Darsu Ram @ Labud Ram v. The State Of Chhattisgarh
CRA/1343/2015 · 2025-07-14
Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, Shri Sanjay K Agrawal
body2025
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[ 2025 DAILYLAW 3985 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2025 DAILYLAW 3985 (CHH) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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1
2025:CGHC:32889-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1343 of 2015 {Arising out of judgment dated 30/09/2015 passed in Special Case No.20/2014 by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Jashpur, Chhattisgarh} 1 - Darsu Ram @ Labud Ram S/o Jhagru Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Dumarpani, Police Station Bagicha, District Jashpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Jashpur Chhattisgarh
... Appellant (s) versus 1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bagicha, District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Shri Shrikant Kaushik, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri R.S.Marhas, Additional Advocate General with Shri Rahul Tamaskar, G.A. and Shri HAPS Bhatia, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput (Judgment On Board) (15.07.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. This appeal is directed against judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 30/09/2015 passed by the Special Judge
2 under Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in Special Case No.20/2014 by which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as stated below - Conviction Sentence
1. U/s 370 (3) of IPC 12 years R.I. & fine of Rs.20,000/- (in default of payment of fine, 1 year additional R.I.)
2. U/s 344 of IPC 2 years R.I. & fine of Rs.5,000/-. (in default of payment of fine 3 months additional R.I.
3. U/s 374 of IPC 1 year R.I. & fine of Rs.2,000/-. (in default of payment of fine, 2 months additional R.I.)
4. U/s Section 3 (1) (vi) of SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for short ‘the Act of 1989’) 3 years R.I. & fine of Rs.6,000/-. In default of payment of fine, 4 months additional R.I. All the sentences to run concurrently
2. Case of the prosecution in short is that in the month of June 2013, the accused Labud Ram @ Darshu Nagesia lured the complainant Picharu's son Bhinsu, daughter-in-law Chandni, neighbour Ajay Ram, Bhukhni, Kandri, Bhattu Ram, Ghuran, Somaru Ram, Sawal, Indarmani, Lamburam etc. by promising higher wages and took them to Banaras and from there to Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh where he got them engaged in the work of brick extraction with one Girija Pandit. Later, the contractor Girja Pandit by pressurizing and luring took them to Calcutta and handed them over to his elder brother Shyam Pandit who made them work from morning till late night, kept them as slaves
3 knowing fully well that they belong to the member of Scheduled Tribe and did not pay wages, regarding which the complainant’s son Bhinsu informed his mother Manghni Bai through mobile. Then his mother Manghni Bai went to Kolkata Mathapara and made an attempt to bring back her son, daughter-in-law and other villagers, but they were not released by the said Girija Pandit. 3. On 29/12/2013, FIR (Ex.P/1 and P/2) was lodged by the complainant Picharu Ram. Thereafter, crime No.213/13 under Sections 344, 363, 370, 374/34 of the IPC was registered and during investigation the victims were recovered through seizure panchnama (Ex.P/4) and their MLC was conducted vide Ex.P/5 to Ex.P/11. The accused were arrested and their medical examination was conducted. Statement of victims and witnesses including complainant Picharu Ram was recorded.
Caste certificate of Bhinsu (PW8) and Somaru (PW13) were seized in front of witnesses vide Ex.P/15 and P/16. During investigation, main accused Girija Pandit and Shyam Pandit were absconding, hence absconding Panchnama was prepared and charge sheet was filed against the said accused under Sections 344, 363, 370, 374/34 of IPC and Section 3 (1) (vi) of the Act of 1989 and produced before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bagicha. 4. Having found the prima facie offence committed by the accused under Sections 344, 363, 370, 374, 341 of IPC and Section 3 (1) (vi) of the Act of 1989 by Judicial Magistrate First
4 Class, Bagicha, the case was committed to Special Judge, Jashpur on 16/04/2014 for trial, from where the case was received by the trial Court. The appellant denied the offence leveled against him under Sections 370 (3), 344, 374 of the IPC and Section 3 (1) (vi) of the Act of 1989 and claimed trial. In the statement under Section 313 of CrPC, the appellant pleaded innocence and false implication. 5. In order to bring home the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses and exhibited 17 documents. No defence witness was examined. 6. Learned trial Court, upon due appreciation of evidence, oral and documentary, found the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced them as stated above by the impugned judgment which is under challenge before this Court. 7.
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the statement of the witnesses cannot be relied upon. It is also submitted that offence under the Act of 1989 is not made out as the appellant was not knowing the fact that the victims belonged to the member of scheduled tribe. He submits that the ingredients of offence under Section 370 (3) and Section 344 of IPC are absolutely missing. Similarly, offence under Section 374 of IPC is also not made out as there is no allegation that the victims were compelled to go to another State. Therefore, it
5 is prayed that the appeal may be allowed. 8. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. He submits that the manner in which the victims were taken to another State in the name of giving higher wages and sent them to work in brick kiln, confined them as slaves knowing fully well that they belong to the member of Scheduled Tribe and no wages paid, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. In order to consider as to whether conviction of the appellant under Section 370(3) of the IPC is justified or not, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 370 (1) and (5) of the IPC which states as under:-
“370. Trafficking of person.-(1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers, or (e) receives, a person or persons, by- First.- using threats, or Secondly.- using force, or any other form of coercion, or Thirdly.-by abduction, or Fourthly.-by practising fraud, or deception, or Fifthly.-by abuse of power, or
6 Sixthly.-by inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received, commits the offence of trafficking.
Explanation1.-The expression “exploitation” shall include any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs. Explanation 2.-The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of the offence of trafficking. (5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than fourteen years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
11. Trafficking was brought in statute book as an offence under the Indian Penal Code by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 w.e.f 3.2.2013. By bringing in the said amendment, the legislature has enlarged the scope of the offence under Section 370 of the IPC and included within its purview not just mischief of slavery, but trafficking in general of minors as also adults and also forced or bonded labourer, prostitution, organ transplantation and to some extent child marriages. 12. For the purposes of this new offence, the offender has been classified into five categories, thus covering every aspect of the commission of such offence. A person can be held liable within the mischief of this offence, if he either (i) recruits or (ii) transports, (iii) harbours, (iv) transfers or (v) receives, a person or persons. 7
13. Exploitation is at the core of this new offence of trafficking. This exploitation can be deciphered from either of the following course of conduct:- (i) use of threats upon the victim who is being trafficked. (ii) use of force, or any other form of coercion upon the victim who is being trafficked. (iii) by means of abduction of the victim who is being trafficked. (iv) by practising fraud, or deception upon the victim who is being trafficked. (v) by abuse of power upon the victim who is being trafficked. (vi) by inducement of the victim who is being trafficked, including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in
order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received. 14. The first explanation that is added to this Section, further adds to the meaning of exploitation, any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or forced removal of organs. The second explanation added to this Section takes away the possibility of the accused from taking a defence of consent of the victim to any act of physical exploitation or other form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the forged removal of organs. 15.
By order dated 11/07/2014, charge was framed against the
8 appellant including offence under Section 370 (3) of the IPC, which states as under:-
प्रथम :-
तुमने जू ने 2013 के आसपास,
ग्राम डू मरटोली म,
थने बगीचा क्षेत्रांतुगीतु, भिन्स ,
चादने बई,
अजूय रम,
खने बई,
केन्दर बई,
ट्टूटो रम, धुरने, समरू रम, सवने,
इन्दरमने के प्रतुपागीढ़ (उत्तरप्रदश)
ली जूकेर दस के रूपा म व्ययभिनेतु किकेय,
तुद1 द्वार तुमने मनेव दव्यपार के अपारधु किकेय,
जू ०द०भिव० के4 धुर 370
म पारिरभि6तु होकेर रतुय दण्डू सभिहोतु 1860
के4 धुर 370 (3) के अतुगीतु
दण्डूनेय होकेर इस न्ययलीय के प्रसज्ञाने म हो:।
भिद्वातुय :-
तुमने उक्त किदनेके,
समय व स्थने पार भिन्स ,
चादने बई,
अजूय रम,
खने बई,
केन्दर बई,
ट्टूटो रम, धुरने,
समरू रम, सवने,
इन्दरमने के
प्रतुपागीढ़ के ईंटोट्टूट्ठा म दस किदने@ स अभिधुके अवभिधु के भिलीए स्वच्छापा वके सद6
पारिररधु केरिरतु किकेय,
तुम्होर यहो केEत्य रतुय दण्डू सभिहोतु 1860
के4 धुर 344
के अतुगीतु दण्डूनेय होकेर इस न्ययलीय के प्रसज्ञाने म हो:।
तुEतुय :-
तुमने उक्त किदनेके,
समय व स्थने पार भिन्स ,
चादने बई,
अजूय रम,
खने बई,
केन्दर बई,
ट्टूG रम, धुरने,
समरू रम, सवने,
इन्दरमने के
प्रतुपागीढ़ के ईटोट्टूट्ठा म उनेके4 इच्छा के भिवरूद्ध श्रम केरने के भिलीए भिववश किकेय,
तुम्होर यहो केEत्य रतुय दण्डू सभिहोतु 1860
के4 धुर 374
के अतुगीतु दण्डूनेय
होकेर इस न्ययलीय के प्रसज्ञाने म हो:।
चातुथ :-
तुमने उक्त किदनेके,
समय व स्थने पार अनेस भिचातु जूभितु/
जूनेजूभितु के
सदस्य नेहोJ होतु हुए,
पाभिLतु भिन्स ,
चादने बई,
अजूय रम,
खने बई, केन्दर बई,
ट्टूटो रम, धुरने,
समरू रम, सवने,
इन्दरमने के अनेस भिचातु जूनेजूभितु के
होने जूनेतु हुए,
सरकेर द्वार अभिधुरभिपातु सवजूभिनेके प्रयजूने@ के भिलीए किकेस
अभिनेवय सव के अभितुरिरक्त बगीर /
बधुव श्रम केरने के भिलीए भिववश किकेय / फु सलीय,
तुम्होर यहो केEत्य अनेस भिचातु जूभितु एव जूनेजूभितु (
अत्यचार भिनेवरण)
अभिधुभिनेयम 1989
के4 धुर 3(1) (6)
के अतुगीतु दण्डूनेय होकेर इस न्ययलीय के
प्रसज्ञाने म हो:।
16.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid charge under Section 370 (3) framed by the learned trial Court would show that the appellant took the victims to Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh in the name of
9 getting job on higher wages where they were kept as slaves thereby committed the offence of human trafficking. However, there is no allegation regarding exploitation. 17. In order to convict a person for offence under Section 370 of the IPC i.e. trafficking a person, it is sine qua non that offence must have been committed for the purpose of exploitation. A person must have been transported, recruited, harboured or received for the purpose of exploitation. Explanation 1 also provides that the expression “exploitation” shall include any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs. 18. In the instant case, there is no allegation of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the forced removal of organs, if any, by the victims. As such, the sole allegation against the appellant is that he took the victims to Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh in the name of getting job at higher wages and kept them as slaves. The word ‘slavery’ has been defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary as under -
“Slavery – 1. A situation in which one person has absolute power over the life, fortune, and liberty of another. 2. The practice of keeping individuals in such a state of bondage or servitude.” However, the statement of Chandni (PW1), Bhukhni Bai (PW2), Bhatthu (PW3), Kandri (PW4), Ghuran (PW5), Ajay (PW6), Maghni Bai (PW7), Bhinsu (PW8), Larang Ram (PW11), Somaru
10 (PW13), Sawal (PW16) and Indarmati (PW18) would show that the appellant had taken them to Pratapgarh, Narharpur, U.P. on the pretext of giving higher wages and engaged them to work in brick kiln under one Girija Pandit and he did not pay the wages which led to filing of the report. Apparently, the main allegation against the appellant is that he took the victims to Pratapgarh, Narharpur, U.P. and engaged them to work in brick kiln and no wages were paid. It is not a case that the appellant kept them as slaves. Statement of Chandni (PW1) reflects that she and abovestated victims were taken by the appellant to Pratapgarh Narharpur, U.P. on the pretext of getting higher wages.
They worked there for about 6 months but wages were not paid. Thereafter, brick kiln owner Pandit took them to Kolkata to work in brick kiln of one Shyam Babu. There also, they worked for three months and wages were not paid. The other witnesses also stated in similar line. As such, there is no evidence that the victims were taken to Narharpur, Pratapgarh, U.P. for the purposes of exploitation, which is sine quo non for conviction of offence under Section 370 (1) of IPC. 19. The word “exploitation” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition as under:-
“Exploitation. Act or process of exploiting, making use of, or working up. Utilization by application of industry, argument, or other means of turning to account, as the exploitation of a mine or a forest. State Finance Co. v. Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610, 613. Taking unjust advantage of another for one's own advantage or benefit (e.g. paying low wages to illegal aliens).”
11
20. Similarly, the word “exploitation” has been defined in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Edition as under:-
“exploitation 1 a situation in which you treat someone unfairly by asking them to do things for you, but give them very little in return – used to show disapproval: [+of] The film industry thrives on the sexual exploitation of women. 2 the development and use of minerals, forests, oil etc for business or industry : [+of] the controlled exploitation of resources | commercial/economic exploitation 3 the full and effective use of something : [+of] greater exploitation of these data 4 an attempt to get as much as you can out of a situation, sometimes unfairly : [+of] the exploitation of religion for political ends.”
21.
In the light of above discussion, it is an admitted fact that 11 victims were taken to Narharpur, Pratapgarh, U.P. for the purposes of engaging them to work in brick kiln and they worked there without making any complaint and the wages were not paid leading to filing of the report, however, the prosecution has not been able to bring home the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 370 (1) of IPC as there is no allegation of physical exploitation, abuse of power or abduction against the appellant. The aforesaid allegations also does not come under the definition of ‘slavery’. Merely because the wages were not paid, ingredients of Section 370 (1) of IPC would not attract as the victims are major, they, of their own gone along with the appellant to Narharpur, Pratapgarh, U.P., remained there for a very long time and worked there in a brick kiln. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that the appellant took the victims to Narharpur, Pratapgarh, U.P. and
12 exploited them. It does not appear from the records that the appellant compelled the victims to get them a job in brick kiln. If the amount is not paid by the owner, it cannot be said that false assurance was given by them. The victims herein worked in brick kiln for about 6 months and it is very difficult to assume that for these long period, they survived without being paid any amount. Therefore, the act of the appellant does not come within the meaning of Section 370 (1) of IPC and the learned trial Court is not justified in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 370 (1) read with Section 370 (3) of IPC. On a careful reading and analysis of the evidence available on record, we are not satisfied with the finding of guilt recorded by the Trial Court, hence, his conviction under Section 370(1) of IPC is set aside.
His conviction under Section 374 and Section 344 of IPC is also hereby set aside. 23. The victims in their statement have not stated anywhere that the appellant was knowing the caste of the victims and took them to another state. Considering the evidence available on record, this Court is unable to hold that the prosecution was able to prove the offence under the Act of 1989 beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, offence under the said act deserves to be and is set aside. 24. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30/09/2015 is hereby set aside and the appellant stands acquitted of all the charges framed against him. 13 He is reported to be on bail. He need not surrender; however, his bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provisions contained in Section 437-A of CrPC. 25. A copy of this judgment with record be sent back to learned trial Court for information and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
JUDGE
JUDGE Deepti DEEPTI HARIKUMAR Digitally signed by DEEPTI HARIKUMAR Date: 2025.07.28 13:10:32 +0530