JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner has filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing of FIR No.18 of 2025, dated 25.07.2025, registered with Women Police Station, BCS, District Shimla, H.P., under Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BNS’), as well as, proceedings resultant thereto, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.6, Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial Court’). 2. The relief of quashing has been sought on the basis of the compromise, effected between the parties. 3. According to the petitioner, on the statement of respondent No.2, the FIR, in question, has been registered against him. 4. According to the petitioner, he had met the complainant (respondent No.2) in the year 2022. The complainant is a divorcee lady and having a son and she had told all these facts to the petitioner. Petitioner has committed wrong act under the pretext of marriage and now he has refused to marry, upon which, FIR in question was registered at the instance of respondent No.2. 5. After registration of the FIR, the police has conducted the investigation and filed the charge sheet, which has been pending before the learned trial Court. 6. On the basis of the said compromise, a prayer has been made to allow the petition, as prayed for, by quashing of FIR No.18 of 2025, as well as, all the proceedings resultant thereto, which are pending before the learned trial Court. 7. When put to notice, the respondent No.1-State has filed the status report, disclosing therein, the FIR No. No.4 of 2025, dated 25.04.2025 was registered under Section 69 of BNS, with Women Police Station, Solan, regarding continuous physical relationship, misleading by promising marriage. 8. The person, who, at one point of time, has levelled the allegations against the petitioner, and has lodged the FIR, in question, appeared today, before this Court and made a statement, on oath, that for about eight years, she was residing at Solan. She was a divorcee and having son from earlier marriage. In the year 2022, she met petitioner through her friend. She was interested to solemnize marriage with the petitioner. Out of her free consent, she has made physical relations with the petitioner, however, due to some misunderstanding, she had lodged the FIR, in question, against the petitioner. 9. She was a divorcee and having son from earlier marriage. In the year 2022, she met petitioner through her friend. She was interested to solemnize marriage with the petitioner. Out of her free consent, she has made physical relations with the petitioner, however, due to some misunderstanding, she had lodged the FIR, in question, against the petitioner. 9. She has deposed that with the intervention of the respectables of the society the matter has been compromised between them and on the basis of the compromise, a prayer for quashing of the FIR in question has been made. 10. Similar type of statement has been made by the petitioner, on oath. 11. Heard. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 Supreme Court Cases 466, has elaborately discussed the powers of this Court, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) and formulated the guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings, while holding that the timing of the settlement is a crucial factor, for exercising the power, under Section 482 CrPC. Relevant para 29.7, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/ investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 13. The judgment in Narinder Singh’s case (supra) has been affirmed by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 Supreme Court Cases 688 . 14. Admittedly, the case has been registered against the petitioner-accused, under the serious provisions of the law, i.e. Section 69 of the BNS (Section 376 IPC). Now, the next question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is as to whether there is clear cut prohibition in quashing the proceedings under Section 69 of the BNS. The answer is in negative, as, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision, in Madhukar & Ors. versus The State of Maharashtra & Anr., Neutral Citation No. 2025 INSC 819 , has provided a window to this Court, while exercising the power, under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 of the BNS), as per the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant para 6, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under Section 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature. Relevant para 6, of the judgment, is reproduced, as under: “6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under Section 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature. Ordinarily, quasing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly. However, the power of the court under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.” 15. In Haji Iqbal alias Bala through S.P.O.A. versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2023) 20 Supreme Court Cases 209, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while re-iterating the powers of this Court, under Section 482 CrPC, has cast a duty upon this Court, to look into the FIR, with care and more closely and held that this Court is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case, as well as, the material collected in the course of investigation. Relevant paras 14 to 17, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “14. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.[See : Raju & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133 ] 15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 133 ] 15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. 16. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. 17. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 16. This Court in Criminal Misc. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.” 16. This Court in Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) u/s 482 CrPC No. 1049 of 2022, titled as Mohan Lal Sharma versus State of H.P. and another, decided on 4th November, 2022, has held that according to the facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer for quashing of FIR in rape cases, can be accepted. Relevant paras 10 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: “10. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein: “13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: “…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved." 14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. R Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376 , the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman “who was following the command of her husband” and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: “... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…” “…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…” 15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions: (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions: (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated: vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 11. True it is that Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh supra, has cautioned High Courts not to exercise power under S. 482 CrPC, for quashing of criminal proceedings in the offence involving rape, dacoity, murder, but if the aforesaid judgment is read in its entirety, it does not suggest that there is complete bar for this Court to accede to the request for quashing of FIR in cases of rape, dacoity, murder etc. If, while considering prayer for quashing of FIR in these cases, court comes to the conclusion that quashing of FIR would result in harmony inter se parties and continuance thereof would be sheer abuse of process of law and wastage of time of the court, it can proceed to quash FIR in such like cases also. 12. Aforesaid view taken by this court is fortified by judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Kapil Gutpa v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr, Cr. Appeal No. 1217 of 2022, decided on 10.8.2022, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court, specifically taking note Narinder Singh Supra, has held that though court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the high court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The court has also to taken into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them, which may improve their mutual relationship. Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.7 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab1, which read thus: "29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship. 14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.” 17. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is the specific stand of respondent No.2/prosecutrix that in the year 2022, she met petitioner-Amit Kumar, through her friend and she was interested to solemnize the marriage with the petitioner, as, at the relevant time, she was a divorcee and having son from her earlier marriage. Not only this, she has stated that they had started residing together and with her consent, she had made physical relations with the petitioner. But the FIR in question, was lodged on account of misunderstanding. When, the physical relations, as per her stand, were made with her consent, then, her allegations in the FIR qua the fact that the petitioner made physical relation with her on the pretext of marriage is nothing, but seems to be the frustration of the respondent, on account of misunderstanding against the petitioner. 18. Petitioner, as well as, respondent No.2, have solemnized the marriage and now residing together, as husband and wife, in the matrimonial home. If, the proceedings are permitted to continue, it would be nothing, but abuse of the process of law. Not only this, the same would also affect upon the matrimonial ties of the petitioner and respondent No.2. 19. From the stand as taken by respondent No.2, an inference can be drawn, at this stage that whatsoever, happened between the petitioner and respondent No.2, prior to their marriage was their consensual act and from any stretch of imagination, the same cannot be said to be the act of the petitioner to have physical relations, on the pretext of marriage. The bonafide of the petitioner stood proved, when, he has solemnized marriage with respondent No.2. 20. As per the stand taken by the parties, the dispute between them has now been settled. The terms and conditions of the settlement, have been placed on record, vide Annexure P-2. 21. The bonafide of the petitioner stood proved, when, he has solemnized marriage with respondent No.2. 20. As per the stand taken by the parties, the dispute between them has now been settled. The terms and conditions of the settlement, have been placed on record, vide Annexure P-2. 21. The criminal machinery, in the present case, has swung into motion, by respondent No.2, by lodging the FIR, in question. However, as per the stand, taken by the petitioner, as well as, respondent No.2, they have compromised the matter, vide Annexure P-2. 22. The terms and conditions, which have been agreed upon by the parties, in order to settle all the disputes, should be honoured by the Court, as no useful purpose would be achieved, by keeping the proceedings alive. 23. Even otherwise, acceptance of the compromise will also save the precious judicial time of the learned trial Court, which the learned trial Court would be in a position to devote such time in deciding some other serious disputes, pending before it. 24. Considering all these facts, the present petition is allowed and FIR bearing No.18 of 2025, dated 25.07.2025, registered with Women Police Station BCS, District Shimla, H.P., under Section 69 of BNS, as well as, proceedings resultant thereto, which are pending before the learned trial Court, are ordered to be quashed. 25. The compromise deed, as well as, statements of the parties, recorded today shall form part of this order. 26. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.