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2025 DAILYLAW 4013 (HP)

Amarjeet Mankotia v. Bhagwan Dass

2025-12-15

Sushil Kukreja

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. The present revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as ‘the accused’) under Sections 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) against the judgment dated 24.08.2022, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur,, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.17 of 2021, whereby the appeal filed by the accused against the judgment of conviction dated 15.03.2021 and order of sentence dated 18.03.2021, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Hamirpur, H.P., in Complaint No.49-III-15, titled Bhagwan Dass vs. Amarjeet Mankotia, were upheld and the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, as emerge from the record, are that the accused had issued a cheque bearing No.388575, dated 15.05.2015, amounting to Rs.5,50,000/- in favour of the complainant in order to discharge his legally enforceable liability and when the said cheque was presented in the bank, it was dishonoured with the remarks ‘funds insufficient’, vide memo dated 24.07.2015. Thereafter, the complainant served a legal notice dated 27.07.2015 upon the accused, demanding the payment of the cheque amount within the stipulated period, however, when no payment was made, he filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, ‘NI Act) before the learned trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court, after having found the accused guilty, convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act, vide judgment of conviction dated 15.03.2021 and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.8,00,000/-, vide order dated 18.03.2015. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the accused preferred an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, which was dismissed, vide judgment dated 24.08.2022. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 24.08.2022, the petitioner-accused preferred the instant revision petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused contended that the judgments passed by both the Courts below are against the law and facts as the same are result of mis- appreciation of the evidence. He further contended that the Courts below have completely failed to appreciate the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and drew unwarranted inferences, resulting into miscarriage of justice. He further contended that the Courts below have completely failed to appreciate the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and drew unwarranted inferences, resulting into miscarriage of justice. He also contended that the Courts below have erred gravely in not appreciating the fact that the complainant/ respondent No.1 had failed to establish that the mandatory notice was duly served upon the petitioner. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.1-complainant supported the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and contended that the learned trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused on the basis of proper appreciation of evidence. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner-accused as well as learned counsel for the respondent No.1-complainant and learned Deputy Advocate General and also gone through the record carefully. 8. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be apposite to have a look into the legal position. It is a settled proposition of law that presumption under Section 139 of NI Act is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact, such a presumption is a rebuttable presumption and the drawer of the cheque may dispel the same. The rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, but such evidence must be adduced in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable; the standard of reasonability being that of a 'prudent man'. The aforesaid position in law stands settled in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hiten P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee , (2001) 6 SCC 16 . While dealing with the aspect of presumption in terms of Section 139 of NI Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- “21.The appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the 'discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability' is answered by the third presumption available to the Bank under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability". The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. 22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court "shall presume" the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, as noted in State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 , it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. "It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused" (ibid). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces 7 of 36 evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the non- existence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'. 24. Judicial statements have differed as to the quantum of rebutting evidence required. In Kundan Lal Rallaram vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316 , this Court held that the presumption of law under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act could be rebutted, in certain circumstances, by a presumption of fact raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The decision must be limited to the facts of that case. The more authoritative view has been laid down in the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575 , where this Court reiterated the principle enunciated in State of Madras vs Vaidyanath Iyer (Supra) and clarified that the distinction between the two kinds of presumption lay not only in the mandate to the Court, but also in the nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent with the innocence" of the accused. On the other hand in the case of a mandatory 8 of 36 presumption "the burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised under S.114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted " 9. In the matter of Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets , (2009) 2 SCC 513 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 118 of the NI Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “13. In a significant departure from the general rule applicable to contracts, Section 118 of the Act provides certain presumptions to be raised. This Section lays down some special rules of evidence relating to presumptions. The reason for these presumptions is that, negotiable instrument passes from hand to hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the Act provides presumptions to be raised until the contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to date of instrument, (iii) as to time of acceptance,(iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of indorsements,(vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder being a holder in due course. 14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 19. 14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 19. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over.” 10. In the instant case, perusal of the record reveals that the cheque Ext. CW2/A was dishonoured by the banker of the accused due to ‘funds insufficient’ in the bank account of the accused, vide memo Ext.CW2/B. In the light of the evidence on record, the complainant has discharged his initial burden and it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the complainant received the same in discharge of the existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts upon the accused to establish probable defence so as to rebut such presumption. 11. The law is well settled that in order to rebut the statutory presumption, the accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the prosecution in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead this court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. It is settled position of law that though there may not be sufficient negative evidence which could be brought on record by the accused to discharge his burden, yet mere denial would not fulfill the requirements of the rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. Reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. Sri Mohan , (2010) 11 SCC 441 , wherein it has been observed that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:- ''26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. 27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the 14 of 36 dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. 28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.' In the present case on hand, the accused merely denied the case of complainant and he has not placed sufficient materials before the court to believe his defence. Mere denial of the case of complainant is not sufficient ground to believe the defence of accused that the complainant has not lent an amount of Rs.30 lakhs to the accused.” 12. In Rohitbhai Jivanial Patel’s case (supra), it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that once the accused could not deny his signatures on the cheque in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant, therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "15. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "15. So far the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, apparent it is that the appellant-accused could not deny his signatures on the cheques in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused for a sum of Rs.3 lakhs each. The said cheques were presented to the bank concerned within the period of their validity and were returned unpaid for the reason of either the balance being insufficient or the account being closed. All the basic ingredients of Section 138 as also of Sections 118 and 139 are apparent on the fact of the record. The trial court had also consciously taken note of these facts and had drawn the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the appellant-accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption." 13. In his statement recorded under Section 313, Cr.P.C., the accused had specifically stated that he had not issued such cheque in favour of the complainant and no notice was received by him but had not denied his signatures on the cheque in question. Since the accused had not denied his signatures on the cheque in question, therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for a consideration and the holder of the cheque, i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. Now, the onus shifts upon the accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption. However, the accused has failed to rebut such a presumption. The accused did not produce any cogent and convincing evidence before this Court to believe that he has not issued the alleged cheque in favour of the complainant for discharge of legally recoverable debt. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused contended that the complainant was unable to establish his financial capacity to advance such a huge amount as mentioned in the cheque to the accused, hence, this proves that no legally enforceable liability existed in this case. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused contended that the complainant was unable to establish his financial capacity to advance such a huge amount as mentioned in the cheque to the accused, hence, this proves that no legally enforceable liability existed in this case. However, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused is devoid of any force. There is no requirement under law that the complainant must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. In terms of Section 118(a) of N.I.Act, it will have to be presumed that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration. The accused has not made any basic foundation challenging financial capacity of complainant in lending money to accused on the first available opportunity. Accused in spite of due service of demand notice has not replied to the same nor paid the amount covered under cheque. Therefore, there was no reason for the complainant to produce required evidence to prove his financial capacity. In this context, it is useful to refer the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Tedhi Singh vs. Narayan Dass Mahant , reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735 wherein it has been observed and held that basic foundation has to be made on the first available opportunity in the reply given to the demand notice by questioning the financial capacity. In Tedhi Singh’s case (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit and the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity to give the amount unless a case is set up in the reply to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “10. The trial court and the first appellate court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit. The trial court and the first appellate court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent, the courts in our view were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more importantly, achieve this result through the cross- examination of the witnesses of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has established a probable defence.” 15. Thus, law does not require the complainant to prove/to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity, unless a case is set up in the reply to the statutory notice sent averring that such a complainant did not have the wherewithal. As a corollary, it is only when an accused puts up a defence of lack of financial capacity on the part of such complainant, it becomes obligatory on the complainant to demonstrate his financial soundness to lend the amount or to encumber an accused with debt or liability as asserted under his complaint. As a corollary, it is only when an accused puts up a defence of lack of financial capacity on the part of such complainant, it becomes obligatory on the complainant to demonstrate his financial soundness to lend the amount or to encumber an accused with debt or liability as asserted under his complaint. However, as afore-noted, in the instant case, it is noted form the material placed on record that the petitioner nowhere before the learned Trial Court, challenged the financial capacity of the complainant by issuing any reply to legal demand notice, as such the complainant was not required to prove his financial capacity. Therefore, in view of principles enunciated in this judgment, the mere defence of accused in challenging the financial capacity of complainant without making any basic foundation cannot be legally sustained. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly contended that no notice was either issued or served on the petitioner and the petitioner had no opportunity for making payment of the amount as demanded by the respondent/ complainant in the notice. He further submitted that the statutory legal notice alongwith receipt has not been proved in accordance with law as the same has not been exhibited during the course of the evidence of the complainant, therefore, the complaint against the petitioner is not sustainable and is liable to be rejected. 17. It is well settled that when notice sent by registered post by correctly addressing the drawer of the cheque, the mandatory requirement of issuance of notice in terms of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of NI Act stands complied with. In C.S. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed and another (2007) 6 SCC 555 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person who does not make payment of the cheque amount within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “17…….. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- “17…….. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskarans case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act. 18. In the instant case, the averment made in the complaint in this regard is: Though the complainant issued lawyers notice intimating the dishonour of cheque and demanded payment on 4.8.2001, the same was returned on 10.8.2001 saying that the accused was out of station. True, there was no averment to the effect that the notice was sent at the correct address of the drawer of the cheque by registered post acknowledgment due. But the returned envelope was annexed to the complaint and it thus, formed a part of the complaint which showed that the notice was sent by registered post acknowledgment due to the correct address and was returned with an endorsement that the addressee was abroad. We are of the view that on facts in hand the requirements of Section 138 of the Act had been sufficiently complied with and the decision of the High Court does not call for interference.” 18. We are of the view that on facts in hand the requirements of Section 138 of the Act had been sufficiently complied with and the decision of the High Court does not call for interference.” 18. In the instant case, it has been averred in the complaint that the complainant, through his counsel served legal notice dated 27.07.2025 upon the accused through registered post on his last known address, which was acknowledged by the accused, vide which he was called upon to make the payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice, but in spite of the receipt of the notice, the accused did not make the payment and even he neglected to reply to the said notice. True that the statutory notice alongwith receipt was not exhibited during statement of the complainant, but it has been annexed with the complaint, thus, it formed part of the complaint, which shows that the legal notice was sent by registered post on the correct address of the accused and the same was duly acknowledged by him by putting his signatures on the acknowledgment, which was duly received back and placed on record with the complaint. Thus, requirement of issuance of notice in terms of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act has been duly complied with. Moreover, in view of principles enunciated in C.S. Alavi Haji’s case (supra), after receipt of the summons from the trial Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, the petitioner cannot contend that he had no opportunity for making payment of the amount as demanded by the respondent/complainant as he could have made payment of the cheque amount and could have submitted to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons. 19. On overall appraisal of the materials available on record, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the accused has failed to discharge his burden to rebut the statutory presumption as well as the facts and circumstances placed on record by the complainant, whereby the complainant has proved the guilt of the accused that the accused is liable to pay the amount covered under the cheque. There is no substance in the probable defence of the accused, whereas the complainant has discharged his burden and proved the guilt of the accused. There is no substance in the probable defence of the accused, whereas the complainant has discharged his burden and proved the guilt of the accused. All the basic ingredients of Section 138 as well as Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act are apparent in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Since the accused has failed to rebut the statutory presumption drawn against him, it can safely be held that the cheque Ext.CW2/A was issued by the accused and received by the complainant in discharge of an existing debt. It was duly proved by the complainant that the cheque in question was issued by the respondent-accused in discharge of an existing debt and the same was dishonoured with the remarks “funds insufficient’. There is sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act. 20. It is well-settled that the object of enacting Section 138 of the N.I. Act, is to enhance the credibility of commercial transactions by attaching penal consequences to the dishonour of cheques issued in discharge of legally enforceable debts or liabilities. The provision is not merely punitive in nature. By virtue of Section 138 of the Act, the Court is empowered to award compensation to the complainant which may extend to twice the cheque amount. Thus, the legislative intent is twofold: first, to deter unscrupulous drawers of cheques by imposing criminal liability; and second, to ensure restitution to the payee by securing compensation commensurate with the cheque amount, often double of it. The prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act therefore serves not only a penal purpose but equally an economic and compensatory one. The legislative scheme discourages hypertechnical objections intended to defeat the object of the statute. Technical defects cannot be permitted to nullify the proceedings. To acquit the petitioner on technical grounds would frustrate the very object of Section 138 of N.I. Act, which is to promote the efficacy of banking transactions, safeguard the sanctity of commercial dealings, and ensure that honest creditors are not left remediless. 21. Technical defects cannot be permitted to nullify the proceedings. To acquit the petitioner on technical grounds would frustrate the very object of Section 138 of N.I. Act, which is to promote the efficacy of banking transactions, safeguard the sanctity of commercial dealings, and ensure that honest creditors are not left remediless. 21. Consequently, the present revision petition is dismissed and the impugned judgment dated 24.08.2022, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No.17 of 2021, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 15.03.2021 and order of sentence dated 18.03.2021, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Hamirpur, H.P., in Complaint No.49-III-15, titled Bhagwan Dass vs. Amarjeet Mankotia, is upheld. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.