Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 15.10.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.06.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that informant Rameshwar Singh (PW-1) had driven his vehicle to Rohru on 16.11.2010. He parked his pickup at a workshop owned by Bharat Thakur at Samala. A motorcycle bearing registration No. CH-04A-1623 came from Kansakoti at 11:30 a.m. at a high speed and hit the informant. The informant fell and sustained injuries. Bharat Thakur (PW- 2) and Uttam Singh (PW-4) carried the informant to Civil Hospital Rohru. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the motorcycle and the negligence of the motorcyclist. The matter was reported to the police. An entry (Ext.PW-7/A) was recorded in the daily diary. ASI Amar Singh (PW-8) and Constable Nanak Chand (PW-5) went to the hospital for verification. ASI Amar Singh (PW-8) recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-6/B) was registered. ASI Amar Singh (PW-8) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-8/A). Dr A.K. Verma examined the informant and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within 24 hours of examination. He advised x-rays. The x-rays were taken, and fractures of the left patella and left distal radius were detected; hence, the nature of the injury was stated to be grievous, and MLC (Ext. PX) was issued. The accused produced the motorcycle and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-2/A). The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. PX) was issued. The accused produced the motorcycle and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-2/A). The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337 and 338 of the IPC , to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Rameshwar Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Bharat Singh (PW-2), Ishwar Singh (PW-3) and Uttam Singh (PW-4) are the eyewitnesses. Nanak Chand (PW-5) carried thestatement of the informant to the Police Station. HC Puran Singh (PW-6) signed the F.I.R. Constable Jai Singh (PW-7) proved the entry in the daily diary, ASI Man Singh (PW-8) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the motorcycle bearing registration No. CH-04A-1623. He claimed that he was driving the motorcycle towards its right side. Rameshwar Singh suddenly crossed the road to the right. He also admitted that the motorcycle and its documents were seized. He claimed that he was innocent and that he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was corroborated by the eyewitnesses. The site plan also shows that the accused was driving the motorcycle towards the right side of the road. This was the proximate cause of the accident. The informant sustained injuries in the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337 and 338 of IPC and sentenced as under:- Section Sentence 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Shimla, District Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the informant was standing near Bharat Workshop, Samalla. The testimonies of the witnesses show that the informant had rushed towards the vehicle of Uttam Singh, which was parked towards the other side of the road. The sudden crossing of the road led to the accident, and the accused could not be held liable. The mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to convict a person. The vehicle was not mechanically examined, and the photographs of the spot were also not taken. These aspects made the prosecution’s case suspect. Hence, the learned Appellate Court set aside the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 , 337 and 338 of IPC . 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Bharat Singh (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that the informant had crossed the road, but he categorically stated in the examination-in-chief that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. Learned Appellate Court ignored this part of the testimony. The informant’s statement was corroborated by the statements of Ishwar Singh (PW-3) and Uttam Singh (PW-4), which were ignored by the learned Appellate Court. The Investigating Officer had shown the place of the accident towards the side of the road. The learned Appellate Court ignored the site plan. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Prem Singh Negi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. The learned Appellate Court ignored the site plan. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Prem Singh Negi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, submitted that the learned Trial Court had convicted the accused after passing a well-reasoned judgment. The learned Appellate Court was swayed by the cross-examination of Bharat Singh (PW-2) to record the acquittal. The testimony of a witness is to be read in its totality, and it is impermissible to rely upon part of the statement to record any findings. Learned Trial Court had appreciated the evidence in a wholesome manner. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the judgment of the learned Appellate Court be set aside, and the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court be restored. 11. Mr Prem Singh Negi, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that eyewitnesses admitted in the cross-examination that the informant had tried to cross the road to go to the vehicle of Uttam Singh (PW-4). Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the driver, howsoever, careful he may be, cannot avoid the accident when someone suddenly crosses the road. The vehicle was being driven at a proper speed. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104 , Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258 , Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320 , and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114 .” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. The informant stated in his cross-examination that Uttam Singh (PW-4) was going to Rohru to buy some articles. He was standing on the other side of the road. He wanted to ask Uttam Singh to bring spare parts for his vehicle. He went towards Uttam Singh (PW-4) to pay him money, and a motorcycle hit him. Thus, the informant admitted the defence version that he was crossing the road when he was hit by the motorcycle. 17. He was standing on the other side of the road. He wanted to ask Uttam Singh to bring spare parts for his vehicle. He went towards Uttam Singh (PW-4) to pay him money, and a motorcycle hit him. Thus, the informant admitted the defence version that he was crossing the road when he was hit by the motorcycle. 17. This statement was also corroborated by Bharat Singh (PW-2), who stated in his cross-examination that the vehicle of Uttam Singh (PW-4) was parked towards the other side of the road. The informant ran towards the vehicle of Uttam Singh (PW-4). The informant wanted to get some articles from Rohru Bazaar. He could not say that the accident occurred because the informant had suddenly tried to cross the road. 17. Uttam Singh (PW-4) admitted in his cross- examination that Rameshwar Singh (PW-1) was coming towards him. The distance between the workshop and his vehicle was about 5-6 feet. He had not seen the motorcycle hit Uttam Singh. 18. The statements of the informant, Bharat Singh and Uttam Singh have corroborated the defence version that the informant was crossing the road and was going towards the vehicle of Uttam Singh (PW-4). Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the driver cannot avoid the accident if someone suddenly crosses the road. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahadeo Hari Lokre v. State of Maharashtra , (1972) 4 SCC 758 , that if a person suddenly crosses the road, the driver may not be able to avoid the accident, and he cannot be held liable for negligence. It was observed at page 759: - “4... But the case assumes a different complexion if we agree with the sole eyewitness in the case, Dayanand PW 1, that at the time of the impact, Ravikant was actually crossing the road from West to East. That would mean that if Ravikant suddenly crossed the road from West to East without taking note of the approaching bus, there was every possibility of his dashing against the bus without the driver becoming aware of his crossing till it was too late. If a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 19. If a person suddenly crosses the road, the bus driver, even if he is driving slowly, may not be in a position to avoid the accident. Therefore, it will not be possible to hold that the bus driver was negligent.” 19. This Court has also taken a similar view in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh , 1989 SCC OnLine HP 18: 1990 ACJ 598 : 1991 Cri LJ 771: (1990) 2 TAC 261 wherein it was observed at page 600: - “14. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving at high speed, but it has not been said what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving at a high speed is neither proper nor legal evidence of high speed, nor does it in any way indicate rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as the speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under section 304- A of the Penal Code, 1860. Further, there are no skid marks, which eliminates the evidence of the high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of the accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking at the two points, viz., the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near the place of the curve, which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW 7, Chander Kanta, PW 8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather, the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane that joined the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than their parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. A minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why, in their deposition, they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that the child got frightened by the blowing of the horn by him and started crossing the road, which could not be seen by him, and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident actually took place has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of driver’s act. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh , Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under: “7…The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the deceased stopped on the road. A similar view was taken in State of H.P. vs. Manpreet Singh , Latest HLJ 2008(1) 538, wherein it was observed as under: “7…The respondent, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has explained that on seeing the deceased, he had blown the horn, and the deceased stopped on the road. As soon as he reached near him, he immediately tried to cross the road and got hit. His version has been duly corroborated by Hardeep Singh (DW1), who was a pillion rider with him. Ajay Kumar (PW1) has admitted that this version is that the respondent had blown the horn, and Daya Ram, on hearing it, had stopped for a while. In these circumstances, if a person suddenly crosses the road, without taking note of the approaching vehicle and its Driver may not be in a position to save the accident, it will not be possible to hold the Driver guilty of the offence. In the instant case, the deceased, knowing fully well at least the approaching vehicle stopped on hearing the horn while crossing the road, but when the motorcycle reached near him, he darted before it, and the accident took place. Thus, in my opinion, the prosecution could not prove the offence charged against the respondent beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent was driving rashly or negligently. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned trial Court had rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him...” (Emphasis supplied) 21. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the learned Appellate Court that the accused was not negligent cannot be faulted. 22. It was submitted that the witnesses specifically stated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed and the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. This submission will not help the prosecution. The witnesses made a generalised statement that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed, and no witness has given the approximate speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amount to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 23. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 24. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 24. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 25. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 26. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable merely because the witnesses have stated that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed. 27. It was submitted that the witnesses deposed about the negligence, and this was sufficient to prove the prosecution’s case. This submission will not help the prosecution. Negligence is an inference from the facts. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 28. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 29. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the statements of the witnesses that the negligence of the accused led to the accident. 30. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 31. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, and the accused is acquitted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337 and 338 of the IPC . Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 33. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.