2025:JHHC:38760 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (L) No.5635 of 2022 Hindustan Media Ventures Limited through its Authorized Representative Sanjeet Kumar Singh, Aged about 46 Yrs, S/o Late P N Singh, Office situated at Industrial area, Kokar, PO-Kokar, PS-Sadar, District-Ranchi ..…… Petitioner Versus 1.The State of Jharkhand 2.The Secretary, Labour, Employment & Training Department, Room No.007/1, Ground Floor, Nepal House, Doranda, PO & PS- Doranda, Dist-Ranchi-834002 (Jharkhand) 3.Shri Dharmendra Kumar Singh, Son of Late Ram Babu Singh, Resident of New Krishna Puri, Sama Toli, P.O-Kokar, PS-Sadar, Dist-Ranchi (Jharkhand) ……. Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ---------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, Advocate : Mr. Rajeev Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the State : Ms. Sunita Kumari, A.C to Sr.S.C-II For the Resp. No.3 : Mr. Rishikesh Giri, Advocate ----------- CAV Judgment Delivered on 10/11/2025 This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for the following reliefs:- “A. For setting aside the Award dated 18.09.2019 pronounced in open Court on 18.08.2021 in Reference Case No. 17 of 2017 by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, (Annexure-4 & 4 “A”), whereby and where under the learned Labour Court purportedly exercising power under Section 17 (2) of The Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (condition of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter for brevity called as 'the WJ Act') and the Provision under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as 2025:JHHC:38760 2 „the ID Act‟) without following the Provisions of either WJ Act, Majithia Wage Board Recommendation (hereinafter for brevity referred as MWB) as well as settled principle of industrial adjudication has passed award in favour of the Workman, Whereby and Where under the learned Labour Court, Ranchi has affirmed the self claimed amount of Respondent No. 3 against the Petitioner to the tune of Rs.13,91,719/-; And for grant of other ancillary reliefs.” 2. The term of reference before the learned Labour Court read as follows:- “Whether due amount of Rs.13,91,719/- (Thirteen Lakhs Ninety one Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen only) claimed by Sri Dharmendra Kumar Singh, Former Sales Manager, Kokar, Ranchi from his Management M/s Hindustan Media Ventures, Ltd. Ranchi Unit is Justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to?” 3. Heard Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner assisted by Mr. Rajeev Kumar Sinha, Ms. Sunita Kumari, learned A.C to Sr.S.C-II for the State and Mr. Rishikesh Giri, learned counsel for the Respondent No.3. 4. It is submitted that the impugned Award dated 18.09.2019 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi in Ref. Case No.17 of 2017 is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that though Majithia Wage Board (in short to be referred as “MWB‟) recommendation was notified on 11.11.2011 and the same is for the benefit of Working Journalist and Non Journalist employee in Newspaper Establishment but there are exception as well, in terms of Section 2 (dd) of the Working Journalist Act, 1955. 2025:JHHC:38760 3 It is submitted that the claimant is not entitled for any sum under the MWB recommendations and the claimant has claimed the sum of Rs.13,91,719/-by erroneously placing the Petitioner‟s Ranchi Newspaper Establishment in Class-1 and further calculating the difference of wages by placing himself in Group-3 of Schedule-IV (grouping of the MWB recommendations). It is submitted that in his written statement as well evidence led by him, the claimant has stated that only his designation was changed, however while calculating the alleged difference in wages, the claimant has placed himself in Grade-3 instead of Grade-5 Thus the Respondent No. 3 intended to gain unjust benefit. Even if it is assumed that his designation merely changed the claimant ought to have calculated his dues, if any, keeping himself in Grade-5 and not in Grade- 3. It is submitted that the claim of the claimant is also barred by estoppel, waiver and acquiescence as it has been proved that the Claimant never raised any claim during the tenure of his service and has raised the same, only after separation from the services of the company. The claimant has failed to substantiate through cogent evidence that he ever raised any dispute or demand regarding Majithia Wage Board recommendations. It is submitted that the Claimant was all along aware that he is not eligible to receive the benefits of the Majithia Wage Board recommendations and therefore, the claimant never raised any claim during the tenure of his service. It is submitted that the claimant also executed several service contracts and renewal with the Management during the tenure of his service. Even in the written statement of the Management, the claimant executed service contract dated 30.12.2004 for a tenure of five years which was further renewed for three years from 2025:JHHC:38760 4 01.11.2005 and later on several times his pay was revised with more responsibilities which will come within the ambit of Managerial/ Supervisory work and the same in also reflecting in the ROLE SHEET. Even after the implementation of Majithia Wage Board recommendations, the Claimant had again executed a service contract with the Management for a period of three years without any demand for the benefits of wage board recommendations since he was well aware of his non-entitlement of Majithia Wage Board recommendations. The Claimant has admitted that he duly got promoted from time to time and that his salary was restructured upwardly on annual basis. There is no whisper of any objection or protest raised by the Claimant qua the restructuring of his salary which shows without a shred of doubt that the Claimant was contented with the salary being drawn by him for last so many years. It is submitted that the claimant exercised his option under Section 16(2) of the WJ Act since he admittedly executed various service contracts with the Opposite Party/ Management, wherein after negotiating favorable salary and benefits, the Claimant agreed not to be governed by any wage fixation machinery. Thus the claimant exercised his discretion under Section 16(2) of WJ Act for a period of 17 years and is therefore, precluded from raising any claim. It is further submitted that the claimant was availing all that facilities of Managerial Cadre and was satisfied enough drawing more favorable benefits than what he would have been entitled to, if he was to receive the benefits of the Majithia Wage Board‟s recommendations. It is submitted that the impugned Award passed by the learned Labour Court is contrary to the provision of industrial 2025:JHHC:38760 5 adjudication and also not in accordance with the mandate of Section 2 (d) and 2 (dd) of the Working Journalist Act. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court, Ranchi has erred in its finding by reaching over the conclusion that the Ranchi “Unit”/Ranchi Newspaper Establishment of M/s Hindustan Media Venture Ltd. shall fall in Class-1. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court has acted against the meaning of Section 2 (d) of the Working Journalist Act. It is submitted that since the claimant was employed at the Ranchi Newspaper Establishment of Hindustan Media Ventures Limited for the purpose of fixation of wages under the Majithia wage Board recommendations, the average annual revenue of Ranchi Newspaper Establishment has to be considered. It is submitted that on conjoint reading of definition under Section 2(d) of the WJ Act, Para 3 (a) (i) and 3(a) (ii) of Section II of Chapter XIX of the Majithia Wage Board recommendations along with Para 6 of the said chapter, it is apparent that the Majithia wage Board while making provision for classification of newspaper establishment, has treated the different centre‟s of newspaper establishments as independent units. The Majithia Wage Board recommendations further classified various cities into separate and distinct classes as mentioned in Table V at Page 39 of the Majithia Wage Board recommendations. It is further submitted that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspapers Ltd. vs. Union of India (AIR 1995) SC 965, while relying on the proposition of law laid down in Express Newspapers Ltd. (supra), has confirmed that the units of the newspaper establishments need to be classified on the basis of their own gross revenue for the purpose of fixation of wage scale. 2025:JHHC:38760 6 The Majithia Wage Board has considered the express provisions under Section 10(4) of the WJ Act and also considered the cost of living, prevalent rates of wages and the circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions of the country and has therefore treated units/centres of newspaper establishments as an independent units and classified them on the basis of their own income for the purpose of fixation of wages. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, has relied upon the following judgments:- (i) AIR 1958 (SC) 578 (Para 243, 244 and 253) (ii) AIR 1995 (SC) 965 (Para 6 and 10) (iii) AIR 2014 (SC) 1228 (Para-56, 66, 67 and 70 to 73) (iv) AIR 2017 (SC) 2955 (Para 27) (v) (2015) 4 SCC 71 (Para 19, 21 and 22) (vi) (2014) 1 SCC 536 (Para-16) (vii) (2004) 10 SCC 460 (Para 23 and 51) (viii) 2010 (2) MhLJ 22 (Para 12 to 19) (ix) (2005) 3 SCC 232 (Para 16 and 17) It is submitted that under the aforesaid facts and circumstances and law laid down accordance with Working Journalist Act, Industrial dispute act as well as Majithia wage Board recommendation, the Respondent No. 3 is not entitled to any claim. Hence, this writ petition may be allowed and the impugned Award may be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State-Respondent No.2- submitted that the impugned Award passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court has properly scrutinized the case of both the sides properly and has rightly passed the Award in the light of report of Majithia Wage Board in favour of the Respondent No.3. 2025:JHHC:38760 7 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent No.3- Workman, has submitted that this writ petition is devoid of merit and may be dismissed. It is submitted that Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference made by the Jharkhand Government and although Applicant was Circulation Manager but he was doing all shorts work in connection with sale of Newspaper. It has also been submitted that as per Majithia Board Wage recommendation, the applicant-Respondent No.3 is entitled for the dues as referred in reference of the Jharkhand Government. It is submitted that the Respondent No.3-Workman joined as Trainee Circulation Assistant w.e.f. August-2000 on monthly consolidated stipend. Later on he was re-designated as “Trainee Assistant Sales” w.e.f 01.04.2001 on revised consolidated stipend. It is submitted that the Workman-Respondent No.3 was further appointed to the post of Junior Executive w.e.f. 01.09.2004 through a service contract dated 30.12.2004 for a period of three years in the sales department on a salary of Rs.1950/- and HRA of Rs.650/- per month in the sales department of the petitioner company. Later on the salary of the Workman-Respondent No.3 was restructured and revised vide letter dated 23.06.2005 and 29.04.2006. Then considering the performance of the Workman- Respondent No.3, the petitioner promoted him to the post of Senior Executive and his salary was restructured vide letter dated 16.06.2007 and subsequently it was revised further vide letter dated 06.08.2008 and on different dates. Thereafter the Workman was promoted to the post of Assistant Manager and his salary was revised w.e.f. 01.04.2011 vide letter of promotion dated 19.05.2011. Even subsequently the salary of the petitioner was revised time to time on 16.05.2012 and 18.05.2013. Then by virtue of letter dated 18.05.2014 the Workman was re-designated as 2025:JHHC:38760 8 Deputy Manager w.e.f. 01.04.2014 and his salary was revised further in the year 2015 and 2016. Finally, the Workman- Respondent No.3 was promoted to the post of Manager vide letter dated 23.05.2016 and his salary was revised w.e.f 01.04.2016. However, there was no other employees working under the Workman-Respondent No.3 and he was performing his job alone without any other assistance of other employee and the Workman was not having any supervisory role in the Newspaper Establishment and thus the Workman neither worked in Supervisory capacity nor in Managerial and hence the Respondent No.3 is a Workman as defined under Section 2(S) of I.D. Act and “Non-Journalist Newspaper Employee” within the meaning of Section 2 (dd) of W.J Act. Therefore, the Workman-Respondent No.3 will be entitled to the beneficial provisions of wages of Majithia Wage Board which was accepted by the Government of India and modified on 11.11.2011 in the Gazette of India. It is submitted that designation of the Workman is covered under Schedule-II, Group-2 (from November 2011 to March 2016) and Schedule-II, Group-1 (from April 2016 to till date) of Majithia Wage Recommendation. It is submitted that during pendency of conciliation period, the Workman-Respondent NO.3 had calculated the arrears of dues and had demanded a sum of Rs.13,91,719/- by virtue of the letter dated 20.01.2017 along with the calculation chart from the Management. However, the Management failed to pay the amount due to the Workman in the light of Majithia Wage Board. It is submitted that Management-Petitioner company is having annual turnover of rupees more than One thousand Crore and as such the Ranchi unit of petitioner falls under Class-I in terms of Majithia Wage Board Recommendation. It has also been submitted that calculation has been made by the Workman- 2025:JHHC:38760 9 Respondent No.3 on the basis of Pan India Revenue of the Hindustan Media Venture and it is as per law. It is also submitted that it has been admitted by the Management that all appointments are made directly from Delhi office and transfer, posting, salary revision etc. are also being done by the Delhi office. It is further submitted that Labour Court, Ranchi has jurisdiction to entertain a reference and applicant-Respondent No.3 falls under the definition of Section 2 (s) of the I.D. Act. So reference should be answered in positive in favour of the Workman and claim of the workman- Respondent No.3 may be allowed. Written notes of argument has also been filed by the workman. 8. The learned counsel for the Workman-Respondent No.3 has relied upon the following judgments:- (i) 2014(I) LLJ 652 ABP Pvt. Ltd., 1969, (ii) LLJ 670 Anand Bazar Patrika, (iii) 1969 (I) LLJ 497 Pratap Press, (iv) 1991 (I) LLJ 591 Nava Bharat, (v) Orders dated 19.06.2016, 23.10.2017 and 23.03.2018 and passed in Cont. Pet. (C) No.411/2014. 9. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court has rightly answered the Award in favour of the Workman. It is submitted that petitioner unit of Ranchi is Class-I unit and not Class-VI unit as claimed by the petitioner company and hence no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below by treating the Workman- Respondent No.3 unit at Ranchi as Class-I unit. It is submitted that although the work has been taken by the Management-Petitioner from the Respondent No.3 in capacity of workman and all the alleged so called promotions are eye wash and in fact no such promotion in actual what to speak of monetary benefit, had been 2025:JHHC:38760 10 given to the respondent-workman by the petitioner company. It is submitted that the petitioner-Management used to take signature on the papers in the printed form without disclosing the real contents to the Respondent No.3-workman. It is submitted that claim of the Management-petitioner that the respondent-workman was working in management capacity is devoid of merit and in fact no such facility was given to the respondent-workman in reality and all the things are in pen and paper only but denied the benefit of Award to the respondent-workman. Hence this writ petition may be dismissed. 10. Perused the scanned copies of the records received from the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi of this case and considered the submission of both the sides. 11. It transpires that the Workman-Respondent No.3 has claimed that while he was working on the post of the Manager then he was terminated in violation of Section 16-A of Working Journalist Act by the petitioner company vide letter dated 20.12.2016 although the Workman-Respondent No.3 was on medical leave. Thereafter the workman had demanded his arrears of due salary amount to the extent of Rs.13,91,719/-, in the meantime, as per recommendation of Majithia Wage Board vide his letter dated 20.01.2017. Thereafter the Respondent No.3-workman claimed his due salary in prescribed formant before the Deputy Labour Commissioner (hereinafter in short „Dy.L.C‟) and upon which the Dy.LC issued notice upon the management company and the management had denied and disputed the claim of the workman and as such settlement could not be arrived at. Then the Conciliation Officer submitted its failure report. Thereafter the Workman-Respondent No.3 had raised this industrial dispute and the appropriate Government (i.e. State 2025:JHHC:38760 11 Government) referred the dispute for adjudication before the learned Labour Court. 12. Thereafter the Management-Petitioner filed its Written Statement on 03.05.2018 and the Workman-Respondent No.3 had filed his Written Statement on 03.05.2018. 13. Thereafter the learned Labour Court, Ranchi had framed the following issues, which are as follows:- “(i) Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain reference or not? (ii) Whether applicant falls within the definition of workman? (iii) Whether it is necessary for claiming a relief under Section 17(2) of the Workman Journalist Act, one should be newspaper employee as well as workman? (iv) Whether newspaper establishment means newspaper establishment of Ranchi Unit or Pan India Establishment of Hindustan Media Venture? (v) Whether applicant is entitled for claim of Rs.13,91,719-/ or not? (vi) If applicant is entitled for claim of Rs.13,91,719-/ whether arrears should be calculated on the basis of Pan India Revenue or Ranchi Unit revenue?” 14. The Workman-Respondent No.3 in support of his case, got examined himself as Witness No.1 namely Dharmendra Kumar Singh. 15. The Respondent No.3-Workman in support of his case also got proved the following documents as the Exhibits which are as follows:- (i) Exhibit-1-Service Contract dated 30.12.2004, (ii) Exhibit-2- Pay revision letter dated 23.06.2005, (iii) Exhibit-3- Pay revision letter dated 29.04.2006, (iv) Exhibit-4-Re-designation letter dated 16.06.2007, (v) Exhibit-5- Pay revision letter dated 06.06.2008, (vi) Exhibit-6- Compensation Structure w.e.f. 01.04.2008, (vii) Exhibit-7- Pay revision letter dated 17.05.2010, (viii) Exhibit-8- Re-designation and revision letter dated 19.05.2011, (ix) Exhibit-9- Pay revision letter dated 16.05.2012, 2025:JHHC:38760 12 (x) Exhibit-10- Pay revision letter dated 18.05.2013, (xi) Exhibit-11- Re-designation and revision letter dated 18.05.2014, (xii) Exhibit-12- Pay revision letter dated 11.05.2015, (xiii) Exhibit-13- Promotion with revision letter dated 23.05.2016, (xiv) Exhibit-14-Representation dated 20.01.2017, (xv) Exhibit-15- Demand letter dated 08.02.2017, Form-C and Statement of claim, (xvi) Exhibit-16- Reply of the management dated 16.03.2017, (xvii) Exhibit-17-Reply of workman dated 16.03.2017, (xviii) Exhibit-18- Pay slip from Oct 2011 to Dec. 2011, (xix) Exhibit-19- Pay slip from Apr. 2012 to Jul. 2012, (xx) Exhibit-20- Pay slip from Apr.2013 to Jul., (xxi) Exhibit-21- Pay slip from Apr. 2014 to Jul. 2014, (xxii) Exhibit-22- Pay slip from Apr. 2015 to Jul. 2015 and (xxiii) Exhibit-23- Pay slip from Apr. 2016 to Oct. 2016, 16. The Management-petitioner in support of its case has got examined two witnesses, who are as follows:- (i) M.W- 1- Monica Aggrawal and (ii) M.W-2- Sanjeet Kumar Singh. 17. The Management in support of its case has got proved the following documents as exhibits which are as follows:- (i) Exhibit-A- Total Turnover of the Ranchi Establishment for Financial Year 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10. Issues No.I, II and III:- 18. All these are interlinked and the same are being disposed of and being decided simultaneously. 19. Before entering into the merits of this case, it would be relevant to refer Section-2 (dd) of the Non Journalist Newspaper Employee Act, 1955 which reads as under:- “2(dd) Non-Journalist Newspaper employee” means a person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any Newspaper Establishment, but does not include any such person who- (i) is a working journalist, or 2025:JHHC:38760 13 (ii) is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iii) being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, function mainly of a managerial nature; 20. It transpires from the impugned Award dated 18.09.2019 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi that the Labour Court has calculated the wage of the Respondent No.3 on the basis of Pan India Revenue of the petitioner company. However, learned Labour Court has failed to take notice of the revenue of the establishment and also failed to consider that the revenue of the establishment of the petitioner is categorized into 6 to 8 categories. Even the VI category has been divided into the Town wise, District wise and Capital wise etc. 21. It transpires that learned Labour Court had decided Issue No.I in favour of the Workman-Respondent No.3 by holding that as per Section 17(2) of the Working Journalist Act, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Newspaper Employee, if wage is due and has not been paid. Learned Labour Court has further observed that as per direction of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Avishek Raja Vs. Sanjay Gupta reported in (2017) 8 SCC 435, the mechanism of Section 17 of Working Journalist Act is to be utilized which provides for jurisdiction of the Labour Court as the Respondent No.3 has worked at Ranchi and transferred to Daltonganj which are within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the opposite party-petitioner has also local office at Ranchi and had held Issue No.I in favour of the Respondent No.3 by holding that Labour Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain reference of Government. 2025:JHHC:38760 14 22. Thereafter the learned Labour Court has clubbed Issue No.II and III and has held that as per Section 3 of the Working Journalist Act, the provision of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 shall apply to Working Journalist as they apply to Workman within the meaning of that Act. It is also held that Respondent No.3 was not functioning mainly as a Managerial nature and there was no evidence to show that the Respondent No.3 was authorized to grant leave or direct any person to discharge his work/duty in any particular manner. 23. The Court below has also observed that the Workman- Respondent No.3 was employed as Junior Executive initially in sales department as per letter dated 23.06.2005 and later on, he was made Senior Executive, Assistant Manager with effect from 01.04.2011. Then further with effect from 01.04.2014, the Respondent No.3 was designated as Deputy Manager and subsequently he was made Manager vide letter dated 23.05.2016. 24. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Oshiar Prasad and Ors. vs. Employers in relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 at para-19, 21 and 22 as follows:- “Para-19:- Mitter, J., speaking for the Bench, held as under : (Delhi Cloth and General Mills case [AIR 1967 SC 469] , AIR p. 472, paras 8-9) “8. … Under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act, it is open to the appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists to make an order in writing referring „the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the dispute … to a Tribunal for adjudication‟. Under Section 10(4): „10. (4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal 2025:JHHC:38760 15 under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto.‟ 9. From the above it therefore appears that while it is open to the appropriate Government to refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected therewith for adjudication, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication to those points of dispute referred and matters incidental thereto. In other words, the Tribunal is not free to enlarge the scope of the dispute referred to it but must confine its attention to the points specifically mentioned and anything which is incidental thereto. The word „incidental‟ means according to Webster's New World Dictionary: „happening or likely to happen as a result of or in connection with something more important; being an incident; casual; hence, secondary or minor, but usually associated:‟ „Something incidental to a dispute‟ must therefore mean something happening as a result of or in connection with the dispute or associated with the dispute. The dispute is the fundamental thing while something incidental thereto is an adjunct to it. Something incidental, therefore, cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct [to it].” Para-21:- The abovesaid principle of law has been consistently reiterated in Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Workmen [(1981) 3 SCC 451 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 515 : AIR 1981 SC 1626] , National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2000) 1 SCC 371 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 264] , Mukand Ltd. v. Staff & Officers' Assn. [(2004) 10 SCC 460 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 798] and State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma [(2006) 5 SCC 123 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 930] . Para-22:- It is thus clear that the appropriate Government is empowered to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act only when “industrial dispute exists” or “is apprehended between the parties”. Similarly, it is also clear that the Tribunal while answering the reference has to confine its inquiry to the question(s) referred and has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the question(s) or/and the terms of the reference while answering the reference. A fortiori, no inquiry can be made on those questions, which 2025:JHHC:38760 16 are not specifically referred to the Tribunal while answering the reference.” 25. Therefore, in view of the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India passed in the case of Oshiar Prasad and Ors. vs. Employers in relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 the Tribunal has to decide as to whether any industrial dispute exist or not and the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the question and/or the terms of reference while answering the reference. 26. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 536 at para-16 as follows:- “16. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The Tribunal has to confine itself within the scope of the subject-matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same. This is the view taken by this Court in a number of cases including in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [(2000) 1 SCC 371 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 264] . It is for this reason that it becomes the bounden duty of the appropriate Government to make the reference appropriately which is reflective of the real/exact nature of “dispute” between the parties.” 27. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukand Ltd. vs. Mukand Staff and Officers Association reported in (2004) 10 SCC 460 at para-23 and 51 as follows:- “Para-23:- We have already referred to the orderof reference dated 17-2-1993 in paragraph supra. The dispute referred to by the orderof reference is only in respect of workmen employed by the appellant Company. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal, being a creature of the reference, cannot adjudicate matters not within the purview of the dispute actually referred to it by the orderof reference. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the 2025:JHHC:38760 17 Tribunal could not have adjudicated the issue of salaries of the employees who are not workmen under the Act nor could it have covered such employees by its award. Even assuming, without admitting, that the reference covered the non- workmen, the Tribunal, acting within its jurisdiction under the Act, could not have adjudicated the dispute insofar as it related to the “non-workmen”. Para-51:- It was not open to the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to modify an award which, at its very basis, was flawed as it lacked proper application of the fundamentals of wage adjudication. The Tribunal, in this case, has exceeded its jurisdiction. It has embarked upon an enquiry against non-workmen and, therefore, the decision of the Tribunal is a non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the determination by a Tribunal on a question other than the one which statute directs it to decide, would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act and, therefore, in exercise of its jurisdiction is liable to be set aside.” 28. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Vandana Joshi reported in 2010 (2) MahLJ 22 : 2009 (0) AIJEL-MH148154 at para-12 to 19 as follows:- “Para-12:- In the present case, the work that was being rendered by the first respondent and for which she was employed as a Personal Financial Consultant cannot be regarded as work of a clerical nature. The Court must have regard to the dominant nature of the work or duties assigned. The dominant nature of work or duties for which the first respondent was engaged cannot be regarded as stereotypical, without an element of initiative or creativeness, which is the test which is elucidated in the judgment in Sonepat Co- operative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra). On the contrary the work which was assigned to the first respondent clearly shows that she was intrinsically associated with the provision of a high level of customer service to the customers of the bank. At one level the first respondent constituted a public interface for the bank with its customers while at another level the first respondent had to ensure that all the processes and mechanisms of the bank were duly complied with in relation to banking transactions. During her evidence the first respondent in fact admitted in terms that the job description included work that would contribute to the business of the 2025:JHHC:38760 18 bank. The first respondent admitted that a term deposit database was provided to her and the purpose of giving such a database was basically for generating and securing new business opportunities. While doing such work the first respondent undoubtedly had to do incidental work including dealing with net banking requests, requests for closure of accounts or change of name and the management of the information system and data entry. What the Court must have due regard to, however, is the overall nature of the duties and responsibilities that are attached to the job. The duties and responsibilities that were attached to the job of the first respondent were not of a clerical nature. As an employee engaged in contributing to the business of the bank the first respondent was recruited to perform duties which cannot be regarded of a clerical nature. Para-13:- The judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab Co- operative Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia, (1975) 4 SCC 696 : AIR 1975 SC 1898 upon which reliance was placed by the first respondent is clearly distinguishable. That was a case where the question as to whether the first respondent was a workman was concluded by the principles of res judicata since it had been decided in an earlier proceeding between the same parties. Besides this, the evidence on the record showed that the employee in his capacity as an accountant used to sign the salary bills of the staff, including himself, even while performing the duties of a clerk. The Supreme Court held that this did not render the employee being one employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. The judgment is distinguishable. Para-14:- During the course of her submissions, the first respondent sought to place reliance on the cross-examination of the two witnesses who deposed on behalf of the bank. MW 1, during the course of her cross-examination admitted that the first respondent did not sanction leave and that she was not aware as to whether the first respondent could initiate proceedings against an employee of the bank. The Tribunal has during the course of its award placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the first respondent could also not recommend leave nor could she initiate disciplinary action against other employees. The fact that an employee is not vested with the power to sanction leave or to initiate disciplinary proceedings is not conclusive of the question as to whether the work that is performed by the employee falls within one of the categories stipulated in section 2(s). Whether leave can be sanctioned and whether disciplinary proceedings can be initiated may in a given case be one of 2025:JHHC:38760 19 the circumstances which may be considered in the balance. The balance, however, has to be drawn on the basis of the overall nature of the duties and responsibilities performed and the dominant nature of the work that is performed by an employee. Virtual offices are now a reality and paperless transactions are no longer a novelty. Managerial organisation today is radically different from the pre- liberalization era. Tests of control which were appropriate to a society thirty years ago have become relics of an era which India has left behind in the annals of history. The law has kept pace with the times by recognizing that in order to determine whether a person is a workman under section 2(s), contemporary notions of business cannot be stratified by notions of economic organisation developed for an era which is no more. Para-15:- In the judgment of this Court in Inthru Nororiha. v. Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd., 2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 884 : 2005 (III) LLJ 12 the Court had occasion to take note of the rapid evolution in business resultant upon the swift changes of technology in modern times. The Court cautioned against placing the discourse on section 2(s) into a straitjacket, in the following observations: “In deciding a case such as the present, the Court must be careful not to place its construction of legal categories into a straitjacket. Business in recent years has been marked by rapid organisational changes. The swift evolution of technology has led to a quantum change in the business environment. Modern managements have to alter the structure of organisation in order to meet the exigencies of the time. Every employee in the managerial cadre may not necessarily have the power to appoint or dismiss personnel nor indeed would an employee engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity always have the power to sanction leave applications. Similarly, the test of the existence of control over subordinates may be applicable in certain factual situations, but not necessarily in every conceivable case. In others, control over subordinates may not necessarily be by all personnel in the managerial cadre. The number and strength of the subordinate staff depends upon the nature of the business that is being conducted. It would, for instance, be wholly inappropriate to apply the same test which would govern the organisation of a traditional form of manufacturing business to a business founded on software, biogenetics or a business at the cutting edge of technology. The interpretation of section 2(s) must be such as would not lead to stultifying innovation, development and change in managerial practice. Business managers should have 2025:JHHC:38760 20 a high degree of latitude to promote efficiency in a competitive business environment. Courts are of course vigilant to deal with subterfuge. The important thing for the Court is to evaluate the position of an employee with reference to the nature of his duties in the context of the business where those duties are performed”. Para-16:- In that case the Court held that the duties and functions showed that the work was anything but clerical. Similarly, in Dhruba Kumar Changkokoti. v. Travel Corporation of India Ltd., 2000 (II) CLR 644 a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that a person who was employed to promote tourism of a travel company in Eastern Europe could not be regarded as a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). Though such a person had no power to recruit or terminate employees or to control employees of the organization, he was regarded as discharging a part of the function on behalf of the employer viz. looking after the business and promoting it in Eastern Europe. In Mukesh Tripathi's case (supra) the Supreme Court emphasized that a person who had been recruited to develop the business of the employer could not have done so without being a full fledged officer of the Corporation and would not be a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). The first respondent was appointed to contribute to the development of the business of the Bank. Her duties were plainly not clerical. Para-17:- The second witness who deposed on behalf of the employer, MW 2 deposed to the key responsibilities of the first respondent. During the course of the cross-examination the witness stated that the product team used to decide upon concessions relating to exchange rate fees and that she was unable to recall as to whether the first respondent had no such right. The managerial staff of the bank was to decide the manner in which control over costs was to be made and the witness stated that there were no documents to show that the first respondent had participated in a meeting for controlling costs. The witness also stated that the first respondent was not the final authority for opening bank accounts; that she had no power to sanction leave or to take disciplinary action. Para-18:- The fact that in an organizational structure the employee, in the course of the decision making process, is subject to checks and balances is not a matter which would establish that she/he is a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). Modern forms of business in corporate organizations put into place a carefully crafted process of checks and balances. Rarely, if ever, would an employee have authoritarian control over business decisions. Employees are made subject to checks 2025:JHHC:38760 21 and balances both at the lateral and vertical level. Managerial decisions are subject to verification and approval. The fact that decisions of an employee are subject to verification or subject to a system of controls and balances does not establish that the employee is a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). Managers do not become workmen because their decisions are structured by processes and approvals. Absolute autonomy is not the norm in managerial decision making. Nor does the law insist on absolute discretion or absolute autonomy for a person to be a manager. Basically the answer to the question must depend upon the dominant nature of the duties and responsibilities. Para-19:- The Industrial Tribunal has applied a superficial approach to the entire problem in determining as to whether the first respondent was a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). The Industrial Tribunal ought to have travelled beyond a superficial analysis of whether or not the first respondent was entitled to recommend leave or to initiate disciplinary action. That the Tribunal has failed to do so has led to a manifest failure of justice. The Tribunal has failed to consider material aspects of the evidence on the record and to apply tests which are now settled in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court to which a reference has been made in the earlier part of this judgment. In the circumstances, the interference of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 is necessitated to correct a patent error on the part of the Tribunal in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” 29. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of M/s Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited Versus Ajit Singh reported in (2005) 3 SCC 232 at para-16 and 17 as follows:- “Para-16:- Thus, a person who performs one or the other jobs mentioned in the aforementioned provisions only would come within the purview of the definition of workman. The job of a clerk ordinarily implies stereotype work without power of control or dignity or initiative or creativeness. The question as to whether the employee has been performing a clerical work or not is required to be determined upon arriving at a finding as regards the dominant nature thereof. With a view to give effect to the expression to do “any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work”, the job of the employee concerned must fall within one or the other category thereof. It would, 2025:JHHC:38760 22 therefore, not be correct to contend that merely because the employee had not been performing any managerial or supervisory duties, ipso facto he would be a workman. Para-17:- In Miss A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Dieu and Others [(1988) 4 SCC 42 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 892] teachers serving in an educational institution being not found to be performing any duty within the aforementioned category have been held not to be workmen. Similarly, an advertising manager, a chemist employed in a sugar mill, gate sergeant in charge of watch and ward staff in a tannery, a welfare officer in a commercial educational institution have also not been held to be workmen. The respondent had not been performing any stereotype job. His job involved creativity. He not only used to render legal opinions on a subject but also used to draft pleadings on behalf of the appellant as also represent it before various courts/authorities. He would also discharge quasi-judicial functions as an enquiry officer in departmental enquiries against the workmen. Such a job, in our considered opinion, would not make him a workman.” 30. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Avishek Raja and Ors. vs. Sanjay Gupta reported in AIR 2017 (SC) 2955 at para-27 as follows:- “Para-27:- Having clarified all doubts and ambiguities in the matter and upon holding that none of the newspaper establishments should, in the facts of the cases before us, be held guilty of commission of contempt, we direct that henceforth all complaints with regard to non-implementation of the Majithia Wage Board Award or otherwise be dealt with in terms of the mechanism provided under Section 17 of the Act. It would be more appropriate to resolve such complaints and grievances by resort to the enforcement and remedial machinery provided under the Act rather than by any future approaches to the courts in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the courts or otherwise.” However, the above judgment is not relevant for the present in deciding this case as the Workman has to establish before the learned Labour Court that he is a Workman within the meaning of Section 2(S) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2025:JHHC:38760 23 31. It further appears that work of the Workman was assigned for the job to visit the Venders, Hockers, Agents and Distribution points fixed by the agents to prepare the list thereof and to submit the same before the Management and to collect payments from agents, but it was having no power to grant leave, give directions or to take actions against any employee. Therefore, this shows that the Workman was acting in Administrative capacity/Supervisory capacity and also doing financial works of the Management. 32. It further reveals from the Exhibit-11, Exhibit-12, Exhibit-13 and Exhibit-21, Exhibit-22 and Exhibit-23 that the Respondent No.3 was posted as Deputy Manager and Manager Sales Department and he had executed various service contracts with the petitioner company time to time. Hence the Respondent No.3- Workman may not be an employee under the provisions of Section 2 (dd) of W.J. Act. 33. The Labour Court has held that as an employee can make an application to the State Government for recovery of dues under Section 17(1) of W.J. Act and Section 17 (2) of W.J. Act provides that if any question arises from his employer, the State Government may upon application made to it refer the question to any Labour Court constituted by it under Industrial Disputes Act. This finding of the learned Labour Court is not tenable and the reliance by the Labour Court upon the judgment reported in the case of Avishek Raja and Ors. vs. Sanjay Gupta reported in AIR (2017) 8 SCC 435 is not tenable. 34. Even from the evidence of M.W-1-Monica Agrawal and M.W-2 Sanjeet Kumar Singh, it would appear that the Workman- Respondent No.3 was discharging his duties as Manager and he was responsible for sales of newspaper on daily basis and he was also concerned with the collection of the money from the Agents. 2025:JHHC:38760 24 The finding of the Court below is perverse to the extent that there is no cogent evidence that there were so many subordinates and there is no evidence that Workman-Respondent No.3 was authorized to grant leave or direct any person to discharge his work. 35. Thus, the learned Labour Court has committed error by declaring and holding that the Respondent No.3 was a Workman, although the Labour Court has himself noticed that the Respondent No.3 was promoted to the post of Senior Executive on 16.06.2007, Assistant Manager on 13.05.2011 from the post of Junior Executive and even later on the Respondent No.3 was promoted to the post of Deputy Manager on 18.05.2014. The post of Assistant Manager and Deputy Manager and the Manager in the year 2016 itself indicative that the status of the Respondent No.3 has already been changed and he had not objected to his promotion. 36. However, the learned Labour Court has failed to consider this aspect that the Workman-Respondent No.3 has been promoted to the post of Assistant Manager by letter dated 19.05.2011 with effect from 01.04.2011 and subsequently he was made Deputy Manager vide letter dated 18.05.2014 with effect from 01.04.2014 and finally he was promoted to the post of Manager vide letter dated 23.05.2016 with effect from 01.04.2016 along with annual revision of salary. Hence the plea of the Workman that he was performing the job on clerical basis is not tenable. 37. The promotion of the Workman-Respondent No.3 cannot be termed as a mere fictitious document to deny the benefits of Majithia Wage Board Act, rather promotions granted to the Workman-Respondent No.3 to the post of Senior Executive, Assistant Manager and Deputy Manager and the Manager on 16.06.2007 and 19.05.2011 is indicative of the fact that the 2025:JHHC:38760 25 Respondent No.3 had entered into the Managerial/Administrative side of the petitioner‟s company in Ranchi. 38. Therefore, the finding of the Labour Court on the Issue No.I, II and III are set aside and the case is remitted to the Labour Court for deciding the issue afresh in accordance with law. Issues No.IV, V and VI:- 39. This Court from going through the records, finds that there is no discussion of evidence of Workman and Management on the point of Ranchi Establishment of the petitioner company as to whether it can be treated as Ranchi Unit or Pan India Establishment of Hindustan Media Venture ( in short to be referred as HMV). The learned Labour Court merely on the basis of definition of Section 2(10) of Section 1 has held that “Newspaper Establishment” shall have the same meaning assigned to them in the Act and Wage Board Recommendation has not defined Newspaper Establishment. 40. The Labour Court has wrongly held that the petitioner company has Pan India existence and there are many local editions through local Newspaper production or publication unit and even Ranchi Unit of the petitioner company has no independent existence rather entire financial transaction takes place in the light of direction issued by the Delhi office. It also held that there is no provision of transfer of Newspaper employee from one Unit to another Unit spread over in all parts of the country. 41. It further transpires that learned Labour Court has erred in holding that Wage Board Recommendation has not defined Newspaper Establishment rather definition of Newspaper Establishment has been given in Working Journalist Act because the appointment letter i.e. service contract letter of the petitioner 2025:JHHC:38760 26 dated 03.12.2004 reveals that petitioner can be transferred from one job to another, from one section/department to another, from one place or establishment to another, in any part of India, in which the Management has the interest and refusal on the part of the Respondent to accept the transfer order, shall amount to misconduct and led to severe disciplinary action and/or summary dismissal as may be warranted by the circumstances and this has been mentioned in paragraph-8 of the service contract dated 30.12.2004 executed with the Workman-Respondent No.3. 42. Thus, the finding of the Labour Court, is completely wrong on this aspect that the Workman cannot be transferred from one place to another. 43. It further reveals from para 14 of the impugned Award that the learned Labour Court has referred only Issue No.IV at para 14 but has also disposed of Issue No.V and VI simultaneously with Issue No.IV by holding that no details has been filed by the Management to substantiate that Respondent No.3 was actually getting more than the Wage Board Recommendation. 44. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1995 (SC) 965 at para-6 and 10 as follows:- “Para-6:- The main contention of the petitioners in the present cases/petitions is that this Court in Express Newspapers case (AIR 1958 SC 578) supra has accepted the contention that in the absence of the requirement of looking into the capacity of industry on an industry-cum-region basis, the entire Act would be violative of the Constitution. Hence the Court had in that case read into the provisions of Section 10(4) [the then Section 9(1)] the requirement of looking into the capacity of the industry to pay on an industry-cum-region basis. The necessity to read the said requirement into Section 10(4) has not been changed by the amendments to Sections 2(d) and 10(4). If it is held that the amendment to Section 2(d) would permit an all-India fixation of wages, taking into 2025:JHHC:38760 27 consideration the gross revenue of the company or other independent companies which are sought to be clubbed, the provisions of Section 2(d), as amended, would be violative of the petitioners' right under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution inasmuch as such fixing up of wages would bring about the situation as it prevailed under the first Wage Board resulting in ignoring the economic viability of the weaker units of the company rendering it impossible to run the said units. It would also make it impossible for the companies to start new newspapers since they would not be viable and would not be in a position to compete with other publications in the same locality. The grouping of the newspapers into chain or multiple units did not imply that the weaker units in those groups must be treated on a par with the stronger units. Any such principle of fixation of wages without taking into consideration the burden that would be imposed upon weaker unit of a particular newspaper establishment would be erroneous. Hence it is contended that the amendment to Section 2(d) would be subject to the provisions of Section 10(4) as it stood and as it stands today. Section 2(d) is only a definition clause and the provisions of Section 10(4) are mandatory. Hence, harmonious construction of the provisions of Section 2(d) and Section 10(4) is necessary. Construed thus, it would enable the Wage Board to fix the wages on all-India basis taking into consideration the industry as a whole and at the same time, the capacity of individual unit. That would enable the Wage Board to classify the individual unit first into its proper class and then upgrade it reasonably if it belongs to a multiple or chain group. In this connection, it is pointed out that all the Wage Boards in the past except the Palekar Wage Board which dealt with the question on a different footing, fixed wages on the above basis. The said Wage Boards thus implemented the aforesaid decision of this Court. It is further pointed out that the present Wage Board itself has recognised this principle and while classifying the newspaper establishments in para 11 of Section II of Part I of Chapter IX of the Report on the basis of the gross revenue into 10 classes, it has made an exception in paragraph 6(2) of the said section in case of newspaper establishments falling in Classes VI to IX by directing that they will not be stepped up by more than two classes as a whole in clubbing of gross revenue as is directed in sub-para (1) of the said para 6. However, the Board has given no reason why similarly for the establishments falling in Classes I-A to V, the same consideration should not be shown. On the other 2025:JHHC:38760 28 hand, the Board without giving any reasons, has chosen to treat every unit of the newspaper establishment falling in the latter classes, viz., Classes I-A to V as being of the same class to which the establishment itself belongs on the basis of its gross revenue. This has manifestly resulted in the weaker units of the newspaper establishments belonging to the said classes being ranked with the highest in the same class, thus, crippling the weaker units with the heavy unbearable financial burden and forcing them to close. Such classification directly offends the petitioners' rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Among the other infirmities which are pointed out in the impugned award, the first is that while classifying the establishments, the benefit of paragraph 12 of Section II of Part I of Chapter IX is not given to them by ascertaining whether their advertisement revenue is less or more than 45 per cent of its gross revenue. If this was done and where it was found that it was less than 45 per cent of the gross revenue, the establishments concerned would have been placed in the class next below that in which they are classified on the basis of their gross revenue. Secondly, the award while calculating the financial capacity, has made no provision even for a reasonable depreciation and to that extent the estimates of the capacity of the establishments to pay are seriously flawed. Thirdly, the award has not considered the burden of retrospective effect it has given to its recommendations from 1-1-1988. The burden on the establishments from 1-1-1988 to 31-12-1989 is enormous and the Board was duty-bound to calculate the said burden to find out whether the establishments were capable of bearing the same. Lastly, the award has also not taken into consideration the costs of newsprint which had in the meanwhile gone up by about 76.6 per cent. We find much substance in the contention that the Board has arbitrarily clubbed together the different units of the same establishment and classified all of them with the highest of the class to which its top-most unit belongs so far as Classes I-A to V are concerned and has not followed in respect of those classes, its own guideline given in the said paragraph 6(2) in respect of the establishments which belong to Classes VI to IX. The Wage Board in paragraph 11 of Section II of Part I of Chapter IX of its Report has classified the different newspaper establishments on the basis of their gross revenue as follows: 2025:JHHC:38760 29 In Annexure V of the Report, the Board has catalogued the effect of clubbing the different units of the same establishment at different places on the basis of average gross revenue for the past 3 years. The annexure itself depicts the inequitable results of the grouping. We may as an illustration refer to the effect of clubbing of the units of some of the petitioner-establishments which are mentioned there. Taking the case of Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., it has its units at Bombay, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Calcutta, Patna, Jaipur, Pune, Madras and also printing presses at Madras, Patna, Jaipur and Lucknow and its total gross revenue is Rs 10,238.72 crores. Its Bombay, Delhi and Ahmedabad units have been classified as I-A, although their gross revenue is less than Rs 100 crores, 50 crores and 5 crores respectively and they would properly fall according to the guidelines of the Board in Classes I, II and V respectively. Similarly, the units of the company at Calcutta, Patna, Bangalore and Jaipur are classified in Categories IV, V, V & V respectively, although on the basis of their gross revenue they would fall in the Categories VI, VII, VII and IX respectively. Coming now to the second establishment, viz., Express Newspapers, they have their two units at Bombay, one at Madurai and another at Hyderabad. The gross revenue of all the units was Rs 7918.18 crores. They are all consigned to Class I, although their main unit at Bombay and their unit at Madurai belong to Class II and their subsidiary unit at Bombay and their unit at Hyderabad belong to Classes IV Class Gross Revenue IA Rs.100 crores and above I Rs.50 crores and above but less than Rs.100 crores II Rs. 20 crores and above but less than 50 crores III Rs. 10 crores and above but less than Rs.20 crores. IV Rs. 5 crores and above but less than Rs.10 crores. V Rs. 2 crores and above but less than Rs.5 crores. VI Rs.1 crore and above but less than Rs.2 crores VII Rs.50 lakhs and above but less than Rs.1 crore VIII Rs.25 lakhs and above but less than Rs.50 lakhs IX Less than Rs.25 lakhs 2025:JHHC:38760 30 and V respectively. It is not necessary to multiply these instances. According to us, in view of the definition of “newspaper establishment” in Section 2(d) and the Explanation to Section 10(4) of the Act and also in view of the fifth and sixth propositions of law laid down by this Court in Express Newspapers case [1959 SCR 12 : AIR 1958 SC 578 : (1961) 1 LLJ 339] as extracted above, the units of an establishment which has branches all over India, can be clubbed together for the purpose of fixation of wages on all- India basis. Since all the units of an establishment are not expected to fare similarly, uniform pay scales for the employees in all the units can be prescribed taking into consideration the financial capacity of the establishment as a whole. The instances pointed out above are the result of the clubbing of the different units of the same establishment. However, there is much force in the contention of the petitioners that the principle of fixation of the wages on all- India basis has not been applied by the Board with uniform yardstick as is evident from paragraph 6(2) of Section II of Part I of Chapter IX of the Report. Whereas the units of the newspaper establishments falling in any of the Classes VI to IX, as detailed above, on the basis of their own gross revenue are, for the fixation of wages not to be stepped up by more than two classes, the units of the newspaper establishments falling in Classes I-A to V are all to be classified as belonging to the class to which the said establishment belongs on the basis of the gross revenue of all the said units. The result of this discrimination is that for the purposes of fixing the wage scales, the units of the newspaper establishments belonging to Classes VI to IX would not be considered as belonging to the said classes but to the classes which are only two grades above the class to which the said units on the basis of their own revenue properly belong. On the other hand, the units of the establishments belonging to Classes I-A to V would all be considered as belonging to the class to which the establishment itself belongs. The Board has not given any reason as to why while applying the principle of uniform wage scales to all units of an establishment on all-India basis, it has made the discrimination in question between the newspaper establishments belonging to Classes I-A to V and those belonging to Classes VI to IX. The respondents also could not offer any satisfactory explanation or advance a plausible contention to defend the said discrimination. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned award to be made legally enforceable will have to be modified by extending the 2025:JHHC:38760 31 limitation of upgradation up to the maximum of two classes laid down in the said para 6(2) also to the newspaper establishments falling in Classes I-A to V. Para-10:- In view of what we have held above, we allow all the writ petitions and transfer cases except TC No. 6 of 1990, only to the extent indicated below. The benefit given in paragraph 6(2) of Section II of Part I of Chapter IX will extend to all classes of the newspaper establishments as categorised in paragraph 11 of the said Report and the units of the newspaper establishments in all the said classes shall not be stepped up by more than two classes over and above the classes to which they belong according to their own gross revenue. In view of our above conclusion, the award as modified, should be implemented by all the establishments w.e.f. 1-1-1988 and the respondent-employees should be paid wages w.e.f. the said date, i.e., 1-1-1988. Where, however, there have been settlements between the management and the employees the payment of wages and of arrears of wages will be governed by the terms of those settlements. There will be no order as to costs. In view of the above order by which TC No. 5 of 1990 is allowed as above, SLP (C) No. 16356 of 1990 filed by the same petitioners in this Court, does not survive. In view of the order passed above in main matters, TC No. 6 of 1990 stands disposed of, as above. In view of our order in the main matters, as above, none of the interlocutory applications survives.” 45. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of ABP Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 2014 (SC) 1228: (2014) 3 SCC 327 at para-56, 66, 67 and 70 to 73 as follows:- “Para-56. Chapter XIV, titled “Capacity to Pay of the Newspaper Industry (A Financial Assessment)” of the Justice Majithia Report, elaborately discusses on the aspect of capacity to pay. However, it is the stand of the petitioners that although the Report purportedly examines the capacity to pay, such evaluation is directly contrary to the principles and accepted material factors which the Report itself identifies as governing a legally sound consideration of the capacity to pay. The relevant portion of the Report in pp. 101 to 102 is as under: 2025:JHHC:38760 32 “The gross revenue of newspaper establishments comprises revenue through advertisements, circulation and other sources relating to newspaper activities and miscellaneous income accrued from investments, interests, rent, etc. The gross revenue can be taken as one of the indicators to judge the health of the newspaper establishments. Strictly speaking several discounted factors are required to be taken into consideration from the gross revenues to make actual assessments of the capacity of the newspaper establishments. But in absence of such parameters, it was decided to rely broadly on gross revenue.” Para-66:- It is further seen that the Wage Board has recommended grant of 100% neutralisation of dearness allowance. The Fifth Pay Commission granted the same in 1996. Since then, public sector undertakings, banks and even the private sector are all granting 100% neutralisation of dearness allowance. The reference to decisions prior to 1995 is irrelevant. Para-67:- Lastly, the contention of the petitioners that the Wage Boards have not taken into account regional variations in submitting their recommendations is also not correct. It is clear from the Report that the Wage Boards have categorised HRA and transport allowance into X, Y and Z category regions, which reflects that the cost of accommodation and transport in different regions in the country was considered. Furthermore, there is gradation of variable pay and allowances according to the size of the establishments wherein smaller establishments are required to pay those at a lower rate compared to larger establishments. Hence, we are satisfied that the Wage Boards followed certain well laid down principles and norms while making recommendations. Para-70:- Thus, it is the prerogative of the Central Government to accept or reject the recommendations of the Wage Boards. There is no scope for hearing the parties once again by the Central Government while accepting or modifying the recommendations, except that the modifications are of such nature which alter the character of the recommendations and such modification is likely to affect the parties. The mere fact that in the present case, the Government has not accepted a few recommendations will not automatically affect the validity of the entire Report. Further, the Government has not accepted all those suggestions including those pertaining to retirement age, etc. as these are beyond the mandate for which the Wage Boards were constituted. Regarding fixation of pay, assured career development, there have been proposals in the 2025:JHHC:38760 33 recommendations which are in the manner of providing higher pay scale after completion of certain number of years which cannot be treated as time-bound promotion. Para-71:- Accordingly, we hold that the recommendations of the Wage Boards are valid in law, based on genuine and acceptable considerations and there is no valid ground for interference under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Para-72:-Consequently, all the writ petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs. Para-73:- In view of our conclusion and dismissal of all the writ petitions, the wages as revised/determined shall be payable from 11-11-2011 when the Government of India notified the recommendations of the Majithia Wage Boards. All the arrears up to March 2014 shall be paid to all eligible persons in four equal instalments within a period of one year from today and continue to pay the revised wages from April 2014 onwards.” 46. The learned Presiding Officer held that there is service agreement showing financial benefits but he had not found any cogent evidence to show that the financial benefit was actually received by the Workman-Respondent No.3. It also held that Hindustan Media Venture has turnover of Rs.1,000 Crore or more and hence it would come under Class-I Establishment and in this case, the revenue of Ranchi Establishment has no relevance and held that Applicant- Respondent No.3 is entitled to Rs.13,91,719/-. 47. It further transpires that as per Para-3(a)(i) of Section 2 of Majithia Wage Board Recommendation, the newspaper can be classified after clubbing different department, branches and centers of the Newspaper Establishment on the basis of their gross revenue and it can be stepped up to two level above only. Even the Workman-Respondent No.3 had admitted that he was Circular Manager but was doing all sort of works in connection of sales of newspaper. Therefore, his own admission of the Respondent No.3 that he was a Manager-Circulation Manager in the petitioner‟s company. 2025:JHHC:38760 34 48. The Labour Court has inferred that Ranchi Unit of the petitioner company would come in the category of Class-I merely on the ground that publisher of Ranchi Unit of the newspaper is also publisher of same newspaper which is published in Pan India with local variation. 49. Thus, finding of the Labour Court is completely in contravention of the judgment reported in (2015) 4 SCC 71 (Oshiar Prasad and Ors. vs. Employers in relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, Jharkhand). 50. Thus, in view of the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court the Ranchi Unit of petitioner company cannot be classified as Class-I Unit and the unit of the Petitioner company-Management has to be classified on the basis of revenue earned in Ranchi District and not on the basis of Pan India basis as this will weaken the establishment of Ranchi Unit of the petitioner company comparing to revenue earned by the Delhi. In the light of the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India, Ranchi unit of the petitioner company as per its income will come near around Category-VI and at best it can be step up to two units i.e. Category-IV based on the income of the income of the unit and which has to be decided by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court. 51. So far as Issue Nos.V and VI are concerned, it would appear that there is no evidence on record that annual turnover of Hindustan Media Venture is more than Rs.1,000/- Crores produced on behalf of the Respondent No.3. Moreover, the Management has produced Exhibit-A which shows the total turnover of the Ranchi Establishment for the financial year 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 respectively was Rs.4,63,08,338/- (i.e.Four Crores, Sixty Three Lakhs, Eight Thousand, Three Hundred Thirty Eight) for the year 2025:JHHC:38760 35 2007-08, Rs.4,87, 59,818/- (Rs.Four Crores, Eighty Seven Lakhs, Fifty Nine Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighteen) for the year 2008- 09 and Rs.13,91,54,160/- (Rs.Thirteen Crore, Ninty One Lakhs, Fifty Four Thousand One Hundred Sixty). 52. However, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court has held that turnover of the petitioner company is above Rs.1000/- Crore which is beyond the record. 53. Thus, there is complete non-appreciation of document filed on behalf of the Management (i.e. petitioner company) marked as Exhibit-A on the part of the learned Labour Court, Ranchi. 54. It further reveals that Management Witness Sanjeet Kumar Singh examined as M.W-2, has stated that dues of the Respondent No.3 can be calculated only on the basis of Class-VI of the Majithia Wage Board Recommendation and on the basis of turnover of Ranchi Establishment. However, the learned Labour Court rejected the said plea and has disbelieved the evidence of M.W-2. 55. Thus, the finding of the Labour Court on Issue No. IV, V and Issue No.VI are also set aside and the case is remitted to the learned Labour Court to decide the Issue No.IV, V and VI afresh. 56. Accordingly, W.P.(L) No.5635 of 2022 is allowed with the observation mentioned above and stands disposed of. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Dated:10.11.2025 Saket/- AFR