in OA(D) No.283/1996 dated 8.5.2002 and judgment rendered in CWP No.1802/2002 dated 31.7.2008. 5. Consequently, the petitions are allowed. The respondents are directed to release all the retiral benefits to the petitioners after counting their services rendered by them in the Panchayat Department/Panchayat Samitis. They are also held entitled to interest @ 8% per annum on delayed payment of retiral benefits after two months from the date of their respective retirement. The judgment be implemented within three months from today. No costs.” 3. Respondents have filed reply to the instant writ petition, wherein facts have not been disputed, but the grant of relief prayed for by the petitioner has been opposed on the grounds:- (i). Petitioner had moved the Court after lapse of 12 years from the date of his retirement. The judgment be implemented within three months from today. No costs.” 3. Respondents have filed reply to the instant writ petition, wherein facts have not been disputed, but the grant of relief prayed for by the petitioner has been opposed on the grounds:- (i). Petitioner had moved the Court after lapse of 12 years from the date of his retirement. He though claims similar benefits as claimed in Basheshar Lal (supra) and Puran Chand (supra), yet, he remained fence sitter during the period. (ii). Rural Development and Panchayati Raj are two separate departments. In Panchayati Raj Department, the benefit of service rendered in the capacity of Panchayat Secretary in Panchayat Samiti was directed to be counted only in case of petitioner in Basheshar Lal (supra). This benefit has not been extended in general to the Panchayat Secretaries of Panchayat Samitis, who were later merged in the Panchayati Raj Department under office memorandum dated 15.06.1984. 4. Taking note of the stand of the respondents, which practically amounted to sitting over the decisions in Basheshar Lal (supra) and Puran Chand (supra), following order was passed in the matter on 12.11.2024:- “Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had rendered 31 years 7 months and 8 days of service with the respondents, whereas the respondents have given him retiral benefits only for 27 years of service. The remaining service has not been counted by the respondents. That the action of the respondents in not treating his balance service as countable towards release of retiral benefits is contrary to the law laid down in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Basheshar Lal and Puran Chand Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. 2. Respondents opposed the writ petition on the ground that Rural Development and Panchayati Raj are two separate departments. It is only the Panchayati Raj Department that has extended the benefit of counting of service rendered in Panchayat Samiti in favour of the petitioners in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Basheshar Lal (supra). The benefit has not been extended in general to the Panchayat Secretaries of Panchayat Samitis, who were later merged in Panchayati Raj Department vide office memorandum dated 15.06.1984. Prima facie, the above does not appear to be valid contention in view of the decisions rendered in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Basheshar Lal and Puran Chand Vs. State of H.P. & Ors. (2015) 1 SCC 347 . Prima facie, the above does not appear to be valid contention in view of the decisions rendered in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Basheshar Lal and Puran Chand Vs. State of H.P. & Ors. (2015) 1 SCC 347 . Let learned Additional Advocate General to have further instructions in the matter within two weeks. List thereafter.” Despite the above opportunity given to the respondents to make amends by considering the total service rendered by the petitioner for the purpose of release of retiral benefits, the respondents reiterated their objections taken in the reply in the instructions placed on record on 21.11.2024. (i). Basheshar Lal (supra) has already held that the services rendered by Panchayat Secretaries in Panchayat Samitis are liable to be taken into consideration without any discrimination irrespective of the department in which they were absorbed, viz. Rural Development Department or Panchayati Raj Department. The directions issued in Basheshar Lal (supra) were in rem and not in personam. Hon’ble Division Bench has very specifically held that “since the petitioners and others had also rendered the service in the same capacity under the Panchayat Samitis which benefit has been given to the persons absorbed in the Rural Development Department, it could not have been denied to the persons like the petitioners and others absorbed in the Panchayat Department of Government of Himachal Pradesh. No different treatment could have been meted out to the employees placed similarly”. The above findings in Basheshar Lal (supra) were relied upon in Puran Chand (supra), wherein the respondents were directed to release the retiral benefits to the petitioners therein alongwith interest @ 8% per annum on delayed payment of retiral benefits. State of Uttar Pradesh and others Versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others (supra) holds that normally when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. This principle is, however, subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. Hon’ble Apex Court, however, further clarified that exception of delay, laches and acquiescence will not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularization and the like (Reference: K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. In Lt. Col Suprita Chandel Vs. Union of India and Ors. In Lt. Col Suprita Chandel Vs. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3664, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that where a citizen aggrieved by the action of the Government Department has approached the Court and obtained the declaration of law in his favour, the other similarly situated ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to approach the Court. There is no justification to penalize the employees, who have not come to Court/for not having litigated, they too shall be entitled to the same benefit as the petitioner. In exceptional cases, where the Court has expressly prohibited the extension of benefit to those who have not approached the Court till then or in cases where grievance in personam is redressed, the matter may acquire different dimension and the Department would be justified in denying the relief to an individual who claims extension of the benefit of the said judgment. In cases where employer is not able to point out any valid justification as to how the petitioner is not identically situated with incumbents who had succeeded before the Court, the respondents are liable to grant same benefits to that petitioner as well. Petitioner’s case, in such situation, is founded on the principle of discrimination. What is sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for the gander. In Union of India and others Vs. Munshi Ram, Civil Appeal No. 2811 of 2022, decided on 31.10.2022 it was held that there cannot be different criteria/ parameters with respect to similarly situated employees working under the same employer. All such employees are required to be treated similar & equally and are entitled to the similar benefits & same treatment. There cannot be any discrimination between the same set of employees. (ii). Present petitioner had superannuated on 31.01.2011, i.e. much after the decisions rendered in Basheshar Lal (supra) and Puran Chand (supra). Respondent as a welfare State was expected to discharge its duties as such and to grant the benefit of aforesaid decisions in favour of the petitioner, who was similarly situated. A judgment delivered in rem is to be applied uniformly to all similarly situated employees. Respondent as a welfare State was expected to discharge its duties as such and to grant the benefit of aforesaid decisions in favour of the petitioner, who was similarly situated. A judgment delivered in rem is to be applied uniformly to all similarly situated employees. Once the respondent-State had already been directed by the Court in Basheshar Lal (supra) to release retiral benefits after counting the service rendered in Panchayat Samitis irrespective of absorption of such incumbent (employee) in Panchayati Raj or Rural Development Department and to apply this principle not just to the petitioners in Basheshar Lal (supra), but to others similarly placed, the respondent-State had solemn duty to apply the same to similarly situated employees including the present petitioner. In fact, petitioner is not even expected to be aware of the decision, but respondent-State was. Instead of itself extending the benefit of Basheshar Lal (supra) to the petitioner, respondent-State has the impudence to deny the benefit to the petitioner on the plea of petitioner’s filing this writ petition twelve years after his retirement. Retiral benefits in lieu of approximately four years of service rendered by the petitioner as Panchayat Secretary in Panchayat Samiti are being denied to the petitioner not only in the reply, but also in the office instructions dated 21.11.2024 on the ground of petitioner having knocked the doors of the Court 12 years after his superannuation and also in a futile attempt to again open the decision rendered in Basheshar Lal (supra), which has admittedly become final and stands implemented. In Union of India and others Versus Pirthwi Singh and others, (2018) 16 SCC 363 Hon’ble Apex Court deprecated conduct of the appellant in filing appeals after dismissal of appeals on the same subject matter. Portions relevant to the context are as under:- “3. After dismissal of the batch of appeals, the Union of India filed yet another appeal on the same subject being Civil Appeal No. (Blank) of 2018 (Diary No. 4893 of 2018) entitled Union of India v. Balbir Singh. That appeal came up for consideration before this Court on 9-3-2018 and was dismissed following the decision in Balbir Singh Turn, (2018) 11 SCC 99 . While dismissing the appeal, it was noted that it was filed well after several similar matters were dismissed by this Court. That appeal came up for consideration before this Court on 9-3-2018 and was dismissed following the decision in Balbir Singh Turn, (2018) 11 SCC 99 . While dismissing the appeal, it was noted that it was filed well after several similar matters were dismissed by this Court. The conduct of the Union of India in filing civil appeals/special leave petitions after the issue is concluded by this Court was not appreciated. It was noted that the Union of India must take full responsibility for unnecessarily adding to the burden of the justice delivery system. 5. The present appeal was filed on 8-3-2018 which is also well after the decision Balbir Singh Turn9. We would have expected that with the dismissal of the appeals relating to Balbir Singh Turn9 and Balbir Singh, the Union of India would take steps to withdraw this appeal from the Registry of this Court so that it is not even listed and there is no unnecessary burden on the Judges. But obviously, the Union of India has no such concern and did not withdraw its appeal from the Registry itself. 6. The Union of India must appreciate that by pursuing frivolous or infructuous cases, it is adding to the burden of this Court and collaterally harming other litigants by delaying hearing of their cases through the sheer volume of numbers. If the Union of India cares little for the justice delivery system, it should at least display some concern for litigants, many of whom have to spend a small fortune in litigating in the Supreme Court.” After considering the National Litigation Policy, 2010, following observations were made:- “11. To make matters worse, in this appeal, the Union of India has engaged 10 lawyers, including an Additional Solicitor General and a Senior Advocate! This is as per the appearance slip submitted to the Registry of this Court. In other words, the Union of India has created a huge financial liability by engaging so many lawyers for an appeal whose fate can be easily imagined on the basis of existing orders of dismissal in similar cases. Yet the Union of India is increasing its liability and asking the taxpayers to bear an avoidable financial burden for the misadventure. Is any thought being given to this? 12. Yet the Union of India is increasing its liability and asking the taxpayers to bear an avoidable financial burden for the misadventure. Is any thought being given to this? 12. The real question is: when will the Rip Van Winkleism stop and the Union of India wake up to its duties and responsibilities to the justice delivery system? 13. To say the least, this is an extremely unfortunate situation of unnecessary and avoidable burdening of this Court through frivolous litigation which calls for yet another reminder through the imposition of costs on the Union of India while dismissing this appeal. We hope that someday some sense, if not better sense, will prevail on the Union of India with regard to the formulation of a realistic and meaningful National Litigation Policy and what it calls "ease of doing business" which can, if faithfully implemented benefit litigants across the country. 14. The appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000 as before to be deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks from today for utilisation for juvenile justice issues. Pending IAs are also disposed of.” Once the legal principle involved in the adjudication of present petition has already been decided in a decision rendered in rem, it was expected from the welfare State to apply the same to the employee-the petitioner, who is admittedly situated similarly and to redress his grievance. This is also the purport and object of the Litigation Policy of the State circulated on 07.03.2011. Not redressing the grievances would not only give rise to unnecessary multiplication of the litigation, but would also bring in otherwise avoidable increase to the Court docket on unproductive government induced litigation. 5. In view of above, this writ petition is allowed. Respondents are directed to implement the decisions rendered in Basheshar Lal (supra) and Puran Chand (supra) in the case of the petitioner by counting the service rendered by him as Panchayat Secretary in Panchayat Samiti alongwith the services rendered by him in the Panchayati Raj Department and Rural Development Department towards release of retiral benefits, i.e. pension, gratuity and leave encashment. The petitioner shall also be entitled to interest @ 5% per annum from the due date till the actual date of payment. This exercise be completed within a period of six months, failing which the payable interest shall become 7% per annum. The petitioner shall also be entitled to interest @ 5% per annum from the due date till the actual date of payment. This exercise be completed within a period of six months, failing which the payable interest shall become 7% per annum. Further, the respondents shall pay costs of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner. The writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.