/ / / APHC010847752018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO SECOND APPEAL No.1610 of 2018 Between: Medasani Ananda Naidu, S/o. late Venkatrama Naidu, Hindu, Aged 64 years, Residing at C. Mallavaram Village, Perumalpalle Post, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Chittoor District. ...Appellant/Respondent No.l/Plaintiff AND 1. Dr Manchu Mohan Babu @ Bhakthavathsalam Naidu, S/o. Narayanaswamy Naidu, Aged about 68 years, Residing at Plot No.6, Road No. 1, Film Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. ...Respondent/Appellant/Defendant No.4 2. Kandati Siddaramaiah Chetty, S/o. Sriramulu Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 77 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 3. Kandati Amarnath, S/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 53 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 4. Kandati Naga Manemma, W/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 67 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. ...Respondents/Respondents 2 to 4/ Defendants 1 to 3 Appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C, against the Judgment and Decree in A.S.No.7 of 2012 dated 27.08.2018 on the file of the X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District, in O.S.No.357 of 2004 dated 16.11.2011 the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District. on Appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the Memorandum of Appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court and the material evidence on record and upon hearing the arguments of Sri Vedula Srinivas, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri N Ashwani Kumar, Advocate for Respondent No.1 and none appeared for Respondent Nos.2 to 4. This Court doth judgment and decree as follows; 1. That the Second Appeal be and hereby is allowed; 2. That the decree and judgment passed by the first appellate Court be and is hereby set aside and confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. 3. That each party do bear their own costs in the Second Appeal. SD/- E.KAMESWARA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To 1. The X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District. 2. The Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tirupathi, Chittoor District. 3. Two CD Copies TK TAC HIGH COURT DATED:08/09/2025 DECREE SA No.1610of 2018 andhS; X 15 SEP 2025 m f/ o ^ Current Section £i?SPATC^^ -7^- ALLOWING THE SECOND APPEAL APHC010847752018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO SECOND APPEAL No.1610 of 2018 Appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C, against the Judgment and Decree in A.S.No.7 of 2012 dated 27.08.2018 on the file of the X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District, in O.S.No.357 of 2004 dated 16.11.2011 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District. Between: Medasani Ananda Naidu, S/o. late Venkatrama Naidu, Hindu, Aged 64 Residing at C. Mallavaram Village, Perumalpalle Post, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Chittoor District. years. ...Appellant/Respondent No.l/Plaintiff AND S/o. Mohan Babu @ Bhakthavathsalam Naidu, Narayanaswamy Naidu, Aged about 68 years. Residing at Plot No.6 Road No.1, Film Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. 1. Dr Manchu ...Respondent/Appellant/Defendant No.4 2. Kandati Siddaramaiah Chetty, S/o. Sriramulu Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 77 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 3. Kandati Amarnath, S/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 53 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 4. Kandati Naga Manemma, W/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 67 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. ...Respondents/Respondents 2 to 4/ Defendants 1 to 3 lA NO: 1 OF 2018 Petition under Section 151 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of operation of the decree and judgment of the X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi in AS No.7 of 2012 dated 27.08.2018 pending disposal of the S.A lA NO: 1 OF 2019 Between: Dr Manchu Mohan Babu @ Bhakthavathsalam Naidu, S/o. Narayanaswamy Naidu, Aged about 68 years. Residing at Plot No.6, Road No.1, Film Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. .. .Petitioner/Respondent/ Appellant/Defendant No.4 AND 1. Medasani Ananda Naidu, S/o. late Venkatrama Naidu, Hindu, Aged 64 years. Residing at C. Mallavaram Village, Perumalpalle Post, Tirupati Rural Mandal, Chittoor District. ...Respondent/Appellant/ Respondent No.1/Plaintiff 2. Kandati Siddaramaiah Chetty, S/o. Sriramulu Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 77 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 3. Kandati Amarnath, S/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 53 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. 4. Kandati Naga Manemma, W/o. Siddaramaiah Chetty, Hindu, Aged about 67 years, residing at Narasingapuram Village and Post, Chandragiri Mandal, Chittoor District. ...Respondents/Respondents 2 to 4/ Defendants 1 to 3 Petition under Section 151 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to Vacate the interim order dated 24.12.2018 passed in I.A.No.1 of ""'18 and dismiss the appeal with heavy costs. f ' i A -1 o ; £-\j i u li t .r\. 1\0 I i I t r I \_/ I ^ ✓ I Counsel for the Petitioner : SRI VEDULA SRINIVAS Counsel for Respondent No.1 : SRI N ASHWANI KUMAR Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 to 4: NONE APPEARED The Court made the following JUDGMENT : HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO Second Appeal No.1610 of 2018 Judgment: This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 27.08.2018 in A.S.No.7 of 2012, on the file of learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati, Chittoor District, setting aside the Judgment and decree, dated 16.11.2011 in 'O.S.No.357 of 2004, on the file of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. 2. The appellant herein is the plaintiff, the 1®^ respondent herein is the 4**^ defendant and the respondents 2 to 4 herein are the defendants 1 to 3 in O.S.No.357 of 2004, on the file of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.357 of 2004, on the file of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, witt performance of an agreement of sale directing the defendants to execute a regular registered sale deed pursuant to agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 by receiving balance sale consideration in favour of the plaintiff and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents, followers etc., from in any way interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and also declaring the pattadar passbook and title deed issued under the A.P. Record of rights in Lands Act, 1971 in favour of 4'^ defendant as null and void and for costs of the suit. prayer for specific 3 4. The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the 4^*^ defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.7 of 2012, on the file of learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati, Chittoor District. The learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati, allowed the appeal by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. / VGKR, J ' sa_16l0_20l8 ^ Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff | second appeal. in the suit approached this Court by way of 5- For the sake of convenience, both as they are arrayed in the original suit. parties in the referred to appeal will be 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief O.S.IMo.357of2004, is as follows: as set out in the plaint averments in The defendants 1 father of 2“ defendant to 3 are closely interrelated and husband of 3 as 1"' defendant is the defendant and defendants are the employees under are ancestral 1 and 2 properties the 4^'^ defendant. The plaint schedule properties of defendants 1 and 2 as it was purchased by a registered sale Sreenviasulu Chetty, who i one IS the father of 1 defendant under deed dated 15.12.1958. defendants 1 Ever since the date of purchase, the predecessor of enjoyment and later the and 2 has been iin possession and defendants 1 and 2 camp inf- . a, lu enjoyment of the plaintiff owns Mango Grove the defendants 1 same. The on the west of the plaint schedule neighbouring landholders property and and they have plaintiff with on 09.08.2004 for and 2 are his proposed to sell the plaint schedule an offer to sale and total sale consideration property and approached the and settled negotiations were made of Rs.4,50,000/-, out of sale consideration, the plaintiff paid Rs.50,000/- as advance sale shall be payable within 6 amount and the balance sale months i.e on or before 08 02 sale deed and entered into an agreement and 2 had delivered the consideration 2005 and get regular on 09.08.2004 and defendants 1 possession of plaint schedule property to the plaintiff as a matter of part performance of agreement of sale. The plaintiff after taking property, spent huge amounts for and granite stone pillars possession of the plaint schedule the lands by erecting fencing schedule property. None others property except the plaintiff. The who is leveling around the plaint reach the plaint schedule have any access to 4*'' defendant i IS distant relative of the plaintiff Engineering College and the daughter of the running Sri Vidyaniketha VGKR, J. sa_1610 2018 plaintiff joined in their college and doing 2^^ year Engineering course and the 4 defendant Institute collected excessive amount of fees, the plaintiff claimed the same and got reimbursement. Due to which, some misunderstandings arose in between the plaintiff and defendants. Later the plaintiff came to know the defendants 1 and 2 are the employees working under 4' Institution and defendants 1 and 2 created sham and nominal documents in favour of third party to defraud the legitimate right under the agreement of sale, the plaintiff forced to make a public notice in Enadu Telugu Daily about the agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 in his favour. On 03.09.2004 itself the plaintiff issued a legal notice requested the defendants 1 and 2 to receive the defendant balance sale consideration of Rs.4,00,000/- under agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 and execute regular registered sale deed on or before 20.09.2004. But, to his surprise, defendants 1 and 2 issued false reply denying the execution of agreement of sale and it was brought to light that defendants 1 anu 2 created -sha-m and notHinal and fraudulent document dated 01.09.2004 in favour of 4'*' defendant with regard to same plaint schedule property and the said document is not valid under law. As such, the plaintiff has no option except to file a suit for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property the plaintiff apart from the main relief of specific performance to get regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004, as the plaintiff has been always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and also declare the pattadar pass books and title deeds issued by revenue authorities in favour of 4*^ defendant as null and void. Hence the suit. 7. The 4**^ defendant filed written statement before the trial Court denying the material averments in the plaint and contended as follows: The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts and denied the allegations made in the plaint. On 21.06.2003, the defendants 1 to 3 offered to VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 sell the plaint schedule property to him and entered into total sale consideration of Rs.3,73,500/ Rs.60.000/- an oral agreement for received - and defendants 1 to 3 on 21.06.2003 and Rs.20,000/- defendant as advance out of the on 13-01-2004 from this said sale consideration and thereafter as per the oral agreement, the defendants received balance sale consideration of Rs.2,93,500/- on 01.09.2004 and favour of this defendant and executed regular registered sale deed delivered in possession of the plaint schedule properly and this defendant is bonafide purchaser of the property by paying valid consideration to plaint schedule the defendants 1 to 3 without notice and knowledge of the suit agreement. The right, title and possession of this defendant in the plaint schedule property is recognized by the property consisting with thorny bushes revenue authorities. The plaint schedule after purchase, this defendant spending huge amount. This defendant is i and removed them and levelled the land by in actual physical possession of the plaint schedule nmnerfu w « w . I 1 K i I M - u • * / L ^ I J I 1 ^ '.v.t— I in n a legisiered bale deed on 01.09.2004 and the said agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 iIS an unregistered and insufficiently stamped and created with anti date and it cannot be looked into for any purpose much less for Sec.35 of Indian Stamp Act and the suit collateral purpose as agreement of sale is recited that there per is delivery of possession of property and when the Indian Registration came into force and the suit Amendment Act 48/2001 taken into consideration and it agreement cannot be cannot be enforced in court of law. The plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands and suppressed the fact that this defendant purchased the plaint schedule property. As such, the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief sought in the plaint and sought for dismissal of the suit. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned following issues for trial; trial Judge, framed the (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 Perrormance of as prayed for? 1 5 VGKR, J . sa 1610 2018 (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as " prayed for? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that the pattadar passbook and title deed as null and void as prayed for? (4) Whether 4'^ defendant is a bonafide purchaser of plaint schedule property for valid consideration without knowledge of the suit agreement? (5) Whether the suit agreement of sale dated 09.08.2004 is not enforceable in a court of law? (6) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.40 were marked. On behalf of the 4‘^ defendant, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were marked. No oral or documentary evidence adduced by the defendants 1 to 3. iu i he iearned Hrincioai oemOi Uivii Judge, i irupati of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the 4‘^ defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.7 of 2012, on the file of learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati, wherein, the following points came up for consideration: ^ y- CJIICI C/UI lOlUOlWl 1) Whether the appellant / defendant No.4 is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice or not? 2) Whether the judgment and decree of trial court are factually and legally sustainable or not? 11. The learned X Additional District Judge, Tirupati i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the plaintiff and allowed the appeal filed by the 4‘^ defendant. Felt aggrieved of the same, the plaintiff in O.S.No.357 of 2004 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 6 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 12. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the appeal, on 24.12.2018, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad framed the following substantial questions of law; at (1) Whether the appreciation of evidence by the Court below, particularly in the light of the crucial aspect that the defendants 1 to 3 filed a memo to the effect that they will not file a written statement and will not adduce evidence in the suit, is perverse? And, if so, whether the impugned decree & judgment, are vitiated and are liable to be set aside? (2) Whether the judgment of the Court below reversing the reasoned and considered judgment of the trial Court, is unsustainable under facts and in law for not evaluating the evidence brought on record, particularly, Exs.A-28 to A-31 and the report of the Commissioner, which sufficiently established possession of the plaintiff over the subject land? 13. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant and heard Sri N.AshwanI Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent / 4^^ defendant. 1 14. In a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot substantiate its own opinion for that of First Appellate Court unless the Court finds that the conclusions drawn by both the Courts being, (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law or (ii) contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court or (iii) based on inadmissible or no evidence. are erroneous 15. The jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of CPC is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by both the Courts below and if the First VGKR, J. • sa_1610_2018 Appellate Court has exercises in its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in a second appeal. 16. The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the findings of facts arrived at by the Court below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are; where (1) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (2) the Courts have drawn the inferences from proves facts by applying the law erroneously; or (3) the Courts have wrongly casts the burden of proof. When it refer to “decision based on no evidence”. It not only refers to cases, where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. 17. The undisputed facts of both parties are the suit schedule property belongs to defendants 1 and 2. Though the defendant obtained Ex.B.1 registered sale deed from defendants 1 to 3, in the sale deed, it was specifically reiterated that the schedule property is ancestral property of defendants 1 and 2. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that defendants 1 and 2 are the owners of the suit schedule property and they executed agreement of sale under Ex.A.I dated 09.08.2004 for Rs.4,50,000/- and received an amount of Rs.50,000/- as advance and balance amount has to be paid within six months i.e. by 08.02.2005. The plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint itself that under the agreement of sale, the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit schedule property and the plaintiff has spent huge . amount for leveling the fand, erecting fencing and granite stone pillars around an 8 VGKR, J. sa 1610 2018 the land as he was having another land with Mango garden abutting the suit It is the specific case of the 4'*' defendant that there was an oral agreement between himself and defendants 1 to 3 for consideration of • Rs.3,73,500/- and after payment of some amount to them in the year 2003, the balance consideration of Rs.2,93,500/- was paid to them on 01.09.2004 and they executed a sale deed under Ex.B.1 in his favour. He further pleaded that he is in possession of the suit subject land and he obtained pattadar passbook and title deed passbook from the Mandal Revenue Officer under Exs.B.2 and B.3 and the agreement of sale is a fabricated document. land. 18. The suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is filed against defendants 1 to 4. The suit document is Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. . Admittedly, the defendants 1 to 3 received suit summons and engaged a counsel and filed a memo before the trial Court that they are not going to file written statement and they are not going to adduce any evidence. By not filing written statement and by not adducing any evidence, the defendants 1 and 2 did not dispute the Ex.A.1 agreement of sale of the plaintiff or the Ex.B.1 sale deed of 4*^ defendant. Order VIII, Rule 10 of CPC reads as follows: “Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.—^Whgre any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up;] - [Provided further that no Court shall make an order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing of the written statement.] 19. In a case of Asma Lateef and another v. Shabbir Ahmad and others\ where the Apex Court held as follows: “26. We have no hesitation to hold that Rule 10 is permissive in nature, enabling the trial court to exercise, in a given case, either of the two alternatives open to it. Notwithstanding the alternative of proceeding (2024) 4 Supreme Court Cases 696 9 VGKR, J. sa_1610 2018 / iudoZTZI an option not to pronounce The u^h such order in relation to the suit it considers fit. The verb shall in Rule 10 (although substituted for the verb “may” by l^ahtTf alternative to the status of a mandatory provision, so much so that in every case where a party from whom a written statement is invited fails to file it the court must pronounce the judgment against him. If that second alternative to which “shall otiose. were the purport, the equally applies would be rendered Balrai^TaniiI'’m^I^®%“® consider it apposite to take a quick look at Balraj Taneja [Balraj Taneja v, Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 3961 to cou^rnot's'^'" of Orders Rule 10. Therein,'this Lurt ruLIhlta Sil^ oSr mechanical judgment invoking Order 8 Rule 10CPC merely on the basis of the plaint, upon the failure of a kfdZ? 1 otolement. The relevant paragraphs of the J dgment are reproduced below for convenience : (SCC p. 410 para 29) hiinHi out earlier, the court has not to act blindly upon he admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not the defendant traversing the facts set out by the paintiff in the plaint filed in the court. In a case, specially where a wmten statement has not been filed by the defendant the court sji^ould be a little cautious in proceeding under Order LfAnH passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted, a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of he courts satisfaction and, therefore, only on being satisfied that there is no fact which need be proved on account of deemed admission, the court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are diluted questions of fact involved in the case regardinq which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself it mm irinn° th^ ^ judgment without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts so as to settle the tactual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression “the court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved” used in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 Order 8 the expression " , or in relation to the suit It thinks fit used in Rule 10 Order 8 ” No doubt this decision was rendered considering that the verb used in the provision is may , but nothing substantial turns on it." Admittedly in the case on hand, the defendants 1 to 3 did not choose to file written statement and they filed a memo before the trial Court by engaging a counsel by saying that they are not intending to file written statement and they are not htending to adduce any evidence. Therefore, it is quite clear that as 10 VGKR, J sa_1610_2018 the defendants No. order to entitled favour, what is ^ to 3 defaults i a decree for in filing written statement. Generally, i of agreement of sale, in his pleaded specific performance required of the plaintiff adducng evidence. It must be a writ petition where 's to prove his case by remembered that a plaint in not only the facts a suit is not akin to are to be pleaded evidence in support of the pleaded exchange of affidavits, Since facts but also the facts is to be annexed, where after upon on affidavit evidence. - evidence, which such petition can be decided are required to be pleaded i - In course of a plaint and not the examination of witnesses a written statement can be adduced i of a defendant, to file tbe plaint, in all cases mere failure or neglect controverting the pleaded facts in ' ® jodsment in favour of the as stated Pmves his case / claim. 2, Who are the may not entitle him J evidence he plaintiff unless by adducing fhe legal position. In view of prove the Ex.A.1 suit Admittedly, the defendants 1 and executants to the suit agreement. are oni\/ fha i ^ - ■ bw.i ti tu •' suit document, but i suit document. not by the 4""^ defendant, who i to the Ex.A. 1 IS the third party 20. In order to plaintiff relied prove the recitals of Ex.A on the evidence of p.w. 1 agreement of sale, 4. P.Ws.2 and 4 the 1 and P.Ws.2 to Ex.A.1 evidence that after the attestors and P.w. 3 is the scribe of are three witnesses agreement of sale. All the duly executing Ex.A. asserted in their agreement of sale, the 1 defendants 1 and 2 delivered the plaint schedule possession of the property to the plaintiff 1 to 3 to make developments i the defendants written statement also P.W.1. 4 defendant before in it. Though choose to file engaged a counsel, and they did not choose P Ws.2 to 4 but they did not to cross-examine P.Ws.2 to 4 and were cross- the trial Court, examined by the learned counsel for the on the agreement itself on the date of Ex.A.1 and to cultivate the their evidence i material aspects of the shows that the IS not disturbed case. In fact, the recitals in Ex.A.1 possession was delivered to the plaintiff the purpose of development agreement of sale for same. 7 11 VGKR, J. sa_1610_20l8 The suit agreement is dated 09.08.2004. The Revenue No.3 Adangals filed by the plaintiff for the fasalies 1414 to 1417 i.e. corresponding years 2004 to 2007 goes to show that the possession was delivered to the plaintiff by virtue of the possessory agreement of sale. Stamp duty and penalty has been collected by the Revenue Divisional Officer on agreement of sale, thereafter the agreement is marked as Ex.A.1 before the trial Court. The learned first appellate Judge held in its judgment that no prudent man by receiving meager amount of Rs.50,000/-, would deliver the property to the vendee to his disadvantage. As noticed supra, in the agreement of sale itself, it was specifically reiterated that after receiving an amount of Rs.50,000/- towards advance sale consideration, the possession of the plaint schedule property was delivered to the plaintiff for development purpose. In my view, the aforesaid finding given by the learned first appellate Judge is nothing but perversive finding. In fact, the first appellate Judge ignored the material evidence i.e. orai and uucuirientary evidence proQucec before the trial Court and the learned first appellate Judge has drawn wrong inferences from the proved facts by applying the law erroneously. r ^! ! i 21. Learned counsel for the 4**^ defendant would contend that Ex.A.1 is a fabricated document. The 4^'' defendant is a third party to the suit document i.e. Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. The vendors under Ex.A.1 are defendants 1 and 2. In fact, both the defendants 1 and 2 engaged a counsel before the trial Court and they filed a memo before the trial Court that they are not going to file written statement and they are not going to adduce any evidence. 2 defendant is son of 1®‘ defendant and 3"'^ defendant is wife of first defendant. Though an Advocate on record is there for defendants 1 to 3, he did not choose to cross-examine P.Ws.1 to 4 i.e. plaintiff, attestor No.1, scribe and attestor No.2 of Ex.A.1. The defendants 1 and 2 are the best persons to speak about the genuineness of the agreement, but they remain silent and there is no dispute about execution of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. nd 12 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 22. Learned counsel for the 4"^ defendant would contend that the plaintiff failed to show the consistent readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates the discretionary relief of specific performance of contract can be granted only in the event, the plaintiff not only makes necessary pleadings but also establishes that he had all along been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In the plaint itself, it specifically pleaded that an amount of Rs.50,000/- was paid to the defendants 1 and 2 on the date of Ex.A.1 and the balance of consideration is payable by 08.02.2005. The plaintiff pleaded his readiness and willingness in the plaint and the same is not denied by the defendants 1 and 2, who are the executants of Ex.A.1 agreement. The fact remains that the plaintiff issued a legal notice under Ex.A.8 dated 03.09.2004 and the said notice is received by the defendants 1 and 2 and they issued a reply notice under Ex.A.9 denying the execution of Ex A. 1 agreement of sale The plaintiff filed a sun performance of agreement of sale on 13.10.2004 itself. The 1®‘ and 2"^^ defendants did not dispute the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration. As noticed supra, the 4"" defendant is no way concerned with the Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and he is a third party to Ex.A.1 agreementof sale. Therefore, the defendants 1 and 2 are the best persons to speak about the alleged unreadiness and willingness of the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration. But they remained silent. The 4‘^ defendant also did not produce any evidence to show that the plaintiff has no capacity to pay the balance sale consideration. was iTu ■ 23. In a case of P.Daivasigamani v. S.Sambandan^, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “15. Readiness and willingness are not one, but two separate elements. Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. Willingness refers to the intention of the plaintiff as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract. Willingness is inferred by scrutinising ^AIR 2022 SC 5009 13 VGKR, J. sa_1610 2018 the conduct of the plaintiff/purchaser, including attending circumstances Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff/purchaser from the date the balance sale consideration was payable in terms of the agreement to sell, till the decision of the condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance ^ expression “readiness and willingness” used in Section 1b (c) of the said Act, has been interpreted in catena of decisions by this Court in the light of facts and circumstances of the cases under consideration for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the relief of Specific Performance of a contract. The said expression cannot be interpreted in a straitjacket formula. suit, is a 9 The language in Section 16(c) does not r any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of readiness and willingness” has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So to insist for a mechanical production of the exact words of a statute is to insist for the form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded”. require r- ^ V. Brij Pal Singh [(1997) 2 SCC 200] this Court had laid down that Law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash v/vith th^m It is suMicient for the respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. The said principle was followed in case of A. Kanthamani v Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy [(2020) 3 SCC 280] etc.” In the case at hand, in the plaint and in the evidence, the plaintiff explained his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. But the vendors under Ex.A.1 failed to produce any evidence to show that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In fact, the readiness and willingness has to be gathered from the pleadings in the plaint and the evidence of witnesses before the trial Court. Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record on the aforesaid aspects i proper manner. But the first appellate in a 14 VGKR, J, sa_1610_2018 24. Learned counsel for respondent / 4‘^ defendant placed a reliance on B.Rajamani v. Mrs.Azhar Sultana and others^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court hdid as follows; 18 As per the explanation to Section 16(c) of the Act for the purpose of said provision, it shall be not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the when so directed by Court. This provision has been the subject-matter of interpretation in a number of cases arising under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 as well as the present Act. It has been consistently held that mere assertion in the plaint that plaintiff is ready and willing to perform the contract is not sufficient. The plaintiff must not only aver and also prove that he/she has been always ready and willing to perform part of the contract. Mere use of the words in a mechanical manner would not be sufficient. There must be acceptable cogent and convincing evidence before the Court, before compliance with the provision is recorded in favour of the plaintiff.” Learned counsel for respondent / 4“" defendant placed another reliance U.N.Krishnamurthy (since deceased) through Legal Representatives v. A.M.Krishnamurthy^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “23, Soction 16 (c) of the Specific Rslie^ relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in Court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, explanation (ii) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. on H r\.o " I CJKJ. ir-1 { >. III!-* 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform obligation to pay money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite ^n example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money.” an ' AIR 2005 AP 260 (2023) 11 Supreme Court Cases 775 I 15 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 In the instant case, the plaintiff specifically pleaded his evidence that he i in the plaint and in IS ready to pay balance sale consideration within a stipulated time as fixed by both the parties under the Ex.A.1 agreement of agreement is 09.08.2004 and both the parties have ! contract within six rnonths by 08.02.2005. sale. contract within six rnonths by 08.02.2005. sale. The date of to perform their part of the The recitals in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale goes to show that on the date of was received by the defendants 1 and 2 agreement, an amount of Rs.50,000/- from out of Rs.4,50,000/- and possession was also delivered to the plaintiff for development and cultivation and the same is evidenced by No.3 Revenue Adangal vide Exs.A.29 to A.31. As per the recitals of Ex.A.1 agreement, the to be paid within six months by legal notice on 03.09.2004 to remaining balance sale consideration has 08.02.2005. The plaintiff issued Ex.A.8 express his part of the contract and the said his readiness and willingness to perform notice is received by the defendants the execution of 1 and 2 and they ga\/e a reply by denying agreement of sale and the plaintiff immediately on the next month itself, filed suit for specific performance 13.10.2004. The plaintiff proved his of agreement of sale i.e. on continuous readiness and willingness to - are no latches on the part of the perform his part of the contract and there plaintiff. Then the burden shifts to the defendants 1 and 2 to prove that the plaintiff is not ready and wiiiing to perform his part of the contract and the Ex.A.1 agreement of saie is not a genuine one. in order to the defendants 1 and 2 did not adduce any evidence, defendants engaged a counsel and the said counsel filed trial Court that the defendants prove the same, . In fact, both the a memo before the 1 to 3 are not inclined to file any written . to adduce any evidence. Though the statement and they are not inclined counsel on record is there to defendants 1 to 3 before the trial Court, he did not choose to cross-examine the plaintiff and also the other witnesses of the plaintiff i.e. P.Ws.2 to 4.. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 is remain unchallenged by defendants 1 to 3. Therefore, the 4- defendant, who is a third party to the su.t contract, ,s not supposed to come with a plea that the plaintiff is not ready 16 VGKR, J. sa_1610 2018 and willing to pay the remaining balance sale consideration defendants 1 and 2 within six months period, as he is no Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. of Rs.4,00,000/- to way connected with 25. Learned counsel for respondent / 4'^ defendant placed a reliance on B.Vijaya Bharathi v. P.Savitri and others^. In the aforesaid case law, the of agreement of readiness and a basic condition for grant of a relief of specific Hon'ble Apex Court held that “the suit for specific performance of sale must be dismissed at the threshold because of lack willingness, which is performance”. 26. Learned counsel for respondent / 4‘^ defendant placed reliance on Alagammal and others v. Ganesan and another^. The facts in the aforesaid case law are the legal notice has been issued by the plaintiff for almost after seven months from the date of alleged last payment. In the present C8S0 another h --5 .-i ! iCJI lt_J r>r> notice iids been issued by the plaintiff to defendants 1 and 2 within six months from the date of agreement and time fixed for performance of the contract is six months. The suit is filed after receipt of reply legal notice issued by defendants 1 and 2. As noticed supra, the date of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale is 09.08.2004 and the suit has been filed in the month of October, 2004 itself by the plaintiff. 27. Learned counsel for respondent / 4‘'' defendant would the 4*^ defendant is contend that a bona fide purchaser and that the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is not maintainable without cancellation of registered sale deed under Ex.B.1. 28. In a case of Lala Durga Prasad and another v. Lala Deep Chand and others^, a Full Bench of Apex Court held as follows; i ^ J ^ (2018) 11 Supreme Court Cases 761 ® (2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 232 ^ (1953) 2 Supreme Court Cases 509 17 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 ? '"nrrt'r ^- M lirse]n'Kalicr:"r“a®ghS see OnS 154). He directed cancellation of the subseouent c;pip =,nH =;£S:~“=*-s r:f:^° wo.r„r;t:r:rnr contraeZrh: "^.r^nTonl -"rrs r:.pS3Ee?EHlrHHi bZe Calcu«a°Hiah r " 'rt "’® . was the course followed Online Cal 4fit anH Kafiladdin v. Samiraddin (1930 SCC Rno f D ^ appears to be the English practice See Frv on pecific Performance, 6th edition, page 90, Paragraph 207; also Patter 67 ER 1057], We direct accordingly.” and others v. Karan Singh (dead) and others', the Hon'ble Apex Court held V. Sanders [(1846) 6 Hare 1 : In a case of Maharaj Singh through Legal Representatives as follows; I Section as the suit agreeruent car 1° fo T® P®rf°™3"ne defendants unless they are bona fide puLa'sers SouUhe"" the cng,nal contract. When, in a given case, the defendims who' (2024) 8 Supreme Court Cases 83 19, the defendants who such notice of are 18 VGKR, J sa_1610_2018 deed in good failh and without nolte of the 1 Section 19(b). a decree ot soecmc ' nr“'' °f aga.nst such defendants, Therefwe in >9(b) IS applicable, under the decree of subsequent purchasers can be directert Performance, the along with the original vendor ThTre L nn ® cancellation of the subsequent sale deSs ° ^ In the present r than the employees of the case on hand, the defendants 1 and 2 are none other came into possession of the piaint schedule property under Fv a i - of sale, Which is evidenced by Revenue Adangals ' Learned counsel for the 4-^ defendant would contend that the 4- d f a not having persona, knowledge about defendants 1 ^ Witness to Ex.B.1 sale deed, itself that defendants 1 , time of Ex.B.1 sale deed under Exs.A.29 to A.31. IS and 2. D.W.2, who i - IS a in cross-examination and 2 are working in Wdyanikethan Institution D,W.2 admits that he does admitted in his evidence i at the not know whpn tho was scnbed and he does ot know the contents of Ex.B. 1 sale deed. D.W.3, who i IS the Administrative Officer of Vidyanikethan Educational of 4 defendant, admits that defendants are working in Educational Institution of 4* sale deed. D.W.3 i Institution and distant relative 1 and 2 respondent by the date of Ex.B 1 ®“cc'or and identifying witness sale deed. Though D.W.3 to execute Ex.B.1 claims that he was present at the time of Ex.B.1 In fact, the Revenue of Ex.A.1 sale deed, he is not the attestor Adangals under Exs.A.29 or scribe of Ex.B.1. to A.31 shows from the date sale, the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule A.31 relates to the agreement of property. Exs.A.29 to In the aforesaid Revenue Adangals years 2004 to 2007. also, it is specifically mentioned that the plaintiff came into possession of the plaint schedule property by virtue it is the duty of the purchaser of the plaint schedule of possessory agreement of sale. Normally, to enquire about the vendors prior to purchase r. r U Ih P™perty under a registered sale deed case of the 4 defendant that that film actor and he is It is the specific - and he is a any personal he used to reside at Hyderabad a bona fide purchaser and he is not having 19 VGKR, J. sa 1610 2018 ■ knowledge about the working of defendants 1 and 2 in his Educational Admittedly, D.W.3-Administrative Officer of the 4^^ defendant’s Institution. Educational Institution and distant relative of 4*^ defendant, clearly admits in his evidence itself that defendants 1 and 2 are the employees of the Educational Institution of the 4'^ defendant. Therefore, it is quite clear that the 4‘^ defendant is having knowledge by the date of Ex.B.1 sale deed that defendants 1 and 2 are the employees of his Educational Institution. 29. The recitals in Ex.B.1 are the defendants 1 to 3 agreed to alienate . the plaint schedule property for Rs.3,73,500/- and that they have received an amount of Rs.60,000/- on 21.06.2003 and Rs.20,000/- on 13-01-2004 and they have received remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.2,93,500/- on the date of registration of sale deed i.e. on 01.09.2004 and delivered possession of plaint schedule property to the 4'*' defendant on the date of Ex B 1 sale deed itself To prove the passing of past consideration and the alleged oral agreement, no evidence is adduced by the 4'^ defendant. One of the witness to Ex.B.1 sale deed is examined as D.W.2. As per his evidence, he does not know when the document was scribed and he does not know the contents of Ex.B.1. Therefore, his evidence is no way helpful to the 4 defendant to prove that he paid advance sale consideration of Rs.60,000/- on 21.06.2003 and Rs.20,000/- on 13-01-2004 to defendants 1 to 3 and also the alleged oral agreement in between the vendors and vendee under Ex.B.1 sale deed. D.W.3 and D.W.4 are not either attestors or identifying witnesses to It seems that to overcome the Ex.A.1 agreement transaction, it was incorporated in Ex.B.1 sale deed about the alleged payment of advance consideration of Rs.60,000/- on 21.06.2003 and Rs.20,000/- on 13-01-2004 as stated supra. th Ex.B.1 sale deed. 30. The trial Court has framed as many as five issues in the suit proceedings and on appreciation of entire evidence on record, decided the each issue and granted the decree for specific performance of agreement of 20 VGKR, J. sa 1610 2018 sale in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, it is the duty of the learned first appellate Judge to evaluate the entire evidence on record with reference to all issues framed by the learned trial Judge and findings given by the learned trial Judge on all issues concerned. But the learned first appellate Judge has framed only two points for consideration namely (1) Whether the appellant / ■ defendant No.4 is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice or not? And (2) Whether the judgment and decree of trial court are factually and legally sustainable or not? 31. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the plaintiff approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. The 4*^ defendant has not approached the civil Court for seeking any relief. It is also undisputed by both the parties that the 4“^ defendant is the Chairman of Educational Institutions and defendants 1 and 2 are its employees. Though tWot K ir»o\A7oro fhof fho Hofonrlc^nfc 1 qhH 9 aro e iS I = t. 1 w W I u his employees, the Administrative Officer of the 4‘^ defendant Institutions, who is a distant relative to 4*^^ defendant i.e. D.W.3 admits in his evidence in cross- examination itself that the defendants 1 and 2 are working in Educational Institutions of 4*^ defendant and by the date of Ex.B.1, they are the employees of 4'*^ defendant Educational Institutions. The defendants 1 and 2 agreed to sell the plaint schedule property under Ex.A.1 to the plaintiff much prior to Ex.B.1 and they delivered the possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and the possession of the plaintiff was recognized by the revenue authorities and the name of the plaintiff is mutated in No.3 Adangals i.e. under Exs.A.29 to A.31 for the years 2004 to 2007. The first appellate Court also failed to consider that the defendants 1 and 2 filed a memo before the trial Court through their counsel stating that they are not intending to file a written statement and they are not intending to adduce any evidence, which itself shows that they are not disputing the Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and also the contents thereof. The possession of the plaintiff by virtue of Ex.A.1 document 21 K VGKR, J. sa 1610 2018 itself is proved by way of entries in the revenue records under Exs.A.29 to A.31. 32. In a case of V.Prabhakara v. Basavaraj K. (dead) by legal representatives and another^, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down a manner in which the first appeal has to be decided under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code by the first appellate Court. In the aforesaid case law, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows; “22. The first appellate court while exercising power under Section 96 can re-do the exercise of the trial court. However, such a power is expected to be exercised with caution. The reason being, the trial court alone has the pleasure of seeing the demeanour of the witness. Therefore, it has got its own advantage in assessing the statement of the witnesses which may not be available to the appellate court. In exercising such a power, the appellate court has to keep in mind the views of the trial court. If it finds that the trial court is wrong, its decision should be on the reasoning given. A mere substitution of views, without discussing the findings of the trial court, by the appellate court is not permissible; If two views are possible, it would only be o r\r>rr\r>r i o to adopting reasoning in support of its findings, the appellate court is not expected to go on moral grounds alone.” to .o o, VViLi i ti lO ^ y II ic II IC3 \ A/U.i^ V V I Itic ‘v i S Vif' . . U I c. Further held as follows; “23. The aforesaid views expressed by us are nothing but a reiteration of the settled principle of law as could be seen through the following paragraphs of the decision rendered by this Court in Jagdish Singh Madhuri Devi [(2008) 10 SCC 497] ; (SCC pp. 504-08, paras 27-37) 27. It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power as the first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence—oral as well as documentary—and can to its own conclusion. 28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not forget that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as that of the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care. V. come the trial court's ® (2022) 1 Supreme Court Cases 115 22 VGKR, J. sa 1610 2018 caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable. 33. In a case of Manjula and others v. Shyamsundar and others^^, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “8. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short “CPC”) provides for filing of an appeal from the decree passed by a court of original jurisdiction. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines to the appellate court for deciding the appeal. This rule mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state; (a) points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. Thus, the appellate court has the jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings jurisdiction involves a rehearing of appeal on questions of law as well as fact. The first appeal is a valuable right, and, at that stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect conscious application of mind and must record the court's findings, supported by reasons for its decision in respect of all the issues, along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties. Needless to say, the first appellate court is required to comply with the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and non-observance of these requirements lead to infirmity in the judgment.” 34. Admittedly, in the case at hand, without discussing the findings given by trial Court on each issue, the own views are expressed by the learned first appellate Judge. As stated supra, the first appellate Court is duty bound to examine the nature of the suit and findings arrived by the trial Court on each and every issue by appreciating the entire evidence on record. In the case on hand, the above aspects are missing in the judgment of the learned first appellate Court. As seen from the judgment of the first appellate Court, it is evident that the first appellate Court has not considered the findings of the . trial Court and has proceeded to decide the issues on its own view, which is "T ./-V !! ^ 4 ^ Guui L b 10 (2022) 3 Suprem6'£ourt Cases 90 23 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 not permissible and contrary to the law supra. laid down by the Apex Court as stated respondent / 4'^^ defendant relied on orders passed b, the High Court of Telangana in W.P.No.30166 of 2017 in between vuppu Shivanagaiah and another Learned counsel for V. The State of Telangana and others dated case law are different to the instant 30.10.2023. The facts in the above said case. 35. Learned counsel for the 4'^ defendant would contend that the 4 in the written statement and defendant specifically pleaded evidence that he is also in the a bonafide purchaser and that the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the 4'" defendant iIS not a purchaser. In a case of Manjit Singh and others V. Darshana Devi and others^^ the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: ■'2111), , 2023 defines “good ■qood is said to be doee or believed in aHenfon,-" care and 36. It is the specific cancellation of Ex.B.1 sale deed has suit itself is not at all i Relief Act says that “the 4 deed executed after the case of the 4*^^ defendant that the relief of not sought by the plaintiff and that the maintainable. Clause (b) of Section 19 of the Specific defendant, who is claiming under the Ex.B.1 sale execution of the sale agreement can be subjected to as the suit agreement can be enforced unless he is bonafide purchaser without a decree of specific performance specifically against such defendant notice of the original contract”. In the present case, the 4*'^ into sale deed in good faith and without notice of Therefore, the subsequent purchaser defendant failed to prove that he entered earlier suit agreement, has to execute a sale deed along with no need for cancellation of subsequent sale deed. original vendor and there iIS 2025 (1) alt 24 VGKR, J. sa_1610_2018 37. In a case of R.K.Mohammed Ubaidullah and others Abdul Wahab (D) and others'^ the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: 1963, to the extent it is V. Hajee C. 14. Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act relevant, reads; 19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. - Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of enforced against - (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract' a contract may be (c) (d) (e) As can be seen from Section 19 (a) and (b) extracted above specific performance of a contract can be enforced against (a) either party thereto and (b) any person claiming under him, by a title arising subsequent to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. Section 19(b) protects the bona fide purchaser in good faith for value without notice of the original contract. This protection is in the nature of exception to the general rule. Hence the onus of proof of good faith is on the purchaser who takes the plea that he i faith IS a innocent purchaser, question of fact to be considered and decided on the Tacts of each case. Section 52 of the Penal Code emphasizes due care and attention in relation to the good faith. In the General Clauses Act emphasis is laid on honesty. IS an 15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or constructive. "A person is said to have notice" of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Explanation II of said Section 3 reads: "Explanation II - Any person acquiring any immoveable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession:thereof." Section 3 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1929 in relation to the definition of 'notice'. The definition has been , , ^ amended and supplemented by three explanations, which settle the law in several matters of great importance. For the immediate purpose Explanation-ll IS relevant. It states that actual possession is notice of the title of the person in possession. Prior to the amendment there had been some uncertainty because of divergent views expressed by various High Courts in relation to the actual possession as notice of title. A person may enter the property in one capacity and having a kind of interest. But subsequently while continuing in possession of the property his capacity or interest may change. A person entering the property as tenant later 12 (2000) 6 see 402 25 VGKR. J. sa_1610 2018 mortgagee or roay be agreement holder to purchase the same property or may be some other interest is created in his favour subsequently. Hence with reference to subsequent purchaser pe?sorrn"ar I af ® '^e madrin hit possesion as on the dale when sale transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a person itself is deemed or constructive notice of the title if any, of a person who is for the lime being in actual possession thereof. A subsequent purchaser has whth possession and title under ^f the property.™ Possession on the date of purchase to In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it is for the 4'" defendant prove that he made all about the title and possession of the vendors before subsequent purchaser to i.e necessary enquiries entering into Ex.B.1 sale deed. Admittedly, in the case at hand, in the written statement, the A® defendant has not pleaded or also not stated in his evidence that he made enquiries about the title and possession of the vendors. 3 Admittedly Ex.B.1 sale deedd is obtained by the 4^^ defendant on 01.09.2004. As per the own case of the A* defendant / purchaser, he filed a caveat against the plaintiff herein litigation, having prior knowledge about the Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, the 4'" defendant filed on 05.09.2004. It seems by expecting the a caveat petition within four days of sale deed i - 05.09.2004 before the civil Court. Furthermore, the recitals in Ex.B.1 shows that the 4“’ defendant paid an amount of Rs.60,000/- on 21.06.2003 and later on 13.01.2004 the 4’*^ defendant paid obtaining any receipt. The 4'^^ defendant I.e. on an amount of Rs.20,000/- without contended that there was an oral agreement prior to Ex.B.1 sale deed. The above circumstances itself goes to show that the alleged oral agreement and alleged part Ex.B.1 without payments prior to any receipt are only created to overcome the Ex.A.1 agreement in favour of the plaintiff. No prudent man will kept silent for a year after payment of alleged amount of Rs.80,000/- obtaining any receipt or without obtaining any agreement. Therefore, it is evident that the aforesaid recitals in period of more than one much prior to Ex.B.1 sale deed without 26 Ex.B.1 with r prior to Ex.B.1 i VGKR, j sa_1610_20l8 '■egard to the alleged , 's only created to defeat payment of Rs,80,000/. rights of the - without receipt plaintiff under Ex.A much 1. ^9- The 4'^ defendant are his denied in the defendants written 1 and 2 ^•^■3, they have statement that of D.W.2 the employees. But i asserted the defendants Of the 4"^ 'a the evidence and . Educational 1 and 2 defendant by the Institutions are the employees of plaintiff 0T09.2004 oivil Court 05.0,9.2004 itself Which i deed by the Tahsildar produced date of Ex.B.1. e'/idence that the 4 a caveat defendant The (h defendant obtained and filed and the 4*^’ sale deed against the plaintiff on °d 05.09.2004 before mutation and the applied for get it done 's a Sunday and on obtained pattadar It is evident that passbook and title on 06.09.2004. mutate his not taken alleged plaintiff to show the 4"" nny steps to defendant has name in Revenue Adangal to show possession. On the other hand, that the plaintiff his real Exs.A.29 to A. 31 produced by the oame into property by virtue possession of the plaint of schedule possessory agreement i. j I “i-i i-efiirien r i_ “ sale deeds ' by the 4*'^ '"e plaintiff also lo A. 39 the under Exs.A.37 property purchased pertaining to 3^d 1998, for defendant i , which in the year 1997 mutation was got done by the 4'^ defendant im the year 2006 40. The material on record plaint schedule clearly possession of the sale, which i by way of '■®'^eals the plaintiff of Ex.A.1 came into agreement of plaintiff 29 to A.31 are the ond filed a any written vendors property by virtue 's proved through P.Ws. possessory agreement 2 lo 4 and also If of sale is possession of the evidenced by Exs.A. defendants '■evenue Adangals. Furthermore, the executants of Ex.A. f^emo before the statement 1 and 2, engaged an Advocate 1 who agreement of sale, trial Court that they are not iintending to file and they are not iintending to adduce under Ex.A.1 any evidence. f and also the are not disputing the The execution of Ex.A fo perform and willingness plaintiff. For of tbe plaintiff the aforesaid readiness fbe part of the contract by the reasons, the plaintiff /'S entitled for protection under r 11 VGKR, J. 1610 2018 sa section 53A of the Transfer of Properfy Act, 1882, in a suit filed by the plaint.ff for fhe relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. The trial Court by giving cogent reasons,, has granted the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale and also the plaintiff. relief of permanent injunction in favour of the of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale 41. The plaintiff proved the execution of P.Ws.2 to 4. As stated supra, the 4"^ defendant is • between the through the evidence having prior knowledge of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale in hand and the plaintiff on the other hand and the Ex.B.1 sale deed. Therefore, the defendants 1 and 2 on one therefore, Ex.A.1 agreement prevail over trial Court rightly grarrted the relief of specific performarrce of agreement of and also the relief of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff. The trial Court also held though the plaintiff has issued notice to the revenue , but the Mandal Revenue Officer sale thnriiif^s bv informing.the aforesaid facts without taking into consideration of the revenue Adangais under Exs.A.29 to A 31 and without conducting proper enquiry, has granted pattadar passboo and title deed passbooks within four days from the date of Ex.B.1 sale deed, which happens to be a Sunday and that the Exs.B.2 and B.3 obtained by the 4“" defendant are not valid. Cii i trial Court after taken into evidence, has rightly . aforesaid reasons, the 42. For the of the entire oral and documentary consideration decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. But failed to taken into consideration of the entire evidence on discuss all the issues decided by the trial Court with reference to the pleadings and evidence and therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the first the learned first appellate Judge record and failed to appellate Court is liable to be set aside. allowed by setting aside the appellate Court and confirming the 43. In the result, the Second Appeal is decree and judgment passed by the first 28 VGKR, J, sa_1610_2018 ' decree and judgment passed by the trial Court^ Each party do bear their costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous stand closed. own petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall SD/- E.KAMESWARA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR ' //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To 1- The X Additional District Judge, Tirupathi, Chittoor District, (with records if any) 2. The Principal Civil Judge (Senior 3. One CC to Sri Vedula Srinivas 4. One CC to Sri N Ashwan 5. The Section Officer, Division), Tirupathi, Chittoor District. Advocate fOPUCJ i Kumar Advocate i i i i < '1 VR Section, High Court of - trial court records) Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi. (to dispatch the 6. Two CD Copies TK TAC T COURT °ATED;08/09/2025 \ \ \ judgment + decree SANo.l6l0of20l8 stands^ X ) 5 SEP 2025 m 09 O Current Section \V^ allowing ^UE SECOND appeal