JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 01.08.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Simrour District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 29.10.2009 and order of sentence dated 31.10.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. I, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that informant Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) was the Principal of National Public School Sataun. The school closed for pre-nursery and KG at 1:00 p.m. The children were standing outside the gate on 20.09.2002 with Sunita Devi (PW-2). The informant Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) was also standing on the staircase. Ram Parkash (PW-4), Shyam Lal, Kamlesh Kapoor, etc., had visited the school to take their children. A tractor having no registration plate came towards the school at a high speed at around 1:10 p.m. The tractor went towards the wrong side of the road and hit Rohit Thakur, Pragya Tomar, Neha Thakur and Sanjana Tomar, who sustained injuries. Rohit Thakur died on the spot, and Pragya Tomar succumbed to her injury on the way to the hospital. Tapender Singh (accused) was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. The accident occurred due to his negligence and the high speed of the tractor. Intimation was given to the police. An entry was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Balak Ram (PW-15) went to the spot for the verification of the information. Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) made a statement (Ext.PW-1/A), which was sent to the Police Station where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-15/B) was registered. SI Balak Ram (PW-15) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-15/D) and seized the tractor and the trolley vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Jai Chand (PW-8) took the photographs of the spot (Exts.P1 to P4) whose negatives are Exts.P5 to P8. Inquests on the dead bodies of Rohit Thakur and Pragya Tomar were conducted, and the reports (Ext.PW-15/E and Ext.PW-15/F) were prepared. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-15/D) and seized the tractor and the trolley vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Jai Chand (PW-8) took the photographs of the spot (Exts.P1 to P4) whose negatives are Exts.P5 to P8. Inquests on the dead bodies of Rohit Thakur and Pragya Tomar were conducted, and the reports (Ext.PW-15/E and Ext.PW-15/F) were prepared. Dr S.N. Sachhan (PW-10) conducted the post-mortem of Pragya Tomar and found that she had died due to a ruptured spleen, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW-10/A). Dr S.N. Sachhan (PW-10) also conducted the post-mortem of Rohit Thakur and found that he had died due to a head injury, causing complete brain damage. He issued the report (Ext.PW-10/B). He examined the accused, Tapender Singh, obtained his blood and urine samples and handed them over to the police. He issued a report (Ext.PW-10/C). Anil Kumar (PW-5) produced the documents of the tractor, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-5/A). HC Mujahir Khan (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found that there was no mechanical defect in it, which could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW-7/A). The viscera of the deceased and blood and urine samples of the accused were sent to FSL Bharari, Shimla. Report (Ext.PW-14/A was issued, showing that no alcohol was found in the blood and urine samples of the accused. Statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses to prove its case. Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) is the informant/eye witness. Sunita Devi (PW-2) and Kripal Singh (PW-3) are the eyewitnesses, but they did not support the prosecution’s case. Ram Parkash (PW-4) is an eye witness to the incident. Anil Kumar (PW-5) produced the driving licence of the accused. Om Parkash (PW-6) came out after hearing the noise. Mujhair Khan (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the tractor. Jai Chand (PW-8) took the photographs. Balbir Singh (PW-9) is the owner of the tractor. Ram Parkash (PW-4) is an eye witness to the incident. Anil Kumar (PW-5) produced the driving licence of the accused. Om Parkash (PW-6) came out after hearing the noise. Mujhair Khan (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the tractor. Jai Chand (PW-8) took the photographs. Balbir Singh (PW-9) is the owner of the tractor. Dr S.N. Sachhan (PW-10) conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and preserved the blood and urine samples of the accused. HHC Pal Chand (PW-11) carried the samples to FSL Bharari. Raj Kumar (PW- 12) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. Dr Inderjit Singh (PW13) examined Neha Thakur and found that she had sustained simple injuries. ASI Ram Singh (PW-14) and SI Balak Ram (PW-15) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that Anil Kumar had obtained a driving license from him regarding a claim case. He was innocent. He examined Inder Singh (DW-1) and Sohan Singh (DW-2) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that a tractor without any registration plate had caused the accident. There was ambiguity regarding the registration number, but that was not material. The accused was apprehended on the spot, and his identity was duly established. Anil Kuamr (PW-5) claimed to be the owner of the tractor, but this claim was false. The defence evidence was contradictory and insufficient to doubt the prosecution’s case. The prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused was driving the tractor at a high speed and towards the right side of the road where the children were standing, which led to the accident. Pragya Tomar and Rohit Thakur died, and Neha sustained injuries in the accident; hence, the trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and sentenced him as under:- 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Simrour District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving a tractor having no registration plate that had caused the accident. The ambiguity in the evidence regarding the registration number was not sufficient to doubt the prosecution’s case. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving a tractor having no registration plate that had caused the accident. The ambiguity in the evidence regarding the registration number was not sufficient to doubt the prosecution’s case. The tractor was driven at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Pragya Tomar and Rohit Thakur died in the accident, and Neha Thakur sustained injuries in the accident; therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and no interference was required with it. Hence, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There was no legally admissible evidence to prove that the tractor involved in the accident was mechanically examined; some other tractor was seized and mechanically examined to fasten the liability upon the accused. There is no evidence to show that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Sunita Devi (PW-2) did not support the prosecution’s case. Shyam Lal, who was named as a witness in the F.I.R., was not examined, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution for withholding him. Statement of defence witnesses made the prosecution’s case doubtful, and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting the defence evidence. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Nitin Soni, learned counsel for the accused/petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr. Nitin Soni, learned counsel for the accused/petitioner, submitted that there is contradictory evidence regarding the registration number of the tractor, which was involved in the accident. Anil Kumar (PW-5) proved that he had employed the accused as a driver in some other tractor. This evidence was ignored by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. Anil Kumar (PW-5) proved that he had employed the accused as a driver in some other tractor. This evidence was ignored by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon a judgment of this Court in Manoj Chauhan vs. State of H.P. 2025 HHC 33018 in support of his submission. 11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the prosecution evidence was quite specific that a tractor having no registration plate was involved in the accident. The accused was apprehended on the spot. Mere mention of the wrong registration number in the mechanical report or the informant’s statement will not make the prosecution case suspect. Anil Kumar (PW-5) never claimed to be the owner of the tractor in the witness box, and this version was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 45 2 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 45 2 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional ju- risdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional ju- risdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. It was specifically mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW-1/A) that a tractor without a registration plate came towards the school at a high speed. Seizure memo (Ext.PW-1/B) also mentions that a tractor without a registration plate was seized by the police. Jai Chand (PW-8) took the photographs (Exts. P-3 and Ext.P-4), which show no registration plate on the front or the rear. It was not suggested to him that he had taken the photographs of some other tractor or that a tractor bearing registration No. HP-17-6423 was also parked on the spot, which had the registration plates on the front and the rear. Therefore, the testimony of this witness also establishes that the tractor involved in the accident had no registration plates. 20. Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) stated that a tractor without any registration plate was going towards the bazaar and hit the children standing near the gate. The accused disclosed the number of the tractor as HP-17-3839. Thus, the informant has stated on oath that the tractor had no registration number plate, and he was disclosing the registration number as per the statement made by the accused on the spot. The registration number mentioned by the informant, based on the information supplied by some other person, is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence, which cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 21. The registration number mentioned by the informant, based on the information supplied by some other person, is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence, which cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 21. Ram Parkash (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that the tractor had no registration plate and no one had disclosed its registration number. Testimony of this witness also establishes that the tractor had no registration plate on the spot. 22. HC Mujahir Khan (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the tractor bearing registration number HP-17-6423. He stated in his cross-examination that the tractor had registration number HP-17-6423 written on the front and the rear. He had not checked the engine number and chassis number of the tractor. The statement made by him that the tractor had registration No HP-17-6323 written on the front and rear is contrary to the prosecution’s case because the tractor had no registration plate either on the front or the back. Thus, it is apparent that he had examined some other tractor. However, this will not make any difference because the accused did not claim that the tractor had any mechanical defect which led to the accident; therefore, even if his report is excluded from consideration, the same would not affect the prosecution’s case. 23. Balbir Singh (PW-9) stated that he is the owner of the tractor bearing registration number HP-17-6423. He had handed over the tractor to Anil Kumar (PW-5). Anil Kumar had employed the accused Tapender Singh as a driver, who informed him telephonically on 20.09.2002 that two children had died in an accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not remember whether the police interrogated him 1,2, or 4 days after the receipt of the phone call. He went to the Rajban Police Post and saw that his tractor was parked in the Police Post. It has the registration No. HP-17-6423. Anil Kumar (PW-5) had two tractors, one belonging to him (Anil Kumar) and another leased to him by Balbir. No document was prepared regarding the lease of the tractor to Anil Kumar (PW-5). He had affixed the registration plates to the tractor after the purchase. He denied that the person residing in Sirmour was employed as a driver. He denied that Anil had not employed the accused as a driver. 24. No document was prepared regarding the lease of the tractor to Anil Kumar (PW-5). He had affixed the registration plates to the tractor after the purchase. He denied that the person residing in Sirmour was employed as a driver. He denied that Anil had not employed the accused as a driver. 24. The testimony of this witness shows that the tractor bearing registration No. HP-17-6473 belongs to him, which was leased by him to Anil Kumar (PW-5), and Anil Kumar (PW-5) had employed the accused as a driver. 25. Anil Kumar (PW-5) stated in his cross-examination that he had tractors bearing registration numbers HP-17-3851 and HP-17-6423, which were sent towards the High School. He denied that he had shown the accused to be the driver of the tractor to avoid a claim. 26. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the ambiguity regarding the registration number of the tractor in the statements of Anil Kumar (PW-5), Balbir Singh (PW-9) and Mujahir Khan (PW-7) would not help the accused because the tractor involved in the accident had no registration plate. 27. Balak Ram (PW-15) denied in his cross- examination that he had seized the tractor bearing registration No. 3839 and thereafter seized tractor 6423. He denied that the accused had no concern with the tractor. He stated that he seized the tractor bearing registration number 6423 on the date of the accident. He denied that the driver involved in the accident had run away from the spot. He denied that the tractor was wrongly seized because the tractor involved in the accident could not be apprehended. 28. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witness to show that he was making a false statement. It was not suggested to him that the tractor seized by him from the spot had any registration plate either in the front or the rear. He categorically denied that the tractor involved in the accident was substituted for some other tractor. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof and will not help the accused. 29. The accused examined Inder Singh (DW-1). He stated that Anil Kumar (PW-5) had employed the accused and Shyam Lal as drivers. Anil Kumar (PW-5) had the tractors bearing registration numbers HP-17-3037 and HP-17-3851. Tractor bearing registration number HP-17A-6423 is owned by Balbir Singh (PW-9). Anil Kumar (PW-5) had no concern with the tractor bearing registration number HP-17A-6423. 29. The accused examined Inder Singh (DW-1). He stated that Anil Kumar (PW-5) had employed the accused and Shyam Lal as drivers. Anil Kumar (PW-5) had the tractors bearing registration numbers HP-17-3037 and HP-17-3851. Tractor bearing registration number HP-17A-6423 is owned by Balbir Singh (PW-9). Anil Kumar (PW-5) had no concern with the tractor bearing registration number HP-17A-6423. The accused never drove this tractor. He was present on the spot. The tractor bearing registration number HP-17A-3823 was involved in the accident, which was being driven by Shyam Lal. Shyam Lal had no driving license, and he ran away from the spot. The owner asked the accused to park the tractor on the side and hand over his driver's license. He stated in his cross-examination that his house is located at a distance of 3 km from Sataun. He is a PWD contractor. He never checked the registration certificate or the documents of the tractor mentioned by him. He denied that Balbir Singh had (PW-9) handed over his tractor to Anil on lease, and Anil had employed the accused as a driver. He denied that he was present on the spot. 30. The testimony of this witness is highly doubtful. He deposed about the ownership of the tractor, but admitted in his cross-examination that he had never checked the registration certificate and documents of the tractor, showing that his statement regarding the ownership cannot be believed. He did not provide any reason for his presence on the spot. He claimed to be an eyewitness but did not protest when the accused was falsely implicated. He did not appear before the police to tell them that the accused had nothing to do with the commission of the crime, and Shyam Lal was the real culprit. His name was not suggested to any witness or even by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, his testimony was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 31. Sohan Singh (DW-2) stated in his cross- examination that he did not remember the day or time of the accident. He volunteered to say that the incident occurred at 12:00. He was going towards Sataun. He could not say that Balbir Singh (PW-9) had leased his tractor bearing registration No. HP-17-6423 to Anil Kumar (PW-5), and he (Anil Kumar) had employed the accused as a driver. The police had not interrogated him. He volunteered to say that the incident occurred at 12:00. He was going towards Sataun. He could not say that Balbir Singh (PW-9) had leased his tractor bearing registration No. HP-17-6423 to Anil Kumar (PW-5), and he (Anil Kumar) had employed the accused as a driver. The police had not interrogated him. He denied that he was making a false statement. 32. The testimony of this witness also suffers from the same infirmity as the testimony of Inder Singh (DW-1). He claimed to be an eye eyewitness but he did not protest when Shayam Lal, the real culprit, was substituted by the police. His name was not suggested to any person. His name was not mentioned by the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. He claimed to know about the ownership of the tractor but had not checked the documents. All these facts will make it difficult to place reliance upon his testimony, and learned Courts below had rightly rejected his testimony. 33. Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) specifically stated that Tapender Singh (accused) was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Kirpal Singh (PW-3) stated that the accused was driving the tractor. Ram Parkash (PW-4) stated that the accused was driving the tractor and the accident occurred due to his negligence. Om Parkash (PW-6) stated that he came out after hearing the noise and saw that the accused was driving the tractor. The people were beating him. He rescued the accused and kept him inside the school. Subsequently, the police arrested the accused. The accused was medically examined on 20.09.2002 at 10:00 p.m., the date of the accident, which corroborates the statement of this witness that the accused was taken by the police from the spot on the date of the incident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kishore Prabhakar Sawant v. State of Maharashtra , (1999) 2 SCC 45 , that when the accused is apprehended from the spot, the question of test identification parade does not arise. Hence, the judgment cited on behalf of the accused in Manoj Chauhan (supra) that the test identification parade is necessary where the accused did not know the accused does not apply to the present case. 34. It was suggested to the witnesses that the accused was not driving the tractor, but they denied it. Hence, the judgment cited on behalf of the accused in Manoj Chauhan (supra) that the test identification parade is necessary where the accused did not know the accused does not apply to the present case. 34. It was suggested to the witnesses that the accused was not driving the tractor, but they denied it. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, and learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. 35. Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) stated in his cross-examination that he had not seen the accused while driving the tractor. He volunteered to say that he had seen the accused in the driver’s seat. It was submitted that his testimony does not establish that the accused was driving the tractor. This is hair-splitting because he had seen the accused sitting in the driver’s seat immediately after the accident. The accused never claimed that somebody put him in the driver’s seat. The accident occurred suddenly, and there was no reason to notice the tractor before the accident. Therefore, the fact that he had not seen the accused while driving the tractor at the time of the accident, but had seen him after the accident sitting on the tractor, cannot lead to an inference that the accused was not driving the tractor and he was sitting on the driver’s seat without any reason. There is a presumption of continuity of things, which presumption applies forward and backwards. Therefore, the only inference that can be drawn from the fact that the accused was sitting in the driver’s seat is that he was driving the tractor, and the cross-examination of this witness will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. 36. It was submitted that Kirpal Singh (PW-3) was declared hostile, and his testimony regarding the accused being the driver cannot be accepted. This submission is stated to be rejected. Kirpal Singh (PW-3) was declared hostile because he stated that he was unable to say whose negligence led to the accident. This was no reason to declare him hostile because a witness cannot depose about the inference from the facts, but the facts alone. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivkumar v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2223, that a witness should not be indiscriminately declared hostile. It was observed: “9. This was no reason to declare him hostile because a witness cannot depose about the inference from the facts, but the facts alone. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivkumar v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2223, that a witness should not be indiscriminately declared hostile. It was observed: “9. We are at a loss to understand why the witness was treated as hostile in the first place. We are frequently coming across cases where the prosecutor, for no ostensible reason, wants to treat the witnesses as hostile, and the Court indiscriminately grants permission. It is well settled, by judgments of this Court, that before a witness can be declared hostile and the party examin- ing the witnesses is allowed to cross-examine, there must be some material to show that the witnesses are not speaking the truth or have exhibited an element of hostility to the party for whom they is deposing. No doubt, the circumstances under which the Court will exercise the discretion under Section 154 of the Evi- dence Act, 1872 (Section 157 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023) and permit the party calling the witness to put any question which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, this Court has held that the contingency of cross- examining the witness by the party calling is an ex- traordinary phenomenon and permission should be given only in special cases. Small or insignificant omis- sions cannot be the basis for treating the witnesses as hostile, and the Court, before exercising its discretion, must scan and weigh the circumstances properly and ought not to exercise its discretion in a casual or rou- tine manner.” 37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Selvamani v. State , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record and the version which is as per the prosecution evidence or the defence version can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence on record. It was observed: “9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Selvamani v. State , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record and the version which is as per the prosecution evidence or the defence version can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence on record. It was observed: “9. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 627 : 1991 INSC 153, relying on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389 : 1975 INSC 306, Sri Rabindra Kuamr Dey v. State of Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233 : 1976 INSC 204, Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30 : 1979 INSC 126, has held that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross- examined him. It was further held that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. 10. This Court, in the case of C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567 : 2010 INSC 553, has observed thus: “81. It is a settled legal proposition that (Khujji case, SCC p. 635, para 6) ‘6..… the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.’ 82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra, (1996) 10 SCC 360 , this Court held that (at SCC p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543 , Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516, Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 , Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh v. State, (2009) 6 SCC 462 . 83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence.” 38. Thus testimony of this witness cannot be discarded because he was treated to be hostile by the prosecution. 39. Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. This is a pure finding of facts supported by the material on record, and this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact while exercising the revisional jurisdiction unless there is some perversity. 40. Informant Kamlesh Sharma (PW-1) stated that the tractor was being driven at a high speed and was taken towards the wrong side of the road. Kirpal Singh (PW-3) stated that the children were standing on the stairs. A tractor hit the children. Ram Parkash (PW-4) stated that a tractor came from Sataun at a high speed and hit the children standing on the stairs. The site plan (Ext.PW-15/D) shows that the tractor was taken towards the extreme right side of the road. 7 feet of space was left towards the left side from the rear tyre, and 6 feet of space was left towards the rear tyre of the trolley. The total width of the road is shown to be 15 feet. This corroborates the informant’s version that the tractor was taken towards the right side of the road after leaving sufficient space towards the left side. The site plan also shows that the tractor had skid marks to the extent of 7 feet, clearly suggesting that the accused was unable to bring the tractor to a halt after applying the brakes. 41. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. The site plan also shows that the tractor had skid marks to the extent of 7 feet, clearly suggesting that the accused was unable to bring the tractor to a halt after applying the brakes. 41. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State , AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 42. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar , 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 43. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj , 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 43. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj , 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 44. Thus, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, which led to the accident, and the learned Courts below had rightly held him guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. 45. Dr S.N. Sachhan (PW-10) conducted the post- mortem of Rohit Thakur and Pragya Tomar, and he found that they had sustained injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. His reports corroborate the prosecution’s version that the death was caused in a motor vehicle accident. 45. Dr S.N. Sachhan (PW-10) conducted the post- mortem of Rohit Thakur and Pragya Tomar, and he found that they had sustained injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. His reports corroborate the prosecution’s version that the death was caused in a motor vehicle accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly affirmed the conviction. 46. Dr Inderjeet Singh (PW-13) conducted the medical examination of Neha and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries could have been caused by way of a fall, but that is merely an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution case suspect. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC. 47. Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, and simple imprisonment of two years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. 48. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana , (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus: "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 49. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh , (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held:- “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 50. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi , (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 51. In the present case, two precious lives were lost, and the sentence of two years is not excessive. 52. No other point was urged. 53. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 51. In the present case, two precious lives were lost, and the sentence of two years is not excessive. 52. No other point was urged. 53. In view of the above, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are sustainable and no interference is required with them. Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 54. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.