2025:JHHC:26951 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (L) No.6674 of 2013 Smt. Raj Laxmi Devi, wife of Jagarnath Badaik, Resident of Qr No.CTI A-32, H.E.C Colony, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S-Jagganathpur, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. …… Petitioner Versus The Management of Heavy Engineering Corporation through its Chief Managing Director, having its office at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S-Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand .……. Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ---------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Manish Kumar, Amicus Curiae For the Respondent : Mr. Sushant Kumar, Advocate ----------- CAV Judgment Pronounced on:29.08.2025 This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing the Award dated 11.11.2011 notified on 03.10.2013 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi in Reference No.2/2008 by which the learned Court held that the dismissal/struck off the name of petitioner after loss of lien by the Management is wholly legal which is contrary to provision of Section 25-F of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. It has been further prayed that the petitioner may be reinstated in services with back wages from the date of her joining and other consequential benefits. 2. Heard Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sushant Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-HEC. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned Award dated 11.11.2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in law. It is submitted that the petitioner was appointed as the Mazdoor in the year 1990 and she was displaced 2025:JHHC:26951 2 person and she was absorbed after two years of training in service. It is further submitted that the husband of the petitioner was abducted and she had lost her mental balance which constrained her to report to the Management for her service and since 07.04.1997 she was under treatment of Dr. M.K Sinha from 09.11.1994 to 27.12.1994, Dr. U.N Choubey, R.M.A Kanke from 10.04.1997 to 25.02.2004 and Dr. M.K. Sinha from 26.02.2004 to 25.03.2005. It is submitted that when she was declared fit to join her duty then she approached the Management of H.E.C and thereafter she learnt that the Management of H.E.C by taking recourse of provisions contained in Order No.15(x) of Certified Standing order, has struck off her name as she failed to respond the letter No.1153 dated 22.05.1997 by which a 30 days‟ notice of loss of lien was served to her. It is submitted she never received such notice as she was not mentally fit to act upon it. The office order no.825/97 dated 07.07.1997, by virtue of which it was alleged that intimation of loss of lien was given by the Management, has also not been received by her. It is submitted that the minor son of workman-petitioner had informed the Management about her treatment but the Management had remained aphetic to her certificate and even after several representation, the Management did not reinstate her in the service. It is submitted that the notice was served to the petitioner by HEC although it was allegedly purportedly send on 22.05.1997. It is submitted that on 07.07.1997 vide Exhibit-A the Management conducted enquiry and letter was sent to the petitioner. It is submitted that the action of the respondent is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that learned Court below failed to consider that the petitioner has not been given proper 2025:JHHC:26951 3 opportunity of hearing and her case was fully supported by the documents and certificates of the doctors and hence the action of the Management is in violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. It is submitted that due date of retirement of the petitioner was in the year 2022 and she is still residing in official quarter and hence the Award passed by the learned Court below may be set aside and the writ petitioner may be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the prayer. It is submitted that the Award passed by the learned Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required. It is submitted that the reference was bad in law as the appropriate government has referred this dispute without application of mind. It is not a case of dismissal rather it is a case of loss of lien in terms of the provisions contained in S.O.no. 15(x) of Certified Standing Order. Since the reference has been made on the part of the concerned workman and hence it is not a case of dismissal and hence this court should not grant any relief to the workman. The termination in such a situation in automatic. Therefore no action can be imputed on the part of the management rather the event of termination took place due to workman negligence. It is further submitted that there is an inordinate delay and the loss of lien has occurred in 1997 whereas the dispute has been raised in the year 2006. The workman had absented herself several days from the date of her appointment and since 17.04.1997 she was absent. 5. The further case of the management is that during training period the workman started absenting unusually and unauthorisedly to the extent after allowing the kind of leave available to her and she was granted 11 days of extraordinary 2025:JHHC:26951 4 leave i.e., leave without pay within a period of 19.2.1990 to 19.02.1992. Not only this by furnishing a chart of duration of absent, it is stated that from 01.01.1993 to 31.12.1993 she remained absent for 45 days. From 01.01.1994 to 31.12.94 she remained absent for 93 days. During this period she was served with notice dated 26.11.1994 issued to her to join her duty and another letter dated 15.12.1994 was issued regarding loss of lien in terms of S.O.no. 15(x) of Certified Standing Order. But the letter returned back unserved with an endorsement of postal peon that no such addressee at Masmano village. Further from 30.01.95 to 27.05.1995 she made absent herself for 112 days and for which charge sheet was issued under S.O.no. 30(ii) vide letter no. 1257 dated 24.08.1995 but she joined on 31.12.1994. As she joined, so the management taking lenient view dropped the charges levelled against her with warning. Further on 7.04.1997 onwards when she made absent then a 30 days‟ notice in terms of S.O.no. 15(x) of Certified Standing Order was issued vide letter no. 1153 dated 22.5.1997 and having waited for 46 days ultimately vide office order no. 825 dated 07.07.1997 taking recourse of S.O.no. 15(x) of Certified Standing Order, the loss of lien was intimated to the workman which was acknowledged on 09.07.1997 by the son of the workman namely Bhawesh Kumar. The further case of the Management is that after 9 years of loss of lien on her appointment, the workman made an appeal before CMD HEC and the Management not being satisfied with the certificates of doctors to their own reason rejected the appeal as the workman had not avail the medical facility available in the plant hospital as an indoor patient. The further case of the management is that this appeal has been made when the workman received notice from the Town and Administration 2025:JHHC:26951 5 Division to vacate the quarter no. A-32/CTI colony, H.E.C. occupied unauthorisedly and subsequent action under P.P.E. Act. The application was received in the office on 24.01.2006. Thus, the workman is a habitual offender and she lost her lien of the appointment and having no case to be considered. Thus, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 6. Perused the Trial Court Record and considered the submission of both the sides. 7. It transpires that in support of her case, the workman has examined four (04) witnesses as follows:- (i) W.W.1-Raj Lakshmi Devi (i.e. the Workman), (ii) W.W.2-Abhay Kumar Singh, (iii) W.W.3- Bhawan Singh and (iv) W.W.4- Kamta Prasad Biswas 8. However, no documents were marked as Exhibit on behalf of the Workman-Petitioner. 9. It transpires that the workman-petitioner had relied upon certain judgments which are as follows:- (i) 2011 Lab.I.C.645, (ii) 2010 Lab.I.C. 3805, (iii) AIR 1960 SC 10, (iv) 1982 SCC 645, (v) 2010 5 SCC 497, (vi) 2010 Lab.I.C. 1462, (vii) LLR 2005 992 (All. H C), (viii) 1976 SCC 822 and (ix) 1977 (4) SCC 415. 10. The Management in support of its case, got examined the following witnesses as follows:- (i) M.W.1-Sukhlal Oraon and (ii) M.W.2-Bir Bahadhur Singh 11. The Respondent-Management in support of its case, got marked the Exhibits, as follows:- (i) Ext A-Xerox copy of letter no. 7.7.97, (ii) Ext.A/1-acknowledgement dated 9.7.97, 2025:JHHC:26951 6 (iii) Ext. A/2-Xerox copy of letter no. 3367 dated 26.11.94, (iv) Ext.A/3 -Xerox copy of letter no3784dated 15.12.1994, (v) Ext. A/4-Xerox copy of letter dated 31.12.94, (vi) Ext. A/5-Xerox copy of letter no.542 dated 4.3.95, (vii) Ext. A/6-Xerox copy of letter no.940 dated 27.3.95, (viii) Ext. A/7-Xerox copy of letter no.453 dated 23.4.95, (ix) Ext. A/8-Xerox copy of letter no.1856 dated 25.5.95, (x) Ext.A/9-Xerox copy of letter no. 1257 dated 24.8.1995, (xi) Ext. A/10-Xerox copy of letter no185 dated 8.10.96, (xii) Ext. A/11-Xerox copy of letter no.190 dated 22.10.96, (xiii) Ext. A/12-Xerox copy of letter dated 19.11.96, (xiv) Ext. A/13- Xerox copy of letter no130 dated 24.01.1997, (xv) Ext. A/14- Xerox copy of letter no.308dated 1.3.1997, (xvi) Ext.A/15-Xerox copy of letter no.992 dated 21.4.1997, (xvii) Ext. A/16-Xerox copy of letter no.1153 dated 22.5.97, (xviii)Ext. A/17- Xerox copy of letter no.940 dated 11.7.06, (xix) Ext. B- Memo of appeal to CMD received on 24.1.06, (xx) Ext. C- Xerox copy of office order dated 17.3.1990, (xxi) Ext. C/1-Xerox copy of office order dated 11.4.1992, (xxii) Ext. C/2-Xerox copy of office order dated 7.6.95, (xxiii)Ext.C/3-Xerox copy of office order dated 28.1.97, (xxiv)Ext. C/4- Xerox copy of office order dated 8.7.97, (xxv) Ext.D-Xerox copy of memo no. 1357 dated 7.3.92, (xxvi)Ext.D/1- Xerox copy of memo no. 394 dated 17.3.1992, (xxvii)Ext.D/2 Xerox copy of memo no, 2597 dated 3.4.92, (xxviii) Ext.E-joining letter dated 29.12.94, (xxix) Ext.F-Xerox copy of charges dated 24.8.95 and (xxx) Ext.G-Xerox copy of application dated 11.4.91. 12. The Respondent-Management has also relied upon certain judgments:- (i) 2007 LLR 435(Delhi), (ii) 2007LLR1132(S.C), (iii) L.P.A.no. 324 of 2001, (iv) L.P.A. no. 595 of 2001, (v) S.L.P. (Civil) no. 20751/2003, (vi) 2001-1-LU-174(S.C), (vii) 2011-1-LU-1630, (viii) 2011 LLR846(Jhr.) (D.B) and (ix) 2011 LLR 847 (Jhr.)D.B). 2025:JHHC:26951 7 13. Thereafter the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi has answered the reference in favour of the Respondent- HEC. 14. It transpires from the evidence of W.W-1 Raj Laxmi Devi that she was a female labour of HMBP of H.E.C Management since 19.2.1990. She has stated that she was not punished in any manner except one warning when she went for her mental disorder and remained absent without sanction of leave. Later on her leave was sanctioned by the Management and payment was also made to her. She also stated that her husband Jagarnath Baraik was working in H.E.C but on 07.09.1996 he became traceless from the office. No report of his whereabouts could be traced out by the Police and not a single farthing was given to her against the dues of her husband by the H.E.C Management till date. This occurrence made her mentally sick. She was suffering from depression. Her mental situation is not good and she always resides in her house. The family members and the relatives got her treated but she could not recover her proper mental state for a long period. When she regained normalcy she approached the Management to join her duty to maintain her small children but even after assurance she was not allowed to join on the ground of struck off her name as an Employee. In the year 2006 she was informed in writing that her Appeal has been dismissed. Then she agitated the matter before the Dy. Labour Commissioner, Ranchi but the Management did not attend the conciliation proceeding. Therefore her case has been referred to the Labour Court. She further deposed that she is an Adivasi lady. Now she is fit to render her service. The provision of 15(x) of the certified 2025:JHHC:26951 8 standing order of the management is only being used against the Schedule Tribe. She has been at length cross-examined. 15. During cross examination she stated that her husband is still traceless for 10-12 years while working under the management of H.E.C. The Management has not given her letter to receive the dues. She denied to have raised the present industrial dispute when the management started proceeding of eviction of the quarter. She has proved the Ext-A. Letter no.1485 dated 07.07.1997 received by L. R. Kapoor, G.M. HMBP and accepted that it was received by her son. Her letter of Appeal dated 24.01.2006 has been marked as Ext-B. She denied the fact that she had been a habitual absentee so she has been removed from the service. She further stated that she has not received any due lying with the H.E.C. Management and she never went to claim it. 16. Thus, from scrutinizing the evidence of WW-1 has fully supported her case and pointed out that her husband became traceless on 07.09.1996 and he is still traceless and she had not actually absented herself rather due to missing of her husband and her mental condition, she remained absent. 17. W.W.2 Abhay Kumar Singh is Vice President of Heavy Engineering Workers Union and who has also supported the case of the petitioner and stated that the Management has not complied with the Section 25-F of the I.D Act. He also deposed that he knows Rajlaxmi Devi who has illegally been removed from the service with the help of provision of 15(x) of certified standing order without service of notice. The management has not complied the provision of Section 25-F of the I. D. Act. The husband of the workman since traceless which made her mentally unbalanced and she became absent. The workman was 2025:JHHC:26951 9 found roaming near the office of Chairman an on query she told that she is moving around the officials for joining the service. During cross examination he has stated that he was not aware about the date of absent of the workman whatever he has deposed it is as per information given by the workman. 18. On the other hand, Management has also produced two witnesses, M.W-1 has stated that the petitioner was habitual defaulter and absentee and she was terminated under the provision of Section 15(x) of the Certified Standing Order of HEC. However, the evidence of M.W-1 gives a sarcastic remark against the petitioner. 19. M.W-2 Veer Bahadur Singh also stated that petitioner remained absent during training for some period from 19.02.1990 to 19.02.1992 and she was habitual absentee. Thereafter since 07.04.1997 the workman made herself unauthorisedly absent. 20. It transpires that the learned Court below has answered the Reference against the petitioner in absence of evidence of any medical report of the Doctor. 21. It reveals that the petitioner remained absent from the year 1997 till 2006. Although, the petitioner had failed to produce any medical papers before the learned Labour Court below though she has adduced four witnesses. 22. Exhibit-A/7, Exhibit-A/8 and Exhibit-A/9 respectively are papers of the Management which reveal that the petitioner was suffering from her mental illness and she was treated by Doctor at Kanke, Ranchi. 23. It is also a case of Management that the notice was served upon the son of the petitioner vide Exhibit-A/16 i.e. letter dated 22.05.1997 and not upon the petitioner. 2025:JHHC:26951 10 24. Exhibit-C/1 issud by the Jr. Manager (Pers) HEC reveals that petitioner was absorbed in service on 11.04.1992 as Mazdoor Trainee in regular pay scale alongwith seven other Mazdoor (Trainee). Exhibit-C/2 reveals that later on the petitioner was transferred and posted to I.P.C, Deptt/HMBP with immediate effect. 25. Exhibit-D is performance report dated 07.03.1992 by which the case of the petitioner was taken for regularization. However, Exhibit-D/1, D/2 and D/3 show that she was absent. 26. Exhibit-E is the joining report dated 29.12.1994 of the petitioner the Respondent-HEC company which shows that she had taken medical leave from the Respondent company from 09.11.1994 to 27.12.1994 as she was under treatment of one Doctor Mukesh Kumar Sinha, RMA, Kanke, Ranchi and had also obtained her fitness certificate. 27. Exhibit-G is the letter of the sons and daughter of petitioner sent to the Manager of HEC on 17.04.1997 by which it has been informed that her mother is traceless. 28. It transpires from the impugned Award that the learned Presiding Officer has not appreciated the oral evidence as well as documentary evidence led on behalf of the petitioner. Even the learned Presiding Officer has failed to consider the documentary evidence proved on behalf of the Respondent-HEC as Exhibit-A to Exhibit-G respectively. 29. It transpires from Exhibit-C/1 filed by the Management- Respondent that the writ petitioner had already been absorbed in the service of HEC and was working like a regular employee till the year 1997 when she failed to report duty on account of 2025:JHHC:26951 11 abduction/missing of her husband who was also working with the HEC-Respondent. 30. The petitioner was absorbed vide Office Order dated 11.04.1992 (Exhibit-C/1) issued by the J.R, Manager, HEC and she was appointed in the service of HEC on 19.02.1990. 31. Thus, the petitioner had completed more than 240 day of service from the year 1990 till the year 1996. However, this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi. 32. It is evident that without holding any domestic enquiry/departmental proceeding, the petitioner has been terminated from the services only on the ground of expiry of lien which is in complete violation of principles of natural justice. 33. Neither any enquiry was conducted nor enquiry report was served upon her, nor any second show cause notice was issued upon her and she was merely dismissed under Clause-15 (x) of Certified Standing Order of the company in one sided manner. 34. It has been held in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 at para 14,15 and 23 as follows:- “Para-14:- Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. 2025:JHHC:26951 12 Para-15:- We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. Para-23:- Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 35. It transpires that the learned Presiding Officer has failed to notice Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 36. At this stage, it will be relevant to refer section 2 (oo), Section 25-B and Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act which read, as follows:- 2025:JHHC:26951 13 “Section 2. (oo) „retrenchment‟ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include— (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; Section 25-B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,— (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer— (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer not less than— (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and 2025:JHHC:26951 14 (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which— (i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks. Section 25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until— (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 37. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of K.V Anil Mithra and Another vs. Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Another reported in (2022) 17 SCC 505 at para-34, 35 and 36 as follows:- 2025:JHHC:26951 15 “Para-34:- It is not open for us to examine the nature of employment offered to the workman and the manner he had served the employer is beyond the terms of reference made by the appropriate Government dated 8- 4-2003 and the fact is that if the service of the workman has been terminated, it will be termed to be a retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act provided it does not fall under any of those expressly excluded under the section. In every retrenchment, the employer is not under an obligation to comply with the twin conditions referred to under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act but in a case where the workman has been in continuous service for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months before the alleged date of termination as contemplated under Section 25-B, the employer is under an obligation to comply with the twin conditions referred to under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act. Para-35:- The consistent view of this Court is that such non-observance has been termed to be void ab initio bad and consequence in the ordinary course has to follow by reinstatement with consequential benefits but it is not held to be automatic and what alternative relief the workman is entitled for on account of non-observance of mandatory requirement of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act is open to be considered by the tribunal/courts in the facts and circumstances of each case. Para-36:- What appropriate relief the workman may be entitled for regarding non-compliance of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act has been considered by this Court in BSNL v. Bhurumal [BSNL v. Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 373] . The relevant paras are as under : (SCC p. 189, paras 33-35) “33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of 2025:JHHC:26951 16 Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious. 34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] ]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose. 35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied.” 2025:JHHC:26951 17 38. It has been held by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranbir Singh vs. Executive Engineer PWD reported in (2021) 14 SCC 815 at para-7 as follows:- “Para-7:- In the light of the state of the law, which we take note of, we notice certain facts which are not in dispute. This is a case where it is found that, though the appellant had worked for 240 days, appellant's service was terminated, violating the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. The authority involved in this case, apparently, is a public authority. At the same time, it is common case that the appellant was a daily wager and the appellant was not a permanent employee. It is relevant to note that, in the award answering Issue 1, which was, whether the termination of the appellant's service was justified and in order, and if not, what was the amount of back wages he was entitled to, it was found, inter alia, that the appellant could not adduce convincing evidence to establish retention of junior workers. There is no finding of unfair trade practice, as such. In such circumstances, we think that the principle, which is enunciated by this Court, in the decision, which is referred to in Raj Kumar [State of Uttarakhand v. Raj Kumar, (2019) 14 SCC 353 : (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 258] , which we have referred to, would be more appropriate to follow. In other words, we find that reinstatement cannot be automatic, and the transgression of Section 25-F being established, suitable compensation would be the appropriate remedy.” 39. It is further evident that the writ petitioner was absorbed in the services of HEC and thus, she was working like a regular employee. However, the Respondents while dismissing the services of the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 40. Thus, it is own documents of the Management HEC- Respondent which show that the petitioner was absent due to medical reasons and hence, she is entitled to sympathy and as such the Award dated 11.11.2011 notified on 03.10.2013, is set aside and the matter is remitted to learned Labour Court to give 2025:JHHC:26951 18 opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and liberty is also granted to the petitioner to produce documentary evidence, if any, and the Reference must be decided within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this judgment. 41. It will be also open to the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi to inform the Workman-Petitioner through Member Secretary, JHALSA to engage a counsel, if the petitioner fails to appear before the learned Labour Court, Ranchi. In the meantime, Member Secretary, JHALSA is directed to provide legal aid to the petitioner, if she approaches the office of JHALSA. 42. With the above observation and direction, the instant writ petition is allowed and stands disposed of. 43. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Court below and the petitioner and the learned Member Secretary, JHALSA by the office at the earliest. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Saket/- NAFR