1 2025:CGHC:31974 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 461 of 2023 1 - The Forest Secretary Department Of Forest, Raipur 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Forest Secretary, State Of Chhattisgarh, Raipur 3 - The Conservator Of Forests Surguja Circle, Ambikapur District Surguja (C.G.) 4 - The Divisional Forest Officer South Surguja Forest Division, Ambikapur District Surguja (C.G.) 5 - Chief Forest Conservation (C.G.) ... Appellants/Defendants versus Vishwanath Vishwakarma S/o Chiju Vishwakarma Aged About 77 Years Retired Forester, South Surguja Forest Division, Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G. ) R/o Ramanujganj Ward No. 5, P.S. And Tahsil Ramanujganj District Balrampur Ramanujganj (C.G.) ... Respondent/Plaintiff For Appellants/State : Mr. Santosh Soni, Govt. Advocate and Ms. Mukta Tripathi, Panel Lawyer For Respondent : Mr. Arpan Verma, Advocate (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judgment on Board 10/07/2025 1. Heard on IA No.01/2023, application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2. This second appeal has been preferred by the State/appellants/ defendants under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2021 (Annexure-A/1) passed by Second Upper District Judge, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja (CG) in BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2025.07.17 10:53:59 +0530 2 Civil Appeal No.12-A/2017, whereby judgment and decree dated 28.02.2017 (Annexure-A/2) passed by First Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur, Surguja (CG) in Civil Suit No.221A/2011 (which was instituted on 04.013.1985), has been set aside and decree has been granted in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. (For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status before the trial Court) 3. Facts of the case in brief are that, the plaintiff filed civil suit seeking notional promotion with seniority and consequential benefits with interest @ 18% per annum and also to set aside the order of punishment imposed upon him in respect of withholding one increment for a period of two years. The learned trial Court after conclusion of the hearing, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 28.02.2017. Appeal bearing No.12-A/2017 preferred by the plaintiff was allowed by the first appellate Court, holding that the plaintiff is entitled for promotion since 1977 on the post of Forester and he is also entitled for all consequential benefits arising after promotion since 1977 with a direction to the defendants to provide all the consequential benefits since 1977 to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree, the State/defendants have preferred second appeal. Since there is delay of 863 days in filing the instant appeal on 12.10.2023, therefore, instant appeal has been filed along with IA No.01/2023, application to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the defendants/State would submit that though impugned judgment was passed on 25.02.2021 and instant appeal has been filed on 12.10.2023 i.e. after delay of 863 days, but delay occurred because of time consumed during official formalities, as after judgment, it was sent to the concerned department, which travel from various officers thereafter permission to file appeal was granted. Thus, delay occurred in filing the 3 appeal is bonafide and unintentional, hence, it is prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent would submit that instant appeal has been filed after the delay of 863 days. Even if the permission from the State Government is required to file appeal, then also huge delay of 863 days cannot be said to be bonafide. He would further submit that the plaintiff, who was forest guard, was deprived from promotion and without getting any promotion, he has been retired on 31.01.1998 after attaining the age of superannuation, because of irrational act of the defendant authorities and now the instant appeal has been filed after huge delay, i.e. to say again to deprive the plaintiff from availing fruit of decree granted in his favour. He further submit that now the plaintiff is aged about 85 years and further lingering to grant retiral benefit will cause more injustice to him, hence, the delay would not be condoned. In this regard, he placed reliance in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer v Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited, (2021) 6 SCC 460. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 7. The proposed appeal has been preferred by the State/appellants/ defendants after the delay of 863 days. Cause shown for the delay is that, various formalities to be completed to obtain permission from the Government Departments to file appeal. Even if such formalities are required, despite that 863 days is found to be inordinate, because for taking required permission to file appeal, 2-4 months are more than sufficient, but in the instant case, delay in filing the appeal is 863 days i.e. two years and five months. Further issue involved in the instant case is that the plaintiff has been deprived from promotion and he has been retired from the post of 4 Forester without getting any promotion in his service life of about 37 years, as contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent and at present he is aged about 85 years. Again the defendants/appellants are causing delay to get the relief to the plaintiff. 8. It is the trite law that merely because Government authorities is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. In this context, the Supreme Court in the matter of Borse Brothers Engineers (supra) held thus at paras 58 & 59 : 58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15) “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by 5 any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, Parimal v. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai.) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao.) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, 6 “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266: ‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.— The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.’ An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and 7 circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [“Postmaster General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29) “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted 8 in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 9. In the case of Union of India and Another vs. Jahangir Byrami Jeejaeebhoy (D) thr. His Lrs. (2024) SCC Online SC 486, while considering the delay in filing the the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered thus in para 27, 30 & 31:- 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. XXXX XXXX XXXX 30. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court, while dismissing the application for condonation of delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition, held that condonation of delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. In that case, this 9 Court held that unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court dealt with the scope of 'sufficient cause' and held as follows: 25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA Nos. 418 and 1006 of 2007 as 11.09.2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 08.01.2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11.09.2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied only on 08.01.2010, i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking 10 appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone 11 under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 31. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by Lrs. v. State of Andhra Prades, (2011) 4 SCC 363, this Court made the following observations. “20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123] this Court again reiterated the principle that 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly.” 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 10. Thus, as has been observed by the Apex Court that condonation of 12 delay is not an exception and it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments unless the Department has reasonable and acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort to file case/ appeal etc. If facts situation of the instance case is considered in the light of the law rendered by the Apex Court in the afore cited cases, then it is found that the plaintiff served on the same post, i.e. Forester for 37 years and without getting any promotion he has been retired in the year 1998 after attaining the age of superannuation. He had filed civil suit for seeking relief in the year 1985, which was ultimately granted by learned first appellate Court vide impugned judgment dated 25.02.2021. But instant appeal has been filed by the appellant/State after the delay of 863 days. Huge delay has already been occurred in granting benefit to the plaintiff and same is again caused by filing instant appeal with delay of 863 days. Cause of delay shown in the application is not found to be sufficient, particularly in the facts situation of the instant case. Therefore, I do not feel inclined to condone inordinate delay of 863 days in filing the appeal. 11. Consequently IA No.01/2023, application filed by the appellants/State for condoning delay is hereby rejected and the corollary of dismissal of application would lead to dismissal of second appeal filed by the appellants/ defendants. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Bini 13