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2025 DAILYLAW 4035 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Sandeep Kumar

2025-12-10

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 10.7.2013, passed by learned Special Judge, Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 323, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(1) (xi) of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). It was asserted that the informant/victim was present in her cowshed on 17.8.2010. Her daughter was inside the house. Accused Sandeep Kumar and Chhotu Ram entered the cowshed. They caught hold of the informant’s arms and touched her breasts. Her shirt was torn in the incident. She shouted for help. Her daughter reached the spot. She rescued the informant from the accused. The accused gave beatings to the informant and her daughter. Mani Ram reached the spot and rescued the informant. The accused threatened to kill the informant in case the incident was reported to any person. The informant went to the Police Station and narrated the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW1/A). HC Sanjay Kumar (PW9) investigated the matter. He filed the application (Ex.PW4/A) for medical examination of the informant and her daughter. Dr Yashwant (PW4) medically examined the informant/victim and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused within 12 to 48 hours. He issued MLC (Ex.PW4/B). He also examined the victim’s daughter and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused by a blunt weapon within 24 to 48 hours. He issued MLC (Ex.PW4/C). The informant produced her shirt (Ex. P1), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). It was sealed in a cloth parcel with seal impression ‘R’. Sample seal (Ex.PW9/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Ved Prakash (PW3) after its use. HC Sanjay Kumar (PW9) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/B). P1), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). It was sealed in a cloth parcel with seal impression ‘R’. Sample seal (Ex.PW9/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Ved Prakash (PW3) after its use. HC Sanjay Kumar (PW9) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/B). He recorded the statements of witnesses and found that the offence punishable under the SC/ST Act was committed. Further investigation was handed over to Nischint Negi (PW10), Deputy Superintendent of Police, who visited the spot and verified the site plan (Ex.PW9/B). He recorded the statement of Mani Ram. He seized the parcel vide memo (Ex.PW10/A). Rajesh produced one stick (Ex.P2), which was seized vide memo (Ex. PW5/A). Sandeep produced the stick (Ex. P3), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW5/B). Shamsher Singh (PW6) produced the caste certificate (Ex.PW6/A), which shows that the victim belonged to the Koli caste, which is a scheduled caste. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354, 323, 506, read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3 (x)(xi) of the SC & ST Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Informant (PW1) and her daughter (PW2) narrated the incident. Ved Prakash (PW3) took the injured/informant to the Police Station for lodging the FIR. Dr Yashwant Singh (PW4) medically examined the informant and her daughter. Inder Singh (PW5) did not support the prosecution’s case. Shamsher Singh (PW6) produced the caste certificate of the informant and the accused. HC Joginder Singh (PW7) was posted as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HC Ram Lal (PW8) handed over the parcel to Deputy Superintendent of Police Nschint Negi (PW10). HC Sanjay Kumar (PW9) and Nischint Negi (PW10) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that the informant and her family members were inimical to them. They used to interfere in the Ghasni and forcibly cut the grass. The informant was cutting the grass in their Ghasni. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that the informant and her family members were inimical to them. They used to interfere in the Ghasni and forcibly cut the grass. The informant was cutting the grass in their Ghasni. She ran away with the grass and fell into the galli. She sustained injuries due to the fall. He inquired from her as to why she had cut the grass, but she picked up the quarrel with the accused and lodged an FIR No. 76 of 2009 against the accused and their brother Rajesh on 6.10.2009. The demarcation was conducted, and the land was found in the possession of the accused. HC Jagir Singh (DW1) was examined in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which made the prosecution’s case suspect. The relationship between the parties was strained because of the land dispute. The informant had initially stated that she was molested and beaten inside the cowshed. She changed her version in the Court and stated that she was molested and beaten outside the cowshed. This made the prosecution’s case suspect. The Medical Officer found that the injuries could have been caused by way of a fall. This made the prosecution’s case suspect. Hence, the accused were acquitted of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. Medical evidence corroborated the testimonies of the informant and her daughter. Minor contradictions were bound to come with the passage of time, and the prosecution’s case could not have been discarded due to some contradictions. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material placed on record. The informant and her daughter consistently deposed about the incident. The medical evidence corroborated the statements of the informant and her daughter. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material placed on record. The informant and her daughter consistently deposed about the incident. The medical evidence corroborated the statements of the informant and her daughter. The delay was properly explained by the informant by saying that she did not have sufficient funds to travel to Rajgarh. This was ignored by the learned Trial Court Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the explanation provided for the delay in lodging the FIR is not satisfactory because Ved Prakash (PW3) specifically stated that the informant and her daughter had reached his house at Bhuira on the date of the incident at 7.00 PM by covering the distance of 55 kilometres. They had also not disclosed the names of the accused to Ved Prakash, which makes the prosecution’s case highly suspect. The relationship between the parties was strained. The informant and her daughter altered the place of the incident, which made the incident suspect. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 : (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omits to consider the material evidence and takes a view that no reasonable person would have taken based on the evidence on record. It was observed: “11. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104 , Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258 , Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320 , and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114 .” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The incident had taken place on 17.8.2010 at 10.00 am, and the matter was reported to the police on 18.8.2010 at 5.45 PM. Informant’s daughter stated in her cross-examination that she could not go to the Police Station on the date of the incident because they had no money. They took money from someone and visited the Police Station, Rajgarh, to report the matter. This explanation is not correct. Ved Prakash (PW3) had accompanied the informant and her daughter to the Police Station. He stated in his cross-examination that the informant and her daughter had reached his house on 17.8.2010 at 7.00 PM after travelling a distance of 55 kilometres. The place of the incident is stated to be 50 kilometres in the FIR (Ex.PW1/A). If the informant and her daughter had the money to cover the distance of 55 kilometres, surely, they could have covered a distance of 50 kilometres on the date of the incident. This shows that the explanation provided by the informant and her daughter regarding the delay in lodging the FIR is not satisfactory. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 16. This position was reiterated in P. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu , 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed:- “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 17. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. , (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 18. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 19. The FIR (Ex.PW1/A) states that the informant was inside her cowshed when the accused entered the cowshed and grabbed her. The informant stated in her cross-examination that the occurrence had taken place outside the cowshed, and she had also reported to the police that the occurrence had taken place outside the cowshed. She denied her previous statement recorded in the FIR that the incident had taken place inside the cowshed. Thus, the victim has shifted the place of the incident, which makes the whole of the prosecution case suspect that the accused had molested and beaten the victim. 20. The informant admitted in her cross-examination that a land dispute regarding the Ghasni has been going on between her and the accused for 6-7 years. Ghasni was demarcated by Field Kanungo. The informant’s daughter also admitted in her cross-examination that she had lodged FIR No. 76/09 against the accused. She admitted that the revenue staff had visited the spot and demarcated the land. She also admitted that the dispute regarding the Ghasni was pending between her and the accused for 5-6 years. Thus, the relationship between the parties was strained, and the witnesses’ testimonies were required to be seen with due care and caution. 21. She admitted that the revenue staff had visited the spot and demarcated the land. She also admitted that the dispute regarding the Ghasni was pending between her and the accused for 5-6 years. Thus, the relationship between the parties was strained, and the witnesses’ testimonies were required to be seen with due care and caution. 21. Dr Yashwant (PW4) examined the informant and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within 12 to 48 hours of the examination. He examined the informant on 18.8.2010 at 6.40 PM, after more than 32 hours of the incident. The fact that he found that injuries could have been sustained within 12-48 hours makes it suspect that the injuries could have been caused at the time stated by the witness. He admitted that the injuries could have been caused by a fall. He also admitted that the blow of a stick would cause patterned injuries equal to the dimensions of the stick used. Significantly, he had not noticed any patterned injury on the person of the informant and her daughter, but only the contusions and abrasions of different sizes. Thus, the medical evidence does not corroborate the prosecution’s version that injuries were caused by means of the stick. Thus, the medical evidence also made the prosecution’s version suspect. 22. The informant stated that Mani Ram came to the spot after hearing the noise, and he rescued the informant from the accused; however, the prosecution did not examine Mani Ram. Therefore, there is no independent corroboration to the testimony of the informant and her daughter. 23. HC Sanjay Kumar (PW9) initially investigated the matter. He had prepared the site plan, seized the informant’s shirt and recorded the statements of witnesses. He found that an offence punishable under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was made out. The investigation was handed over to Deputy Superintendent of Police Nishint Singh Negi (PW10), who stated that he visited the spot and verified the site plan. He recorded the statement of Mani Ram and seized the parcel already seized by HC Sanjay Kumar. This was not permissible. In Akshaya Kumar Parida Versus State of Orissa 2005 (2) Orissa Law Reporter 251, the investigation was conducted by an ASI, and it was found at a later stage that an offence punishable under Section 3 of the SC & ST Act was committed. This was not permissible. In Akshaya Kumar Parida Versus State of Orissa 2005 (2) Orissa Law Reporter 251, the investigation was conducted by an ASI, and it was found at a later stage that an offence punishable under Section 3 of the SC & ST Act was committed. Superintendent of Police directed the Investigating Officer to hand over the investigation to Deputy Superintendent of Police, who tested the witnesses, made supervision and submitted the charge sheet. It was laid down by the Court that there was a violation of Rule 7, which would vitiate the proceedings under Section 3 of the SC & ST Act. It was observed: 6. The second submission of Mr. Parida is that the order of cognisance must be quashed as the statutory provision of Rule 7 of the Rules has been violated during an investigation of the case. Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules mandates that a case involving offences under S.C. & S.T. (PoA). Act should be investigated by an officer, not below the rank of D.S.P. The case diary shows that the investigation of the case was undertaken by one A.S.I. of Mancheswar Police Station, and the said officer recorded the statements of the witnesses. At a later stage of the investigation, it was found that the offence was under Section 3 of S.C. & S.T. (PoA). Act is also involved, and the Superintendent of Police, Bhubaneswar, directed the I.O. to hand over the investigation of the case to Mr. D.N. Satpathy, D.S.P., Bhubaneswar. The said D.S.P., after taking over the investigation, tested the witnesses, made supervision and then submitted a charge sheet. 7. The petitioner challenges that such action of a D.S.P. will not amount to an investigation and therefore, the mandate of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules was never complied with. In the case of State v. D. Jayamma (supra), Mohan Choudhury v. State of Bihar (2001 Crimes 529), it was observed by the High Court of Karnataka and Patna, respectively, that unless a case involving an offence under S.C. & S.T. (P.A.) Act is investigated by an officer, not below the rank of D.S.P., the investigation will be vitiated, and the cognisance taken on such investigation for any offence under the S.C. & S.T. (P.A.) Act would not be allowed to stand. In the case of Jhulu Behera and Dalai v. the State of Orissa (supra), the question came up as to whether taking over charge of the investigation by the D.S.P. and submission of a charge-sheet by such officer after supervision of the previous investigation can amount to the investigation as contemplated under Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules. After examining the position carefully, this Court held that taking charge of the investigation at a late stage by the D.S.P. and submission of the charge sheet after some supervision will not amount to an investigation in the case. It was also observed that where an investigation has not been done by the officer of the rank of D.S.P., then the cognisance of an offence under S.C. & S.T. (P.A.) Act shall be quashed. The Courts, however, expressed the unanimous view that in such a contingency order of cognisance so far as an offence under I.P.C. is concerned cannot be quashed. 8. In the instant case, the investigation as contemplated under Rule 7 of the aforesaid rules in the strict sense was not done by an Officer of the rank of D.S.P. So, for violation of the mandates contained in Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules, the order of cognisance under Section 3 of the S.C. & S.T. (P.A.) Act against the petitioner is legally vulnerable. However, the order of cognisance so far as offences under Section 341, 294, 506, IPC, are concerned, cannot be faulted as the investigation of such offence fey a police officer below the rank of. D.S.P. is not barred. 24. A similar situation arose in Ranjit alias Rajat Kumar Dass & Ors. vs. State of Orissa, 2003 (2) Orissa Law Reporter 65, wherein it was held: “9. On the face of the above statutory provisions, if a Sub- Inspector of Police is allowed to investigate into a case of the present nature and a seal of approval is given by the Dy. Superintendent of Police on such an investigation without the investigation being done by the Dy. Superintendent of Police himself, and a charge sheet is filed by the Dy. Superintendent of Police on such investigation, then the intention of the Legislature drafting the Rules, and the statutory provisions made to curb the increasing number of oppressions on the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, would be frustrated.” 25. Superintendent of Police himself, and a charge sheet is filed by the Dy. Superintendent of Police on such investigation, then the intention of the Legislature drafting the Rules, and the statutory provisions made to curb the increasing number of oppressions on the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, would be frustrated.” 25. Similar is the judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Babbu Rathore & Anr. 2020 (2) SCC 577 , wherein it was held: 10. By virtue of its enabling power, it is the duty and responsibility of the State Government to issue a notification conferring the power of investigation of cases by a notified police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Rule 7 of the Rules 1995 provides that the rank of investigation officer to not be below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. An officer below that rank cannot act as an investigating officer in holding an investigation in reference to the offences committed under any provisions of the Act, 1989….” 26. Thus, the investigation in the present case is not proper. 27. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible. 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 30. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents/accused are directed to furnish personal bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 32. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.