JUDGMENT : Romesh Verma, J. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree, passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. dated 20.10.2010, whereby the appeal filed by the present appellant was dismissed and the judgment and decree, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.2, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. was affirmed. 2. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the plaintiff and defendants. 3. The present appeal was listed for final disposal at the admission stage. Both the parties agreed that following substantial questions of law arise for determination in the present appeal: 1. Whether the impugned judgment and decree as passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, H.P. and judgment and decree as passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.2, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. are the result of misreading, misappreciation and misrepresentation of the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record? 2. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC filed by the appellants as a result of which the great prejudice has been caused to them? 4. The appeal is admitted on the aforesaid substantial questions of law for its determination and consideration. With the consent of the parties, the case was taken up for final hearing. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 5. The brief facts of the case are that plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief under Sections 38 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act against the defendants. It was averred in the plaint that the land comprised in Khewat No. 106 min, Khatauni No. 121 min, Khasra No. (old) 573/468/212 and changed Khasra No. 224, measuring 0-15-2 bighas, situated in Muhal Nela, No. H.B. 342, Tehsil Sadar, Distt. Mandi, H.P.(hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘suit land’) as per copy of the jamabandi/missal haqiat for the year 1997-1998 is recorded under the ownership and possession of the defendants. The said entries are wrong, illegal, incorrect and contrary to the factual position of the spot. Mandi, H.P.(hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘suit land’) as per copy of the jamabandi/missal haqiat for the year 1997-1998 is recorded under the ownership and possession of the defendants. The said entries are wrong, illegal, incorrect and contrary to the factual position of the spot. It was stated in the plaint that the suit land was previously in peaceful possession of the father of the plaintiff since the year 1964 and despite this defendant by misrepresentation of facts and without the knowledge of the father of plaintiff managed to get the suit land sanctioned in his favour vide File No.109, dated 05.12.1975, decided on 29.12.1975 from the Tehsildar, Sadar, Mandi by way of Nautor and later on mutation No. 167, dated 11.07.1977 has also been attested in his favour, but no possession of the suit land was obtained by the defendant from the revenue agency through the process of law. 6. It was alleged in the plaint that the possession was never delivered to the defendant by the revenue agency and, on the other hand, the father of the plaintiff continued to be in an exclusive possession of the suit land till his death. It was further stated that the defendant on 13.09.1986 made an attempt to forcibly plough the suit land and to dispossess the plaintiff, but his attempt was foiled by the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant did not take any steps to obtain the possession and thereafter, the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land is open, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, knowledgeable, hostile and notorious. It was stated that defendant has the knowledge with respect to the possession of the plaintiff and the same has ripened, matured and perfected into an absolute title on 13.09.1998. The plaintiff prayed that in view of the said facts, plaintiff be declared to have become the owner of the suit land by virtue of the adverse possession and the same is liable to be recorded in the revenue record. He prayed that entries showing the defendant as owner in possession of the suit land are wrong, illegal, incorrect and void ab initio and the same be declared to be cancelled. Decree for injunction was also prayed by the plaintiff against the defendant. 7. The suit was contested by the defendants by taking preliminary objections such as maintainability, cause of action etc. Decree for injunction was also prayed by the plaintiff against the defendant. 7. The suit was contested by the defendants by taking preliminary objections such as maintainability, cause of action etc. On merits, the suit was contested by denying the fact that the revenue entries of the suit land are wrong and incorrect and contrary to the factual possession. It was denied that the suit land is in possession of father of the plaintiff since 1964 and despite this fact, the defendants on misrepresentation of facts has managed to get the suit land sanctioned in his favour on 29.12.1975. It was averred in the written statement that suit land has been sanctioned in favour of Haru Ram in a rightful manner and he has been put in possession since the time of its sanction. Haru Ram continued to be in possession of the suit land and the defendants being legal representatives of late Sh. Haru Ram are the owners in possession of the suit land. It was stated in the written statement that as a matter of fact the replying defendants are in exclusive possession of the suit land and previously their father was in exclusive possession of the suit and there is no question of the possession of the plaintiffs or their father on the suit land. All the averments as made in the plaint were denied and the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 8. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.2, Mandi, H.P. on 03.10.2002 framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the plaintiff has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession, as alleged? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled for injunction? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action? OPD 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 5. Relief.” 9. Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.2, Mandi, H.P. vide its judgment and decree dated 30.04.2009 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant. 10. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, H.P. on 29.05.2009. The learned Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 20.10.2010 dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff. 11. Division), Court No.2, Mandi, H.P. vide its judgment and decree dated 30.04.2009 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant. 10. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, H.P. on 29.05.2009. The learned Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 20.10.2010 dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff. 11. The plaintiff has approached this Court by filing the present regular second appeal against the judgments and decrees as passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, H.P. and learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Court No.2, Mandi, H.P. 12. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the courts below have erred by dismissing the suit and the appeal filed by the present appellants. He submits that the courts below have misread and misinterpreted the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, as a result of which, great prejudice has been caused to them. He submits that an application filed by the applicant-appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC has been wrongly rejected; rather it ought to have been allowed by the learned First Appellate Court. 13. On the other hand, learned counsels for the respondents have defended the judgments as passed by learned courts below and they have vehemently argued that there is no error in the judgments and decrees as passed by the two courts below. They have submitted that since there are concurrent findings of fact rendered by the learned courts below, therefore, no interference of any kind is required in the present appeal. 14. Coming to the first question on which the appeal has been admitted. A perusal of the record reveals that the plaintiff had placed his claim by filing a suit for declaration and injunction by stating that on the basis of adverse possession, he has become the owner of the suit property. Both the parties in support of their contentions have led oral as well as documentary evidence. The Jamabandi for the year 1997-98 of the suit land depicts Haru, s/o Masantu to be the owner of the suit land bearing Khasra No. (old) 573/468/212 and changed Khasra No. 224, measuring 0-15-2 bighas and also to be possessed by said Sh. Haru. Both the parties in support of their contentions have led oral as well as documentary evidence. The Jamabandi for the year 1997-98 of the suit land depicts Haru, s/o Masantu to be the owner of the suit land bearing Khasra No. (old) 573/468/212 and changed Khasra No. 224, measuring 0-15-2 bighas and also to be possessed by said Sh. Haru. The copy of mutation is also a part of the record which clearly reveals that on 29.12.1975 the mutation was attested in favour of Haru, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, whereby by virtue of grant of Nautor, the suit land was given to him. It establishes the title and possession of the defendants in unequivocal terms. Presumption of truth is attached with the revenue records until and unless the same is rebutted by the opposite side. In the present case, the record depicts the defendants to be the owner and in possession of the suit land, therefore, the burden shifts on the plaintiff to rebut the said presumption. No documents have been placed on record by the plaintiff to establish that they are in possession of the suit land in any manner. 15. In order to substantiate its case, plaintiff examined PW-1 Raghubir Singh, S/O Sh. Gurmukh Singh. In his examination-in-chief, he has reiterated the averments of the plaint. He has stated that suit land consists of 0-15-2 bighas and the suit land is owned by them. He has stated that on the spot the possession of the suit land is with them and their possession is coming since 1962-64. He has stated that the grant of Nautor in favour of Haru was sanctioned in the year 1975 and they were unaware about the said fact. He has stated that on 13.09.1986, the defendants tried to disturb the possession of the plaintiff, however, the same was stopped by the plaintiff and the possession of the plaintiff is uninterrupted since then and by virtue of adverse possession they have become the owner of the suit land. PW-1 has stated that Haru Ram, the father of the defendants, had left the suit land in his favour and till his death late Haru Ram did not object to the same. 16. PW-1 has stated that Haru Ram, the father of the defendants, had left the suit land in his favour and till his death late Haru Ram did not object to the same. 16. In cross-examination, he has stated that for the first time in the year 1986 they came to know that the suit land has been allotted to Haru, the predecessor, of the defendants by way of Nautor. He stated that he had objected before the Deputy Commissioner with respect to grant of Nautor and the said proceedings are still pending before the competent Court. 17. The plaintiff examined Sh. Kanshi Ram, S/O Titu Ram, retired Naib Tehsildar, to corroborate his case. He has submitted that the suit land is situated at Nela and the dispute is with respect to 15 biswas of suit land. He stated that earlier the suit land was possessed by the father of the plaintiff, Gurmukh and thereafter the suit land is being possessed by his sons. He has stated that the possession of the suit land is coming since long and earlier it was cultivated and now various plants have been planted over the land. 18. The plaintiff examined PW-3, Sh. Shiv Dass to corroborate his case. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that he knew the parties and he has seen the suit land, which is situated at Village Nela and it comprised of 14-15 bishwas. He has stated that the suit land is coming in the possession of Raghubir and prior to that it was possessed by his father. He has stated that possession of the plaintiff is since 1983. He has further stated that the plaintiff has planted fruit bearing trees over the suit land. He deposed that when he was extracting the stones at the time of Haru, the predecessor of the defendants had objected to the same. 19. In the cross-examination, he stated that earlier they used to graze their cattle over half portion of the suit land and the remaining half land was in the possession of late Sh. Haru Ram. He stated that this suit land was granted to Haru as a Nautor and the mutation was attested in his favour. After attestation of mutation, late Sh. Haru Ram did not allow the cattle of the plaintiffs to graze over the suit land. Haru Ram. He stated that this suit land was granted to Haru as a Nautor and the mutation was attested in his favour. After attestation of mutation, late Sh. Haru Ram did not allow the cattle of the plaintiffs to graze over the suit land. He admitted that after the death of Haru, the suit land is owned by his sons. He further admitted that sons of Haru had planted fruit bearing trees over the suit land. The testimony of PW-3 Shiv Dass is very important and he has categorically admitted that the suit land was allotted by way of Nautor to Sh. Haru and earlier it was owned by him and after his death, his son planted fruit bearing trees over the suit land. The testimony of PW-3 is contrary to the case as set up by the plaintiff, especially, in view of plaint and statements of PWs-1 and 2. The plaintiffs have failed to establish their possession over the suit land. Therefore, both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to establish their case. As such, no relief can be granted to them once plaintiffs have failed to prove their possession. Therefore, no question arises with respect to adverse possession. In case plaintiff is not in possession, no question arises of deriving title by means of adverse possession. 20. Even otherwise, while deposing as PW-1, the plaintiff has stated that Haru Ram had left this land to him. This statement is in conflict to the case as set up by the plaintiff in the plaint as well as in the evidence. This statement shows that Haru Ram came to be in possession of the suit land after its allotment. Therefore, case as projected by the plaintiff is falsified. 21. In order to corroborate its case, defendant has examined Kanoura Ram as DW-1. He has stated in his statement that the suit land consists of 15 bishwas. He has stated that the suit land was allotted to Sh. Haru Ram in the year 1975 by way of Nautor. He specifically stated that possession of this land was handed over to his father by the Patwari of the area. After its allotment, some fields were made and fruit bearing trees were planted over the suit land. Thereafter, it is owned and possessed by the defendant. Haru Ram in the year 1975 by way of Nautor. He specifically stated that possession of this land was handed over to his father by the Patwari of the area. After its allotment, some fields were made and fruit bearing trees were planted over the suit land. Thereafter, it is owned and possessed by the defendant. He stated that after the death of his father, the brothers and sisters became the owners of the suit land. 22. In the cross-examination, the plaintiff could not extract anything fruitful from the defendant and the testimony of the defendant remained unrebutted. 23. From the perusal of the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, especially, jamabandi for the year 1997-98 it clearly demonstrates that Haru Ram, predecessor of the defendants, was the owner of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 224, measuring 0.15.2 bighas. The copy of record also establishes the title of the defendants. The said evidence has remained unrebutted, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to establish its case with respect to the ownership and possession. Once, it has been found that plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit land, therefore, no question of adverse possession arises in the case. The statement of the plaintiff does not inspire confidence. On the contrary, PW- 3 has falsified the case as projected by the plaintiff and he has admitted that land was allotted to late Sh. Haru and after his death his sons are coming in possession of the same and they have planted fruit bearing trees over the suit land. The learned courts below have rightly appreciated the point in controversy qua the subject matter. 24. This Court is dealing with a Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows: “100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.]” 25. In the present case, there are concurrent findings of fact rendered by the learned Courts below and the scope of interference as per the various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court is very narrow and limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in its various decisions that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to substitute its own view for a plausible finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. 26. Reference in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521 . 27. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others (1997) 5 SCC 438 has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals as involve a substantial question of law. 28. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others , AIR 1999 SC 2213 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 29. 29. It is thus clear that under Section 100 C.P.C., this Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings are erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. The High Court in the Second Appeal can interfere with the findings of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such findings are recorded without proper appreciation of the documents or failure to follow the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court and acted on assumption not supported by evidence. 30. It is settled law that High Court can go into the findings of the fact only if first appellate court has not considered the law and evidence or has considered the inadmissible evidence or different evidence. 31. Section 103 Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- “103. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact.—In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,— (a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100.” 32. A perusal of Section 103 CPC reveals that it permits the High Court to go into the facts only when the Courts below have not determined or rendered any findings on a crucial fact, despite evidence already available on record or after deciding the substantial questions of law, the facts of a particular case demand re- determination. 33. Further, when the first appellate Court, in due exercise of its jurisdiction, has considered the entire evidence on record and has rendered well-reasoned findings of fact, this Court, in second appeal, is not supposed to re-appreciate such evidence, save and except, in a case where a substantial question of law arises, or where the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or arrived at in disregard to the voice of law. 34. 34. The judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court authorize to reconsider the evidence as available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of CPC and not this Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100 of CPC, unless the case falls under Section 103 of CPC. 35. From perusal of the judgments of the learned courts below which have concurrently held against the plaintiff, the learned counsel for the appellants has failed to point out any perversity in the judgments of the learned courts below either oral or documentary evidence. Therefore, on this ground the judgments/findings of the learned courts below do not call for any interference. 36. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the application which was filed by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC, has been wrongly rejected by the First Appellate Court. 37. The record reveals that an application under order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC was filed by the plaintiff/appellant before learned First Appellate Court for leading additional evidence. It was averred in the application that documents i.e. legal notice dated 03.09.1996, demarcation report dated 22.04.1996 alongwith statement of official witnesses and parties contained in File No. 1/96 which was instituted on 27.03.1996, titled Haru Ram vs. Raghubir etc., notice under Section 163 of H.P. Land Revenue Act, issued to the predecessor of the plaintiff on 05.09.1975 pertained to the suit land and it was stated that while filing the present suit, the documents were not in possession of the plaintiff/appellant and these documents could not be filed at the appropriate time/stage with due diligence. 38. The said application was duly resisted by the defendants by filing a detailed reply, in which averments made in the application were resisted and they prayed for dismissal of the same. 39. Learned Appellate Court vide its order dated 20.10.2010 dismissed the said application by passing a detailed order. The order passed on application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned first appellate Court reads as follows:- “1. This order shall dispose of an application filed by the appellant/plaintiff Under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. 2. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for both the parties on the application and gone through the record carefully. 3. The order passed on application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned first appellate Court reads as follows:- “1. This order shall dispose of an application filed by the appellant/plaintiff Under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. 2. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for both the parties on the application and gone through the record carefully. 3. The documents which are now sought to be adduced by way of additional evidence are as under: (a) A copy of Legal Notice dated 3-9-96. (b) Demarcation report dated 22-4-1996 along with the statements of the official witnesses and parties contained in file No.1/96, instituted on 27-3-1996, titled as “Haru son of Sh. Masantu Versus Raghubir Singh etc.” (c) Notice under section 163 of H.P. Land Revenue Act issued by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Tehsil Sadar, Mandi to the predecessor of the appellant/ applicant dated 5-9-1975 pertaining to the suit land. 4. The documents which are now sought to be adduced by way of additional evidence were very much within the knowledge of the appellant/plaintiff when the case was at the stage of the plaintiff’s evidence in the Ld. Trial Court. No satisfactory explanation has been given by the appellant/plaintiff as to why the documents were not produced in the Ld. Trial Court at the appropriate stage. It appears that the appellant/ plaintiff remained negligent when the case was at the stage of evidence. He could easily produce the aforesaid documents in the Ld. Trial Court, had he exercised due diligence. Since, the appellant/plaintiff did not adduce evidence despite availability at the relevant time, he now cannot be allowed to produce that evidence by way of additional evidence. Reference is made to AIR 2000 H.P. 130 , Kamal Dev and another Versus Hans Raj, wherein it has been held as under:- “(B)Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), O.41, R.27-Application to adduce additional evidence- Defendant throughout found to be negligent- Not adducing said evidence despite availability at relevant time. Order rejecting application to adduce additional evidence is proper.” 5. A perusal of the record of the Ld. Trial Court shows that the plaintiff’s evidence was closed by the order of the court on 16-3-2005. The plaintiff filed a revision petition against that order, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26-7-2005 passed in CMPMO No. 147/05. A perusal of the record of the Ld. Trial Court shows that the plaintiff’s evidence was closed by the order of the court on 16-3-2005. The plaintiff filed a revision petition against that order, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26-7-2005 passed in CMPMO No. 147/05. Since, the revision petition of the appellant/plaintiff filed against order dated 16-3-2005 has been dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court, the appellant/plaintiff cannot be allowed to agitate the same matter again and again. Under these circumstances, the application filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., deserves to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed. Be tagged with main case file. 6. Announced in the open Court today the 20th October, 2010.” 40. The learned first appellate Court has rightly come to the conclusion that plaintiff/appellant was negligent about its case when it was at the stage of evidence. Further, it has been held that the plaintiff/ appellant has failed to exercise due diligence. The Court below held that the evidence of the plaintiff was closed by the order of the Court in the year 2005. Against the closer of the evidence, the plaintiff filed a Revision Petition which was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 26.07.2005, passed in CMPMO No.147 of 2005. Since the petition filed by the plaintiff against the order dated 16.03.2005 was dismissed, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to agitate the same matter again and again. The provision of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC shows that the application for leading additional evidence can be allowed in case the party, who intends to produce the additional evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not after exercise of due diligence be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed or the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. 41. From perusal of the application and submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, it reveals that he could not point out that despite due diligence such evidence was not in his knowledge. 41. From perusal of the application and submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, it reveals that he could not point out that despite due diligence such evidence was not in his knowledge. As a matter of fact, the documents intended to be produced by way of additional evidence are prior to the institution of the suit and there is no averments with respect to the due diligence on the part of the plaintiff. There is no explanation why plaintiff did not place on record the said documents at the time of filing of the suit. The explanation as given by the plaintiff is vague and does not fulfill the parameters of order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. 42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another (2012) 8 SCC 148 has held as under: “49. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ). 50. In Parsotim Thakur & Ors. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ). 50. In Parsotim Thakur & Ors. v. Lal Mohar Thakur & Ors., AIR 1931 PC 143 , it was held: “….The provisions of S.107 as elucidated by O.41, R.27 are clearly not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the Court of appeal. ….Under R.27, Cl.(1) (b) it is only where the appellate Court “requires” it (i.e. finds it needful). …… The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but “when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent”, ….It may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the Court to apply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the court upon its appreciation of evidence as it stands. Wherever the Court adopts this procedure it is bound by R. 27(2) to record its reasons for so doing, and under R.29 must specify the points to which the evidence is to be confined and record on its proceedings the points so specified. The power so conferred upon the Court by the Code ought to be very sparingly exercised and one requirement at least of any new evidence to be adduced should be that it should have a direct and important bearing on a main issue in the case…” (Emphasis added) (See also: Indirajit Pratab Sahi v. Amar Singh, AIR 1923 P.C. 128 )” 43. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order of the first appellate court. The said application has rightly been dismissed. Therefore, both the substantial questions are answered accordingly. 44. No other point raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 45. Consequently, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.