[2025:RJ-JP:40740] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3975/2025 Gordhan Das S/o Sh. Haridas, Resident Of 24/150, Swarn Path, Mansarovar, Jaipur. ----Appellant Versus Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpora- tion (RSRTC), Parivahan Mukhyalaya, Jaipur. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Farooq Ahmed For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 07/10/2025 1. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), assailing the order dated 25.07.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.6, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.37/2025, CIS No.1169/2025, CNR No. RJJM010142532025, whereby the learned Court below dismissed the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC as well as the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act). 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a civil suit bearing No.591/2002 was filed by the respondent against the present appellant. In the said suit, notice was duly served upon the appellant; however, despite service, the [2025:RJ-JP:40740] (2 of 4) [CMA-3975/2025] appellant failed to file a written statement, and his right to do so was closed vide order dated 11.03.2003. Thereafter, the learned trial Court recorded the evidence of Basant Singh as PW-1 and exhibited certain documents. Since defendant No.1 did not adduce any evidence, the Court proceeded with the hearing of the suit and decreed it ex-parte by judgment and decree dated 06.12.2003. 3. In relation to the said ex-parte decree, the appellant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC seeking to set aside the ex-parte decree, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 7,842 days. The learned Court below dismissed both the applications by the impugned order dated 25.07.2025. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was not informed by his lawyer about the impugned decree. Thus, the appellant came to know about the ex-parte decree only upon receiving the notice of execution. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the liti- gant should not be penalized or made to suffer for the mis- take of the lawyer, and to support his contention, relied upon a judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Mool Chandra Vs. Union of India & Anr.1. 6. Heard and considered the submissions made at bar and perused the impugned order. 1 Civil Appeal Nos.8435-8436 OF 2024 (@) S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 2733-2734 OF 2024, decided on 05.08.2024. [2025:RJ-JP:40740] (3 of 4) [CMA-3975/2025] 7. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that notice of the suit was duly served upon the appellant and due opportunity to contest the suit was granted to the appellant; however, he failed to avail the same. A perusal of the impugned order further reveals that the civil suit was decided in the year 2003 and the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was filed in the year 2025, after an inordinate delay of about 22 years (7,842 days). The reasons furnished for seeking condonation of such inordinate delay cannot be regarded as bona fide, satisfactory or sufficient in order to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 8. It is indubitably established that service of summons was duly effected upon the appellant and the learned counsel for the appellant had put in appearance on 18.01.2003. It also appears that the appellant himself did not make any effort to sincerely participate in the suit proceedings or to ascertain the updated status of the pending suit for over 22 years. Therefore, the contention that the delay solely occurred due to the alleged inaction or negligence of the counsel cannot be accepted. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash2, has held as under: "It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings 2 2024 INSC 891 [2025:RJ-JP:40740] (4 of 4) [CMA-3975/2025] before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief." 10. Apart from the above, it is evident that the appellant himself was careless and negligent in making inquiries about the pending Court proceedings, since the litigant (appellant) himself owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and the presence of parties is very much essential in trial Court proceedings. Therefore, the appellant cannot shift the entire blame on his lawyer, and the alleged grounds for condonation of delay lack bona fide. 11. In view of the above, the impugned order does not suffer from any arbitrariness, perversity or any kind of legal infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Court. 12. Accordingly, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 13. The stay application and all other pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J Seema/9