- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION No. 15257 OF 2024 (S-KSAT) BETWEEN: 1. THE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, M.S. BUILDING, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU - 560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR. …PETITIONER (BY SRI MALLIKARJUN REDDY K.S., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SRI SIDDARAJU S., S/O. LATE SIDDAIAH, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS O/O. ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, PROJECT SUB-DIVISION, PRE DEPARTMENT, K.R. NAGAR, MYSURU DISTRICT - 571 602. R/A D.No.864, FIRST FLOOR, PRARTHAN MANDIRA APARTMENT, Digitally signed by VALLI MARIMUTHU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 KUVEMPU NAGAR, MYSURU - 570 001. 2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PANCHAYATH RAJ DEPARTMENT, VIKAS SOUDA, BENGALURU - 560 001. 3. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ZILLA PANCHAYATH, MYSURU - 570 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI REUBEN JACOB, AAG A/W SRI B. RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 04.02.2021 PASSED BY THE KSAT AT BENGALURU IN A.No-363 AND 496/2019 AS PER ANNEXURE-B. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 ORAL ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. ARAVIND) Heard Sri K.S. Mallikarjun Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Reuben Jacob, learned Additional Government Advocate, along with Sri B. Ravindranath, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing for respondent No.2. 2. The Karnataka Lokayukta has filed this writ petition challenging the order in Application Nos.363 & 496 of 2019, dated 04.02.2021, passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'). 3. Respondent No.1 served as Assistant Engineer, PRE Sub-Division, T. Narasipura Sub-Division, Mysuru District, from July 2010 to June 2014. A complaint dated 08.12.2014 was filed against respondent No.1 alleging substandard work and payment of bogus/fake bills in the names of contractors, thereby causing loss to the Government. The petitioner submitted a report under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (hereinafter 'the Act') on 10.08.2018, recommending the recovery of a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 pecuniary loss. Respondent No. 2 entrusted the enquiry to the petitioner under Rule 14-A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter 'the CCA Rules') on 27.10.2018. The enquiry officer was appointed on 19.12.2018. 3.1 The order of entrustment and the Articles of Charge dated 19.12.2018 were challenged before the Tribunal. Respondent No. 1 also challenged the order dated 05.12.2018 directing the recovery of a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. The Tribunal, in the impugned order, held that respondent No.2 had not independently applied its mind to the investigation report submitted by the petitioner-Institution. Accordingly, the matter was remitted to the State, for fresh consideration of the report under Section 12(3) of the Act. The fresh consideration was directed to be completed within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The petitioner-institution has filed the present petition against the said order of re- consideration. 4. Sri K.S. Mallikarjun Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the report under - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 Section 12(3) of the Act was comprehensive and that the decision under Section 12(4) of the Act was rendered after due application of mind and careful consideration of the material on record. He contends that, in remitting the matter for fresh consideration, the Tribunal committed an error. 5. Sri Reuben Jacob, learned Additional Advocate General, along with Sri B. Ravindranath, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing for respondent No.2, supports the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. In response to the directions issued by this Court on earlier dates, regarding the non-implementation of the order of the Tribunal, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that, in view of the contemplated filing of the writ petition by the Karnataka Lokayukta, the order of the Tribunal was not given effect to. The learned Additional Advocate General has filed a memo dated 24.09.2025, along with the Government Order dated 22.09.2025. 7. On consideration of the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, we notice two aspects in the present - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 writ petition. Firstly, there is the question of delay in filing the writ petition by the petitioner. The impugned order is dated 04.02.2021, whereas the writ petition was filed on 07.06.2024, that is, nearly three and a half years thereafter. The pleadings in the writ petition do not offer any explanation for the delay. Even when queried, the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to provide any justifiable reason for the delay. While there is no specific limitation prescribed for filing a writ petition, the right to do so must be exercised within a reasonable time. The principle of reasonable time applies equally to an institution such as the petitioner; there can be no different standard in assessing what constitutes reasonable time in such cases. 7.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and Others (2024 SCC OnLine Sc 551) has considered the question of delay in approaching High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and at paragraphs 9 to 13, which reads as follows: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect: “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]). 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated: “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 8. In view of the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which we have consistently followed in similarly situated cases, we are constrained to hold that the writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 8.1 Further, the Tribunal set aside the order of entrustment under Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules on the ground of non-application of mind by the State. If the State had any grievance, it had the right to challenge the same. Undisputedly, the State has chosen not to challenge the order of remand by the Tribunal. When the order of the State is quashed and remitted for fresh consideration by the Tribunal, the grievance raised by the petitioner-Lokayukta becomes of little consequence. The moot question that arises is whether the Lokayukta is entitled to challenge an order of such nature, which pertains to a jurisdictional matter. 9. The Tribunal has passed a common order in respect of two DGOs. A similar writ petition was filed by the petitioner herein, challenging the order of the Tribunal, in Writ Petition No.15136 of 2024. This Court, by order dated 10.06.2025, - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 dismissed the said writ petition. For this reason as well, we are not inclined to entertain the present writ petition. 10. At this stage, this Court is concerned with the action of the respondent-State in giving effect to the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal had directed the respondent-State to reconsider the matter by order dated 04.02.2021, within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. However, the order of remand was not implemented by the State until this Court issued directions for filing an affidavit by the competent authority explaining the reasons for non- compliance. 10.1 In compliance with these directions, a memo dated 24.09.2025, along with the order dated 22.09.2025, has now been placed on record, giving effect to the Tribunal’s order. Yet, the said order does not explain the delay of over three and a half years. The memo records certain dates, which on perusal, indicate that the respondent-State was awaiting the filing of the writ petition by the Lokayukta. This Court finds no justification for such a contention. When the order of the State itself was quashed by the Tribunal and the direction was to the State, - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 there was no impediment to give effect to the Tribunal’s order within the time prescribed. Moreover, since the State chose not to challenge the Tribunal’s order, it was incumbent upon it to implement the order within a reasonable time. 10.2 The explanation that the State was waiting for the Lokayukta to file a writ petition is, in this Court’s view, a mere lame excuse. After such an inordinate delay, the State cannot cover its inaction with such reasoning. This Court expresses strong exception to the inaction and conduct of the State in this regard. Failure to act within reasonable time, or within the time prescribed by the Tribunal or the Court, defeats the very purpose of disciplinary proceedings. It is pertinent to note that when the State conducts inquiries into lapses of its officers, inaction or dereliction by the State’s own machinery in implementing Court or Tribunal orders is far more serious than the indiscipline or misconduct being investigated. 11. We consider this case fit for initiating appropriate proceedings against the concerned officials for failure to give effect to the Tribunal’s order and for imposing costs. However, at this stage, Sri Reuben Jacob, learned Additional Advocate - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:38729-DB WP No. 15257 of 2024 General, assures this Court that such lapses will not recur and that he will advise the concerned officials to maintain discipline in implementing orders within the prescribed time. On his assurance, this Court refrains from imposing any costs or initiating proceedings against the officials. The lapses noted above have been observed in several cases. To prevent recurrence, it is incumbent upon the State to formulate a clear policy for implementing Court and Tribunal orders and to ensure that the responsible officials are held accountable, if found lapses. 12. In view of the foregoing, the writ petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU List No.: 1 Sl No.: 16