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2025 DAILYLAW 38971 (JHR)

Sahim Alias Sayeem Hussain v. The State Of Jharkhand And Anr

Cr.Rev./854/2017 · 2025-12-08

Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2025:JHHC:36751 --1-- Criminal Revision No. 854 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI Criminal Revision No. 854 of 2017 ---- Sahim @ Sayeem Hussain, S/o Late Mustaque Hussain, resident of village – Hatu, PO and PS – Bero, District – Ranchi .... Petitioner -- Versus -- 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Kamla Pathak, S/o Late Ramadhar Pathak, R/o Ganga Apartment, 2nd Floor, Morabadi, PO and PS – Morabadi, District – Ranchi .... Opposite Parties ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI --- For the Petitioner :- Mr. Anil Kr. Ganjhu, Advocate For the State :- Mr. Suraj Deo Munda, Advocate For O.P. No.2 :- Mr. Chandrajit Mukherjee, Advocate ---- 19/08.12.2025 Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel appearing for the State and learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No.2. 2. This revision petition has been preferred for setting aside the judgment dated 28.04.2017 passed by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner in Criminal Appeal No.217 of 2015 which was allowed by the learned Court and the opposite party No.2 was acquitted. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ranchi in connection with T.R. No.694 of 2015 arising out of Complaint Case No.2004 of 2012 has been pleased to sentence the opposite party No.2 under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act for one year and pay a fine of Rs.16,00,000/- and further in default of fine convict shall further undergo three months 2025:JHHC:36751 --2-- Criminal Revision No. 854 of 2017 of simple imprisonment. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Court has wrongly acquitted the opposite party No.2. He further submits that stop payment order was issued by the competent authority of the partnership firm namely M/s Sonanchal India Partner which was a partnership firm. He then submits that the learned Trial Court has rightly passed the order of sentence and compensation, however, learned Appellate Court on the erroneous grounds has been pleased to acquit the opposite party No.2. He next submits that once the cheque is dishonoured the opposite party No.2 was liable to pay the compensation. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the State submits that the matter is arising under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No.2 submits that the learned Appellate Court has rightly passed the order and the learned Court has considered the entire exhibits as well as oral evidences of PWs and thereafter has passed the order considering that the said firm was not made accused. He submits in view of that the learned Appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment of learned Trial Court. 7. In view of above argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and opposite party No.2, it transpires that the cheque was issued on behalf of M/s Sonanchal India Partner and it is an admitted position that M/s Sonanchal India Partner was not made an accused. The learned Appellate Court has considered the oral and documentary evidence which has been marked in the case and if the partnership firm was not made accused the learned Court has rightly acquitted the 2025:JHHC:36751 --3-- Criminal Revision No. 854 of 2017 opposite party No.2. 8. This aspect of the matter has been settled in the case of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 wherein at paragraph Nos.58 and 59 it has been held as under :- 58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag- net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [(1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [(1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [(2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery [(1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove. 9. The said ratio has been further followed in other judgments by Hon’ble Supreme Court. There is no illegality in the impugned judgment, 2025:JHHC:36751 --4-- Criminal Revision No. 854 of 2017 as such this criminal revision petition is dismissed. 10. Let the trial court record be sent back to the learned Court concerned forthwith. (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Dated 08.12.2025 Sangam/ Uploaded on