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2025 DAILYLAW 3925 (HP)

Gurdev Sharma v. State of H. P.

2025-12-17

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
Judgment J. Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 211 of 2021, dated 02.10.2021, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 448 and 186 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant was posted as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Mandi, H.P. She was present in her home on 02.10.2021. The accused Jeevan Lal was produced before her by ASI Nagender in F.I.R. No. 308 of 2021 registered at Police Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P. She enquired the Investigating Officer about the remand counsel and she was informed that the accused Jeevan Lal was in touch with his children, who are Advocates. The informant remanded the accused to police custody at about 4:45 p.m. until 3.10.2021. HC Sharma, Advocate and one woman, who identified herself to be Advocate, came to the informant’s residence at about 5:20 p.m. and moved a bail application, which was listed for 3.10.2021. The Advocate pressed for bail. The informant told them that the order had already been passed and the matter would be taken up on 03.10.2021. The Advocates left, and the informant followed them out. She noticed that some people were standing outside the door of her house. They wanted to enter the informant’s house and talk to her. They blocked the passage and sat there, demanding the immediate release of the accused. The informant told them that the order had been passed, their Advocate had also left, and nothing could be done. They shouted and continued to sit outside the informant’s residence. The informant called the police and reported the matter to the police. The people left the place before the arrival of the police. The informant, her parents, aged 70 years and her son, aged about 4 years, were kept confined to the house by blocking the passage. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The police identified the petitioners as the persons who had blocked the passage and shouted outside the informant’s house, and filed a charge sheet against them. 3. The informant, her parents, aged 70 years and her son, aged about 4 years, were kept confined to the house by blocking the passage. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the matter. The police identified the petitioners as the persons who had blocked the passage and shouted outside the informant’s house, and filed a charge sheet against them. 3. The learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to the accused on 24.02.2025 and listed the matter for recording the statement of witnesses. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of F.I.R., filing of charge-sheet and putting of notice of accusation, the petitioners/accused approached this Court for quashing the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. It is asserted that the allegations made in the F.I.R. do not fulfill the ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 448 and 186 read with Section 34 of IPC . The learned Trial Court erred in putting the notice of accusation to the accused. The informant had specifically stated that the petitioners’ body language was not threatening. They wanted to come inside and wanted to talk. Petitioners’ intention was not to commit any offence. The building at the relevant time was functioning as a court, and entry into it by the children of the accused could not be termed as an act of trespass. The informant was not proved to be working as a Judicial Officer at the relevant time. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Ambika Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 6. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance and putting up notice of accusation to the accused. The allegations in the F.I.R. show that the informant was working as a Judicial Officer, and petitioners, being relatives of the accused, were entitled to seek release of the accused on bail. They never intended to commit any offence, and the informant herself stated that the petitioners’ body language was not threatening. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not satisfy the ingredients of the offence alleged against them. They never intended to commit any offence, and the informant herself stated that the petitioners’ body language was not threatening. The allegations in the FIR, even if accepted to be correct, do not satisfy the ingredients of the offence alleged against them. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. be quashed. 7. Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court has already put notice of accusation to the petitioners, and the statutory period of challenging the order putting the notice of accusation has expired. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not interfere when the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records meticulously. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was submitted that the building, in which the informant was present, was a Court building where the public had the right to go, and the informant was not acting in the capacity of a Judicial Officer. Both these pleas are contradictory because the building could have only been a Court when the informant was working as a Judicial Officer. Therefore, the petitioner cannot assert that the informant’s residence was a court where they had a right to access, without conceding that the informant was functioning as a Judicial Officer at the relevant time. 13. The averments made in the F.I.R. show that the informant had remanded the accused to police custody at 4:45 p.m. Learned counsel for the accused visited the informant’s residence at 5:20 p.m. and filed a bail application, which was listed for 03.10.2021. He left after about 20 minutes. 13. The averments made in the F.I.R. show that the informant had remanded the accused to police custody at 4:45 p.m. Learned counsel for the accused visited the informant’s residence at 5:20 p.m. and filed a bail application, which was listed for 03.10.2021. He left after about 20 minutes. The petitioners sat outside the informant’s residence and shouted after the learned counsel had left. These averments clearly show that judicial proceedings had come to an end. The accused was remanded to police custody, and the bail application was listed on the next day. Hence, the plea that the petitioners had a right to enter the informant’s residence because it was a Court is not correct. 14. It was submitted that the petitioners never intended to commit any offence. They had only pressed for the release of the accused on bail. This submission will not help the petitioners. Section 441 of the IPC defines criminal trespass as an entry into or upon the property in possession of another with an intent to commit an offence, intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property. It is undisputed that the property where the petitioner had sat was in the informant’s possession as her residence. The petitioners were insisting upon the release of the accused on bail and continued to sit outside the residence shouting for the release despite having been told about the remand of the accused and listing of the bail application on the next day. Prima facie, the petitioners had entered the petitioners’ residence to intimidate her to grant bail; therefore, the necessary ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 448 of the are satisfied. 15. The informant also mentioned that she was confined inside the house with her parents and child, as the accused kept sitting outside the door of her house. Prima facie, these averments satisfy the ingredients of Section 342 of the IPC . 16. It was submitted that the ingredients of Section 186 of the IPC are not made out. It is not necessary to adjudicate this plea because, prima facie, the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 448 and 342 of the is made out. 17. It was submitted that the petitioners were only seeking the release of the accused on bail, which is their right. This submission cannot be accepted. It is not necessary to adjudicate this plea because, prima facie, the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 448 and 342 of the is made out. 17. It was submitted that the petitioners were only seeking the release of the accused on bail, which is their right. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned counsel for the accused had filed a bail application, and the learned Magistrate, in her wisdom, had listed the application on the next day for hearing. A citizen has a right to redress his grievances by filing an appropriate petition and not by shouting and intimidating the Judicial Officer. The petitioners were within their right to engage a counsel and file a bail application, but once the Court had passed an order, rightly or wrongly, they had to abide by it or assail it by taking recourse to the law. They could have approached the Court of Sessions under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. for seeking bail, but could not have sat outside the residence of the Judicial Officer and shouted at her to force her to release the accused on bail. This conduct, prima facie, is a direct attempt to interfere with the administration of justice by intimidating the Judicial Officer, which cannot be approved. 18. It was submitted that the contents of the FIR are false and the FIR should be quashed on this ground. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed:- “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 19. This Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 19. This Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 21. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini- trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini- trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 22. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 23. F.I.R was registered in the year 2021. The charge- sheet was filed on 31.01.2022 as per the endorsement on Anenxure P-1. The petitioner approached this Court after a lapse of more than 3½ years. No reason has been assigned for approaching the Court after such a long delay. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Sanyam Bhushan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4545, that the Court should not entertain the belated petitions for quashing the FIR. It was observed: “43. At the outset, I find merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the Complainant that the present set of petitions is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, as also for the failure of the petitioners to avail of their alternate efficacious remedy in the form of Revision Petitions under Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. 44. It need not be emphasised that powers under Section 482 of the Cr. PCs are discretionary in nature, and though there may not be a total ban on the exercise of such power where the situation so warrants, at the same time, there are limitations of self-restraint that are recognised and followed by the Courts in exercising this jurisdiction. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. One such limitation is where the petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy; however, they did not avail of the same within the period of limitation and thereafter filed the petition under of the Cr. P.C. to overcome the objection of limitation. Similarly, the Courts have refused to entertain a petition under of the Cr. P.C., where it is filed with unexplained delay and laches and in the meantime, the trial has proceeded.” 24. Hence, in these circumstances, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or Section 582 of BNSS is not justified. 25. It is undisputed that the charge-sheet has been filed before the competent Court, and the Court had put notice of accusation to the petitioners, which means that the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate it. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 26. No other point was urged. 27. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 28. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.