JUDGMENT : AJAY MOHAN GOEL , J. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief:- “It is, therefore, very humbly prayed that impugned order dated 30.05.2023 (Annexure P-1), passed in case No.39/3 of 2023 titled as Chief Executive Officer Cantonment Board versus Mohd. Sultan Malik, by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Kasauli, may please be ordered to be quashed and set aside and the Magistrate may be directed to recovery the arrear of lease rent in accordance with the mandate of Section 324 of the Cantonment Act, 2006 and Sections 421 and 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in view of the submissions made hereinabove, in the interest of justice.” 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, in an application filed by the petitioner under Section 324 of the Cantonment Act, 2006, in terms whereof, the application of the petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the private respondent before this Court is running a shop on rent which belongs to the petitioner. Cantonment Board Kasauli vide CBR No.10 dated 11.05.2020 resolved to exempt full lease rent of stall holder for lockdown period w.e.f. 22.03.2020 to 17.05.2020. Later on, the Chief Officer, Commanding in Chief issued direction to the Cantonment Board, Kasauli on 11.05.2020 that exemption be modified to the effect that instead of full exemption, the same shall be exempted upto 50% of the rent from 22.03.220 to 17.05.2020. 4. Pursuant to the said direction of the Officer concerned, Cantonment Board Kasauli on 13.07.2021 again passed a resolution and granted exemption of 50% of rent from 22.03.2020 to 17.05.2020. 5. Thereafter, a notice was issued by the Cantonment Board to the present respondent on 12.07.2021 for the payment of arrears/rent. 6. As the needful was not done by the respondent, the Cantonment Board filed an application under Section 324 of the Cantonment Act to recover the said sum and in terms of the impugned order; said application has been dismissed by the learned Court below. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned order is per se perverse. As the needful was not done by the respondent, the Cantonment Board filed an application under Section 324 of the Cantonment Act to recover the said sum and in terms of the impugned order; said application has been dismissed by the learned Court below. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned order is per se perverse. He submitted that under Section 324 of the Cantonment Act, method of recovery of arrears of rent etc., is provided and as the petitioner had invoked this provision for the recovery of rent against the respondent and as the rent was admittedly due from the respondent to the petitioner, learned Court should have allowed the application. However, rather than doing the same, it went into the issue of the grant of exemption without having any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same. Learned Senior Counsel thus submitted that, as the impugned order was per se without jurisdiction, the same was liable to be set aside on this count. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the order passed by the learned Trial Court and by referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 108, titled Cantonment Board versus Pyare Lal, he argued that the arrears of rent due under a lease cannot be recovered by invoking the provisions of Section 324 of the Act. Learned counsel further submitted that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was clear on this aspect of the matter and, in fact, Section 259 of the Old Act, (The Cantonments Act, 1924), was almost para materia with the provisions of Section 324 of the 2006 Act. Learned counsel also referred to Annexures R-6 and R-7 and submitted that the authority concerned had granted exemption in the cases of persons similarly situated as the respondent and, therefore also, the order passed by the learned Court calls for no interference. Accordingly, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also carefully gone through the order under challenge as well as the pleadings on record. 10. Accordingly, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also carefully gone through the order under challenge as well as the pleadings on record. 10. A perusal of Section 324 of the Cantonment Act, 2006 demonstrates that this Section provides for method of recovery of arrears of any tax or any other money recoverable including rent on land or building due or damages and fine due under lease or licences executed by or in favour of a Board or the Defence Estates Officers under the 2006, Act. Section 324(2) provides that an application to a Judicial Magistrate under Sub-section (1) shall be in writing and shall be signed by the President or Vice-President of the Board etc. and in terms of Sub-section (3) thereof on receipt of an application, the Judicial Magistrate referred to in Sub-section (1) may take action for the recovery of the amount of tax, rent or money from the person specified in the application. 11. A perusal of the impugned order demonstrates that what weighed with the learned Judicial Magistrate while dismissing the application of the petitioner was that once Cantonment Board had taken a decision to exempt the full lease rent for the lockdown period and the decision was taken on humanitarian ground, the subsequent decision to roll back from said decision and to compel the lessees and stall holders to pay 50% of the rent arrears of aforesaid period was not justified. 12. This Court is of the considered view that these findings returned by the learned Judicial Magistrate are perverse and are without jurisdiction. This Court is making this observation for the reason that it is not as if an aggrieved person had invoked the jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate seeking a declaration that the subsequent decision of the Cantonment Board to roll back the concession from full to half was bad in law. In fact, under Section 324, no such application or petition otherwise could have been filed. It is a matter of record that it was the Cantonment Board, which took the decision initially to give full exemption, but, on the intervention of the Superior Officer, the same was rolled down to 50%. This order of Roll down was not assailed by anyone and is still in force. 13. It is a matter of record that it was the Cantonment Board, which took the decision initially to give full exemption, but, on the intervention of the Superior Officer, the same was rolled down to 50%. This order of Roll down was not assailed by anyone and is still in force. 13. Besides this, it was not the case of the respondent before the Judicial Magistrate, nor, it is the case of the respondent before this Court, that the demand raised in the application under Section 324 was beyond the subsisting resolution of the Cantonment Board. Therefore, as the demand was raised by the Cantonment Board in the light of the subsequent resolution, which was passed to grant exemption to the extent of 50% only, which resolution was not and has not been assailed by anyone, there was no occasion for the learned Judicial Magistrate to dismiss the application filed by the Cantonment Board by holding that the roll back was bad. Learned Judicial Magistrate erred in not appreciating that he was exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 324 of the 2006 Act. 14. Therefore, in light of this discussion, the petition succeeds and the impugned order is set aside and learned Judicial Magistrate is directed to decide the application of the petitioner afresh in light of the observations made in this order. Learned Judicial Magistrate shall decide the application on the basis of the pleadings before it and the respondent herein is at liberty to assist the Court in the course of the adjudication of the application and all the judgments, which may be cited on behalf of the respondent shall be referred to and taken into consideration in the course of the adjudication of the application. 15. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.