Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:47636 WP No. 8929 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA WRIT PETITION NO. 8929 OF 2025 (GM-KEB) BETWEEN:
THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (ELE) KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION LIMITED., MAJOR WORKS DEPARTMENT, P.B. ROAD, R. H. BUILDING, SECOND FLOOR, DAVANAGERE - 577 002. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. H V DEVARAJU.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
SRI.SIDDAPA B S/O SRI. BANNIKODA RAMAPPA, PRESENTLY AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, RESIDING AT KOMARANAHALLI VILLAGE, HARIHAR TALUK, DAVANAGERE - 577 530. …RESPONDENT (NOTICE TO RESPONDENT IS SERVED AND REPRESENTED)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COMPENSATION OF RS.
14,00,000/- (RUPEES FOURTEEN LAKHS ONLY) ALONG WITH INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 24 PERCENT PER ANNUM
Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:47636 WP No. 8929 of 2025
FROM THE DATE OF THE DRAWING THE LINE TILL THE DATE OF REALIZATION OF AMOUNT BY THE PETITIONER.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING B-GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner-Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (for short 'the Corporation') calls in question the order passed in Civil Misc.No.81/2021 dated 08.11.2024 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge at Davanagere, (hereinafter referred to as the 'District Judge'), wherein the petition filed by the respondent-claimant under Section 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, (for short 'the Act of 1885') was allowed in part and compensation of Rs.18,948/- along with interest at the rate of 8% was awarded. 2. The petitioner-Corporation has drawn a 66/11 KV High Tension transmission line over the respondent's land. Aggrieved by the meager compensation awarded,
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:47636 WP No. 8929 of 2025
the respondent-claimant filed a petition under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1885. The Trial Court not only awarded compensation but also condoned the delay on the ground that the application was filed within three years, relying on the principles of natural justice. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Though the respondent is duly served with notice, he has chosen to remain absent. 4. It is an admitted fact that the transmission line was drawn and commissioned on 22.09.2014 and the respondent-claimant has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he received compensation on that date, 22.09.2014. The cause of action thus arose on
22.09.2024. 5. The respondent-claimant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act of 1963') for condonation of delay, as the petition
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under Section 16(3) was filed on 04.03.2021, well beyond the statutory period. 6. The Apex Court in the case of KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD, TRIVANDRUM V. T.P. KUNHALIUMMA1, has unequivocally held that while dealing with applications under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1885, for enhancement of compensation, the District Judge acts as a Civil Court and consequently, Article 137 of the Act of 1963 applies. The Apex Court has held in Paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 as under:
"18. The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure.
In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other applications as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words “any other application” under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code
1 (1976) 4 SCC 634
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:47636 WP No. 8929 of 2025
other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period. 19. In the present case, the applications contemplated under Section 16(3) of the Telegraph Act are applications to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate. Applications are contemplated if any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be paid under Section 10 of the Telegraph Act. Section 10 of the Telegraph Act states that the telegraph authority shall pay compensation to all persons interested for any damages sustained by them by reason of exercise of powers mentioned in Section 10 of the Telegraph Act, 1885. Reference may also be made to Section 16(1) which states that if the exercise of powers mentioned in Section 10 in respect of property referred to in clause (d) is resisted or obstructed the District Magistrate may
order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise them. 20. The provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:47636 WP No. 8929 of 2025
payment of compensation payable under Section 10 of the Act indicate that the District Judge acts judicially as a court. Where by statutes matters are referred for determination by a court of record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the court will determine the matters as a court. (See National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General [1913 AC 546 : 82 LJKB 1197 : 29 TLR 637] . In the present case the statute makes the reference to the District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge. Section 16(4) of the Telegraph Act requires payment into the court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again, in Section 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central Legislature means the judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context. In the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest
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that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. The District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a civil court in dealing with applications under Section 16 of the Telegraph Act."
7.
The Apex Court clarified that application under Section 16(3) fall within 'any other application' under Article 137, the District Court acts judicially as a Civil Court and Limitation under Article 137 applies to such proceedings. 8. In the present case, the application filed on 04.03.2021 under Section 16(3) of the Act of 1885, is clearly beyond three years from the date of the cause of action i.e. on 22.09.2014 and is clearly barred by limitation. The District Judge, at paras 15 and 16 of the impugned judgment, has gone to the extent of condoning the delay solely on the ground of principles of natural justice require such condonation, ignoring mandatory application under Section 137 of the Act of 1963. The District Court therefore erred in law in condoning the delay
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and assuming jurisdiction when the petition itself was time-barred. In view of the above, the impugned order warrants interference. 9. Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
ORDER i) The Writ Petition is allowed. ii) The impugned order dated 08.11.2024 passed in Civil Misc.No.81/2021 on the file of II Additional District and Sessions Judge at Davanagere, is hereby set aside and Civil Misc.No.81/2021 is dismissed as barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Sd/- ____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
SMC/ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 43