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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 3888 (HP)

Nand Lal alias Nandu v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-10-14

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 28.03.2013 and order of sentence dated 30.03.2013, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452 and 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) was sleeping in her room on 21.06.2009 with her husband, who was hard of hearing. She had kept the door open because of the summer season. The accused opened the drawstring of her Salwar at about 2:00 a.m. and dragged her out of the room. She shouted for help. The accused ran away from the spot, but left his slippers. The victim’s son and other persons arrived on the spot. The victim narrated the incident to them. She went to Pardhan, who advised her to file a complaint before the Police. The victim reported the incident to the police, who registered the F.I.R. (Ex.PW1-A). 3. SI Dharam Singh (PW-4) investigated the matter. He went to the spot, took the photographs and prepared the spot map (Ex. PW-4/A). The victim produced one V-shaped slipper and her salwar. These were put in the separate parcels, and each parcel was sealed with six seal impressions of seal ‘A’.The seal impression ‘A’ was taken on a separate piece of cloth (Ex.PW-4/F). The parcels were seized vide memo (Ex.PW-4/B). The accused was arrested on 25.06.2009. He made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW-4/C) that he could get the other slipper recovered. The accused got recovered a V-shaped slipper, which was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with six seal impressions of seal ‘P’. The parcel was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.PW-4/E). Specimen seal impression‘P’ was taken on a separate piece of cloth(Ex.PW-4/G). The spot map (Ex.PW-4/L) of the place of the recovery was prepared. Medical examination of the accused was conducted, and a report (Ex.PA) was issued. The parcel was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.PW-4/E). Specimen seal impression‘P’ was taken on a separate piece of cloth(Ex.PW-4/G). The spot map (Ex.PW-4/L) of the place of the recovery was prepared. Medical examination of the accused was conducted, and a report (Ex.PA) was issued. SI Dharam Singh filed an application (Ex.PW-4/H) before the Secretary, Gram Panchayat Taroh, for obtaining a copy of the Pariwar Register. The copy of the Pariwar Register (Ex.PW-4/J) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW-4/K). The case property was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga and a report (Ex.PW-4/M) was issued stating that the slipper produced by the victim and got recovered by the accused could have been used by a single person. The statements of proseuction witnesses were recorded as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Mandi, who committed it to the Court of Sessions for trial. 4. Learned Sessions Judge charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452 and 376 read with Section 511 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. The prosecution examined four witnesses to prove its case. Victim (PW-1) narrated the incident. HC Prabhakar (PW-2) was working as an MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HHC Tej Ram (PW-3) carried the case property to SFSL. SI Dharam Singh (PW-4) investigated the case. 6. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was falsely implicated due to the enmity. His brother Chuni Lal had a stone quarry, where he (accused) used to work. The son of the victim complained to the Mining Department, which conducted a raid and closed the quarry. He enquired from the victim’s son as to why the Mining department was involved. The victim’s son replied that he had not complained to any person. The accused, the victim’s son and two other persons consumed liquor at Ratti. The accused and the victim’s son went to their homes together. The victim’s son called his family members near his home by saying that the accused had beaten him. The family member chased the accused, and he ran away. He examined Gopal Singh (DW-1) and Yog Raj (DW-2) in his defence. 7. The accused and the victim’s son went to their homes together. The victim’s son called his family members near his home by saying that the accused had beaten him. The family member chased the accused, and he ran away. He examined Gopal Singh (DW-1) and Yog Raj (DW-2) in his defence. 7. The learned Trial Court held that the victim’s testimony was credible. There was some delay in reporting the matter to the police, but the delay in reporting the sexual offences was not material. There was no reason to disbelieve the victim’s testimony. She produced one slipper, and one slipper was recovered at the instance of the accused. Both of them matched each other as per the report of SFSL. The defence taken by the accused did not disprove the prosecution’s version. The act of untying the drawstring of the victim's Salwar and dragging her would amount to outraging the victim’s modesty and not an attempt to commit the rape. The accused had entered the victim’s house in the middle of the night to commit an offence. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452 and 354 of the IPC and was sentenced as under:- Section(s) Sentence(s) 354 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for 1 ½ years, pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. 452 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a 2 years, pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused/appellant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The prosecution’s story is highly improbable. The statements of the prosecution witnesses materially contradicted each other. The victim stated that she was sleeping in the Veranda, which is contrary to the contents of the F.I.R. The ingredients of Section 452 of the IPC were not satisfied. The defence taken by the accused that there was a dispute between him and the victim’s son was highly probable. The recovery of the slipper was planted by the Investigating Officer to implicate the accused. The defence taken by the accused that there was a dispute between him and the victim’s son was highly probable. The recovery of the slipper was planted by the Investigating Officer to implicate the accused. No independent witness was examined by the prosecution to corroborate the prosecution’s case. The incident occurred on 21.06.2009, whereas the F.I.R. was lodged on 25.06.2009 after a lapse of four days. No proper explanation was provided for the delay. The disclosure statement was not proved as per the law. The spot map mentioned that the accused had entered the victim’s room, which is contrary to her statement on oath that she was sleeping in the Veranda. Learned Trial Court imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The accused was not properly identified. The defence version that the accused had a dispute with the victim’s son was duly proved on record. The possibility of false implication of the accused at the instance of the victim’s son cannot be ruled out. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The victim stated that she and her husband were sleeping in the room, and the door was half-opened because of the summer season. The accused entered her room at about 2:00 a.m. and untied the drawstring of her salwar. He dragged her out of her room by her legs. She recognised the accused and shouted for help. The accused fled from the spot. His slipper remained on the spot. The accused entered her room at about 2:00 a.m. and untied the drawstring of her salwar. He dragged her out of her room by her legs. She recognised the accused and shouted for help. The accused fled from the spot. His slipper remained on the spot. The accused was noticed by her husband, sons and daughter-in- law. Thakur Dass was also present in the house, and he also saw the incident. Efforts were made to nab the accused, but he could not be found. She reported the matter to the police, and the police investigated the matter. She stated in her cross-examination that her elder son was residing with her. Her house had three rooms and one Veranda. She was sleeping in her room. Her son, his wife and children were present in the house. Another son was residing separately near her house. Her husband was sleeping with her. Her son was working in a stone quarry. She was not aware that Chuni Lal, brother of the accused, had opened a stone quarry on his land. She admitted that the house of the accused and her house were located on the same path. She denied that the accused visited her home with her son. The light was switched on. It was a summer time; hence, she and her husband had slept on the floor. She was wearing a yellow salwar with a yellow string. She and her husband were sleeping opposite the door. She again stated that she had slept in the Veranda at the time of the incident. The Veranda was covered, and its door was kept open. She was in deep sleep when the accused dragged her. She was dragged for about 8-10 feet. She had not sustained any injury or scratches on the head or back. She screamed, and the accused ran away. The police had searched for the accused the next day. She denied that the matter was reported to the police after due deliberation,that the accused never entered her room, or that she made a false complaint against the accused. 14. Mr. G.R. Palsara, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the victim stated in her examination-in-chief that she and her husband were sleeping in the room, but stated in her cross-examination that she and her husband were sleeping in the Veranda, which makes the incident highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. 14. Mr. G.R. Palsara, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the victim stated in her examination-in-chief that she and her husband were sleeping in the room, but stated in her cross-examination that she and her husband were sleeping in the Veranda, which makes the incident highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. The site plan (Ex.PW-4/A) shows that the room where the victim was sleeping and the Veranda are separated by a door. The victim was dragged from the room to the Veranda. The victim is illiterate, which is evident from the fact that she had put her thumbprint on her statement. She stated in her examination-in-chief as well as in her cross-examination that she was sleeping in the room. She volunteered to say after persistent cross-examination that she was sleeping in the Veranda. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728: 1983 SCC OnLine SC 152 that a witness is not expected to recall the sequence of events accurately, and he can get overawed and confused by the court atmosphere. It was observed: “(6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. Perhaps it is a sort of psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.” 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross- examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )” 16. In the present case, the victim’s testimony has a ring of truth, and it cannot be discarded due to a discrepancy in her statement arising out of the persistent cross- examination. 17. The incident occurred on 21.06.2009, and the matter was reported to the police on 25.06.2009. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, which would make the prosecution’s case highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the delay in reporting the matter to the police is not material because in a conservative society like India, the matter of sexual assault is not immediately reported to the police but is reported after due consultation. This submission cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the delay in reporting the matter to the police is not material because in a conservative society like India, the matter of sexual assault is not immediately reported to the police but is reported after due consultation. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017) 2 SCC 51 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 648 : 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1473 that the delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution’s case, especially in sexual offences. It was observed at page 64: “24. When the matter is examined in the aforesaid perspective, which in the opinion of this Court is the right perspective, the reluctance on the part of the prosecutrix in not narrating the incident to anybody for a period of three years and not sharing the same event with her mother is clearly understandable. We would like to extract the following passage from the judgment of this Court in Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 44] : (SCC p. 592, para5) “5. We shall first deal with the question of delay. The unusual circumstances satisfactorily explained the delay in lodging the first information report. In any event, delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in lodging the first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubting its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. In case the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the prosecution’s version on account of such delay, it is a relevant factor. On the other hand, a satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication or vulnerability of the prosecution’s case. As the factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of the catastrophe which had befallen her. On the other hand, a satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication or vulnerability of the prosecution’s case. As the factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of the catastrophe which had befallen her. That being so, the mere delay in lodging of the first information report does not in any way render the prosecution version brittle.” 25. In Karnel Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 977, this Court observed that : (SCC p. 522, para 7) “7. … The submission overlooks the fact that in India, women are slow and hesitant to complain of such assaults, and if the prosecutrix happens to be a married person, she will not do anything without informing her husband. Merely because the complaint was lodged less than promptly does not raise the inference that the complaint was false. The reluctance to go to the police is because of society's attitude towards such women; it casts doubt and shame upon her rather than comfort and sympathise with her. Therefore, delay in lodging complaints in such cases does not necessarily indicate that her version is false.” 26. Likewise, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316, it was observed : (SCC p. 394, para 8) 8. … The courts cannot overlook the fact that in sexual offences, delay in the lodging of the FIR can be due to a variety of reasons, particularly the reluctance of the prosecutrix or her family members to go to the police and complain about the incident, which concerns the reputation of the prosecutrix and the honour of her family. It is only after giving it a cool thought that a complaint of sexual offence is generally lodged.” 18. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653 , wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 19. In the present case, the victim approached the Pradhan, who advised her to report the matter to the police. The victim was an illiterate villager, and her approaching Pradhan was natural. Therefore, the delay in reporting the matter will not be material. 20. It was submitted that the members of the house and Thakur Dass, who were stated to be present in the house, were not examined, and an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. This submission is not acceptable. Learned Public Prosecutor gave up the victim’s husband, as he was hard of hearing, and the victim’s son, as he was repetitive in nature. These reasons are sufficient for not examining a witness. It would have been difficult to examine a witness who was hard of hearing. The victim was examined, and examination of her son would have amounted to the repetition of the victim’s testimony. These reasons are sufficient for not examining a witness. It would have been difficult to examine a witness who was hard of hearing. The victim was examined, and examination of her son would have amounted to the repetition of the victim’s testimony. It was held in Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1311 that the Public Prosecutor cangive up a witness to avoid repetition. It was observed at page 495:- “13…If there are too many witnesses on the same point, the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the Court considerably in lessening the workload. The time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the workload, particularly in those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice.” 21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196 , that the intrinsic worth of the testimony of witnesses has to be assessed by the Court, and if the testimony of the witnesses appears to be truthful, the non-examination of other witnesses will not make the testimony doubtful. It was observed: - “[10]..It is true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the Court. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the Court. If their evidence appears to be truthful, reliable and acceptable, the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been examined will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution…” 22. This position was reiterated in Rohtash vs. State of Haryana 2013 (14) SCC 434 , and it was held that the prosecution is not bound to examine all the cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It was observed: “23. Thus, the prosecution is not bound to examine all the cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. The accused can also examine the cited, but not examined, witnesses, if he so desires, in his defence. It is the discretion of the prosecutor to tender the witnesses to prove the case of the prosecution, and "the court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the prosecution has been influenced by some oblique motive." In an extraordinary situation, if the court comes to the conclusion that a material witness has been withheld, it can draw an adverse inference against the prosecution, as has been provided under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, the public prosecutor must not take the liberty to "pick and choose" his witnesses, as he must be fair to the court, and therefore, to the truth. In a given case, the Court can always examine a witness as a court witness if it is so warranted in the interests of justice. The evidence of the witnesses must be tested on the touchstone of reliability, credibility and trustworthiness. If the court finds the same to be untruthful, there is no legal bar for it to discard the same.” 23. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, wherein it was observed at page 224: - Non-examination of the witness 34.A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their importance. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution, along with the adequacy of the materials, sufficient to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. The onus is on the party that alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it. 35. The aforesaid settled principle of law has been laid down in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 646]: (SCC pp. 377-78, para 13) “13. Another circumstance which appears to have weighed heavily with the Additional Sessions Judge was that no independent witness of Salabatpura had been examined by the prosecution to prove the prosecution case of assault on the deceased, although the evidence shows that there were some persons living in that locality like the “pakodewalla”, hotelwalla, shopkeeper and some of the passengers who had alighted at Salabatpura with the deceased. The Additional Sessions Judge has drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for its failure to examine any of those witnesses. Mr Hardy has adopted this argument. In our opinion, the comments of the Additional Sessions Judge are based on a serious misconception of the correct legal position.The onus of proving the prosecution's case rests entirely on the prosecution, and it follows as a logical corollary that the prosecution has complete liberty to choose its witnesses if it is to prove its case. The court cannot compel the prosecution to examine one witness or the other as its witness. At most, if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. But it is not the law that the omission to examine any and every witness, even on minor points, would undoubtedly lead to rejection of the prosecution's case or drawing of an adverse inference against the prosecution. The law is well-settled that the prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as are essential for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. The law is well-settled that the prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as are essential for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. In other words, before an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses who had been withheld were eyewitnesses who had actually seen the occurrence and were therefore material to prove the case. It is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point; it is the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence that matters. In the instant case, the evidence of the eyewitnesses does not suffer from any infirmity or any manifest defect on its intrinsic merit. Secondly, there is nothing to show that at the time when the deceased was assaulted, a large crowd had gathered, and some of the members of the crowd had actually seen the occurrence and were cited as witnesses for the prosecution and then withheld. We must not forget that in our country, there is a general tendency amongst the witnesses in mofussil to shun giving evidence in courts because of the cumbersome and dilatory procedure of our courts, the harassment to which they are subjected by the police and the searching cross-examination which they have to face before the courts. Therefore, nobody wants to be a witness to a murder or any serious offence if they can avoid it. Although the evidence does show that four or five persons had alighted from the bus at the time when the deceased and his companions got down from the bus, there is no suggestion that any of those persons stayed on to witness the occurrence. They may have proceeded to their village homes.” (emphasis supplied) 36. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar [Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195]: (SCC pp. 410-11, para 19) “19. In the matter of the appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle that evidence must be weighed and not counted. It is a time-honoured principle that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has emphasised the value provided by each witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity which determines the adequacy of evidence, as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even in probate cases, where the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it has been held that the production of more witnesses does not carry any weight. Thus, conviction can even be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness if the same inspires confidence. (Vide Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614 ], Kunju v. State of T.N.[Kunju v. State of T.N., (2008) 2 SCC 151 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.[Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150], Mahesh v. State of M.P. [Mahesh v. State of M.P., (2011) 9 SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)783], Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab [Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana [Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807]. 24. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution or the non-examination of the witnesses. 25. It was submitted that the victim was dragged for a certain distance, and she had not sustained any injury, which makes her version highly doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The victim stated that she was sleeping on the floor. Therefore, she would have put something beneath her. When the accused dragged her, she would have been dragged with whatever was lying beneath her; therefore, the chance of the victim sustaining the injuries was remote, and the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because the victim had not sustained any injury on her person. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1610, that the absence of injuries on the victim’s body does not make her testimony doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1610, that the absence of injuries on the victim’s body does not make her testimony doubtful. It was observed: “5.5. In cases of offences committed under Section 376, IPC, when the story of the victim girl as told in the evidence is found credit-worthy, the apparent insufficiency of medical evidence pitted against acceptable testimony of the victim, the latter would prevail. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [ (1996) 2 SCC 384 ] it was observed: In the absence of injury on the private part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident had not taken place or the sexual intercourse was committed with the consent of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix being a small child of about nine years of age, there could be no question of her giving consent to sexual intercourse. The absence of injuries on the private part of the prosecutrix can be of no consequence in the facts and circumstances of the present case.(Para 16) 5.5.1. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh, [ (2019) 16 SCC 759 ], which was also a case in relation to the offence committed under Section 376, IPC where the prosecutrix was minor girl aged 9 years, she was staying in her aunt's house pursuing her studies. When the offence of rape was committed against her, she narrated the story to her teacher. The High Court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground, inter alia, that the medical evidence of the doctor was not conclusive to hold that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse. 5.5.2. This Court observed that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmities and the factor of probability does not render it unworthy evidence, the conviction could base solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix. It was further observed that as a general rule there is no reason to insist on the corroboration accept in certain cases, it was stated. 5.5.3. The medical evidence may not be available in which circumstance, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix could be sufficient to base the conviction. “The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. 5.5.3. The medical evidence may not be available in which circumstance, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix could be sufficient to base the conviction. “The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law; but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”(Para 11) 5.5.4. It may be true that in the present case the evidence of the medical officer (PW-17) spoke about absence of external injury marks on the genitals of the victim. However, the proposition that the corroboration from the medical evidence is not sine qua non when the cogent evidence of the victim is available, was reiterated in a recent judgment of this Court in Lok Mal alias Loku v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [ (2025) 4 SCC 470 ], observed: “Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major injury marks, this merely cannot a be a reason to discard the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. We reiterate that absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution.(Para 4) 5.5.5. Akin to the facts of the present case, it was stated in Lok Mal(supra), according to the version of the prosecutrix, that the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the defence of false implication, however, he was unable to support his defence by any cogent evidence. 5.5.6. The credible and reliable evidence of prosecutrix could not be jettisoned for want of corroboration including the corroboration by medical report or evidence. The appellant made an attempt to raise the defence of false implication, however, he was unable to support his defence by any cogent evidence. 5.5.6. The credible and reliable evidence of prosecutrix could not be jettisoned for want of corroboration including the corroboration by medical report or evidence. The Court observed in Manga Singh (supra) that “in absence of injury on the private part of the prosecutrix, it cannot be concluded that the incident had not taken place or the sexual intercourse was committed with the consent of the prosecutrix”. It was stated that it is well settled that in the cases of rape it is not always necessary that external injury is to be found on the body of the victim. 5.5.7. In Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [ (2010) 2 SCC 9 ], this Court repelled the contention of the appellant that since the hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be intact, it cannot be said that an offence of rape has been committed. The Court refuse to accept such contention in light of the definition of offence of rape in Section 375 of the Penal Code, 1860. It was further observed that it is the consistent view of this Court that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape. 5.6. It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and sole evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759 , this Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone. The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”(Para 10) 5.6.1. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.”(Para 10) 5.6.1. It was further asserted that corroboration is not an essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.(Para 11) 5.6.2. In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to reiterate that in all cases, the corroboration to the statements made by the victim in her evidence could not be insisted upon as a rule of thumb: In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook.(Para 8) 5.6.3. It was asserted that only compelling reasons would justify rejection of testimony of a rape victim, and not otherwise: “….the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury…..”(Para 8) 5.6.4. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury…..”(Para 8) 5.6.4. From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997), following observations could be noticed: “…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice but a victim of another person's lust and it will be improper and undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion. All that the law mandates is that the Court should be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her and if after keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is thereafter satisfied that the evidence is trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the Court from acting on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30 , Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 , State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 ]” (Para 18) 5.6.5. As early as in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, [ (1990) 1 SCC 550 ], this court observed that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with the accomplice, it was further observed that she is a victim of crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. It was further observed that evidence of a rape victim must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured person in cases of physical violence. It was stated that there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which may require it to look for corroboration.” 26. Therefore, the victim’s testimony cannot be discarded because she had not sustained any injury during the incident. 27. Gopal Singh (DW-1) stated that he, Nand Lal and Tara Chand were present at Ratti. Bodhraj and the victim’s son met them at about 8:00 p.m. All of them consumed liquor. They went to their respective homes. Accused Nand Lal and the victim’s son discussed the Stone quarry. 27. Gopal Singh (DW-1) stated that he, Nand Lal and Tara Chand were present at Ratti. Bodhraj and the victim’s son met them at about 8:00 p.m. All of them consumed liquor. They went to their respective homes. Accused Nand Lal and the victim’s son discussed the Stone quarry. A heated argument took place between them. Thereafter, all the people went to their respective homes. This statement does not make the prosecution’s case doubtful because he was deposing about an incident which occurred at about 8:00 p.m. The incident with the victim occurred at 2:00 a.m.; therefore, both incidents are not related to each other. Further, the testimony of Gopal Singh (DW-1) makes the defence of the accused highly suspect. If the accused and the victim’s son had a heated exchange, it is highly unlikely that the victim’s son would take the accused to his home. Therefore, the testimony of this witness does not make the prosecution’s case suspect. 28. Yog Raj (DW-2) stated that he heard the noise of ‘CHOR-CHOR’ from the victim’s house at about 12 midnight on 21.06.2009. He went to the victim’s house. The victim’s son met him, who disclosed that a scuffle had occurred between the victim’s son and the accused over the stone quarry. 29. This statement also does not help the case of the defence. The statement is seeking to prove the statement made by the victim’s son to this witness that a dispute had occurred between the accused and the victim’s son over the stone quarry. This evidence is hearsay and inadmissible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143 , that the statement of a witness made to a person who is not called as a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It was observed: - “20. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal? 21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 22. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal? 21. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on the information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). 22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made." 30. Therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the statement of Yog Raj (DW-2) to discard the prosecution version. 31. The victim denied that the accused had visited her home with her son. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof; therefore, no advantage can be derived from the denied suggestion made to the victim. 32. There is no other evidence to establish the defence of the accused, and the learned Trial Court had rightly discarded it. 33. The victim stated that the accused had left his slipper at the time of running away. The fact that somebody ran away is also corroborated by the statement of Yog Raj (DW-2). 34. SI Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated that the victim handed over a slipper to him. He sealed the slipper in a parcel with seal ‘A’. 33. The victim stated that the accused had left his slipper at the time of running away. The fact that somebody ran away is also corroborated by the statement of Yog Raj (DW-2). 34. SI Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated that the victim handed over a slipper to him. He sealed the slipper in a parcel with seal ‘A’. He denied in his cross-examination that the accused had not made any disclosure statement or that the victim had not produced any salwar; however, the part of his testimony that the victim had produced the slipper was not challenged in the cross-examination.It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58.A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9- 2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such the argument that the accused was arrested on 1-9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as under: “Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross-examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross-examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross- examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling.” 60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: “My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.” 61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], quoted from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13) “13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross- examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision isenlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.” 62. This Court, in a judgment reported Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) “15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross- examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross-examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906 . This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. The effect of not cross-examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906 . This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440. 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross- examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 35. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon the recovery of the slipper from the victim. 36. SI Dharam Singh (PW-4) stated that he interrogated the accused, and the accused made a disclosure statement (Ex.PW-4/C) that he could get the slipper recovered. The accused got recovered a slipper, which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW-4/E). He denied in his cross- examination that the accused had not got the slipper recovered. This was the only cross-examination regarding the recovery of the slipper. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted that the testimony of this witness that the slipper was recovered at the instance of the accused. 37. The slippers were sent to SFSL, Junga. The report (Ex.PW-4/M) was issued, in which it was mentioned that slippers could have been used by a single person. The recovery of one slipper from the victim’s house and one slipper at the instance of the accused corroborated the victim’s version that the accused had entered her house. The defence version that he was invited by the accused was not proved, as noted above. 38. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the victim’s testimony that the accused had entered her house in the middle of the night, untied the drawstring of her salwar and dragged her out of the room. The victim’s testimony proved that the accused had committed the house trespass and had outraged the victim’s modesty. Thus, the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452 and 354 of the IPC. 39. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for 1½ years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 354 of IPC and two years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 452 of IPC. Considering that the accused trespassed into the victim’s house in the middle of the night and outraged her modesty, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is not excessive, and no interference is required with it. 40. No other point was urged. 41. Considering that the accused trespassed into the victim’s house in the middle of the night and outraged her modesty, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is not excessive, and no interference is required with it. 40. No other point was urged. 41. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application, if any. 42 The records of the learned Trial Court be returned with a copy of this judgment for the information 14th October, 2025.