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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 3975 (HP)

Varinder Singh v. Nirmala Devi

2025-12-18

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision petition is directed against the order dated 03.02.2024, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra (H.P.) (learned Trial Court), vide which an application under Section 156 (3) of Criminal Procedure Code (in short “Cr.P.C.”) for directing the Station House Officer (in short “SHO”) to register the First Information Report (in short “FIR”) was dismissed. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the Complainant filed a complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking a direction to the SHO of Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra (H.P.), to register an FIR and take appropriate action against Nirmala Devi (accused/respondent no. 1). It was asserted that the petitioner was married to Nirmala Devi. Their relationship deteriorated within 8 to 10 days of their marriage. The accused withdrew money from the "Pradhan Mantri Matri Vandana Yojna" scheme by forging the complainant’s signature. The supervisor, Manglesh Guleria, knew about the forgery, but he allowed the accused to obtain benefits under the scheme. The complainant made complaints to the Chief Minister’s Helpline, the SHO of the Local Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kangra, and the CDPO Kangra. However, no action was taken. Consequently, the application was filed to take action against the accused. 3. The learned Trial Court held that the documents annexed to the complaint did not establish that the complainant had reported the matter to the SHO, Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, or that he had failed to take action. Since the complainant had not first approached the SHO of the Police Station Baijnath, therefore, the application was not maintainable. Hence, the learned Trial Court dismissed the application as not maintainable. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present revision petition, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the application. The accused, Nirmala, had withdrawn money from the "Pradhan Mantri Matri Vandana Yojna" by forging the complainant’s signature. The supervisor, Manglesh Guleria, had also conspired with Nirmala Devi and aided her in withdrawing the amount. The accused, Nirmala, had withdrawn money from the "Pradhan Mantri Matri Vandana Yojna" by forging the complainant’s signature. The supervisor, Manglesh Guleria, had also conspired with Nirmala Devi and aided her in withdrawing the amount. The learned Trial Court wrongly held that the complainant had not approached the SHO, and ignored the postal receipts annexed to the application proving the submission of the complaint to the police. Therefore, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr Vivek Thakur, learned counsel, vice Mr Abhishek Sharma, learned counsel, representing the petitioner/complainant, Mr Bhim Raj Sharma, learned counsel, for respondent No. 1/accused, and Mr Abhinav Ghhabroo, learned counsel, for respondent No.2. 6. Mr Vivek Thakur, learned counsel, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P.C. The complainant had specifically mentioned in his application that he had earlier filed complaints before the SHO, local Police Station, Baijnath, District Kangra, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Kangra, and the CDPO Kangra. He had annexed the postal receipts to establish this fact. The learned Trial Court ignored the postal receipts. The complaint disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, and if the learned Trial Court was not inclined to refer the matter to the police for investigation, it should have taken cognisance and proceeded as per the law. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. Mr Bhim Raj Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the complaint was required to be made to the Police, and only thereafter the application could have been filed before the Court. The complainant had failed to establish that he had made a complaint to the SHO, Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, and the learned Trial Court was justified in dismissing the application. There is no jurisdictional error in the order passed by the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not interfere with the well-reasoned order of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. There is no jurisdictional error in the order passed by the learned Trial Court, and this Court should not interfere with the well-reasoned order of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. Mr Abhinav Ghhabroo, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, submitted that respondent No. 2 was not arrayed as a party before the learned Trial Court and could not have been impleaded before this Court; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Avinash v. State of Maharashtra , 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5197, that an order passed under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC disposes of an application under of the Cr.PC and is a final order; hence, a revision lies against such an order. It was observed:- 14. We thus find from the perusal of the scheme contained in the aforesaid two Chapters, viz. XII and XV, and in the light of the above decisions, that the order u/s 156(3) of the Code must be held to be not an interlocutory order, but an order in the nature of a final order. In the case of B.S. Khatri v. State of Maharashtra & another, 2004 1 MhLJ 747 , a Division Bench of this Court held thus in paragraph nos.13, 17 and 19 and extracted portion from paragraph no.20 as under: "13. All that has been done in the present case is an order under Section 156 (3) of the Code requiring investigation by a particular wing of the police of the State of Maharashtra, is passed, and it is at this stage that the petitioners have moved this court for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Factually, an order under (3) of the Code can be revised by a Sessions Judge or by this court under Section 397 read with 401 of the Code. Even for that purpose, therefore alternate remedy is available to the petitioners. Apart from that mere order directing investigation does not cause any injury of an irreparable nature, which requires quashing of even the investigation. All that has been ordered is an investigation into the complaint.” 11. Even for that purpose, therefore alternate remedy is available to the petitioners. Apart from that mere order directing investigation does not cause any injury of an irreparable nature, which requires quashing of even the investigation. All that has been ordered is an investigation into the complaint.” 11. This judgment was approved by the Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Arun P. Gidh v. Chandraprakash Singh , 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1028. 12. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, held in Father Thomas v. State of U.P. , 2010 SCC OnLine All 2438: (2011) 72 ACC 564 2011 Cri LJ 2278 that an order passed under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC is interlocutory and such an order is not revisable. It was observed at page 573: “50. We thus see that the orders for investigation are only an ancillary step in aid of the investigation or trial, and are clearly interlocutory in nature, similar to orders granting bail, or calling for records, or issuing search warrants, or summoning witnesses and other like matters which infringe no valuable rights of the prospective ac- cused, and are not amenable to challenge in a criminal re- vision, in view of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Code. xxxxxx 61. In view of the aforesaid, our answer is that the revi- sion against that the order under section 156(3) of the Code directing the police to investigate is clearly an inter- locutory order and a Criminal Revision (as also an order under section 482 Cr. P.C. against the same) is barred in view of section 397(2) of the Code.” 13. A subsequent Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held in Jagannath Verma v. State of U.P. , 2014 SCC OnLine All 11859: AIR 2014 All 214 that the bar to file revision will apply to the accused when the Magistrate orders the registration of the FIR and not to the complainant when the application has been dismissed. A subsequent Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held in Jagannath Verma v. State of U.P. , 2014 SCC OnLine All 11859: AIR 2014 All 214 that the bar to file revision will apply to the accused when the Magistrate orders the registration of the FIR and not to the complainant when the application has been dismissed. It was observed: “In view of the discussion above and for the reasons which we have furnished, we have come to the following conclusion: (i) Before the Full Bench of this Court in Father Thomas, the controversy was whether a direction to the Police to register a First Information Report in re- gard to a case involving a cognizable offence and for investigation is open to Revision at the instance of a person suspected of having committed a crime against whom neither cognisance has been taken nor any process issued. Such an Order was held to be interlocu- tory in nature and, therefore, to attract the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397. The decision in Father Thomas does not decide the issue as to whether the re- jection of an application under Section 156 (3) would be amenable to a Revision under Section 397, by the Complainant or the informant, whose Application has been rejected. (ii) An Order of the Magistrate rejecting an Application under Section 156 (3) of the Code for the registration of a case by the Police and for investigation is not an In- terlocutory Order. Such an Order is amenable to the remedy of a Criminal Revision under Section 397; and (iii) In proceedings in Revision under Section 397, the prospective Accused or, as the case may be, the person who is suspected of having committed the crime is en- titled to an opportunity of being heard before a deci- sion is taken in the Criminal Revision. 14. Therefore, the present revision petition against an order dismissing an application filed under Section 156 (3) of CrPC is maintainable. 15. The record of the learned Trial Court shows that the complaint was filed only against Nirmala Devi (respondent No. 1), whereas Manglesh Guleria has been arrayed as respondent No. 2 before this Court in the present proceedings. 14. Therefore, the present revision petition against an order dismissing an application filed under Section 156 (3) of CrPC is maintainable. 15. The record of the learned Trial Court shows that the complaint was filed only against Nirmala Devi (respondent No. 1), whereas Manglesh Guleria has been arrayed as respondent No. 2 before this Court in the present proceedings. No prayer was made in the complaint to take action against Manglesh Guleria; therefore, he could not have been impleaded as a party before this Court, and the petition is liable to be dismissed qua him. 16. Learned Trial Court held that no complaint was made to the SHO, Police Station Baijnath, and the complaint under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P.C. was not maintainable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1514, that a person cannot approach the Magistrate under (3) of CrPC without approaching the Police. It was observed: “26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities that, if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognisance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC.” 17. In the present case, the complainant specifically asserted in Paragraph No. 3 of the complaint that he had given a written complaint to the local Police Station Baijnath on 20.06.2023, but no action was taken. He again filed a complaint to the SHO, Police Station Baijnath, on 24.06.2023. He filed the complaints with the Dy. S.P., Baijnath, and S.P., Kangra, on 06.07.2023. The learned Trial Court ignored the specific allegations, which were duly supported by an affidavit, and the order passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be sustained on this short ground alone. 18. He again filed a complaint to the SHO, Police Station Baijnath, on 24.06.2023. He filed the complaints with the Dy. S.P., Baijnath, and S.P., Kangra, on 06.07.2023. The learned Trial Court ignored the specific allegations, which were duly supported by an affidavit, and the order passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be sustained on this short ground alone. 18. The complaint specifically mentioned that the accused had forged his signature and obtained the benefit under the “Pradhan Mantri Matri Vandana Yojna”. Thus, the allegation of a commission of a cognizable offence was made in the complaint. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Amit Khera v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi , 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2706, that where the complaint made under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, the Magistrate could not have dismissed the complaint, but should have taken action as per law. It was observed:- 4. Section 200 Cr. P.C. requires a Magistrate to take cognisance of an offence on a complaint. When a complaint is made, the Magistrate has to examine the complainant and other witnesses present, on oath, and he has to record the substance of such examination and ask the complainant and witnesses to sign the same. However, a complaint can be made to the learned MM orally as well as in writing. Thus, when a complainant approached the Court with an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P.C. with specific allegations that his report was not being registered by the police and the police was not acting, the Magistrate could not have sent back the person, unless the Magistrate had come to the conclusion that from the complaint, no cognizable offence was made out. The reasons given by the Court of MM and upheld by the Court of ASJ for not acting on the application of the petitioner are bereft of any logic. On receipt of a complaint, the city police is not only to do scientific investigation and make recoveries, but it has to take action against the offenders as per law. The investigation is done by the police, even by recording statements of witnesses. On receipt of a complaint, the city police is not only to do scientific investigation and make recoveries, but it has to take action against the offenders as per law. The investigation is done by the police, even by recording statements of witnesses. Moreover, in the present case, the petitioner had only the phone number of the caller, and the police had the resources to find out the name of the caller and other particulars of the caller by approaching service providers, which the petitioner himself could not have done. I, therefore, consider that the learned MM went wrong in observing that no FIR was required to be registered since no scientific investigation/recovery needed to be done. 5. The learned MM and learned ASJ both went wrong in observing that a formal complaint was required to be made by the complainant under Section 200 Cr. P.C. Section 200 Cr. P.C. does not require the making of a written formal complaint by a complainant. A complainant can just appear before the Court of MM and request the Court to take his oral complaint on record. The Court of MM, under Section 200 Cr. P.C. is obliged to record the statement of the complainant and his witness, if any, appearing with him, and the learned MM has to act on such a statement, if the commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed. The Court cannot refuse to entertain a complainant who appears in person before the Court and wants to make an oral complaint. In the present case, the complainant had made an application under Section 156 (3) wherein he had made specific allegations against the respondent. The Court was duty-bound to take cognisance of this complaint as a complaint of the petitioner and was bound to act upon it. The petition is hereby allowed, and the order passed by learned MM and learned ASJ, both being illegal orders, are hereby set aside. The application of the petitioner under (3) is allowed. The police of the police station in Delhi Cantt. Is hereby directed to register an FIR on the complaint of the petitioner. The concerned SHO shall register a case and bring it to a logical conclusion after proper investigation. 19. The application of the petitioner under (3) is allowed. The police of the police station in Delhi Cantt. Is hereby directed to register an FIR on the complaint of the petitioner. The concerned SHO shall register a case and bring it to a logical conclusion after proper investigation. 19. Therefore, the learned Trial Court could not have dismissed the complaint, but the learned Magistrate was bound to record the statement of the complainant and the witnesses present, if any; hence, the order passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the complaint cannot be sustained. 20. In view of the above, the present petition is partly allowed, and the matter is ordered to be remitted to the learned Trial Court for taking a fresh decision in the light of the observations made hereinabove. The complainant, through his learned counsel, shall appear before the learned Trial Court on 29th December, 2025. 21. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith along with a copy of this order so as to reach the concerned Court well before the date fixed. 22. The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.