2025:HHC:46545 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWPOA No.1899 of 2019 Decided on: 04.12.2025 _______________________________________________________ Nirmal Singh Thakur ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondents & Another Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge 1Whether approved for reporting?. For the petitioner: Mr. Paras Dhaulta, Advocate, for the petitioner. For the respondents: Mr. Amit Kumar Chaudhary, Deputy Advocate General. Ranjan Sharma, Judge [Oral] Petitioner, Nirmal Singh Thakur, retired Sub-Fire Officer, had initially filed a writ petition No.3229 of 2013, and on establishment of the State Administrative Tribunal the same was transferred to the Tribunal; and upon its abolition, stands re-transferred to this Court as CWPOA No.1899 of 2019, seeking the following relief(s):- (a). That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari quashing communication dated 28th July 2012 issued on behalf of Respondent No.2 i.e. Annexure P-9. (b). That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2025:HHC:46545 - 2 - issued writ of mandamus directing respondent No.1 and 2 to grant to the petitioner service benefits which have been withheld by Respondents on account of pendency of Criminal Case against the petitioner i.e. (i) Regularization of Suspension period; (ii) Increments due w.e.f. year 2000 to year 2005 (iii) Benefits of Assured Career Progression Scheme on completion of 16 years of service in the same Scale/Grade in June 2002 with all consequential benefits from the date the same were due to the petitioner with interest @ 12 percent per annum from the date the amounts were due till the date of actual payment.” FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed as Fireman in the Directorate of Home Guards, Civil Defence and Fire Services Himachal Pradesh on 01.06.1978 [Annexure P-1]. While working as such, he faced the selection for the post of Leading Fireman and was appointed as such on the recommendation of the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission on 27.01.1986 [Annexure P-2]. While working as Leading Fireman a Criminal case originating FIR No.58 of 2000, dated 05.04.2000 was registered against him under Sections 120-B & 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The aforesaid accusation in the Criminal Case was 2025:HHC:46545 - 3 - put to trial, which led to his acquittal by Special Judge (Forests), Shimla in Corruption Case No.91- S/7 of 2003 on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6]. After acquittal, the respondents issued an order on 16.11.2011 [Annexure P-5], promoting the petitioner on the post of Sub-Fire Officer [Class-III] w.e.f. 03.09.2007 notionally. Pursuant to his joining as Sub-Fire Officer, the petitioner submitted a representation on 30.01.2012 [Annexure P-7] to Director Fire Services, Himachal Pradesh, requesting for releasing the service benefits by regularizing the suspension period; and for giving the annual increments due for the period from 2000 to 2005; and for releasing ACP benefits due on completion of 10 years of service w.e.f. June, 2002 and the arrears of revised pay also. The Respondent No.2-Director of Fire Service responded to the representation on 28.07.2012 [Annexure P-9], stating that the State Authorities have filed an appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6] and the decision on the representation shall be taken after outcome of 2025:HHC:46545 - 4 - criminal appeal. In this backdrop, the petitioner has filed the instant petition laying challenge to order dated 28.07.2012 [Annexure P-9] denying the claim and had prayed for regularizing the suspension period and release of increments from 2000 to 2005 and for considering and releasing the ACP benefits due for June 2002 on completion of 16 years of service with all consequential benefits along with interest. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES: 3. Pursuant to the issuance of notice by this Court on 31.05.2013, the State Authorities have filed the Reply-Affidavit dated 19.07.2013 of Director General (Police)-cum-Director Fire Services Himachal Pradesh. 3(i). In the reply affidavit, the factual narration as set up in the writ petition is not denied. The primary ground set up in the Reply-Affidavit is that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Special Judge [Forests] on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6], has been assailed in Criminal Appeal No.41 of 2025:HHC:46545 - 5 - 2012, in Re: State of H.P. versus Nirmal Singh & Others, which is pending adjudication before this Court and further action for regularizing the suspension period, release of annual increments and grant of ACP benefits etc. shall be taken subject to the final outcome of the said appeal. In this background, the State Authorities have opposed the claim of the petitioner with the prayer for dismissing the writ petition. REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER: 4. Petitioner had filed a rejoinder, rebutting the stand of the State Authorities with the specific plea that mere pendency of appeal against acquittal cannot be a ground to deny the legitimate benefits which accrue to the petitioner after his acquittal which is honourable acquittal being an acquittal on merits. In this background, the claim in the writ petition has been reiterated. 5. Heard, Mr. Paras Dhaulta, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Amit Kumar Chaudhary, Learned Deputy Advocate General, for the Respondents-State and have gone through the 2025:HHC:46545 - 6 - material available on record. STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED: 6. Before analyzing the claim of the petitioner, it is necessary to have a recap of statutory provisions of Rule 10 of the CCS [CCA] Rules, as applicable in instant case also, dealing with suspension of an employee, in following terms:- 10. Suspension : (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension- (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial: Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor - General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the 2025:HHC:46545 - 7 - circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority – (a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours; (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty- eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction. EXPLANATION- The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub- rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the 2025:HHC:46545 - 8 - circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders : Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case. (5) (a) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (7), and order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (b) Where a Government servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings. (c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. 2025:HHC:46545 - 9 - (6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time. (7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub- rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub- rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.” 7. The statutory provisions of Rule 54-B of Fundamental Rules, dealing with rights of an employee during suspension and its revocation; and effect of the pendency and conclusion of departmental or judicial proceedings; and the 2025:HHC:46545 - 10 - corresponding obligation of an employer on conclusion of such proceedings; and the legal entitlements accruing to an employee therefrom; have been spelt out in the following terms:- FUNDAMENTAL RULE 54-B (1). When a Government servant who has been suspended is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement (including premature retirement) while under suspension, the authority competent to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order- (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement (including premature retirement), as the case may be; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 53, where a Government servant under suspension dies before the disciplinary or the Court proceedings instituted against him are concluded, the period between the date of suspension and the date of death shall be treated as duty for all purposes and his family shall be paid the full pay and allowances for that period to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, subject to adjustment in respect of subsistence allowance already paid. (3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the opinion that the suspension was wholly 2025:HHC:46545 - 11 - unjustified, the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub- rule (8) be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled, had he not been suspended: Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government servant had been delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, it may, after giving him an opportunity to make his representation within sixty days from the date on which the communication in this regard is served on him and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him, direct, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that the Government servant shall be paid for the period of such delay only such amount (not being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine. (4) In a case falling under sub-rule (3) the period of suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes. (5) In cases other than those falling under sub-rules (2) and (3) the Government servant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rules (8) and (9) be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period (which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served) as may be specified in the notice. (6) where suspension is revoked pending finalization of the disciplinary or the Court proceedings, 2025:HHC:46545 - 12 - any order passed under sub-rule (1) before the conclusion of the proceedings against the Government servant, shall be reviewed on its own motion after the conclusion of the proceedings by the authority mentioned in sub-rule (1) who shall make an order according to the provisions of sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5), as the case may be. (7) In a case falling under sub-rule (5), the period of suspension shall not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the competent authority specifically directs that it shall be so treated for any specified purpose: Provided that, if the Government servant so desires such authority may order that the period of suspension shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible to the Government servant. NOTE: The order of the competent authority under the preceding proviso shall be absolute and no higher sanction shall be necessary for the grant of- (a) extraordinary leave in excess of three months in the case of temporary Government servant; and (b) leave of any kind in excess of five years in the case of permanent or quasi-permanent Government servant. (8) The payment of allowances under sub-rule (2), sub-rule (3) or sub-rule (5) shall be subject to all other conditions under which such allowances are admissible. (9) The amount determined under the proviso to sub-rule (3) or under sub-rule (5) shall not be less than subsistence allowance and other allowances admissible under Rule 53.” ANALYSIS: 8. Taking into account of the factual matrix 2025:HHC:46545 - 13 - and the stand of the Respondents in the Reply Affidavit and the statutory rules, this Court is of the considered view, that the claim of the petitioner carries weight; and the stand of the Respondents- State Authorities in denying the benefits to the petitioner is misconceived and devoid of any merit, in view of the following discussion hereinbelow :- NOT PASSING THE STATUTORY ORDERS AFTER REVOCATION OF SUSPENSION & REINSTATEMENT UNDER FR 54-B (1) (a) (b): 8(i). First contention of Learned Counsel is that though an FIR No.58 of 2000, dated 05.04.2000 was registered against the petitioner under Sections 120-B & 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and due to his arrest he was placed under suspension on 19.06.2000 [Annexure P-3] and upon revocation of suspension on 02.02.2005 [Annexure P-4] was reinstated in service. The criminal case originating from the above FIR ended in acquittal on 30.04.2011 [Annexure A-6]. No disciplinary proceedings were ever initiated against 2025:HHC:46545 - 14 - the petitioner. Upon reinstatement, the Respondent No.1 was bound to consider and pass a specific order firstly, on reinstatement, regarding the pay and allowances payable to petitioner for the period of suspension till reinstatement and secondly, for treating suspension period as duty period in terms of FR 54-B[1]. The action of the Competent Authority-Respondent No.1 in neither considering nor in passing a specific order dealing with the twin requirements of Clauses (a) & (b) of Sub Section (1) of FR 54 B amounts to abdication of powers mandated under the Rules. NON PASSING OF STATUTORY ORDERS ON TWIN ASPECTS UNDER FR 54-B (I) (a) & (b) VIOLATIVE OF NATURAL JUSTICE- HAVING CIVIL CONSEQUENCES: 8(ii). During suspension, the Respondents have given 50% subsistence allowance to the petitioner and after revocation of suspension and rejoining, the denial of balance of pay and allowances for suspension period has visited petitioner with civil consequences. Action of the Competent Authority in withholding admissible pay and allowances for suspension period, after revocation of suspension 2025:HHC:46545 - 15 - and rejoining and also in not passing an order for treating this period as duty period under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) could not be resorted to without giving a prior notice, without affording a personal hearing without calling for an explanation from the petitioner before denying these benefits is violative of the principles of natural justice. Thus, the non-compliance of the mandate under Rule 54 B (1) (a) & (b) and non-compliance of principles of natural justice vitiates the State action, in instant case. 8(iii). While dealing with a similar fact situation, the action of the Competent Authority was deprecated in not passing the mandate under FR 54-B (1) (a) & (b) when, after revocation of suspension and acquittal in criminal case and when, neither any other departmental nor judicial-criminal proceedings were pending in M. Gopala Krishna Naidu vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 240, in the following terms: “5. The first question which requires consideration is whether there was a duty on the competent authority to 2025:HHC:46545 - 16 - afford an opportunity to the appellant to show cause before that authority formed the opinion as to whether he was fully exonerated and whether his suspension was wholly unjustified. Under F.R. 54 where a Government servant is reinstated, the authority has to consider and make a specific order (i) regarding pay and allowances payable to him for the period of his absence from duty and (ii) whether such period of absence should be treated as one spent on duty. The consideration of these questions depends on whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Government servant had been fully exonerated and in case of pension whether it was wholly unjustified. If the authority forms such an opinion the Government servant is entitled to full pay and allowances which he would have been entitled to had the order of dismissal, removal or suspension, as the case may be, not been passed. Where the authority cannot form such an opinion the Government servant may be given such proportion of pay and allowances as the authority may prescribe. In the former case the period of absence from duty has to be treated as period spent on duty for all purposes and in the latter case such period is not to be treated as period spent on duty. But the authority has the power in suitable cases to direct that such period of absence shall be treated as period spent on duty in which case the government servant would be entitled to full pay and allowances. 6. It is true that the order under FR. 54 in a sense a consequential order in that it would be passed aft an order of reinstatement is made. But the fact that it is a consequential order does not determine the question whether the government servant has to be given an opportunity to show cause or not. It is also true that in a case where 2025:HHC:46545 - 17 - reinstatement is ordered after a departmental inquiry the government servant would Ordinarily have had an opportunity, to show: cause. In such a case, the authority no doubt, would have before him the entire record including the explanation given by the government servant from which all the facts and circumstances of the case would be before the authority and from which he can form the opinion as to whether he has been fully exonerated or not and in case of suspension whether such suspension was wholly unjustified or not. In such a case the order passed under a rule such as the present Fundamental Rule might be said to be a consequential order following a departmental inquiry. But there are, three classes of cases as laid down by the proviso in Art. 311 where a departmental inquiry would not be held, viz., (a) where a person is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for reasons to be record in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry; and (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied, that in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Since there would be no inquiry in these classes of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the' government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by the department concerned. The order in such a case would be ex-parte without the authority having the other side of the picture. In such cases the order that such authority would pass would not be a consequential order as where a 2025:HHC:46545 - 18 - departmental inquiry has been held. Therefore, aft order passed under Fundamental Rule 45 is not always a consequential order nor is such order a continuation of the departmental proceeding taken against the employee 7. It is true as Mr. Sen pointed out that F.R. 54 does not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order. Even so, the question is whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The order as to whether a given case falls under cl. 2 or cl. 5 of the Fundamental Rule must depend on the examination by the authority of all the facts and circumstances of the case and his forming the opinion therefrom of two factual findings; whether the employee was fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. Besides, an order passed under this rule would obviously affect the government servant adversely if it is one made under cls. 3 and 5. Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action, proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice. 10. In our view F.R. 54 contemplates a 2025:HHC:46545 - 19 - duty to act in accordance with the basic concept of justice and fairplay. The authority therefore had to afford a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to show cause why Cls. 3 and 5 should not be applied and that having not been done the order must be held to be invalid.” 8(iv). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurpal Singh versus High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, (2012) 13 SCC 94, has outlined that mere pendency of an appeal cannot be the basis for denying the benefits accruing from revocation of suspension and upon his exoneration and the competent authority is bound to take a decision on admissibility of pay and allowances and to treat the period as duty period, in the following terms: “45. The acquittal of the petitioner having been affirmed by the High Court of Delhi, in our opinion, it was necessary for the High Court of Rajasthan to take a decision: (a) whether to revoke the order of suspension and permit the petitioner to perform judicial functions; (b) whether to hold a departmental enquiry with regard to the receipt of money allegedly received by him from the deceased; (c) as to how the period of suspension was to be treated; (d) whether the petitioner was entitled to full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period of suspension. 46. It appears to us that given the findings recorded by the trial court, 2025:HHC:46545 - 20 - subsequently reiterated by the High Court of Delhi, the decision to continue the petitioner under suspension, thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension of the petitioner was continued as the High Court had decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of record that both the trial court as well as the High Court had found the entire story with regard to the alleged receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was founded on the same facts and the same evidence which have had been examined by the trial court as well as the High Court. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the High Court to examine the findings of the trial court as well as the High Court in detail before taking a decision to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner, founded on the same set of facts and the evidence. It is apparent from the record that no such examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High Court. Even after taking a decision to initiate departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it was no longer imperative to continue the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner was no longer charged with any criminal offence as both the trial court as well as the High Court had literally concluded that the charges against the petitioner had been concocted. The petitioner had been subjected to continued suspension since 22nd December, 1985. During the period of departmental proceedings, even if the petitioner was not to be assigned any judicial work, the High Court could have conveniently given him suitable posting on the administrative side. In our opinion, from the time of dismissal of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the 2025:HHC:46545 - 21 - continued suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. 50. In view of the authoritative judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Jankiraman (supra), the submissions made by Mr. Calla would have to be accepted. In the aforesaid judgment it was held that:- “26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings.” 52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27th September, 2005, i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider the case of the petitioner for 2025:HHC:46545 - 22 - promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the rules) from the date when a person junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. 53. We further direct that the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits, such as salary and other allowances by treating him on duty with effect from the date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court and after fixing his last pay drawn correctly. The consequential benefits shall be paid to him with 6% interest from the date of the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court on 27th September, 2005. The enhanced retiral benefits shall be released to him within three months of the receipt of a copy of this order.” 8(v). While dealing with a similar eventuality that failure to pass an order after revocation of suspension shall entitle an employee for full salary for the suspension period in terms of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Agarwal versus Union of India and another, (2015) 17 SCC 625, in the following terms:- 22. When the order of suspension is revoked and the suspended employee is asked to join the duty, he is required to do so. How the period of suspension is to be treated is another aspect. At 2025:HHC:46545 - 23 - the most, such an employee would be entitled to full salary during the suspension period if no order is passed as to how the suspension period would be governed. That would not mean that order revoking suspension itself becomes bad in law. It is pertinent to mention that even the Tribunal did not say that order revoking suspension was bad in law (In fact that part of the order was favorable to the petitioner). What it held was that in terms of Rule 5(b), the Government should have also decided how the period of suspension is to be treated and, therefore, directed the Government to pass necessary order to that effect. DENIAL OF FULL PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR SUSPENSION PERIOD DESPITE HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL DATED 08.05.2013 [ANNEXURE A-4] 9. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to analyze the judgement dated 30.04.2011 [Annexure A-6], acquitting the petitioner, in following terms: “16. There is no evidence showing involvement of accused Babu Ram and Nirmal Singh. The evidence led by defence proved that two receipts Ex.PW1/LL and MM were cancelled by M/s Tek Chand and Sons and there was no question of any conspiracy on the part of Babu Ram. Similarly, Nirmal Singh had no role to play either in drawal of money, cancellation of the drafts or in preparation of cheque for Rs. 2,45,000/-Ex.PW1/V. He was working in a different branch. They did not prepare any document for the purpose of cheating as well. 25. Therefore, the evidence on record sufficiently proved that there was conspiracy amongst accused Sant Ram 2025:HHC:46545 - 24 - and Amar Singh Verma and pursuant to this conspiracy, criminal breach of trust was committed by both of them and they also committed criminal misconduct. Amar Singh Verma allowed Sant Ram to encash the drafts meant for payment to M/s Tek Chand and Co and allowed him to retain the money with him. Accused Sant Ram prepared the forged documents Ex.PW1/Q, R, S and T and used them as genuine for the purpose of drawal of money from the bank. Accused Babu Ram and Nirmal Singh have not been proved committed any offence in this case. Hence charges against Sant Ram Under Section 120B, 468, 471, 409 IPC and Section 13[2] PCA stood proved whereas against Amar Singh Verma, charges under Section 120B, 409 IPC and Section 13[2] PCA stood established. To this extent, these points are decided accordingly. Point No.5 26. As a result of findings aforesaid, accused Sant Ram is convicted under Section 120B, 409, 471 IPC and Section 13[2] PCA; accused Amar Singh Verma is convicted under Section 120B, 409 IPC and Section 13[2] PCA. Accused Amar Singh - Verma is acquitted under Section 468, 471 IPC. Accused Babu Ram acquitted under Section 120B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Nirmal Singh acquitted under Section 120B, 420 IPC and Section 13[2] PCA.” HONOURABLE ACQUITTAL OF PETITIONER IN CRIMINAL CASE: 9(i). Notably, the expressions ‘honorable acquittal’ or ‘acquitted of blame’ or ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, but once the 2025:HHC:46545 - 25 - petitioner was acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and coupled with the fact that prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges leveled, then, in these circumstances, the acquittal of the petitioner was an honorable acquittal for all purposes, as has been outlined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another vs S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, as under :- “24. The meaning of the expression ‘honourable acquittal’ came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honorable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’, ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honorably acquitted.” 2025:HHC:46545 - 26 - 9(ii). Likewise, an honorable acquittal shall lead to conferment of service benefits, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Others vs Pradeep Kumar and Another (2018) 1 SCC 797, in the following terms:- “10. The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of the candidates in the concerned post. If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or he had no criminal antecedents. Unless it is an honourable acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the benefit of the case. What is honourable acquittal, was considered by this Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, in which this Court held as under:- "24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial 2025:HHC:46545 - 27 - pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted." 9(iii). In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another vs Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, the principle of honourable acquittal has been outlined as under :- 24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co- relation between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical namely whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India this Court has taken a 2025:HHC:46545 - 28 - view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve- teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions ‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully exonerated’ are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression ‘honourably acquitted’. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.” Even a perusal of the judgment of 2025:HHC:46545 - 29 - acquittal 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6] establishes beyond doubt that no evidence showing the involvement of the petitioner was proved by the prosecution. Even the evidence led by the accused as per receipts did not reveal any conspiracy in the matter. Based on the evidence adduced before the Trial Court, categorical findings were recorded that the petitioner had was involved in any manner; and the petitioner had no role either in the drawal of money, cancellation of the drafts or in preparation of cheques for 2,45,000/- [Rupees Two Lakh Forty Five Thousand Only]. It is further borne out from the judgment that the petitioner was working in a different branch and he did not prepare any document for the purposes of cheating as alleged. Even, the findings recorded in Para 21 also negates the accusation in view of the fact that the Learned Trial Court had specifically recorded a finding that there was no occasion for Sant Ram to pay the alleged loan to the petitioner i.e. Nirmal Singh Thakur. In Para 25 2025:HHC:46545 - 30 - specific findings were recorded by the Learned Trial Court that Nirmal Singh Thakur-petitioner had not committed any offence in this case and based on this the accusation against the petitioner was being not proved on merits, therefore, the petitioner was acquitted in the said case. That being so, the suspension of petitioner based on FIR and resultant arrest and the judicial-criminal proceedings in which he was honorably acquitted leads to an irresistible conclusion, that the suspension was wholly unjustified. Thus, once the acquittal was an honourable acquittal as the prosecution failed to prove the accusation against the petitioner, in these circumstances, the denial of benefits of pay and allowances during the suspension period and in not treating the suspension period as duty period and after obliteration of stigma on acquittal even the denial of service benefits accruing from such period when, neither any other judicial proceedings nor any departmental proceedings were initiated/ pending against the petitioner; and therefore, the 2025:HHC:46545 - 31 - inaction and denial of these benefits is uncalled for and the same is accordingly interdicted, in instant case. DENIAL OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES INABSENCE OF FORMATION OF OPINION & WITHOUT SEEKING REPLY : VIOLATIVE OF PROVISIO TO FR 54-B (3) & (4): 10. After revocation of suspension and upon his acquittal, the Competent Authority-Respondent No. 1 could deny part of the pay and allowances subject to fulfilment of twin pre-conditions under the proviso to FR 54-B (3) i.e. “forming an opinion as to whether the proceedings {departmental or criminal proceedings, as the case may be} had been delayed for reasons directly attributable to the petitioner” and “upon formation of such opinion”, in case, the competent authority intended to deny any part of full pay and allowances due to delay in termination-conclusion of such proceedings, then, such an action could be resorted to after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to submit a representation against the intended action, considering the representation and after passing a speaking order dealing with 2025:HHC:46545 - 32 - the aspect as to whether the proceeding were in-fact delayed at the instance of the petitioner or not. In the instant case, the Reply Affidavit does not refer to any such formation of opinion that the criminal proceedings were delayed at the instance of the petitioner and nothing has been placed on record to assert that the mandatory notice/opportunity was given calling for a representation from the petitioner to justify the denial of the remaining admissible pay and allowances. Non-performance of the statutory duty by Respondent No.1-Competent Authority under the proviso to FR 54-B (3) is enough to infer that the denial or withholding or deprivation of financial benefits due for suspension period suffers from non-application of mind, is contrary to the intent and object of the Rules and such deprivation resulting in financial loss cannot be permitted to operate against the petitioner. NOT PASSING ORDERS QUA SUSPENSION PERIOD {PAY AND DUTY} AFTER CONCLUSION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IS VIOLATIVE OF FR-54-B (6): 11. While dealing with the issue that 2025:HHC:46545 - 33 - assuming, even if no decision was taken on the admissibility of pay and allowances for the suspension period and in treating this period as duty period due to pendency of judicial- criminal/disciplinary proceedings, then upon the termination-conclusion of these proceedings [as the case may be], the Competent Authority was bound to take a decision on both these twin aspects in terms of the statutory rules i.e. FR-54B(6), for giving effect to FR-54B(1) (a) & (b) as mandated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and another versus Mangat Lal Sidana, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 378 as under: 16. Rule 54 with which we are concerned contemplates an amalgam of situations which deal with disciplinary proceedings culminating in dismissal, compulsory retirement and removal and it also deals with absence from duty on account of suspension. In other words, when an employee at the end of the disciplinary proceedings is punished in terms thereof and as a result of the order passed is reinstated, then the competent authority is called upon to consider and pass specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid for the period for absence from duty. The Rule appears to separately contemplate the duty to provide for the pay and allowances for the period of suspension ending with the date of retirement on superannuation as the 2025:HHC:46545 - 34 - case may be. In other words, the Rule in its application contemplates a situation wherein a Government servant being dismissed, removed, compulsory retired or suspended is reinstated. It also takes in a case where but for his retirement, he would have been reinstated while under suspension. In both these cases, the duty of the competent authority is to pass the order within the contemplation of Rule 54 (1) (a) and (b). This means that apart from dealing with pay and allowances, as to whether the period of absence is to be treated as duty must be dealt with. This flows from Rule 54(1)(b). The manner in which the authority is to pass the order is regulated by subsequent provisions in Rule 54. Sub-rule 54(2) contemplates that the competent authority must examine the proceedings, apply its mind, and find whether it is a case where the Government servant at the end of the day has been fully exonerated. In the case of suspension where a person being under suspension is reinstated, the duty lies on the competent authority to consider the question as to whether the suspension was justified or wholly unjustified. If the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant would be entitled to be paid the full pay and dearness allowance which he was entitled to had he not been suspended. The same is the case of the Government servant visited with the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. If it is found that at the end of the day that the penalty was wholly unjustified in that, on merit it is found that the employee stands completely exonerated, he would be entitled to get full pay and dearness allowance. Rule 54 (3) is the residuary clause. The provisions of Rule 54 (2) and (3) are mutually exclusive. In other words, if an employee is not fully 2025:HHC:46545 - 35 - exonerated, he is to be given such proportion of the pay and allowances as the competent authority may prescribe. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 54 is relatable to sub-rule 54(1) (b). In other words, whenever there is re-instatement in the circumstances attracting Rule 54, the authority is to pass a specific order relating to the pay and allowances to be paid and also as to whether the period of such absence is being treated as period spent on duty. Both these aspects must be reflected in the order. 21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants would point out that in such circumstances, the course to be adopted would be to remit it back to the competent authority so that the competent authority may ensure that the respondents appear before the authorities and then the case is decided. In fact, we find that the course adopted by this Court finally in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu (supra) was to remit the matter back to the competent authority to pass an order after hearing the employee. But then, learned counsel for the respondent would point out that the respondent is aged 76 and at this stage, remitting back the matter would be highly inequitable. In the leading case, we notice, at the time of admission, this Court had passed an order of stay subject to payment of 50 per cent of the backwages. 23. The disciplinary proceedings against the respondents in both the cases have not culminated in a situation where it could be said that they have been completely exonerated. This would take their case outside the four walls of Rule 54(2) of the Rules. Their suspension may not fall in the category of unjustified suspension. This inevitably and necessarily would bring their cases within the scope of Rule 54(3). This would necessarily mean that the exact 2025:HHC:46545 - 36 - amount of pay and allowances to be paid is to be less than the full pay and allowances. However, this exercise can be done only after notice to the employee. Admittedly, there is a failure by the appellants in this regard. But, at the same time, to remit it back for this purpose in our view would be inequitable. Hence we would rather adopt the middle path by directing that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents be paid pay and allowances fixed at 50 per cent of the pay and allowances which they would have drawn for the period of their absence. Accordingly, the appeals are partly allowed. We direct that the respondents in both the cases will be paid the pay and allowances at 50 per cent of the amount which they would be entitled for the period in question. Pertinently, since the petitioner stood honourably acquittal by Learned Trial Court on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6] and the accusation against the petitioner was not proved, then, the respondents were bound to comply with the mandate of proviso to FR 54-B (1) (a) & (b) which has not been done in the instant case. Nothing has been placed on record to show that these proceedings were delayed at instance of petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record to assert that the competent authority had formed an opinion that criminal proceedings were delayed directly at 2025:HHC:46545 - 37 - the instance of the petitioner so as to denying any part of the pay and allowances for suspension period and to treat this period as duty period. Non-compliance of the Sub-Rule (3) of FR 54-B by not passing the statutory orders as contemplated under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) since his acquittal on 30.04.2011 till the filing of CWP [now CWPOA No.1899 of 2019] and even thereafter has visited the petitioner with civil consequences and has resulted in depriving the petitioner of his legal entitlement by giving a complete go-bye to principles of natural justice and the mandate of FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) read with FR 54-B (3) (4) & (6), has been defeated by the State Authorities leading to illegality and arbitrariness and accordingly, the State action, is set-aside. 12. 12. Given in terms of discussion in Paras 7 to 12 [supra], this Court is of the considered view that the action of the Respondents-Competent Authority in denying the pay and allowances to the petitioner for the suspension period from 19.06.2000 [Annexure P-3] till revocation of 2025:HHC:46545 - 38 - suspension i.e. 02.02.2005 [Annexure P-4] and denial of consequential benefits cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny, for the reason, that firstly, the denial of the benefit of pay and allowances for suspension period has visited the petitioner with civil consequences and; secondly, such deprivation could not be resorted to by giving a complete go-bye to the principles of natural justice in an arbitrary manner without giving a prior notice, without affording a personal hearing ; and thirdly even after revocation of suspension and reinstatement the Respondents-Competent Authority has abdicated its authority by not passing the mandatory specific order as contemplated under Clause (a) & (b) of sub-rule (1) of FR-54B; and fourthly, failure to pass the mandatory order under FR-54B (1) (a) & (b) cannot be the basis for denying the pay and allowances for the suspension period and to treat suspension period as duty period; and fifthly, upon an honorable acquittal in criminal proceedings on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6] the suspension was 2025:HHC:46545 - 39 - wholly unjustified and therefore, the denial of pay and allowances for the suspension period was violative of sub rule (3) of FR-54-B and was uncalled for; and sixthly, nothing has been placed on record to assert that the judicial-criminal proceedings, which ended in acquittal were delayed by the petitioner and when, such deprivation could only be ordered only after formation of opinion qua delay attributed directly to petitioner and that too after issuing a notice, calling for a reply-representation and after passing a reasoned order in writing, in terms of the proviso to Rule 54-B (3) and not otherwise. Moreover, once these statutory compliances are absent, the only irretrievable conclusion is that the action of not treating this period as duty period, by acting wholly contrary to and in defiance of the Rule 54-B as discussed above is untenable; and seventhly, except the sole criminal proceedings, [in which he stood acquitted] neither any other departmental proceedings nor any other criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner as on the date of 2025:HHC:46545 - 40 - reinstatement or date of acquittal and in these circumstances, the suspension was wholly unjustified; and eighthly, the denial of service benefits due to mere pending of criminal appeal against acquittal certainly amounts to denying the legal entitlements on extraneous factors, which have no legal sanctity and ninthly, even if, the Respondents did not issue the twin orders mandated under FR 54-B (1) & (3) from date of revocation of suspension due to the pending criminal case then also, upon termination- conclusion of criminal case, the Respondents were bound to pass the specific order regarding the twin aspects under FR 54-B(1) (a) & (b) after the decision of the criminal case leading to acquittal but the State Action in not passing the specific statutory orders for releasing pay and allowances for suspension period and in not treating this period as duty period since acquittal on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6] till the filing of CWP-CWPOA on 04.03.2013 and even thereafter certainly defeats the mandate of FR 54-B (1) (3) (4) & (8) ; and 2025:HHC:46545 - 41 - tenthly, the action of the State Authorities in not passing the specific order on twin aspects probably, on the ground that an appeal against acquittal is pending and this plea cannot be permitted to be invoked for the reason, that nothing has been placed before this Court entitling or empowering an employer not to pass the statutory order under FR 54-B even after his exoneration-acquittal ; and further such a plea is without any authority of law; and lastly, as per law discussed in succeeding paras, mere pendency of an appeal against acquittal cannot be treated as continuation of the criminal proceedings, wherein also, the petitioner stood acquitted, as discussed in succeeding paras of this judgement. Failure to issue the resultant order(s) by the Respondents-Competent Authority reveals non application of mind to the relevant twin aspects and abdication or inaction has resulted in depriving the petitioner of his legal entitlements of pay and allowances and other service benefits flowing from such service resulting in depriving the petitioner of his property within 2025:HHC:46545 - 42 - the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India without authority of law. Non-compliance of Sub-Rule (1) (3) and (5) of FR 54-B and the denial of full salary, pay and allowances and in not treating the suspension period as duty period since acquittal in 2011 till day i.e. for last 14 years now cannot pass the test of judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the petitioner is held entitled to full pay and allowances [minus the balance of subsistence allowance, already received] for suspension period upon reinstatement, after conclusion of criminal proceedings leading to acquittal and to treat this period as duty period for all service benefits accruing therefrom in favor of the petitioner. DENIAL OF ANNUAL INCREMENT W.E.F. 01.01.2012 ONWARDS ILLEGAL 13. Learned Counsel submits that while the petitioner was working appointed as Leading Fireman since April 2000 on regular basis, he was placed under suspension on 19.06.2000 [Annexure P-3] and suspension was revoked on 02.02.2005 [Annexure P-4]. After revocation of suspension, he 2025:HHC:46545 - 43 - was reinstated in service Learned Counsel submits that respondents have not given annual increments due to the petitioner w.e.f. June, 2000 till 2005 and benefit of higher pay on refixation till the filing of CWP renumbered as CWPOA No.1899 of 2019, and even thereafter have not been released or were withheld. The prayer of the petitioner for releasing the annual increments due w.e.f. June, 2000 onwards till day, deserves to be accepted, for the following reasons :- 13(i) Respondents could not withhold or deny the annual increments w.e.f. June, 2000 till 2005 till the filing of the CWP/CWPOA and thereafter, till day but without giving issuing prior notice and without affording a personal hearing and without giving him an opportunity to submit an explanation, in case, any justifiable grounds- material existed against the petitioner. Absence of any grounds or material vitiates the action of withholding/denying annual increments is certainly illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice. 2025:HHC:46545 - 44 - 13(ii). Action of withholding or denial of annual increment w.e.f. June, 2000 to 2005 despite the fact that nothing adverse regarding work or conduct was ever pointed out or exists and thus the withholding of increments, is violative of FR 24, reads as under:- FUNDAMENTAL RULE 24: “An increment shall ordinarily be drawn as a matter of course unless it is withheld. An increment may be withheld from a Government servant by the Central Government or by any authority to whom the Central Government may delegate this power under Rule 6, if his conduct has not been good or his work has not been satisfactory. In ordering the withholding of an increment, the withholding authority shall state the period for which it is withheld, and whether the postponement shall have the effect of postponing future increments.” 13(iii). Learned Counsel contends that the action of the State Authorities in withholding the annual increments payable to petitioner w.e.f. June, 2000 to 2005 is punitive, is without any authority of law, is uncalled for and this could not be resorted to without complying with the mandate of Rule 11 and Rule 16 of CCS (CCA) Rules. The operative part of Rule 11 (iv) and Rule 16 read as under:- 2025:HHC:46545 - 45 - “11. Penalties The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government servant, namely :- Minor Penalties – (i) censure; (ii) withholding of his promotion; (iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence or breach of orders; (iii a) reduction to lower stage in the time- scale of pay by one stage for a period not exceeding three years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension. (iv) withholding of increments of pay Major Penalties – (v) to (ix) [not relevant] 16. Procedure for imposing minor penalties (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5) of rule 15, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in clause (i) to (iv) of rule 11 shall be made except after- (a) informing the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; (b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (24) of rule 14, in every case in which the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary; 2025:HHC:46545 - 46 - (c) taking the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant under clause (a) and the record of inquiry, if any, held under clause (b) into consideration; (d) consulting the Commission where such consultation is necessary. The Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the advice of the Commission to the Government servant, who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission on the advice of the Commission, to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days; and (e) recording a finding on each imputation or misconduct or misbehavior. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-rule (1), if in a case it is proposed after considering the representation, if any, made by the Government servant under clause (a) of that sub-rule, to withhold increments of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of pension payable to the Government servant or to withhold increments of pay for a period exceeding three years or to withhold increments of pay with cumulative effect for any period, an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in sub-rules (3) to (24) of Rule 14, before making any order imposing on the Government servant any such penalty. (2) The record of the proceedings in such cases shall include- (i) a copy of the intimation to the Government servant of the proposal to take action against him; (ii) a copy of the statement of imputations of misconduct or 2025:HHC:46545 - 47 - misbehaviour delivered to him; (iii) his representation, if any; (iv) the evidence produced during the inquiry; (v) the advice of the Commission, if any; (vi) representation, if any, of the Government servant on the advice of the Commission; (vii) the findings on each imputation of misconduct or misbehavior; and (viii) the orders on the case together with the reasons therefor.” In the instant case, even the Respondents have not passed any specific order, withholding the annual increments of the petitioner and in absence of any order withholding the annual increments for the period from June 2000 till 2005 is unsustainable. Moreover, the annual increments which were due to the petitioner, in the normal course, could only be withheld, in case, the work was not satisfactory and conduct was not satisfactory. Nothing has been placed on record to show that the conduct of the petitioner for one year preceding the date of accrual of increment in June 2000 till 2005 and the denial of resultant refixation of pay till filing of CWP in 2013 2025:HHC:46545 - 48 - [renumbered as CWPOA in 2019] and thereafter till day [decision thereof] was not good/unsatisfactory and absence of any adversial events, the action of the State Authorities in withholding the increments accrued for service rendered during this period is illegal. Further, the action of withholding of increment(s), of the petitioner has resulted in imposing the penalty in terms of Rule 11 (iv) of the CCS [CCA Rules] and since withholding of increments was a recognized penalty and such penalty could not have been imposed without complying with the mandate of Rule 16 of the CCS [CCA Rules]. Total non-compliance of Rule 11(iv) and Rule 16 of CCS [CCA] Rules in instant case, renders the action withholding/denying the actual benefits to be highly perverse, illegal and unsustainable and thus, withholding of annual increments due to the petitioner from June, 2000 onwards till 2005 and refixing the pay thereafter till retirement on 30.06.2012 cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. 13(iv). Action of the State Authorities, in 2025:HHC:46545 - 49 - resorting to the abrupt withholding or denial of annual increments [due from 2000 to 2005] is without authority of law. Withholding or denying the legal entitlements is without authority of law and in violation of principles of natural justice and that too, by way of a penalty, which cannot sustain, in eyes of law. In the absence of anything adverse, having been conveyed regarding his work and/or conduct w.e.f. June 2000 to 2005 and then, in such a situation a right for enhancement in pay, by way of annual increments, under Pay Revision Rules and Fundamental Rule 24 could neither be restricted, curtailed, withheld or taken away and denied dehors the mandate in the Rules as discussed above. Entitlement for increment adds towards salary payable every month and such legal entitlement undoubtedly comes within the ambit of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and deprivation of annual increments is uncalled for; and the State action is accordingly quashed and set-aside. 2025:HHC:46545 - 50 - DENIAL OF ACPS ON COMPLETION OF 16 YEARS W.E.F. 27.01.2002 ILLEGAL 14. Learned Counsel submits that petitioner was appointed as a Leading Fireman in Respondent- Department on 27.01.1986 and he completed 16 years of service on 27.01.2002 and on completion of 16 years service, the petitioner became eligible and entitled for grant of ACP due on completion of 16 years in view of ACP Scheme dated 15.12.1998 issued by the State Authorities but this benefit has been denied illegally. The plea of the petitioner for grant of ACPS on completion of 16 years of service as Leading Fireman w.e.f. 27.01.2002, deserves to be accepted, for the following reasons:- 14(i). Once the time scale on completion of 16 years service become due and payable to the petitioner w.e.f. 27.01.2002, then, the denial of higher pay scale without giving a prior notice and without giving a personal hearing is violative of the principles of natural justice. 14(ii). As per ACP Scheme-Guidelines dated 15.12.1998 and the New ACP Scheme dated 09.08.2012 issued by the State Government, the 2025:HHC:46545 - 51 - increment or higher grade pay was admissible to an employee by assessing the work and conduct by adopting the same procedure, as applicable in case of promotion. Guidelines indicate that the placement in higher pay scale was akin to promotion and respondents have withheld this benefit due to registration of FIR No.58 of 2000, dated 05.04.2000, but the aforesaid accusation and charge was tried by Learned Special Judge [Forests], Shimla, in which the petitioner was acquitted on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6]. Consequent upon his acquittal on 30.04.2011, the Respondents were bound to consider the case of the petitioner for grant of benefit of proficiency step-up or next higher grade pay on completion of 16 years service as Leading Fireman w.e.f. 27.01.2002, but the inaction of the respondents amounts to penalizing the petitioner by subjecting him to further penalty by not considering and in depriving him of ACP benefits, illegally. 14(iii). On acquittal in criminal case on 30.04.2011 [Annexure P-6], coupled with the fact that the respondents have not initiated any 2025:HHC:46545 - 52 - departmental action against the petitioner, then, on conclusion of the Court proceedings leading to acquittal, respondents were bound to consider and grant the benefits which would have accrued in the normal course. The denial of consideration and the denial of resultant benefits of ACP increment, which is akin to promotion is violative of the mandate of law in Union of India vs K.V. Jankiraman 1991 (4) SCC 109, in the following terms:- “22. This sentence is preceded by the observation that when the employee is completely exonerated on the conclusion of the disciplinary/ court proceedings, that is, when no statutory penalty, including that of censure, is imposed, he is to be given a notional promotion from the date he would have been promoted as determined by the Departmental Promotion Committee. This direction in the Memorandum has also to be read along with the other direction which follows in the next sub- paragraph and which states that if it is found as a result of the proceedings that some blame attaches to the officer then the penalty of censure at least, should be imposed. This direction is in supersession of the earlier instructions which provided that in a case where departmental disciplinary proceedings have been held, "warning" should not be issued as a result of such proceedings. 26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the 2025:HHC:46545 - 53 - Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/ criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz., "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual 2025:HHC:46545 - 54 - promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: "However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so." 32. In this case, no charge-sheet was served on the respondent-employee when the DPC met to consider the respondent's promotion. Yet, the sealed cover procedure was adopted. The Tribunal has rightly directed the authorities to open the sealed cover and if the respondent was found fit for promotion by the DPC, to give him the promotion from the date his immediate junior Shri M. Raja Rao was promoted pursuant to the order dated April 30, 1986. The Tribunal has also directed the authorities to grant to the respondent all the consequential benefits. The Tribunal has further stated in the impugned order that its order would not mean that the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the respondent-employee should not go on. We see no reason to interfere with this order. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.” 14(iv). In backdrop of the above facts the ACP benefit was due on completion of 16 years of service on 27.01.2012, then, despite the acquittal 2025:HHC:46545 - 55 - in the criminal case, the denial of consideration and non-release of higher pay scale, as referred to above, is perverse, illegal when, the grant of ACP or higher pay scale-grade pay was a kin to promotion and since nothing adverse existed, then, the non-grant of ACP benefits due w.e.f. 27.01.2012 or such due date as per the ACP Scheme does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and therefore, the denial is quashed and set aside. MERE PENDENCY OF APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL CANNOT BE BASIS FOR WITHOLDING- NOT RELEASING BENEFITS WHICH WERE WITHELD PRIOR TO ACQUITTAL. 15. Mere pendency of appeal against acquittal can be the basis for denying service benefits [salary of pay and allowances for suspension period upon revocation of suspension and annual increments due in normal course till day; and the ACP benefit on completion of 16 years service from 27.01.2002 in absence of any departmental proceedings against the petitioner, the claim of petitioner for releasing the salary i.e. pay and allowances for suspension period w.e.f. 19.06.2000 till the revocation of suspension 2025:HHC:46545 - 56 - on 02.02.2005 and till reinstatement/joining; and the claim for annual increments w.e.f. June 2000 to 2005 and resultant higher pay on refixation till filing of CWP in 2013 [now CWPOA 1899 of 2019] and thereafter; and the denial of ACPS on completion of 16 years as Leading Fireman w.e.f. 17.01.2012 merely on the plea that an appeal [Criminal Appeal No.41 of 2012] against acquittal is pending before the High Court cannot be the basis for depriving the petitioner of service benefits, for the reasons, firstly, mere pendency of appeal against acquittal cannot be regarded as a continuation of a trial, when, the acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner and secondly, in case, appeal against acquittal is to treated as continuation of the criminal proceedings, then, there would be no end to the litigation; and thirdly, the petitioner who stands acquitted honorably, shall not get legal entitlements including service benefits which accrue to him till the appeals were concluded and fourthly, once acquittal leads to affirmation of 2025:HHC:46545 - 57 - innocence of accused then, it would be unfair, unjust and unreasonable to deny entitlements-legal service benefits due to mere pendency of criminal proceedings /appeal, if any and fifthly, the pendency of criminal appeal cannot be permitted to be the reason for denying admissible service benefits on acquittal, when no departmental proceedings were initiated or were pending in this case; and sixthly, in the event of reversal of acquittal, in pending appeal leading to conviction, the State Authorities are free to take action against an employee or a pensioner, by resorting to Rule 19 of CCS [CCA Rules] or by taking recourse to such other action under the aforesaid Service Rule. Likewise, even in case of a pensioner, State Authorities are not powerless and upon conviction the State Authorities are at liberty to proceed under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules by withdrawing or withholding the Pension or Gratuity or both in part or in full, as the case may be. 15(i). The inaction of the respondents in denying above service benefits, merely due to pendency of 2025:HHC:46545 - 58 - appeal preferred by the State Authorities against the judgment of acquittal, does not conform to the mandate of law passed by Division Bench of this Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Himachal Pradesh and Another (1985) 3 SLR 254 [CWP No.191/1984], reads as under:- “12. It may be recalled in this connection that as a result of the lodgement of the first information, the petitioner was detained in custody and that after investigation, he was put up for trial in two cases before a criminal court. The trial court convicted him but the appellate court acquitted him in both the cases. The orders of acquittal are indubitably under challenge in the High Court. The preferment of acquittal appeals cannot, however, be regarded as the continuance of the trial. The trial shave concluded with the judgment of acquittal. The initial presumption of innocence must, therefore, be regarded as having been doubly reinforced by orders of acquittal passed in favour of the petitioner. Under such circumstances, the continued operation of the order of suspension as from the date of acquittal cannot be regarded as reasonable, fair and just. Merely because the petitioner was, at one point of time detained in custody for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he cannot be kept under suspension perpetually, especially when the allegations on the basis of which he was detained and which ultimately became the subject matter of two trials before the criminal court, are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been not established beyond reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances, in our 2025:HHC:46545 - 59 - opinion, on a rational and just view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is required to be re-instated in service on and with effect from the date of the orders of acquittal. If the acquittal appeals are allowed and the petitioner is convicted, there is nothing to prevent the competent authority from dealing with the petitioner in accordance with law. If, on the other hand, the acquittal appeals fail and a departmental inquiry, if any, is ordered to be instituted on the same charges, it would not be fair and just and reasonable to suspend the petitioner once again in view of the initial presumption of innocence having been reinforced twice over. 13. It would be pertinent, in this connection, to refer to the decision in Corporation of Nagpur City v. Ramachandra. In that case, the order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on September 23, 1974. The order was confirmed by the Corporation on the same day. The suspension was ordered in connection with a departmental inquiry relating to two accidents which occurred during the construction of a stadium which was being looked after by the delinquents and which resulted in the death of seven persons and injuries to eight others. A complaint was also filed before the police as a result of which a charge-sheet under Section 304-A IPC, was filed against the delinquents on September 25, 1976. In view of the chargesheet submitted by the police, another order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner on January 13, 1977 with effect from October 8, 1976. The delinquents filed an unsuccessful appeal to the departmental appellate authority and thereafter moved a writ petition which was allowed and the order of suspension was quashed on the ground that the competent authority to 2025:HHC:46545 - 60 - pass the order of suspension was the Corporation itself and not the Chief Executive Officer, On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Municipal Commissioner was fully competent to suspend the delinquents and that, therefore, the decision rendered in the writ petition was not sustainable. The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to make the following observations : “The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. …… If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted, we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry…………...If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow.” 15. For the foregoing reasons, the respondents are directed to revoke the order of suspension and to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith effect from the date on which the orders of acquittal were recorded by the appellate court in the criminal proceedings instituted against him, that is, November 30, 1981. As regards the treatment of the period actually spent by the petitioner under suspension from May 7, 1976 till November 29, 1981, and 2025:HHC:46545 - 61 - the refixation of his pay and allowances for the said period, the competent authority will make suitable orders in accordance with law and in light of the provisions of F.R. 54. As regards the period commencing from November 30, 1981 till the date of actual reinstatement of the petitioner pursuant the order made hereinabove, the petitioner will be entitled to all the benefits following upon such reinstatement including back wages which shall be adjusted against the suspension allowance already drawn.” 15(ii). While dealing with the issue that an appeal against acquittal, cannot be made the basis for withholding/denying the service benefits has been answered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh In Re: Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, A.P. Hyderabad and Another vs R.S. Ramakrishna Rao and Another, WP Nos. 27607, 27614 and 22929 of 2009, decided on 28.01.2010, in the following terms :- “10. The facts, as narrated above, are not in dispute. In all these cases, the criminal cases filed against the applicants ended in acquittal, against which, criminal appeals were filed and the same are still pending. During pendency of the criminal cases, they were allowed to retire subject to finalization of criminal proceedings and their retirement benefits were withheld. 11. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is as to whether 2025:HHC:46545 - 62 - the applicants are entitled for retirement benefits immediately after the orders of acquittal? 20. Insofar as the criminal cases are concerned, the department has got a right to file an appeal. But, it cannot be said that the judicial proceedings have not been concluded. Once the criminal Court acquits the accused, it must amount to be the conclusion of the judicial proceedings in the first instance. Therefore, the appeals filed against the acquittal orders cannot be treated as continuation of criminal proceedings. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal’s case (supra), referred to above. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as follows: “The submission of Mr. Chakraborty to the effect that pendency of the appeal against acquittal will amount to continuation of the proceedings cannot be accepted. Continuation of the proceedings must relate to investigation, enquiry or trial, and such investigation, enquiry or trial, if any, have come to an end with the judgment of acquittal. The same being continuing in the instant case, is misconceived, only on the ground that an appeal there against is pending. If the respondent No.1 is convicted by the Appeal Court for commission of a criminal offence, sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of the said Rules would be attracted. Keeping in view the fact that different sub- rules of Rules 3 operate in different fields, we are of the opinion that sub- rule (3) of Rule 3 be held to be operative only in the case namely, when an investigation enquiry or trial remains pending and not or when the employee person is acquitted. The situations obtaining under different sub-rule being 2025:HHC:46545 - 63 - absolutely different, in our opinion, sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 must be given a restrictive interpretation”. 21. If the appeal is not in continuation of original criminal proceedings, the order of acquittal is a final order within the ambit of Rule 52 of the Pension Rules, referred to above. After the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal Court, as already stated above, there is no power for the Government to withhold pension or retirement benefits. The said benefits therefore, are liable to be paid immediately after acquittal order. 22. If the appeal or revision proceedings are in continuation of the criminal proceedings, there will be no end for the litigation and the employees, who have been acquitted honourably, shall not get retirement benefits till conclusion of all appeals, revisions, special leave petitions etc. Appeal against acquittal, not being continuation of original criminal proceedings, Rule 52 as above, will not be available to Government for withholding retirement benefits. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in passing the impugned order and we do not see any error committed by the Tribunal warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 15(iii). While dealing with a similar issue as to whether the mere pendency of criminal appeal can be made the basis for denying service benefits to an employee, has been answered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Balak Singh Thakur 2025:HHC:46545 - 64 - vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 2014 SCC OnLine MP 1036, [decided on 23.01.2014], in the following terms :- “Question is whether an appeal against an acquittal can be said to be a continuation of criminal case. Section 2 (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 defines expression “judicial proceedings” “includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.” The definition as apparent is not exhaustive. Therefore, before proceeding can be held to be a judicial proceeding, it must be found that in the course of that proceeding evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. If evidence could not be taken legally on oath it would not judicial proceeding. Furthermore, a criminal proceeding is initiated when a criminal law is set at motion against a person on the basis of an information to the police that a person has committed a cognizable offence leading to an investigation into the accusation against the person and filing of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C whereupon an accused is tried of an offence registered leading to the conviction or the acquittal, as the case may be. With the acquittal the charges of commission of offence gets washed of. A person so acquitted of the charges stand at par with a person who is not being charged and was not subjected to a criminal proceeding. The preferment of a criminal revision or an appeal against an acquittal cannot be regarded as a continuance of the trial and cannot be treated to be pendency of judicial proceeding as the initial presumption of innocence gets reinforced by the orders of acquittal. 2025:HHC:46545 - 65 - The contention, therefore, put forth by the respondents that the filing of revision against the judgment dated 12.12.2000 would tantamount to the pendency of judicial proceeding does not reason with the provisions as they stand under law. In the considered opinion of this Court, after acquittal, which lead to an affirmation of the innocence of the accused, an appeal or revision, as the case may be, being not a continuation of trial, will not amount to a pendency of judicial proceedings. In this context regard can be had of judgment of Division Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Shri Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1985 (3) SLR 254). In view whereof, since with the acquittal of petitioner for an offence under Section 13 (1)(e) and 13(2) of 1988 Act, his suspension which was based on criminal proceedings stands unjustified. The respondents are directed to settle the same within a period of 3 months from the date of communication of this order.” 15(iv). Even the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Madras in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs S. Rajagopal and Another, (2015) 7 MLJ 851 decided on 26.08.2015, while dealing with the issue of as to whether the time bound upgradation scale could be withheld/denied due to pendency of criminal appeal has been answered in the following terms :- “11. Admittedly, Criminal proceedings in 2025:HHC:46545 - 66 - ACB Case No.3/2006 has ended up in acquittal on 31.03.2008, by the learned Special Judge and Presiding Officer of Fast Track Court, Vadodara. On the contention of the writ petitioner that filing of an appeal and pendency in the High Court, is a continuation of the proceedings, disentitling the 1st respondent to receive all consequential benefits, this Court deems it fit to consider the decisions relied on by both the parties. xxx….. xxx…. xxx... 13. In State of West Bengal v. Hari Ramalu reported in 2000 (3) LLN 638, the respondent therein was placed under suspension on 09.09.1994. FIR was registered on 28.08.1994. The question posed before the Hon'ble Division Bench, was that in view of the pendency of the appeal, whether sub-rule (3) of rule of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, would still be applicable. The said rule states that a member of the service in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, inquiry or trial, relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the Government be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge if the charge is connected with his position as a member of the Service or is likely embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. Defining the words "inquiry" and "investigation, under Sections 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and considering Rule 3 of abovesaid Rules, a Hon'ble Division 2025:HHC:46545 - 67 - Bench of Calcutta High Court, at Paragraph 10, held as follows: "Continuation of the proceedings must relate to investigation, enquiry or trial and such investigation, enquiry or trial, if any, have come to an end with the judgment of acquittal. The same being continuing in the instant case is misconceived, only on the ground that an appeal there against is pending. If respondent 1 is convicted by the appeal Court for commission of a criminal offence, sub-rule (4) of rule 3 of the said Rules would be attracted. Keeping in view the fact that different sub-rules of rule 3 operate in different fields, we are of the opinion that sub-rule (3) of rule 3 be held to be operative only in the case namely, when an investigation, enquiry or trial remains pending and not or when the employee person is acquitted. The situations obtaining under different sub-rule being absolutely different, in our opinion, sub-rule (3) of rule 3 must be given a restrictive interpretation." 14. In Chandu Ram v. State of H.P., reported in 2009 SCC Online HP 1303, a corruption case was registered against the petitioner therein before the Special Judge (Forests), Shimla. He was acquitted by the Special Judge, vide judgment delivered on 17.06.2000. Thereafter, he retired on 31.10.2000. Thus, he 2025:HHC:46545 - 68 - was eligbile to be considered for promotion as Deputy Ranger in the year 1992. Even after the acquittal, he was not given gratuity amount. It was the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner therein that after acquittal, he was entitled to get his gratuity, with interest, as per Rule 68 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. He has also pleaded that he was eligible to be promoted as Deputy Ranger, with effect from the date, his immediate juniors were promoted. Following the decision in Shri Surinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1985 (3) SLR 254, the Calcutta High Court allowed the petition and directed the respondents therein to release the gratuity to the petitioner therein with interest, as per Rule 68 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. The respondents therein were further directed to open the sealed cover and in case, the name of the petitioner therein has been recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee for promotion to the post of Deputy Ranger, necessary consequential orders, be passed. xxx… xxx… xxx… 20. Insofar as the criminal cases are concerned, the Department has got a right to file an appeal. But, it cannot be said that the judicial proceedings have not been concluded. Once the criminal court acquits the accused, it must amount to be the conclusion of the judicial proceedings in the first instance. Therefore, the appeals filed against the acquittal orders cannot be treated as 2025:HHC:46545 - 69 - continuation of criminal proceedings. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in STATE OF WEST BENGAL’s case, referred to above. Para 9 of the said judgment reads as follows…. 21. If the appeal is not in continuation of original criminal proceedings, the order of acquittal is a final order within the ambit of Rule 52 of the Pension Rules, referred to above. After the orders of acquittal passed by the criminal court, as already stated above, there is no power for the Government to withhold pension or retirement benefits. The said benefits, therefore, are liable to be paid immediately after acquittal order. 22. If the appeal or revision proceedings are in continuation of the criminal proceedings, there will be no end for the litigation and the employees, who have been acquitted honourably, shall not get retirement benefits till conclusion of all appeals, revisions, special leave petitions etc. Appeal against acquittal, not being continuation of original criminal proceedings, Rule 52 as above, will not be available to Government for withholding retirement benefits. 20. While that be the clear finding recorded in the judgment, acquitting the respondent, under the premise of appeal, being filed and pending, against the order of acquittal, the 1st respondent cannot be deprived of the time bound IDS scale upgradation, endlessly. Disposal of 2025:HHC:46545 - 70 - the appeal may take a long time. The 1st respondent is stated to have retired from service. There is no certainity that the State would be satisfied, even if the appeal in the High Court fails. If the State chooses to prefer a further appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Department may again contend that the appeal is pending before the Apex Court. Thus, if the arguments of the petitioner have to be accepted, then there is no finality to the judgment of acquittal. In the light of the discussion and decisions considered, the further contention of the learned counsel that Vigilance has not given a clearance, cannot be countenanced. 22. Hence, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the petitioner is directed to comply with the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, within a period of two months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.” 15(v). After following the mandate of law in the case of Balak Singh Thakur [supra], the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has reiterated the mandate of law that mere pendency of criminal revision or appeal against acquittal cannot be treated as continuance of trial and cannot form the basis for denying the legal entitlements due 2025:HHC:46545 - 71 - to an employee in Gayaram Singh Rathore vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, CWP No.12953 of 2017, dated 14.03.2018 as under :- “7. The point involved in this case is not more res integra. In Balak Singh Thakur (supra). This Court has opined as under: “The preferment of a criminal revision or an appeal against an acquittal cannot be regarded as a continuance of the trial and cannot be treated to be pendency of judicial proceedings as the initial presumption of innocence gets re- enforced by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh orders of acquittal. The contention, therefore, putforth by the respondents that the filing of revision against the judgment dated 12-12-2000 would tantamount to the pendency of judicial proceedings does not reason with the provisions as they stand under law. In the considered opinion of this Court, after acquittal, which lead to an affirmation of the innocence of the accused, an appeal or revision, as the case may be, being not a continuation of trial, will not amount to a pendency of judicial proceedings.” 9. Considering the aforesaid, the action of respondents in not releasing the retiral dues under the garb of pendency of criminal appeal is disapproved. The respondents are directed to release and settled the retiral dues of the petitioner within 90 days from the date of production of copy of this order.” 15(vi). Further, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Kona Appa Rao vs State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025:HHC:46545 - 72 - 2024 SCC OnLine AP 2730, decided on 02.04.2024 has mandated that unless there is any Rule mandating denial of service benefits, upon filing of an appeal, review or revision against acquittal, then deprivation of salary and other service benefits accruing therefrom, which constitutes property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to an employee in the following terms :- 12. The short issue that falls for consideration in the present W.P. is in regard to the encashment of the earned leave when the Criminal Appeal on conviction is pending and when the disciplinary proceedings on the very same allegations are dropped. It is appropriate to extract Rule 52 of the Rules, 1980 which was cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondents and it reads as under: “Rule 52. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceeding may be pending:- (1) (a) (b) (c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders : Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 9 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Control Classification and Appeal) Rules, 1991, for imposing any of the penalties 2025:HHC:46545 - 73 - specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 9 of the said rules, except the cases falling under sub- rule (2) of Rule 22 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant. Provided further that notwiths- tanding anything contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) above, where a conclusion has been reached that a portion of pension only should be withheld or withdrawn and the retirement gratuity remains unaffected in the contemplated final orders, the retirement gratuity can be released upto 80%.” 13. As relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is relevant to refer to the decision dated 16.02.2022 of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.196 of 2022, captioned as State of Andhra Pradesh v. Miryala Jagannadham, which is an Appeal against the order of learned Single Judge, whereby the action of not releasing the encashment of earned leave amount and 80% of retirement gratuity on the account of pendency of a C.C. before the ACB Court was declared to be illegal. The Division Bench modified the judgment to the extent of gratuity, but upheld the view taken on earned leave encashment. Relevant portion reads thus; “11. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled for leave encashment. To this extent, learned State counsel would not object to the prayer because, according to him, the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in W.P. No. 30443 of 2016 deals with encashment of leave and moreover, clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of 2025:HHC:46545 - 74 - Rule 52 of the Rules, 1980 deals with gratuity and not with leave encashment. 12. For the foregoing discussion, the said part of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge allowing payment of 80% of the retirement gratuity to the writ petitioner is set aside. However, we observe that the writ petitioner is entitled to leave encashment.” 14. It is also relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, wherein the following observations were made: "16. The fact remains that there is an imprimatur to the legal principle that the right to receive pension is recognised as a right in "property". Article 300-A of the Constitution of India reads as under: "300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the question posed by us in the beginning of this judgment becomes too obvious. A person cannot be deprived of this pension without the authority of law, which is the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300-A of the Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative instruction cannot be countenanced. 17. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the executive instructions are not having statutory character and, 2025:HHC:46545 - 75 - therefore, cannot be termed as "law" within the meaning of the aforesaid Article 300-A. On the basis of such a circular, which is not having force of law, the appellant cannot withhold even a part of pension or gratuity. As we noticed above, so far as statutory Rules are concerned, there is no provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation. Had there been any such provision in these Rules, the position would have been different." 15. In the backdrop of the legal position referred to supra, the Petitioner is entitled for earned leave encashment, though the Appeal is pending for consideration before the Appellate Court as there is no Rule stipulating otherwise. In that view of the matter, the impugned Memo dated 27.12.2008 passed by the Respondent No. 1 rejecting the claim of the Petitioner is liable to be interfered with as the due is only relating to payment of earned leave encashment, but not gratuity. 16. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned Memo dated 27.12.2008 passed by the respondent No.1 is hereby set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to settle the encashment of the earned leave of the Petitioner pending before them, which is due and payable to the Petitioner, within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs.” DOUBLE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ON ACQUITTAL NOTWITHSTANDING PENDENCY OF APPEAL 16. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal and the effect of acquittal, the Hon’ble 2025:HHC:46545 - 76 - Supreme Court in Chandrappa and Ors. vs State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, has mandated that acquittal of a person gives rise to double presumption in favour of an accused until proved guilty and such presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court on acquittal in the following terms :- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 2025:HHC:46545 - 77 - (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16(i). This view has further been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Champaben Govindbhai vs Popatbhai Manilal and Others (2009) 13 SCC 662, reinforcing the presumption of innocence, has been outlined, in the following terms:- “14. The counsel for the respondents referred to the decision of this Court in Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka , to put forward the argument that an appellate court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he 2025:HHC:46545 - 78 - is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having been acquitted, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.” While dealing with the issue as to whether mere pendency of an appeal against acquittal can be made the basis for denying the service benefits [balance of pay and allowance for suspension period; annual increments due in normal course; and other service benefits in absence of any departmental or criminal proceedings stands answered by the Division bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., CWP No.7001 of 2020, decided on 28.05.2025, mandating that mere pendency of an appeal against acquittal cannot be made the basis for withholding or denying service benefits, by re- invoking the stigma or accusation, which stands obliterated as a result of acquittal against an employee. Moreover, Learned State Counsel has placed on record a communication dated 04.12.2025, received from the competent authority- Director of Health Services Himachal Pradesh 2025:HHC:46545 - 79 - affirming that the judgment in the case of Ashok Kumar (supra) stands implemented, in terms of communication dated 18.10.2025 in following terms:- “To The Advocate General, State of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla-1. 04/12/2025 Subject:- CWPOA No. 7001/2020- Dr. Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of HP & Ors. Sir, Kindly refer to the telephonic directions as conveyed by Sh. Sumit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, HP on the subject cited above. In this regard, it is submitted that after examination of the matter at Government level in consultation with the Law Department, the Administrative Department (Health) vide its letter No. Health-A-E(3)28/2019 dated 18-10-2025 has conveyed its decision that the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Court is just, proper and well reasoned and therefore may be implemented. Accordingly, the Chief Medical Officer Sirmaur, District Sirmaur, HP, vide endorsement dated 24-10-2025 has been directed to take further necessary action in the matter, copy of letter dated 24-10-2025 is enclosed as FLAG-A. Further as per latest information received from the Chief Medical Officer Sirmour, the annual increments withheld of the petitioner has been granted/release w.e.f. 01-01-2012 to 01-01- 2025 by way of pay fixation vide office order dated 17-11-2025, copy enclosed as FLAG-B. This is for favour of information and further necessary action at your end in the matter, please. Encls: As Above/- Yours faithfully, 2025:HHC:46545 - 80 - Sd/- Jt. Director Health Services, Himachal Pradesh” In these circumstances, service benefits including salary for the suspension period, annual increments and the ACP benefits cannot be denied to the petitioner due to mere pendency of a criminal case, despite his acquittal which was an honourable acquittal. Moreover, once neither any other departmental proceedings nor criminal proceedings have been initiated by the Respondents against the petitioner for relevant period. Even there is no express provision in the Service Rules i.e. the CCS [CCA Rules] or CCS (Pension) Rules or Fundamental Rules providing for denying the admissible and accrued service benefits due to the mere pendency of the criminal appeal against acquittal. In absence of any statutory mandate, the denial or withholding of service benefits to the petitioner is wholly unwarranted and the same cannot be permitted to operate to the prejudice of the petitioner anymore. SERVICE BENEFITS ARE PROPERTY UNDER ARTICLE 300-A OF CONSTITUTION: 2025:HHC:46545 - 81 - 17. This Court proceeds to examine the case of the petitioner from another angle. As per Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. Article 300-A of the Constitution reads as under:- “300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.— No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” In the background of the mandate of Article 300-A, in case of the petitioner, who is an employee of the State Government the service benefits, which entail accrue to an employee in the normal course by way of service benefits in terms of money, constitute the property of the petitioner. Such service benefits, be it salary for the period of suspension and the annual increments due in the normal course and the ACP benefits by way of proficiency step-up or next grade pay are legal entitlements, which fall within the ambit of property of an employee. That being so, the deprivation of such legal entitlements or property 2025:HHC:46545 - 82 - merely due to mere pendency of the criminal appeal against acquittal is without there being any authority of law for the reason that there is no statutory mandate in Service Rules providing for withholding the legal entitlements, merely due to pendency of criminal appeal and thus the State action is wholly arbitrary, illegal, perverse, without authority of law and the same cannot sustain. In these circumstances, the stand so taken by the State Authorities that the benefits cannot be granted/ extended/released till the conclusion of the criminal appeal which is pending against acquittal before the High Court, is arbitrary, perverse and cannot sustain in law. Accordingly, the action of the respondents in withholding or denying the above service benefits, is interdicted by this Court and accordingly quashed and set aside. CONCLUSION 18. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated hereinabove, the instant writ petition is allowed, in the following terms :- 2025:HHC:46545 - 83 - (i) Rejection Orders dated 28.07.2012 [Annexure P-9] denying the service benefits despite honourable acquittal is quashed and set aside; (ii). State Authorities are directed to regularize the suspension period from 19.06.2000 [Annexure P-3] till the revocation of suspension of the petitioner on 02.02.2005 [Annexure P- 4], in accordance with the provisions of Fundamental Rules; (iii) State Authorities shall also release the annual increments for the period of suspension period from 2000 till 2005 i.e. [revocation and rejoining] with all consequential benefits; (iv) State Authorities shall consider the case of the petitioner for release of ACP on completion of 16 years of service on 17.01.2002 as Leading Fireman; and upon consideration and finding the petitioner as fit for ACP; all consequential benefits be released; (v) Benefits as in (ii) to (iv) above including revised retiral benefits be released to the petitioner with all consequential benefits; (vi) Since the criminal appeal is pending, the prayer for interest is left open to be adjudicated, if so desired, thereafter. (vii) Directions contained herein be complied within four weeks from receipt of certified/downloaded copy of 2025:HHC:46545 - 84 - this judgment. (viii) Parties to bear respective costs. In aforesaid terms, the instant writ petition and all pending applications, shall stand disposed of accordingly. (Ranjan Sharma) Judge December 04, 2025 [Shivender]