JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. Appellant-Dr. Nishi Sharma has filed the present appeal, under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’), against the judgment of acquittal, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 1, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’). 2. By way of judgment, dated 26th September, 2011, the learned trial Court has dismissed the complaint, filed, under Sections 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘ IPC ’), by petitioner-Dr. Nishi Sharma against respondent-Dr. Ashok Sharma. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the lis, shall hereinafter, referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, before this Court, may be summed up, as under: 4.1. Complaiant-Dr. Nishi Sharma lodged a report, with the police, disclosing therein, that she is posted as Medical Officer, for the last three years and has recently been transferred from Andretta to Lahtekri, Chamba. 4.2. According to the complainant, on 14th March, 2008, at about 09.30 a.m., she was on her duty at Health Centre. At that time, one Urmila Devi, Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat was also there, who had come to get medicines. One Shakuntla Devi is also stated to be present there. Then Dr. Ashok Sharma, OSD, Health Centre, came there for surprise inspection and by giving signal, by hand, he has directed her to come out of the room, upon which, the complainant came out of the room. When, she came out of the room, Dr. Ashok Sharma allegedly told her that Dr. Nishi, number of days have passed, but, you have not come to Shimla. She has been allured by saying that come to him at Shimla, he will get her transfer cancelled and with the bad intention, touched her shoulder with his hand and started doing obscene acts. On this, the complainant, at once, returned to her room and Dr. Ashok Sharma, OSD, also chased her and taken away the attendance registered and dispatch register, in which, the complainant has not marked her presence, upon which, the complainant requested him to return the registered, but, said Dr. On this, the complainant, at once, returned to her room and Dr. Ashok Sharma, OSD, also chased her and taken away the attendance registered and dispatch register, in which, the complainant has not marked her presence, upon which, the complainant requested him to return the registered, but, said Dr. Ashok Sharma, with bad intention, had stated to her that she has to come to Shimla and I will see how you will not come there. 4.3. She has also stated that Ashok Sharma, with bad intention, has done obscene acts with her and after showing his status of OSD, he has outraged her modesty. 4.4. Lastly, she has stated that yesterday, she has tried to contact her father and brothers, but, could not contact, as such, she could not lodge the report, on that day. 5. On the basis of the above facts, the police registered the case FIR No. 69 of 2008, under Sections 354 and 509 IPC , with Police Station Palampur. Thereafter, the police has conducted the investigation and submitted the cancellation report, as, no offence was found against the accused. 6. After perusing the said cancellation report, the learned trial Court has issued the notice to the complainant. On 3rd October, 2009, the complainant put appearance before the learned trial Court and deposed that she is not satisfied with the investigation of the police and wants to contest the case. Consequently, the case was ordered to be tried as private complaint and the complainant was directed to adduce preliminary evidence. Consequently, the complainant has examined three PWs, upon which, the learned trial Court found a prima facie case, against the accused, under Section 354 IPC , as such, he was ordered to be summoned. 7. After securing the presence of the accused, Notice of Accusation, under Section 354 IPC , was put to the accused, for which, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. As such, the complainant was directed to adduce the evidence. Consequently, she has examined as many as, four PWs. 8. After the closure of the evidence, the entire incriminating evidence, appearing against the accused, was put to him, in his statement, recorded under Section 313 CrPC. As such, the complainant was directed to adduce the evidence. Consequently, she has examined as many as, four PWs. 8. After the closure of the evidence, the entire incriminating evidence, appearing against the accused, was put to him, in his statement, recorded under Section 313 CrPC. The accused persons has denied the entire prosecution case and has taken the plea that he is innocent person and has falsely been implicated, in this case, as he has submitted absent report of the complainant to the Director (Ayurveda) and recommended disciplinary action against her and on the same day, i.e. 15th arch, 2008, on the complaint, show cause notice was issued to the complainant. In his defence, the accused has examined one DW. 9. The learned trial Court, after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the complainant, as well as, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, has acquitted the accused, from the offence, punishable under Section 354 IPC , vide judgment of acquittal, dated 26th September, 2011. 10. Against the said judgment of acquittal, the present appeal has been filed, before this Court, mainly on the ground that the learned trial Court has ignored the natural version of the complainant and wrongly held the same to be unnatural ad not trustworthy. 11. The evidence of CW-3, Shakuntla Devi, is also stated to be not considered by the learned trial Court properly, as, she has categorically denied the suggestion that the Health Centre was not opened at proper time. 12. The photographs, Ex. DX and DY, are also stated to be wrongly relied upon, by the learned trial Court. Those photographs are stated to have wrongly been taken note of, in violation of the provisions of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, as, the negatives of the same have not been produced on the file. 13. The findings of the learned trial Court have further been assailed, on the ground that the learned trial Court has wrongly concluded that since the complainant had not marked her presence in the attendance register, as such, she is deemed to be absent from duty, at 9.45 a.m., whereas, CW-2, Urmila Devi, at the relevant time, was presence and her presence was also not marked in the registered. 14. Similarly, according to the appellant- complainant, even on 13th March, 2008, the presence of the workers and the complainant has not been marked, in the register. 14. Similarly, according to the appellant- complainant, even on 13th March, 2008, the presence of the workers and the complainant has not been marked, in the register. 15. The findings have further been assailed on the ground that from the record of Government Primary School, Chatter, it has been established that on 13th March, 2008, the complainant and the staff were on duty for the School Health Programme, as the tour was fixed for the said School, on that day. 16. Similarly, according to the appellant- complainant, the evidence of CW-4, Sapna Devi, has also been misinterpreted by the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court is stated to have given undue weightage to the delay in lodging the FIR, whereas, according to the appellant-complainant, she is a woman, besides being a Doctor, having respect in the society. As such, before lodging the FIR, she has to think twice. Not only this, she had to consult her father and brothers, as, it affects the family reputation, besides her own reputation. 17. On the basis of the grounds of appeal, Mr. Hemant Vaid, learned counsel appearing for the appellant- complainant has prayed that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court, may be set aside and the accused may be convicted, for the commission of offences, for which, he has been charge-sheeted, by the learned trial court. 18. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. Arshita Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused, has supported the judgment of acquittal, on the ground, that the evidence, so adduced, before the learned trial Court, has rightly been considered by the learned trial Court and the conclusion, which has been drawn by the learned trial Court, is sustainable in the eyes of law, and, as such, the same does not require any interference. 19. In order to decide the controversy, involved in the present case, it would be just and appropriate for this Court to discuss the evidence, so adduced, by the parties, before the learned trial Court. 20. Complainant-Dr. Nishi Sharma has appeared as CW-1 and deposed that in the year 2008, she was posted as Medical officer at Andretta in Ayurvedic Health Centre. According to her, on 14th March, 2008, at about 9.30 – 9.45 am, Urmila Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Andretta, was being checked up by her. Meanwhile, Ashok Kumar, OSD (Ayurveda) (accused) came there. 20. Complainant-Dr. Nishi Sharma has appeared as CW-1 and deposed that in the year 2008, she was posted as Medical officer at Andretta in Ayurvedic Health Centre. According to her, on 14th March, 2008, at about 9.30 – 9.45 am, Urmila Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Andretta, was being checked up by her. Meanwhile, Ashok Kumar, OSD (Ayurveda) (accused) came there. At that time, Shakuntla, Part Time Water Carrier, was also stated to be present there. Thereafter, OSD Ashok (accused) directed the complainant to come out of the room. 20.1. Consequently, she came out of the room and reached at the verandah. The said place is also stated to be secluded one as no one was there. At that place, he (accused) has said to the complainant that your transfer has been ordered and despite a number of days having been passed, neither you had come to me nor made a call. She has further deposed that the accused told her to come for a night to him at Shimla and thereafter, he will get her transfer cancelled. 20.2. Thereafter, according to the complainant, the accused has touched her inappropriately on her shoulder and with bad intention, started teasing her. Due to his act, the complainant got perplexed and ran inside the room. Accused allegedly chased her and took away the attendance register and dispatch register, by saying that in order to get those registers back, come to Shimla. Subsequently, the accused is stated to have left the said place. 20.3. The applicant has further deposed that the accused had come there in his private vehicle. Thereafter, the complainant allegedly disclosed this fact to Pradhan and Part Time Water Carrier. Lastly, she has deposed that the accused, by taking undue advantage of his position, was harassing her. 20.4. In the cross-examination, the complainant has admitted that the distance between Andretta and Panchrukhi is 2 kms. At the relevant time, the residence of the complainant was at Baijnath. The Police Post is stated to be in Panchrukhi and Police Station is in Baijnath. This witness has admitted that in the premises, in which, the dispensary was functioning, the office of Forest Guard is also there. She has denied the suggestion that the Panchayat Ghar is also there. She has denied that the shop of Ex. BDC Member Baldev Singh is near the dispensary. This witness has admitted that in the premises, in which, the dispensary was functioning, the office of Forest Guard is also there. She has denied the suggestion that the Panchayat Ghar is also there. She has denied that the shop of Ex. BDC Member Baldev Singh is near the dispensary. She has further admitted that there was a mesh door on the main entrance of the Health Centre. 20.5. This witness has admitted that on 15th March, 2008, she has made a telephonic call to District Ayurvedic Officer, Dharamshala and inquired about the diary dispatch register and the attendance register, which were taken away by the accused. She has admitted that the Ayurvedic Officer replied to her that the said registers were with him and asked her to depute a person to get them back. She has also admitted that on that day, the pharmacist brought back the registers. 20.6. She has admitted that her attendance was not marked in the register for 13th and 14th March and accused has put question mark over those relevant columns. She has qualified the said statement by stating that she had seen the said fact when the register was received back in the dispensary. She has admitted that the documents, Ex. DX and DY, are the copies of those registers. While denying the suggestion that she would not have made the complaint, had the accused not marked her absent in the register, she has voluntarily stated that she was mentally disturbed on that day and due to this fact, the matter was not reported to the police on 14th and 15th March, however, on 15th March, 2008, she had checked a number of patients in the dispensary. 20.7. This witness has admitted that for 13th, 14th and 15th March, 2008, she had kept her casual and station leave, without getting the same sanctioned, in the register, which was taken away by the accused. She has further admitted that the application of Ghanshyam, Pharmacist, without sanction, was also found lying in the register. She has denied that on 14th March, 2008, when the accused had inspected the dispensary, on the direction of Director (Ayurveda), neither she nor any staff member was present there. She has admitted that in the application, Ex. DA, she has mentioned that she is unable to attend the duty. She has denied that on 14th March, 2008, when the accused had inspected the dispensary, on the direction of Director (Ayurveda), neither she nor any staff member was present there. She has admitted that in the application, Ex. DA, she has mentioned that she is unable to attend the duty. She has also admitted that on 14th March, 2008, the presence of the entire staff was not marked in the register. Rest, she has denied all the suggestions, which were put to her, by the learned counsel appearing for the accused. 21. CW-2, Urmila Devi, has deposed that on 14th March, 2008, at about 9.30 – 10.00 am, she had gone to Ayurvedic Dispensary in order to get medicines and when, the complainant was checking her, then, she had gone out of the room. Thereafter, she came back inside the room. At that time, she was weeping and on inquiry, she has stated that a person had touched her. Thereafter, the said person had taken away the registers, by saying to the complainant, to take back those registers from Shimla. 21.1. In her cross-examination, this witness has admitted that the dispensary and the Panchayat Ghar are situated in the same premises. She has admitted that she had made a statement to the police that the person, who came there, had left the place, after taking away the register and then, the complainant had started weeping. She has admitted that no alleged incident had taken place in her presence qua inappropriate touch by the accused. 22. CW-3, Shakuntla Devi, has stated that on 14th March, 2008, at about 09.30-09.45 am, Doctor (complainant) was checking the patient. Meanwhile, someone came there and made a signal to the complainant to come out. The said place is stated to be secluded one. According to this witness, subsequently, the complainant had gone out and she came back after five minutes, while weeping. Meanwhile, the said person also came there and taken away the registers, by telling the complainant to take back those registers, from Shimla. 22.1. In the cross-examination, this witness has deposed that at the relevant time, she did not mark the presence, in the register. She has admitted that in the photograph, Ex. DX, she is the person, who has been shown to be opening the lock of the dispensary. According to her, she is also known as Asha. 22.1. In the cross-examination, this witness has deposed that at the relevant time, she did not mark the presence, in the register. She has admitted that in the photograph, Ex. DX, she is the person, who has been shown to be opening the lock of the dispensary. According to her, she is also known as Asha. She is stated to be getting pension from the Welfare Office. 23. CW-4 Sapna Devi, has deposed that on 14th March, 2008, the teacher has directed her to call the peon of the dispensary, upon which, she had gone to the house of Shakuntla Devi, to call her, but, she was not present there. The son of Shakuntla Devi met this witness and disclosed that she had gone to dispensary. Thereafter, this witness had gone back to school. 23.1. In her cross-examination, this witness has feigned her ignorance to the fact that at the relevant time, it was 9.45 am. She has also feigned her ignorance to the fact as to whether on that day, the officers from Ayurvedic Department had visited the dispensary or not. 24. In his defence, the accused has examined Baldev Singh, Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Andretta, as DW-1. This witness has also remained as Up-Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat. According to this witness, in the month of March, 2008, he was Member of the Panchayat Samiti. His shop and house are stated to be adjoining to the dispensary. 24.1. This witness has deposed that on 18th March, 2008, again stated that on 14th March, 2008, one officer had visited the Ayurvedic Dispensary at about 9.30 am, and, at that time, the dispensary was closed. Consequently, the said officer had called the peon from the adjoining Primary School to call the Part Time Peon of dispensary, who came there after 10-15 minutes and opened the dispensary. When, the dispensary was opened by the Peon, the said officer had clicked the photographs. Thereafter, the said officer had taken away the register. This witness has identified the said officer, as the accused, present in the Court. According to this witness, the complainant was posted as Doctor in the dispensary. 24.2. In the cross-examination, this witness has admitted that he has made similar statement to the officers of Ayurveda and police. The accused was not known to him. According to him, a number of persons had gathered on the spot, on that day. According to this witness, the complainant was posted as Doctor in the dispensary. 24.2. In the cross-examination, this witness has admitted that he has made similar statement to the officers of Ayurveda and police. The accused was not known to him. According to him, a number of persons had gathered on the spot, on that day. This witness has denied the suggestion that he had a dispute with the complainant, on account of cutting the bamboo trees. 25. This is the entire evidence, adduced by the parties, before the learned trial Court. 26. The complainant is before this Court, against the judgment of acquittal. The scope of the powers of the Appellate Court, in an appeal, against acquittal, has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case, titled as Sadhu Saran Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others , reported in (2016) 4 Supreme Court Cases 357. Relevant paras-20 to 22, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “20. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, in Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 , has held: (SCC p. 415, para 7) “7. The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. It is only when the approach of the trial court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal.” (emphasis supplied) 21. This Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If the appellate court, on scrutiny, finds that the decision of the court below is based on erroneous views and against settled position of law, then the interference of the appellate court with such an order is imperative. 22. This Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, after referring to a catena of decisions, has laid down the following general principles with regard to powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” (self emphasis supplied) 27. Even otherwise, in a recent decision in Criminal Appeal No. 355 of 2013, titled as Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. versus State of Uttarakhand, Neutral Citation No. 2025 INSC 114 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has again reiterated the powers of the Appellate court, while deciding an appeal, against the judgment of acquittal. Relevant paras-8 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: 8. It is further submitted that the interference in the judgment of acquittal by the learned trial judge would have been warranted by the High Court only in the event the view taken by the learned trial judge was found to be perverse or impossible. It is submitted that no perversity or impossibility could be noticed in the view taken by the learned trial judge and as such the interference by the High Court in an appeal against the acquittal was totally unwarranted. 9. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent. State submits that the Division Bench of the High Court has given sound reasons for reversing the order of acquittal and as such no interference is warranted in the present appeals. 10. 9. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent. State submits that the Division Bench of the High Court has given sound reasons for reversing the order of acquittal and as such no interference is warranted in the present appeals. 10. We have perused the entire material on record with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: "38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31) encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325), SCC P. 432, para 42) '42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following principles general regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers. an appellate court in an appeal of against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers. an appellate court in an appeal of against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption favour of in the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental of principle criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, strengthened by the trial court. reaffirmed and (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence record, appellate on the court should not disturb the finding of trial acquittal recorded by the court.'" 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748) this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) "8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record." 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” (self emphasis supplied) 28. Being guided by the above decision, this Court would proceed further to determine as to whether the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, while acquitting the accused, suffers from perversity. 29. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘ Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another ’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 30. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another , reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” (self emphasis supplied) 31. In this case, the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused, mainly, on the ground that there is unexplained delay of two days, in lodging the FIR. The incident has allegedly taken place on 14th March, 2008, at 9.30 am., whereas, the matter has been reported to the police, only on 16th March, 2008, at 4.30 pm. 32. In this case, the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused, mainly, on the ground that there is unexplained delay of two days, in lodging the FIR. The incident has allegedly taken place on 14th March, 2008, at 9.30 am., whereas, the matter has been reported to the police, only on 16th March, 2008, at 4.30 pm. 32. A futile attempt has been made by the complainant to explain the delay in lodging the FIR, by stating, that before reporting the matter, she had tried to contact her father and brothers, but, could not contact them. The complainant is not an ordinary lady. She, at the relevant time, was posted as Medical Officer. Moreover, as per her own case, on 15th March, 2008, she had contacted the District Ayurvedic Officer, telephonically, and inquired about the dispatch and attendance registers, which, the accused had allegedly taken away and at the instance of the District Ayurvedic Officer, she had deputed the pharmacist to bring back those registers. 33. Not only this, when the attendance register was with her, on 15th March, 2008, in which, the accused allegedly had put question mark, over the column, meant for the signatures of the employee, then, the explanation, which has been given in the FIR, with regard to the delay in lodging of the FIR, is nothing, but, appears to be an afterthought to cover up the delay, which has rightly been discarded by the learned trial Court, in the present case. 34. Prompt lodging of the FIR rules out the chances of deliberations. In the ordinary course of events, if an educated and self-dependent lady would have been forced to meet such type of behaviour, then, she would have reported the matter immediately. At the relevant time, the complainant was about 42 years of age, as, she has given her year of birth as 1966, at the time of lodging of FIR, on 16th March, 2008. 35. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution is bound to prove the ingredients of the offence beyond any shadow of doubt and if the accused is able to create a doubt in the prosecution case, then, in the absence of any explanation, with regard to such doubt, the accused is entitled for the benefit of the same. 36. 36. In the present case, the photographs, allegedly clicked by the accused, have been relied upon by him, which are Ex. DX and DY. These photographs were categorically put to CW-3 Shakuntla Devi, who, as per the case of the complainant, was present in the Health Centre, at the relevant time, whereas, according to CW-3, Shakuntla Devi, has admitted that she is the person, who has been depicted in the said photographs, opening the lock. Moreover, there was no occasion for CW-3 to put the lock, had the dispensary been opened and the complainant and said CW-3 been in the dispensary, as per the official timings. Her admission, qua the fact that in the photographs, Ex. DX and DY, she has been shown to be opening the lock of the dispensary, is sufficient to create doubt in the prosecution story. 37. Even, the complainant, while appearing as CW- 1, has admitted that the photographs, Ex. DX and DY, are of the dispensary, where she was posted. 38. The complainant has changed her version, step by step. On the one hand, in the FIR, she has made an attempt to explain the delay by stating that she could not lodge the FIR on 14th or 15th March, 2008, since, she could not contact her father and brothers, and, on the other hand, she herself has admitted that the application for casual leave and station leave for 13th, 14th and 15th March, 2008, was lying in the register, without getting the same sanctioned, which has been taken away by the accused, alongwith the registers. This brings the entire story of the prosecution under the cloud of suspicion. 39. Considering the final conclusion, drawn by the learned trial Court, this Court is of the view that the said view is the possible view, on the basis of the evidence, so adduced before the learned trial Court and there is no occasion for this Court to differ with the findings of the learned trial Court, as, those findings do not fall within the definition of perverse findings. 40. Considering all these facts, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, does not require any interference by this Court. 41. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is upheld. 42. 40. Considering all these facts, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, does not require any interference by this Court. 41. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in the present appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court is upheld. 42. The bail bond and surety bond furnished by the accused are discharged. He is directed to furnish the bail bond in the sum of Rs. 20,000/-, with one surety, of the like amount, under the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC, to the satisfaction of learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, within a period of seven days, by giving an undertaking to appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, this judgment is being assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 43. Send down the record.