Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 3.8.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 2, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.). It was asserted that ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6), HC Vikram Singh (PW4), Constable Karan Singh (PW1) and HHG Maan Singh were present on patrolling duty at Khehar on 29.3.2009. The accused was found coming towards the police party at about 12.30 PM carrying a container (Ex.P1) in his right hand. He returned after seeing the police and started walking briskly. The police became suspicious that the accused might be possessing illicit liquor and called him to stop, but the accused did not stop. The police apprehended the accused. A brick kiln located in the vicinity was closed, and there was no abadi in the vicinity. Hence, the police could not associate any independent witness. The police inquired about the name of the accused, and he identified himself as Totu. The police checked the container and found that it contained illicit liquor. The police took out a sample of 180 ml for chemical analysis and sealed the sample and container with seal ‘H’. Seal impression (Ex.PX) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to the witness, Vikram Singh after use. Liquor was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). Rukka (Ex.PW6/A) was prepared and sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/B) was registered. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW6/C) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He handed over the case property to HC Bir Singh (PW3), who deposited it in Malkhana. Liquor was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). Rukka (Ex.PW6/A) was prepared and sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/B) was registered. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW6/C) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He handed over the case property to HC Bir Singh (PW3), who deposited it in Malkhana. He handed over the sample to Constable Ranjeet Singh (PW5) on 21.4.2009 with a direction to carry it to CTL, Kandaghat vide RC No. 94/2009. HHC Ranjeet Singh deposited the sample at CTL Kandaghat in a safe condition and handed over the receipt to MHC on his return. The result of the analysis (Ex.PW6/D) was issued, in which it was mentioned that the sample of illicit liquor contained 26.4% proof alcohol. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.), to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Constable Karam Singh (PW1) and LHC Vikram Singh (PW4) are the witnesses to the recovery. HHC Rajinder Singh (PW2) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Bir Singh (PW3) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HHC Ranjeet Singh (PW5) carried the case property to CTL, Kandaghat. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that the witnesses had falsely deposed against him. He did not lead any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the Investigating Officer did not associate any independent witness without any plausible reason. The police party went on patrolling duty to detect crime cases, and it was expected of them to associate independent witnesses with them. The Investigating Officer handed over the receipt to LHC Vikram Singh, who was a police official. Therefore, the possibility of tampering with the case property could not be ruled out. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P. 7. The Investigating Officer handed over the receipt to LHC Vikram Singh, who was a police official. Therefore, the possibility of tampering with the case property could not be ruled out. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner and discarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses due to untenable reasons. Karan Singh (PW1), LHC Vikram Singh (PW4) and ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) categorically stated that the accused was found carrying a container in his right hand, who tried to run away after seeing the police. It was a case of chance recovery, and there was no occasion to associate any independent person. Moreover, the Investigating Officer stated that the brick kiln was closed. The case property was deposited with MHC Bir Singh on the same day and was sent for analysis to CTL, Kandaghat. The seal on the sample was found to be intact. The chain of custody was complete. The report of analysis (Ex.PW6/D) stated that the sample analysed was of the illicit liquor. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Arush Matlotia, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the official witnesses that the accused suddenly appeared before the police and tried to run away. The brick kiln located in the vicinity was closed, and no witness could have been associated. The failure to join an independent witness is not fatal. The integrity of the case property was duly proved, and the failure to produce the sample seal before the Court was not fatal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Arush Matlotia, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution’s evidence proved the existence of abadi in the vicinity. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Arush Matlotia, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution’s evidence proved the existence of abadi in the vicinity. The Investigating Officer failed to associate any independent person from the locality. The seal was not handed over to any independent witness, and the possibility of tampering with the case property cannot be ruled out. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Learned Trial Court held that the police party was proceeding on patrolling duty. Therefore, it was bound to associate independent witnesses with them. This finding is incorrect. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Learned Trial Court held that the police party was proceeding on patrolling duty. Therefore, it was bound to associate independent witnesses with them. This finding is incorrect. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed: “3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence recorded by the prosecution, as also the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty, and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. It has come to the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared would not have lent any further credence to the prosecution’s version.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. Thus, the reason assigned by the learned Trial Court to discard the prosecution’s case is incorrect. 17. The learned Trial Court also held that the seal was handed over to the police official, and the possibility of tampering with the case property could not be ruled out. This is also not correct. It was laid down by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 SCC OnLine P&H 55, that there is no requirement under the Rules or the Act to hand over the seal to an independent person. The Court cannot start with the presumption that the police officials would act dishonestly to tamper with the evidence, and handing over the seal to an independent person would prevent such tampering. It was observed:- “14. The Court cannot start with the presumption that the police officials would act dishonestly to tamper with the evidence, and handing over the seal to an independent person would prevent such tampering. It was observed:- “14. It seems to follow from the above that within this jurisdiction, there is high authority for the proposition that the success or failure of criminal prosecution should not turn wholly on the technicalities of the handing over or non-handing over of the investigative seal or the production or the non-production only of a witness with regard thereto. 15. That the law does not visualise a plethora of seals with every Investigating Officer to be handed over to non- officials after their use and to remain in their custody for an unlimited or unspecified period is otherwise manifest when viewed from another angle as well. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the varied gamut of the statute and the Rules in this context, there is no specific provision that each Investigating Officer must be officially provided with a large number of individual and personal seals, which alone would make it possible for them to comply with the stand taken by the learned counsel. In fact, the admitted stand before us was that even though the relevant instructions do provide for the articles in the Investigating kit of the police officials but herein there is also no requirement of any official seal. It is plain that there is no provision either providing a large number of personal official seals to the Investigating officers or further that these should be handed over to private persons for an unspecified period of time. Therefore, the statutory provisions seem to be a clear pointer to the contrary of what is sought to be advocated on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel. 16. Therefore, the statutory provisions seem to be a clear pointer to the contrary of what is sought to be advocated on behalf of the petitioners by their learned counsel. 16. Now, apart from the absence and indeed the contradictions from the statutory provisions themselves, I am impelled by the under-mentioned four-fold reason (to be elaborated hereinafter) to take the view that the stand taken on behalf of the petitioners is not only counterproductive but, for ought one knows, might well be fraught with public mischief: — i) The basis of the whole argument stems from an inveterate and ingrained suspicion and assumption that responsible police officers would tamper with the seals and forge and fabricate evidence with regard to the case property in their custody. ii) There can be no guarantee that the non-official to whom such a seal is entrusted would be one of unimpeachable integrity, far above a responsible police official amenable to administrative discipline. Consequently, even the handing over of such a seal in no way ensures is not being misused. iii) There can be no warranty that the seal so entrusted to a third person cannot be duplicated. iv) If the police officers are to be entrusted with a plethora of official seals can be no guarantee or possibility that all of them would be beyond duplication and substantially and materially different from each other. 17. What first calls for notice in this context is the fact that the seal used in the course of investigation by responsible police officials would obviously be governmental property, and there is neither a mandate nor any inference for passing them on to private persons. The relevant provisions of Para 22. 16(2) of the Rules is indicative that the whole purpose thereof is that the sealed property should bear the imprint of the seal of a responsible police officer who is enjoined with the safe custody thereof and disposal in accordance with law. In a way, therefore, responsibility is cast on the police officer whose seal has been used that the parcel or the seal does not pass into irresponsible hands. The whole thrust of the provisions seems to be to cast the burden on the responsible police officer for the safe custody of the parcel and case property. In a way, therefore, responsibility is cast on the police officer whose seal has been used that the parcel or the seal does not pass into irresponsible hands. The whole thrust of the provisions seems to be to cast the burden on the responsible police officer for the safe custody of the parcel and case property. To direct, on the contrary, that such a seal should be handed over during the material period to any non-official is something that may absolve the concerned officer of further responsibility without resting the same in law on any other. Such a view would provide no guarantee that the person to whom the seal is entrusted would necessarily be of a higher calibre and integrity. It had to be conceded before us that any third person entrusted with such a seal is under no legal obligation or discipline to keep it under safe custody or not allow it to be passed on into unworthy hands bent upon tampering with the case property. Nor can it be ensured that such a person would not himself become a party to any design or attempt to do so at some stage. In essence the argument on behalf of the petitioner seems to lead to anamolous results in the sense that the handing over of the seal to a third person would absolve the responsible Police official who is within the bounds of discipline and administrative control, and pass it into the hands which are not amenable to any legal or administrative liability and about whose conduct there can be neither any guarantee nor the sanction of punitive action. 18. Again, the argument ab inconvenienti in this context also calls for pointed notice. It was not disputed before us that in a busy police station, worth the name, occasions may arise for sealing property or parcels, etc., to the extent of a hundred times or more within a month. Can it be made the requirement of the law that every time a seal is used for the sealing of a parcel of property, the same should be handed over to a non-official and a fresh or new seal be manufactured for sealing the next parcel or in any case, the property in the succeeding cases. Can it be made the requirement of the law that every time a seal is used for the sealing of a parcel of property, the same should be handed over to a non-official and a fresh or new seal be manufactured for sealing the next parcel or in any case, the property in the succeeding cases. It’s a police official who has once used the seal and handed it over to a third person, then was barred from proceeding with the investigation and sealing the case property or the samples thereof till he manufactured another seal for the said purpose? Where is the guarantee that the new seal made would not be identical or similar and thus totally distinguishable from the first one? By what method can it possibly be ensured that the hundreds of seals that may become necessary in this context would be so individually distinguishable from each other in order to prevent any similarity in the imprints on the sealing wax for detecting any alleged tampering with the sealed samples? It appears to me that accepting the stance taken on behalf of the petitioner may well hamstring the responsible police officer from continuing with the investigation and official functions, and in the ultimate analysis, lead to no meaningful results worth the name for ensuring the purity of the investigation. 19. Equally, then, I am unable to see how the mere handing over of a seal to a third person by the Investigating Officer would in any way ensure or guarantee against tampering. It appears to me that the whole argument herein stems from an inveterate and deeply ingrained mistrust of public officials, which is sought to be elongated to the length of criminality. This approach has been repeatedly disapproved and dispelled by the final Court. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra Chandrasekhara Alyar, J., has observed as follows:— “The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration.” 20. In the light of the aforesaid observations. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration.” 20. In the light of the aforesaid observations. Beg, J. speaking for the Court in Nathu Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1974) 3 SCC 584 : AIR 1973 SC 2783 , held as follows:— “*** The fact that the two witnesses called from amongst the members of the public, namely, Ragunath Singh (P. W. 1) and Gambhirsingh Tomar (P. W. 2), had turned hostile was considered by the High Court and the Courts below. They had held that the two prosecution witnesses who had turned hostile could not be relied upon. Their evidence could not destroy the prosecution’s case is fully supported by Mahadevasingh (PW 5) and Umashankar (PW 5), who are police officers. The mere fact that they are police officers was not enough to discard their evidence. No reason was shown for their hostility to the appellant.” 21. In view of the aforesaid authoritative enunciation, how can one presume that the responsible police officials would act criminally in breaking open the sealed parcel and resealing the same to forge or tamper with crucial evidence? Again, how can it be assumed that any and every non-official necessarily would be of greater integrity than these public officials? However, what is significant is that if it were once presumed that the responsible police officer is determined to tamper with the case property, then how can this be prevented by the mere subterfuge of handing over the seal to a third person? The enigmatic question that who will guard the guards thus arises. If the responsible police official were to be so criminally minded, he could easily hand over the seal to a convenient or subservient person. In fact, doing so would absolve him from further responsibility, whilst he can always take the seal back from such a person and, after misusing it, return the same to him. What guarantee can there be that such a third person himself may not be liable to subversion by anyone determined or intent on forging and tampering with the case property. It is indeed unfortunate that occasions have arisen where police officials entrusted with the enforcement and custodianship of the law and order have deviated from their duty. What guarantee can there be that such a third person himself may not be liable to subversion by anyone determined or intent on forging and tampering with the case property. It is indeed unfortunate that occasions have arisen where police officials entrusted with the enforcement and custodianship of the law and order have deviated from their duty. I am second to none in condemning such a serious and grievous default. Yet it is a far cry therefrom to infer an inveterate and inbuilt suspicion that every responsible police official entrusted with case property would forge, fabricate and tamper therewith.” 18. The ultimate conclusion of the Full Bench was explained as under: - “34. Therefore, in the ultima ratio trials ordinarily turn and must continue to do so on the credibility and acceptability of the evidence on record, I am unable to hold that a criminal trial would succeed or fail merely on the technicality of the delivery of an investigating seal to a third person or the latter's refusal or inability to appear as a witness about the same. It is more so in the admitted position that there is no statutory requirement whatsoever to this effect. It has been authoritatively said, though in the realm of contracts under seal, that there is no magic in water. Perhaps it may be said in the present context also that there is no magic in the wax for sealing samples or the custody of seals used therefor. 35. To conclude, it must be held that there is neither a statutory requirement nor “a precedential mandate for handing over the seal used by the police officer in the course of an investigation to a third person forthwith. It necessarily follows therefrom that even where it has been so done, the non-production of such a witness cannot by itself affect the merits of the trial.” 19. This judgment was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600. Therefore, the reasons for acquittal assigned by the learned Trial Court are contrary to the settled position of law and not sustainable. This judgment was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600. Therefore, the reasons for acquittal assigned by the learned Trial Court are contrary to the settled position of law and not sustainable. The learned Trial Court failed to notice the binding precedents of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the persuasive precedent of the Punjab & Haryana High Court noticed above and reached a conclusion which it would not have reached had the correct position of law been brought to its notice. 20. Mr Arush Matlotia, learned counsel for the respondent-accused, submitted that the evidence on record supports the ultimate conclusion of the learned Trial Court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was found in possession of liquor and he could not produce any permit for its possession. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the evidence to appreciate these submissions. 21. Constable Karan Singh (PW1) stated that he and HC Ramesh Kumar were present near PSS Brick Kiln, at about 12.30 pm. The accused came towards the police party carrying a white container in his right hand. He tried to return after seeing the police. The police apprehended him, checked the container and found illicit liquor in the container. The place was lonely and deserted, and no independent witness could be associated. The police obtained a sample and sealed the sample and container with seal ‘H’. He identified the container in the Court. He stated in his cross-examination that one police official was sent to call an independent witness. He admitted that Panchayat Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, etc., reside in the village. The police remained on the spot for 30-45 minutes. He denied that no recovery was effected from the accused, and a false case was made against him. 22. LHC Vikram Singh (PW4) stated that he was accompanying Hoshiar Singh on 29.3.2009 for patrolling. When they reached Khehar, they saw the accused carrying a white container in his right hand, who tried to run away after seeing the police. The police apprehended him, checked the container, and found 5 litres of illicit liquor. The accused revealed his name as Totu. When they reached Khehar, they saw the accused carrying a white container in his right hand, who tried to run away after seeing the police. The police apprehended him, checked the container, and found 5 litres of illicit liquor. The accused revealed his name as Totu. The police obtained a sample and sealed the container and the sample with seal ‘H’. A sample seal was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the liquor was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.PW1/A). He identified the container, the seal and the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that the brick kiln was closed. No police official was sent to call an independent witness like Pradhan, Numberdar or Member, etc. He denied that a false case was made against the accused because the accused belongs to the Sansi community. 23. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) stated that he, Vikram Singh, Karan Singh and Maan Singh were patrolling near Khehar. They saw the accused carrying a container in his right hand at about 12.30 PM. He tried to run towards the fields after seeing the police. The police apprehended him. No independent witness was available, and the brick kiln was closed. The accused identified himself as Totu. The police checked the container and found illicit liquor in it. The police obtained one sample and sealed the container and the sample with seal ‘H’. Seal impression (Ex. PX) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The liquor was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. Rukka (Ex.PW6/A) was prepared and sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW6/B) was registered. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW6/C) and handed over the case property, sample and the sample seal to MHC. He identified the container and the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that they started from Police Post Rehan at 10.30 AM. An entry regarding their departure was recorded. No independent witness was associated. 1500-2000 people reside within the jurisdiction of the Khehar Panchayat. He had not sent any person to call any independent witness. He denied that a false case was made against the accused. 24. These are the statements of the witnesses to the recovery. An entry regarding their departure was recorded. No independent witness was associated. 1500-2000 people reside within the jurisdiction of the Khehar Panchayat. He had not sent any person to call any independent witness. He denied that a false case was made against the accused. 24. These are the statements of the witnesses to the recovery. It was suggested to these witnesses that the accused was falsely implicated because he belongs to the Sansi community; however, no reason was assigned as to why a person belonging to the Sansi community should have been falsely implicated. Nothing was suggested to the police officials that they had any enmity with the Sansi community. The accused also did not state in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had any enmity with the police. Thus, the police had no reason to falsely implicate the accused, and the testimonies of police officials cannot be discarded without any reason. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed: “11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony of the police official, which, if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer, even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the credibility of the prosecution’s case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 25. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.” 25. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State, AIR 2003 S.C. 3011 , wherein it was held: “The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and there is no principle of law that, without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed: 22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588 after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [ 1988 Supp SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [ (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 6 SCC 595 : AIR 2013 SCW 3102 ] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large shows its disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. Ordinarily, the public at large shows its disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the police Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that the quality of the evidence outweighs the quantity of evidence. 23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 674 , this court held that: — “23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence.” 24. We must note that in the former it was observed: — “21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.” 25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. The correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”, which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.” 27. Thus, the testimonies of police officials have to be accepted as correct. 28. It was submitted that there is a major contradiction in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Constable Karan Singh (PW1) stated in his cross-examination that the Investigating Officer sent one police official to call an independent person, whereas Hoshiar Singh (PW6) specifically stated that he had not sent any police official to call the independent person. It was submitted that this material contradiction makes the prosecution’s case suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The incident occurred on 29.3.2009. Witness Karan Singh (PW1) made a statement on 16.4.2010, and ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) made a statement on 16.4.2011 after the lapse of one year and two years, respectively. Therefore, contradictions were bound to come due to failure of memory with the passage of time, and it is not permissible to discard the prosecution case based on the minor contradictions regarding the sending of a police official to call the independent witnesses. This is a contradiction regarding the detail not connected to the recovery, which could not be used to discard the prosecution’s version. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096: ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )” 29. It was submitted that ASI Hoshiar Singh admitted in his cross-examination that the Khehar Panchayat had a population of 1500-2000, and no witness was called from the Panchayat. The police officials could have visited the Gram Panchayat to call an independent person. The failure to do so will vitiate the prosecution’s case. This submission is only stated to be rejected. The testimonies of police officials clearly show that the accused appeared before the police suddenly. He tried to run away after seeing the police, which created suspicion. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the police officials that they had prior information about the transportation of the liquor by the accused. Therefore, it was a case of chance recovery. 30. The testimonies of police officials clearly show that the accused appeared before the police suddenly. He tried to run away after seeing the police, which created suspicion. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the police officials that they had prior information about the transportation of the liquor by the accused. Therefore, it was a case of chance recovery. 30. The term chance recovery was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Sunil Kumar, (2014) 4 SCC 780 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 449: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 205, and it was held that chance recovery means a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. When the police were not looking for the contraband nor expected to find the contraband, any recovery is a chance recovery. It was observed at page 784: “13. The expression “chance recovery” has not been defined anywhere, and its plain and simple meaning seems to be a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. In Mohinder Kumar v. State [ (1998) 8 SCC 655 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 79], this Court considered a chance recovery as one when a police officer “stumbles on” narcotic drugs when he makes a search. In Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 13 SCC 608 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 508], the police officer, while searching for illicit liquor, accidentally found some charas. This was treated as a “chance recovery”. 14. Applying this to the facts of the present appeal, it is clear that the police officers were looking for passengers who were travelling ticketless and nothing more. They accidentally or unexpectedly came across drugs carried by a passenger. This can only be described as a recovery by chance since they were neither looking for drugs nor expecting to find drugs carried by anybody. 15. It is not possible to accept the view of the High Court that since the police officers conducted a random search and had a “positive suspicion” that Sunil Kumar was carrying contraband, the recovery of charas from his person was not a chance recovery. The recovery of contraband may not have been unexpected, but the recovery of charas certainly was unexpected, notwithstanding the submission that drugs are easily available in the Chamba area. The recovery of contraband may not have been unexpected, but the recovery of charas certainly was unexpected, notwithstanding the submission that drugs are easily available in the Chamba area. The police officers had no reason to believe that Sunil Kumar was carrying any drugs, and indeed, that is also not the case set up in this appeal. It was plainly a chance or accidental, or unexpected recovery of charas—Sunil Kumar could well have been carrying any other contraband, such as smuggled gold, stolen property or an illegal firearm or even some other drug. 31. In the present case, the police apprehended the accused based on his conduct. Once the accused was apprehended, it was useless to associate with any independent witness because he could have witnessed the possession of the container by the accused. 32. In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this Court in Chet Ram Vs. State, Criminal Appeal no. 151/2006, decided on 25.7.2018, that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed:- “(A) appellant was intercepted, and a search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any prior information, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched, and Charas was recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any need to associate any person from the nearby village because there was nothing left to be witnessed. It is by now well settled that non-association of independent witnesses or non-support of the prosecution version by independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself, is not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinise the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed at page 566: (C) Need for independent witnesses 19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC 201 , para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which, if found reliable, can form the basis of a successful conviction.” 34. This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein it was observed at page 633: “12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement, and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420]]. 13. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement, and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420]]. 13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767], while considering somewhat similar submission of non-examination of independent witnesses, while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under: (SCC p. 568) “15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191], relied on by the counsel for the respondent State, also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved merely on account of their official status. 16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 248], it was held as under: (SCC p. 655) ‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.” 35. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh &Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it was held: - “3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it was held: - “3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon the titled Krishan Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531 3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.” 36. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it was held at page 204: - “17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent witnesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the accused was found suspicious, and a chance recovery from the vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of the courts do not call for interference.” 37. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825, wherein it was observed: 16. As regards non-association of the independent witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the independent witnesses or non-support of the prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a ground for acquittal of the Appellants/accused. It is also well-settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses, including police officials, carry the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. The only difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be a material and not a trivial one, which alone would assume significance. 17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery; therefore, the police party was under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. Xxxx 19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345, wherein it was observed as under: — “24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The factual situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at some distance, who got perplexed and started walking back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been apprehended immediately, the police could have lost the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of independent witnesses could be there when such witnesses were immediately available or had already been associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not mandatory conditions and will always depend on the factual situation of each and every case. The reason is that once the person is apprehended and is with the police, a subsequent association of independent witnesses may not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.” Xxxx 22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.” Xxxx 22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024.” 38. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal, and the prosecution's case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses. However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinise the testimonies of the police officials. 39. Even if the testimonies of police officials are examined with due care and caution, there is nothing in those testimonies to show that they were making false statements or had any motive to depose against the accused. Nothing was suggested to this effect to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, the testimonies of the police officials are accepted as correct, and it is held that the accused was found in possession of a plastic container. 40. ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) stated that he handed over the case property to MHC. HC Bir Singh (PW3) stated that ASI Hoshiar Singh (PW6) handed over the case property, sample seal and sample to him. He deposited them in Malkhana and handed them over to Constable Ranjeet Singh with a direction to carry them to the Police Station. The case property remained intact till it was in his custody. This witness was not cross-examined, which means that the defence does not dispute his testimony. 41. HHC Ranjeet Singh (PW5) corroborated his version and stated that MHC Bir Singh (PW3) handed over a sample with a direction to carry it to SFSL, Junga vide R.C. No.94/09. He deposited it in a safe condition on 22.04.2009 and handed over the receipt to MHC. The case property remained intact till it was in his custody. He was also not cross-examined. Therefore, his testimony is deemed to be accepted as correct. 42. The testimonies of these witnesses are corroborated by the report of analysis (Ext.PW6/D), in which it was mentioned that a sample and a sample seal were received in FIR No.110/2009 on 22.04.2009 through Constable Ranjeet Singh. The seals on the sample were found intact and unbroken, which matched with seal impression sent separately. 42. The testimonies of these witnesses are corroborated by the report of analysis (Ext.PW6/D), in which it was mentioned that a sample and a sample seal were received in FIR No.110/2009 on 22.04.2009 through Constable Ranjeet Singh. The seals on the sample were found intact and unbroken, which matched with seal impression sent separately. The result of the analysis showed that the sample of illicit liquor contained 26.4% proof alcohol. 43. The certificate issued by the Chemical Examiner stating that the seals were intact and were compared with the specimen seal sent separately establishes the integrity of the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P. 2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent, tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 44. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557 , wherein it was held: “It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 45. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402 , the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 46. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: - “10. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 46. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was held: - “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar, till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. Therefore, the integrity of the case property is duly established in the present case. 48. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. Therefore, the integrity of the case property is duly established in the present case. 48. The result of the analysis showed that the sample of liquor contained 26.4 % proof alcohol. Section 3 (14) of the Punjab Excise Act defines liquor as intoxicating liquor and includes all liquids containing alcohol or any other substance which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be liquor. Therefore, it is apparent that every substance containing alcohol falls within the definition of liquor. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Meakin Ltd. v. Excise & Taxation Commr., (1997) 2 SCC 193 at page 195 that Section 3(14) of the Act defines the liquor, including all liquids consisting of containing alcohol. It was observed:- 2. With a view to appreciating the correctness of the view taken and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Chapter I, Section 3 of the Act defines various words and phrases in the Act. Section 3(1) defines “beer” to include ale, porter, stout, and all other fermented liquors made from malt. “Liquor” has been defined under Section 3(14) of the Act to mean “intoxicating liquor and includes all liquid consisting of or containing alcohol; also, any substance which the State Government may by notification declare, to be liquor for the purpose of this Act”. “Excisable article” has been defined in Section 3(6) to mean any alcoholic liquor for human consumption, or any intoxicating drug. “Excise duty” and “countervailing duty” as defined in Section 3(6-b) would mean any such excise duty or countervailing duty, as the case may be, as is mentioned in Entry 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. “Intoxicant” under Section 3(12-a) means any liquor or intoxicating drug as has been defined in Section 3(16) to include every process, whether natural or artificial, by which any intoxicant is produced or prepared, and also re-distillation, and every process for the rectification, reduction, flavouring, blending or colouring of liquor. “Place” has been defined under Section 3(17) to include a building, shop, tent and closure, booth, vehicle, vessel, boat and raft. “Spirit” has been defined in Section 3(19) to mean any liquor containing alcohol obtained by distillation, whether denatured or not. “Place” has been defined under Section 3(17) to include a building, shop, tent and closure, booth, vehicle, vessel, boat and raft. “Spirit” has been defined in Section 3(19) to mean any liquor containing alcohol obtained by distillation, whether denatured or not. Section 31 of the Act is the charging provision which envisages that an excise duty, or a countervailing duty, as the case may be, at such rate or rates as the State Government shall direct, may be imposed, either generally or for any specified local area, on any excisable article. Section 23 of the Act prescribes removal of the excisable article from the distillery, brewery etc. and provides that no intoxicant shall be removed from any distillery, brewery, warehouse, or other place of storage established, or licensed under the Act, unless the duty, if any, payable under Chapter V has been paid or a bond has been executed for the payment thereof. Chapter V deals with the levy of duties and fees; the details of which are not material for the purpose of this case. As stated earlier, in this case, the levy of excise duty was sought to be made at the stage when the manufacturing of the beer was at the wort stage. The question is whether the levy of excise duty on beer when it was in the process of manufacture is correct? The levy of excise duty is on alcoholic liquor for human consumption, manufacture or production. At what stage beer is exigible to duty is the question. The process of manufacturing beer is described as under: “The first stage brewing process is the feeding of malt and adjuncts into a vessel known as the Mash Tun. There it is mixed with hot water and maintained at a certain temperature. The objective of this process is to convert the starches of the malt into fermentable sugar. The extract is drawn from the Mash Tin and boiled with the addition of hops for one to two hours, after which it is centrifuged, cooled and received in the receiving Vats. At this stage, it is called ‘Wort’ and contains only fermentable sugars and no alcohol. After this, it is transferred to the fermentation tanks where yeast is added and primary fermentation is carried out at a controlled temperature. At this stage, it is called ‘Wort’ and contains only fermentable sugars and no alcohol. After this, it is transferred to the fermentation tanks where yeast is added and primary fermentation is carried out at a controlled temperature. After attenuation (Diminution of density of ‘Wort’ resulting from its fermentation) is reached, for fermented wort is centrifuged and transferred to the storage vats for secondary fermentation. After secondary fermentation is over in the storage vats, it is filtered twice-first through the rough filter press and then through the fine filter press and received in the bottling tanks. It is in bottling tanks that the loss of carbon dioxide gas is made up, and bulk beer is drawn for bottling. It is filled into the bottles, and then the last process of pasteurisation is carried out to make it ready for packing and marketing. Till the liquor is removed from the vats and undergoes the fermentation process as mentioned above, the presence of alcohol is nil.” 6. It is, thus, clear that the range of potable alcohol varies between country spirit to whisky and the ethyl alcohol. The alcoholic strength of each excisable article and its percentage varies as per the ISI specifications, but intoxicating liquor necessarily means only that liquor which was consumable by human beings as it was. The state of levying excise duty upon alcoholic liquor arises when an excisable article is brought to the stage of human consumption with the requisite alcoholic strength thereof. It is only the final product which is relevant.” 49. Therefore, the plastic container containing 25.2% proof alcohol will fall within the definition of liquor. 50. Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.) punishes a person who possesses any intoxicant, which, as per Section 3(12)(a), means liquor or intoxicating drug. It was laid down by this Court in Mahajan v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 88, that as per the notification issued by the State Government, the limit of transportation is two bottles of country liquor, each of capacity 7.50 ml. It was observed:- 9. In exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 5 and 58 of the Punjab Excise Act, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, on 29-3-1985 issued an order bearing No. EXN. It was observed:- 9. In exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 5 and 58 of the Punjab Excise Act, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, on 29-3-1985 issued an order bearing No. EXN. F(1)-4/76 published in Himachal Rajpatra (Extra-ordinary) on 30- 3-1985 prescribing the limit for possession of Indian made foreign spirit (for short, IMFS) in respect of the areas/territories comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966. This order was issued by way of amendment of O. 2 of Himachal Pradesh Intoxicants Licence and Sale Orders, 1965. The relevant order reads:— “2-A. Limit for retail possession: The following are the maximum quantities of intoxicants which can be sold in each transaction in retail sale under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, in the said area:— (1) Foreign spirit Two bottles each of the capacity of 750 ml. (2) Beer whether imported or made in India. Twelve bottles each of the capacity of 650 ml of Ciders. (3) Cider (liquor manufactured by fermentation of juice of any fruit) whether imported or made in India. Six-quart bottles. (4) Country liquor Two bottles each of the capacity of 750 ml. (5) Country fermented liquor. Six-quart bottles. (6) Bhang 100 grams. (7) Rectified spirit One Pint of 375 ml (8) Denatured spirit One bottle of 650 ml. Note. — The limit of transportation mentioned in Items Nos. (1) and (2) above shall be alternative with the limit mentioned at Item No. (4): Provided that a person may, for bona fide consumption by him, the members of his family, or his guests, purchase, transport and possess foreign spirit up to 12 bottles of the capacity of 750 ml. each inclusive of imported spirit and 36 bottles of the capacity of 650 ml. each of Beer on the authority of a permit in Form L-50 granted by the Excise Officer, holding the charge of the District, on payment of a permit fee according to the following scale for a financial year or part thereof:— Quantity Permit Fee Exceeding six bottles of IMFS of 750 ml. each and 12 bottles of 650 ml. each of Beer but not exceeding 12 bottles of IMFS and 36 bottles of Beer. Fifty rupees only. Note:— The possession limit by one family living in a separate and distinct premises will be six bottles of IMFS of 750 ml. each and 24 bottles of Beer of 650 ml. each at one time. each of Beer but not exceeding 12 bottles of IMFS and 36 bottles of Beer. Fifty rupees only. Note:— The possession limit by one family living in a separate and distinct premises will be six bottles of IMFS of 750 ml. each and 24 bottles of Beer of 650 ml. each at one time. Imported liquor will be considered as part of the stocks of IMFS, and bottles of foreign liquor, which may be of one litre or two litres, will be converted, for this purpose, to the limits prescribed for IMFS in 750 ml. bottles: Provided further that in case of possession and purchase of denatured spirit for industrial purposes, a permit may be obtained from the Excise Officers of the 1st Class as declared by the State Government.” 51. In the present case, the accused was found transporting 5 litres of liquor, which is more than two bottles.Hence, he violated Section 61 (1) (a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P). 52. The prosecution proceeded on the basis that the liquor was illicit. The report of analysis shows that the sample of illicit liquor contained 26.4 per cent proof alcohol. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State v. Bikar Singh, 1965 SCC OnLine Punj 146: PLR (1965) 67 P&H 1044 that the prosecution is required to establish that the constitution of the liquor found in possession of the accused was different from that of spirits distilled in Punjab distillery to prove that it was an illicit liquor. It was observed: “3. In the State appeal against Garib Diss (No. ??? of 1963), the learned Sessions Judge made a reference to the Chemical examination, and he was specifically asked to state if he could say that the sample sent to him was “illicit in reference to spirits distilled in other States of India under a licence by the Government.” The reply received from the Chemical Examiner was to the effect that he was not in a position to examine the sample on the footing mentioned by the learned Sessions Judge or to hold that the same was illicit in reference to spirits manufactured in other States. The point taken in all these appeals on behalf of the State was that once the prosecution established that the constitution of the liquor found in possession of he accused was different from that of spirits distilled in the Punjab distilleries, the burden shifted to the accused to establish that the same was illicit with reference to spirits legally manufactured by any distillery in India or with reference to spirits allowed to be imported from outside the country. I am afraid there is no warrant for this. Possession of one bottle of liquor is permissible, and if it is the case for prosecution that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, because the liquor was of unauthorised origin, the burden lies entirely on the prosecution to establish it. It is too much to ask the accused, who is in possession of one bottle of liquor, to get evidence from all over the country, and even from outside, to establish that the liquor conforms to the standards of any spirits from any authorised source. In fact, I consider it an utter waste of time of the enforcement staff, the investigating agency and the judicial courts in launching proceedings for recovery of liquor not exceeding one bottle. It would be better if the enforcement staff concentrated on illicit distillation, or the sale of illicit liquor, or its possession in large quantities. 4. In any case, I am definitely of the view that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution to establish that the liquor recovered is of illicit origin vis-à-vis the spirits manufactured by any authorised distillery in this country or of any other distillery import of which is permitted.” 53. This position was reiterated in Ram Singh v. State of Haryana, 1987, SCC Online P&H 368, wherein it was observed: “8. Bladder recovered contained liquor, which was poured into 14 bottles. As per the Chemical Examiner, the liquor had a composition different from the one manufactured in the distilleries of Haryana in respect of the ingredients noted therein. There is no evidence that in Haryana, only liquor having a composition manufactured in the distilleries of Haryana, with respect to the ingredients noted, is sold. In the absence of such evidence, the possibility of the liquor seized having a composition as manufactured at a place outside Haryana cannot be ruled out. There is no evidence that in Haryana, only liquor having a composition manufactured in the distilleries of Haryana, with respect to the ingredients noted, is sold. In the absence of such evidence, the possibility of the liquor seized having a composition as manufactured at a place outside Haryana cannot be ruled out. Thus, the liquor cannot be said to be of an illicit nature. Even if it were licit liquor, a conviction sentence, of course, could be based on possession of more than the requisite quantity.” 54. Even proviso 3(iii) to Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act provides that in case of country liquor manufactured otherwise in a licensed distillery, the imprisonment shall not be less than six months. Therefore, the burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the liquor was manufactured otherwise than in a licensed distillery. There is no evidence of this fact. The report of the chemical examiner does not say that the constitution of the liquor found in possession of the accused was different from the liquor manufactured in the licensed distillery. Thus, the liquor is not proved to be illicit, and the accused cannot be convicted of possessing illicit liquor but can only be convicted of possessing liquor in excess of the retail sale. 55. No other point was urged. 56. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the accused is convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act (as applicable to the State of H.P.). 57. Let accused be produced for hearing him on quantum of sentence on 4th November, 2025.