[2025:RJ-JP:39224] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18700/2012 Vinod Krishna Sharma S/o Shri Jagdish Prasad Sharma, aged about 60 years, resident of 6/329, Diggi Mohalla, Beawar, Distt. Ajmer, presently posted as Production Manager, Central Workshop, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Ajmer. ----Petitioner Versus 1. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman cum Managing Director, Head Office, Chomu House, Jaipur. 2. Chairman cum Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Head Office, Chomu House, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Lokesh Sharma with Ms. Anzum Parveen For Respondent(s) : Ms. Sakshi Srivastava HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 23/09/2025 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 19.10.2012 (annex.-7) issued by the Chairman cum Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, whereby penalty of compulsory retirement has been imposed following the disciplinary proceedings conducted the provisions of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. 2. It is stated that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Junior Engineer (Mechanical) on 01.12.1976 and thereafter, he was further promoted on the post of Junior [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (2 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] Engineer-A and further on the post of Assistant Mechanical Engineer in the year 2003. One charge-sheet dated 23.11.2011 was issued by the Disciplinary Authority levelling allegations that on account of indifferent and irresponsible behaviour of the petitioner in as much as, despite holding the responsible post, he kept his mobile switched off, which has ultimately caused heavy loss to the respondent-Corporation. Petitioner filed a reply to the charge-sheet, denying all the charges. Thereafter, an Inquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Inquiry Officer conducted inquiry in accordance with the Rules, and granted equal opportunity to the delinquent as well as to the management to lead evidence, however, the management has utterly failed to prove the charges. After analysing the charges, reply to the charge-sheet and evidences on record, the Inquiry Officer has categorically given a finding that no charge as alleged against the petitioner was proved. After conducting the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 19.09.2012 to the Disciplinary Authority. 4. The Disciplinary Authority issued one notice dated 28.09.2012, directing the petitioner to appear in person for personal hearing before the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner appeared before the Disciplinary Authority for personal hearing and thereafter, directly one order dated 19.10.2012 imposing one of the harshest penalty of compulsory retirement from the service was passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while passing order dated 19.10.2012, the Disciplinary Authority has [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (3 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] flouted the mandatory provisions of the Rules of 1958, and has also not followed the principles of natural justice. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasized that once the Inquiry Officer, after conducting the full-fledged inquiry has held that the petitioner was not guilty of any charges levelled against him and a report was given that the charges alleged against the petitioner are not made out, as per Rule 16(10-A) & (10-B), the Disciplinary Authority was under a legal obligation, in the circumstances in which if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, to specifically frame the points on disagreement and to communicate the same along with notice to the delinquent so as to enable him to represent against such points of disagreement. However, instead of doing so, in a quite arbitrary and illegal manner, the Disciplinary Authority thus, despite all the findings of the Inquiry Officer, in favour of the petitioner in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rule passed the order dated 19.10.2012, which is totally whimsical and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the writ petition and submitted that order dated 19.10.2012, has been passed by the Disciplinary Authority strictly in accordance with law, and after following the procedures contemplated in the Rules of 1958. It was submitted that since the Disciplinary Authority did not concur with the findings recorded in the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, a notice dated 28.09.2012 was issued to the petitioner to afford him personal opportunity of hearing and upon consideration of the submission made by him during personal hearing, order dated 19.10.2012 has been issued [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (4 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] for imposing penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. It is also submitted that since the petitioner was heard by the Disciplinary Authority prior to passing the impugned penalty order, it cannot therefore be said that either the Rules of 1958 or principles of natural justice have been violated by the Disciplinary Authority. 7. I have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. It has not been disputed by learned counsel for the respondents that pursuant to charge-sheet dated 23.11.2011, an inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer who submitted his report on 19.09.2012, in which none of the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved against him. 9. Rule 16(10-A) & (10-B) of the Rules of 1958 are quoted hereunder:- "(10-A) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose and the same to be forwarded to the Government servant for his representation along with a copy of the report of the inquiry. (10-B) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant before proceeding further in the manner specified in sub-rules (11) and (11 A)." 10. It is a settled proposition of law that Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the findings given by the Inquiry Officer in disciplinary proceedings, and has every right to disagree with the Inquiry Officer, but such right or power is not unbridled and unfettered as it is governed by the Disciplinary Rules. In the [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (5 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] instant case, admittedly at no point of time, points of disagreement were framed by the Disciplinary Authority, expressing his dissent with the findings given by the Inquiry Officer. It is also not disputed that at no point of time, the petitioner was apprised of the issue of divergence of opinion by the Disciplinary Authority and without granting any opportunity to the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded further. Even, the order dated 19.10.2012 does not reflect that any points of disagreement were framed by the Disciplinary Authority to show his divergence with the findings of Inquiry Officer or at any point of time, the petitioner was granted any opportunity to represent after framing and communicating such points of disagreement. 11. Under these circumstances, the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority is totally in defiance of mandatory provisions of Rule 16(10-A) & (10-B) of the Rules of 1958. On account of not following the above procedure, contemplated in Rule 16(10-A) & (10-B), the proceedings against the petitioner have been initiated. 12. In the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in 1998 (7) SCC 84, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar situation, has held that when the Inquiry Officer during the course of disciplinary proceedings comes to the conclusion that all or some of the charges alleging misconduct against the delinquent are not proved, although the Disciplinary Authority can differ it's decision, it must do so, only after giving due opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. In the aforesaid judgment, following paras are relevant:- [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (6 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] "17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case (supra) quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar's case (supra) the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the inquiry officer holds the charges to be proved then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority. 18. Under Regulation 6 the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar's case (supra). 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the [2025:RJ-JP:39224] (7 of 7) [CW-18700/2012] delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer. 20. The aforesaid conclusion, which we have arrived at, is also in consonance with the underlying principle enunciated by this Court in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants (supra). While agreeing with the decision in Ram Kishan's case (supra), we are of the opinion that the contrary view expressed in S.S. Koshal and M.C. Saxena's cases (supra) do not lay down the correct law." 13. In view of above, upon analysis of the material on record and examination of Rules as well as judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is evident that the Disciplinary Authority has acted in quite arbitrary and illegal manner and has disregarded the mandatory provisions of law while imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner vide order dated 19.10.2012. 14. Accordingly, this Court deems it just and proper to quash and set aside the penalty order dated 19.10.2012. The petitioner shall be entitled to all the consequential benefits, which shall be released to him within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 15. The writ petition stands allowed in view of above directions. (ANAND SHARMA),J DIVYA /48