V S CHINNA v. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
WP/20651/2024 · 2025-11-02
R Raghunandan Rao, Subhendu Samanta
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 39981 (AP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 39981 (AP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
APHC010401662024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3559] MONDAY, THE THIRD DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA WRIT PETITION NO: 20651/2024 Between:
1. V S CHINNA, S/O V.S.DEVDAS, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, R/O D.NO. 4-1581/3, BARBER STREET GREAMSPET, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND
1. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT, REP BY ITS REGISTRAR ADMINISTRATION. 2. THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT JUDGE, CHITTOOR DISTRICT, CHITTOOR. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue a Writ more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, 1. Declaring the action of Respondents herein, more particularly the action of the Respondent No.2 herein in passing an order vide Dis.No.790/2024 dated 02.02.2024, by virtue of which the Petitioner has been terminated from the post of Court Assistant (on Contract), Spl Judicial Magistrate of II Class Court, for Excise, Chittoor and in not paying the salary to the Petitioner herein after July, 2023 as being illegal, arbitrary, unjust, violative of Principles of Natural Justice and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, 2. Consequently set aside Dis.No.790/2024 dated 02.02.2024 that is issued by the Respondent No.2
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herein. 3. Direct the Respondent No.2 herein to reinstate the Petitioner into the post of Court Assistant (on Contract), Spl Judicial Magistrate of II Class Court, for Excise, Chittoor. 4. Direct the Respondent No.2 herein to pay the salary and back wages to the Petitioner herein till his reinstatement.
And pass IA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to suspend Dis.No.790/2024 dated 02.02.2024 that is issued by the Respondent No.2 herein, pending disposal of the Writ Petition and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to direct the Respondent No.2 herein to reinstate the Petitioner herein into the post of Court Assistant (on Contract), Spl Judicial Magistrate of II Class Court, for Excise, Chittoor and pay his wages, pending disposal of the Writ Petition and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to grant leave to file the counter affidavit and receive the same in the above Writ Petition No.20651 of 2024 and pass Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. VIVEKANANDA VIRUPAKSHA Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. G VIVEKANAND
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The Court made the following order: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao)
The petitioner had been appointed as a Court Assistant on 11.08.2015 by the 2nd respondent, on a contract basis. The petitioner discharged his functions, in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate of II Class, Madanapalle, till August, 2023. The petitioner contends that he was paid his salary up to August 2023 and no further salary was paid thereafter. 2. The petitioner has now approached this Court, being aggrieved by the order of termination, issued by the 2nd respondent, on 02.02.2024. 3.
A perusal of the order of termination, dated 02.02.2024, shows that the 2nd respondent had terminated the services of the petitioner, with effect from 18.08.2023, on consideration of the report of the learned III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Chittoor- FAC Special Judicial II Class Magistrate for Excise, Chittoor; the application of the petitioner, dated 25.01.2024 and the office note and order passed thereon on 01.02.2024. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the confidential report of the learned III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Chittoor- FAC Special Judicial II Class Magistrate, which was the basis for the order of termination of the petitioner, by the 2nd respondent, is ostensibly an enquiry report sent to the 2nd respondent and the conduct of the petitioner. The
learned counsel would submit that in such circumstances, the said order of termination would have to be set aside and the matter has to be remanded
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back to the 2nd respondent for reconsideration of the application of the petitioner.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would, for the purpose of these contentions, rely upon a Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Shiva Bhikshuk Mishra1 and the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Cotton Corporation of India Limited & Ors. Vs. J. S. Ravi Kumar2. The learned counsel relies upon Paragraph No.6 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which is extracted below:
“6. We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the ratio of the above decision is that so long as there are no express words of stigma attributed to the conduct of a Government Officer in the impugned order it cannot be held to have been made by way of punishment. The test as previously laid and which was relied on was whether the misconduct or negligence was a mere motive for the order of reversion or whether it was the very foundation of that order. In Dhaba's C.A.882 of 1966 dt 7-4-69 case it was not found that the order of reversion was based on misconduct or negligence of the officer. So far as we are aware no such rigid principle has ever been laid down by this Court that one has only to look to the
order and if it does not contain any imputation of misconduct or words attaching a stigma to the character or reputation of a Government Officer it must be held to have been made in the ordinary course of administrative routine and the court is
1 AIR 1971 SC 1011; (1970) 2 SCC 871 2 2020 (2) ALD 144; 2020 (1) ALT 299
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debarred from looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover whether tile order had been made by way of punishment. The form of the order is not conclusive of its true nature and it might merely be a cloak or camouflage for an
order founded on misconduct (see S. R. Tewari v. District Board Agra & Anr. MANU/SC/0223/1963 : (1964)ILLJ1SC. It may be that an order which is innocuous on the face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct is a circumstance or a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine. But the entirety of circumstances preceding or attendant on the impugned order must be examined and the overriding test will always be whether the misconduct is a mere motive or is the very foundation of the order.”
And the Judgment of the Division Bench (stated supra) of this Court, where the Division Bench relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Civil Appeal Nos.2289 of 1970 and 632 of 1971. Paragraph No.158, which is relevant, is extracted below:
“158. …. The learned Chief Justice summarised the legal position thus:
“1. Appointment to a post on probation gives the person so appointed no right to the post and his services may be terminated, without taking recourse to the proceedings laid down in the relevant rules for dismissing a public servant, or removing him from service. 2. The termination of employment of a person holding a post on probation without any enquiry whatsoever cannot be
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said to deprive him of any right to a post and is, therefore, no punishment. 3. But if instead of terminating such a person's service without any enquiry, the employer chooses to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct, or inefficiency, or for some similar reason, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 4. . . . . 5. But, if the employer simply terminates the services of a probationer without holding an enquiry and without giving him a reasonable chance of showing cause against his removal from service, the probationary civil servant can have no cause of action, even though the real motive behind the removal from service may have been that his employer thought him to be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding, on account of his misconduct, or inefficiency, or some such case.”
6.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the aforesaid passages, clearly lay down a principle of law, that any order of termination, preceded by an enquiry report, would be vitiated unless opportunity is given to the affected person, to set out his case. The learned counsel would submit that as no such opportunity has been given to the petitioner, the order of termination would have to be set aside. 7. The 2nd respondent has filed a counter affidavit. In this counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner had been appointed on a contractual
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basis and his contract of service was being renewed from time to time. It is stated that the last renewal was of 05.09.2022, when his services were extended from 18.08.2023 to 17.08.2023. It is stated that the petitioner, on the expiry of this period, had submitted an application, dated 18.08.2023, seeking extension of his service. This application was returned on 22.08.2023, as this application did not enclose the original deed of agreement. Thereafter, the petitioner kept quiet for five months and submitted an un-dated application, which was rejected on 25.01.2024. This application, which was for extension of service from 17.08.2023 to 18.08.2024, was forwarded by the learned III Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, FAC Special Judicial Magistrate of II Class for Excise, Chittoor, to the 2nd respondent. Apart from this, a confidential letter, dated 25.01.2024 was also sent to the 2nd respondent. It is stated by the 2nd respondent that after taking into account all the overall facts and circumstances, the proceedings, dated 02.02.2024, terminating the services of the petitioner, with effect from 18.08.2023 came to be passed. 8. Even if the contention of the petitioner is to be accepted, the fact remains that the contract of the services of the petitioner, had expired on 18.08.2023 and no further extension had been given.
In such circumstances, setting aside the order of termination does not, in any manner, assist the petitioner in the present case. 9. The order of the 2nd respondent, dated 02.02.2024, though couched as a letter of termination, can only be treated as an order of refusal of the extension of the contract of the petitioner. The reference to the application
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of the petitioner, in the order, dated 02.02.2024, makes it clear that even the petitioner understood that the contract for his services had expired on 18.08.2023 and he was seeking extension of the said contract for a further period of one year. 10. In these circumstances, nothing further would survive in the present Writ Petition, as the services of the petitioner had stood terminated on 18.08.2023 itself, by virtue of time. 11. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. Needless to say, it is further observed that the said proceedings of the 2nd respondent or the confidential letter, that is said to have been sent by the learned III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, FAC Special Judicial Magistrate of II Class for Excise, Chittoor, dated 25.01.2024, shall not be, in any manner, treated as being prejudicial to the petitioner or as casting any stigma on the petitioner. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. ________________________ R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J
______________________ SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
Date: 03.11.2025 MJA
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111
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION NO: 20651/2024 (per Hon’ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao)
03.11.2025
MJA