PHUL CHANDRA ORAON ALIAS PHUL CHAND ORAON v. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH CBI
Cr.Rev./131/2025 · 2025-07-25
Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 4023 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 4023 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Revision No. 131 of 2025
Phul Chandra Oraon @ Phul Chand Oraon @ Phulchand Kujur, aged about 64 years, son of late Jharia Oraon, resident of village Khetari Bagan, Road No. 7, P.O. and P.S. Namkum, District-Ranchi- 834010, Jharkhand
……………….Petitioner
Versus
Union of India through C.B.I.
.…… Opposite Party
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
For the Petitioner : Mr. Shubhashis Rasik Soren, Advocate For the C.B.I. : Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharti, Advocate
04/Dated: 25/07/2025
Heard Mr. Shubhashis Rasik Soren, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharti, learned counsel for the C.B.I.
2. I.A. No. 1383 of 2025 has been filed for condoning the delay of 36 days in filing the present criminal revision. 3. Mr. Shubhashis Rasik Soren, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that due to ailment of the petitioner the said delay has occurred and in view of that the said delay of 36 days may kindled be condoned. 4. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharti, learned counsel for the C.B.I. has got no serious objection if the delay of 36 days is condoned. 5. In view of above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and further looking into statement made in para 6 of the I.A., the Court finds that sufficient ground is made out to condone the delay of 36 days. 6. Accordingly, delay of 36 days in filing the present criminal revision is condoned. I.A. No. 1383 of 2025 stands allowed and disposed of. 7. This criminal revision has been preferred against the order dated 13.09.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 3474/2023, by
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learned Special Judge, C.B.I.-II (Other than AHD Scam Cases), Ranchi in connection with R.C. Case No. 08(A)/2019-R arising out of F.I.R.-Ranchi CBI/ACB P.S. Case No. RC08(A)/2019-R registered under sections 120B read with sections 409, 420, 471, 477A of the I.P.C, Section 13 (2) read with section 13 (1) (c) & (d), Section 13 (2) read with 13 (1) (a) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, whereby the discharge petition filed by the petitioner under section 239 of Cr.P.C., has been rejected. 8. At the outset, Mr. Shubhashis Rasik Soren, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is not named in F.I.R. however, the final report in chargesheet filed by the C.B.I. the name of the petitioner has been reflected and the petitioner has been charged under sections 409, 477A, 201 and 120B of the I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with 13 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
He further submits that in view of this the petitioner filed petition for discharge under section 239 of Cr.P.C before the learned court which has been rejected by the impugned order dated 13.09.2024. He further submits that the petitioner is 65 years and retired from the service of postal department. According to him C.B.I. has not discovered any material evidence which can point out the guilt towards the petitioner. He draws the attention of the Court by way of submitting that that petitioner during his tenure as Stamp Treasurer in Doranda Post Office during 01.01.2008 to 10.12.2015 acted in accordance with law. He submits that the petitioner issued postal stamps against each cash or cheques presented before him in good faith and without any intention to deceive Postal Department. He submits that the petitioner never demanded and never accepted any gratification in lieu of his official work and view of that linking the petitioner along with one Rajesh Kumar who was said to be the main accused, was not warranted inspite of that the C.B.I. has submitted chargesheet against the petitioner. He further submits that
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allegation against the petitioner is completely erroneous and the learned court has not considered the parameters of discharge and in view of that impugned order may kindly be set aside. 9. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharti, learned counsel for the C.B.I. submits that investigation was properly made by the C.B.I and in the investigation it has been found that the documents namely, stamp sale register for the period of 01.08.2014 to 04.10.2015 and “voucher of cheque encased on” from 2011 to 2015 at the level of stamp treasurer to be maintained by Sri Phul Chandra Oraon and Ajay Kumar Srivastava which have to be intact in their capacity/custody but the same was destroyed or concealed by them as they have not handed over the said documents intentionally to their successor.
He further submits that the postal department has incurred loss of Rs. 71 lakh and odd to such act of the petitioner and other co-accused. He further submits that this Court is exercising its power under revisional jurisdiction and this court may not roam into to come to the conclusion whether the case of discharge is made out or not and only the illegality and perversity of the order is required to be considered by this Court and to buttress this argument he relied in the case of “ Supriya Jain V. State of Haryana and Another’ reported in (2023) 7 SCC 711. He refers to para 16 and 17 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
“ 16. This is a case where the charges have been framed and the accused are awaiting trial. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, noticed above, we are of the considered opinion that the investigation and the follow-up steps are not so patently and unobtrusively defective or erroneous (except to the extent we propose to mention before concluding our judgment) that allowing the trial to progress might cause a miscarriage of justice. This is also not an appropriate stage to delve deep into the records. It is no part of the business of any of the courts to ascertain what the outcome of the trial could be, ~ conviction or acquittal of the accused. The small window that the law, through judicial precedents, provides is to look at the allegations in the FIR and the materials collected in course of investigation, without a rebuttal thereof by the accused, and to form an opinion upon consideration thereof that an offence is indeed not disclosed from it. Unless the prosecution is shown to be illegitimate so as to result in an
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abuse of the process of law, it would not be proper to scuttle it. 17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to quashing of a charge / proceedings either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397, Cr. PC or section 482, Cr. PC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary.
However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarized by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chandra1, this Court laid down the following guiding principles:
“27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6.
The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was
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disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution.
Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.”
10. On the same line he relied in the case of “ Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and Another” reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460. He refers to para 7, 13, 17, 27.3 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
“7. The investigating officer prepared the site plan, effected recoveries of the articles from the place of occurrence and thereafter recorded the statements of the witnesses.
Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code wherein Ramesh Chander Sibbal was stated as the accused and names of his wife, Suman Sibbal and son Gaurav Sibbal were shown in Column 2. Upon committal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused under Sections 306 and 448 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC. 17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court
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and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such.
The C satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and
judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of d charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere, No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.”
11.
Relying on the above two judgments, learned counsel for the C.B.I. submits that only legality, propriety and correctness of an order passed by the learned court can be looked into by the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. On these grounds, he submits that materials are there and the petitioner is required to face the charge and in view of that this petition may kindly be dismissed.
12.
It appears that chargesheet has been brought on record by way of Annexure-2 that during the period from 2011 to 2018, Rajesh Kumar, the then Marketing Executive deposited cheques issued by the customer to the treasury and received stamps worth Rs, 39,79,976/- without any purpose with the connivance of the petitioner and one Ajay Srivastava without any consent or approval from the competent authority. It has been stated that was issued without any purpose and the allegations are further there of concealing and destroying the said transactions and not handing over to his successors. The petitioner happens to be a Government Servant and there are rules and regulations which is required to followed. If such a huge transaction has been made without permission of the competent authority that is another aspect of the matter for
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consideration in discharging the petitioner. In the chargesheet it appears that duties of the petitioner have been disclosed wherein further it is pointed out that the petitioner was responsible for maintenance of computerized stock in Meghdoot and Philsim and he was required to perform the duties as assigned by the Postmaster whenever required. Thus, prima facie the allegation against the petitioner is there and the said has been done in connivance with one Rajesh Kumar and Ajay Kumar Srivastava.
13. The revisional jurisdiction is required to be exercised when it has been found that the error is on record and the Court is not required to scrutinize the orders if the consideration and proper reasons are provided in the order. The said jurisdiction is to be exercised only if the Court finds that decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, no compliance of provision of law, the finding recorded on no evidence, material evidence has been ignored, judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely and in that scenario only the revisional jurisdiction is required to be exercised by the High Court.
14. What has been discussed hereinabove prima facie materials are there against the petitioner and this Court is not is not required to roam into to look into the entire evidence to come to a finding that no case of charge is made out against the petitioner.
15. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis the Court finds that there is no merit in the petition. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A, if any, stands disposed of.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/-A.F.R.