JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 15.10.2013 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Shimla (learned Trial Court), vide which the complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, ‘NI Act’). It was asserted that the complainant is running a business of sanitary and hardware at Kamla Nagar, Sanjauli, Shimla. The accused No.1 is the Managing Director of accused No.2 and is responsible for the affairs of accused No.2. She was known to the complainant. She approached the complainant for supplying goods on credit and assured to repay the amount. The complainant supplied the material to the accused, and the accused issued a cheque of Rs.3,63,670/- drawn on H.P. State Co-operative Bank, Shimla, in favour of the complainant. The complainant presented the cheque on 20.09.2007 and thereafter on 03.10.2007, but the cheque was returned unpaid with the remarks “insufficient funds”. The complainant sent a notice to the accused by means of registered post. The notice was duly served upon the accused. The accused failed to repay the amount. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to her for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant was called upon to produce the evidence, and the complainant examined Malkiat Singh (CW1). 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that Malkiat Singh (CW1) deals in sanitary and hardware items and is a partner in the firm M/s Gee Ess Trading Company. She admitted that she had purchased hardware items in the year 2006. She denied that she had issued the cheque to discharge her legal liability. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that Malkiat Singh (CW1) deals in sanitary and hardware items and is a partner in the firm M/s Gee Ess Trading Company. She admitted that she had purchased hardware items in the year 2006. She denied that she had issued the cheque to discharge her legal liability. She stated that three blank signed cheques were obtained by the complainant as security when she had purchased items from him. She made the payment for the items purchased. She initially stated that she wanted to lead the defence evidence, but subsequently made a statement that she did not want to produce any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the cheque was issued in the name of M/s Gee Ess Trading Company and the complaint was filed by Mr. Malkiat Singh, as a partner of the firm. However, no material was placed on record to show that Malkiat Singh is a partner of the firm. He could not maintain the complaint without establishing this fact. Therefore, the complaint was dismissed. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material placed before it. It was wrongly held that Malkiat Singh had not proved the partnership deed, and he had no authority to institute the complaint. This was a technical ground for acquittal. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. The complainant also filed an application (Cr.M.P No. 58 of 2024) under Section 391 of the Cr. P.C. for leading the additional evidence. It was asserted that the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused on the ground that the complainant had failed to prove the partnership deed. The complainant wanted to prove that Malkiat Singh was the partner of the firm. He intended to produce the partnership deed and the account of the firm to prove this fact. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be allowed and the documents be taken on record. 9. I have heard Mr. Tarunjeet Singh Bhogal, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sumit Sood, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. Therefore, it was prayed that the application be allowed and the documents be taken on record. 9. I have heard Mr. Tarunjeet Singh Bhogal, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sumit Sood, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. Tarunjeet Singh Bhogal, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused on the ground that the partnership deed was not proved. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the complainant is the partner of the firm. Therefore, this question was not disputed. Learned Trial Court ignored the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sumit Sood, Advocate for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. The complainant is required to prove that he is the payee or the holder in due course, in the absence of which the complaint is not maintainable. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Shirgul Filling Station vs. Kamal Sharma, 2025:HHC:21725-DB, in support of his submission. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 : (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/ omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it is necessary to dispose of the application under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. filed by the complainant for leading the additional evidence. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Asharam, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 423, that Sections 311 and 391 of Cr. P.C. deal with the power of the Court to take additional evidence. Section 311 deals with the trial, while Section 391 deals with the appeal. The Appellate Court can examine the evidence, but it does not possess the wide powers conferred upon the Trial Court. It was observed: “6. Both Sections 311 and 391 of the Cr. P.C. relate to the power of the court to take additional evidence; the former at the stage of trial and before the judgment is pronounced; and the latter at the appellate stage after judgment by the trial court has been pronounced. It may not be totally correct to state that the same considerations would apply to both situations, as there is a difference in the stages. Section 311 of the Cr. P.C. consists of two parts; the first gives power to the court to summon any witness at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings, whether the person is listed as a witness, or is in attendance though not summoned as a witness. Secondly, the trial court has the power to recall and re-examine any person already examined if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. On the other hand, the discretion under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. should be read as somewhat more restricted in comparison to Section 311 of the Cr. Secondly, the trial court has the power to recall and re-examine any person already examined if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. On the other hand, the discretion under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. should be read as somewhat more restricted in comparison to Section 311 of the Cr. P.C., as the appellate court is dealing with an appeal, after the trial court has come to a conclusion with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the person being prosecuted. The appellate court can examine the evidence in depth and detail, yet it does not possess all the powers of the trial court, as it deals with cases wherein the decision has already been pronounced.” 17. It was laid down in Sukhjeet Singh v. State of U.P., (2019) 16 SCC 712 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 434 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 72, that the additional evidence can be taken by the Appellate Court if the evidence is necessary for just determination of the case, however, Section 391 cannot be used for retrial. The order should not be made if the party had sufficient opportunities and had not availed those opportunities. It was observed at page 721: “22. Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with “Appeals”. Section 391 CrPC empowers the appellate court to take further evidence or direct it to be taken. Section 391 is as follows: “391. The appellate court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken.— (1) In dealing with any appeal under this Chapter, the appellate court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when the appellate court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate. (2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the appellate court, and such court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal. (3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional evidence is taken. (4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry.” 23. (3) The accused or his pleader shall have the right to be present when the additional evidence is taken. (4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXIII, as if it were an inquiry.” 23. The key words in Section 391(1) are “if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary”. The word “necessary” used in Section 391(1) is to mean necessary for deciding the appeal. The appeal has been filed by the accused, who have been convicted. The powers of the appellate court are contained in Section 386. In an appeal from a conviction, an appellate court can exercise power under Section 386(b), which is to the following effect: “386. (b) In an appeal from a conviction— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same;” 24. Power to take additional evidence under Section 391 is, thus, with an object to appropriately decide the appeal by the appellate court to secure ends of justice. The scope and ambit of Section 391 CrPC has come up for consideration before this Court in Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Bench held that a wide discretion is conferred on the appellate courts and the additional evidence may be necessary for a variety of reasons. He held that additional evidence must be necessary not because it would be impossible to pronounce judgment but because there would be a failure of justice without it. The following was laid down in paras 8 and 9: (AIR p. 1892) “8. … Since a wide discretion is conferred on appellate courts, the limits of that court's jurisdiction must obviously be dictated by the exigency of the situation and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides. There is no doubt, some analogy between the power to order a retrial and the power to take additional evidence. … Since a wide discretion is conferred on appellate courts, the limits of that court's jurisdiction must obviously be dictated by the exigency of the situation and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides. There is no doubt, some analogy between the power to order a retrial and the power to take additional evidence. The former is an extreme step appropriately taken if additional evidence will not suffice. Both actions subsume failure of justice as a condition precedent. There, the resemblance ends, and it is hardly proper to construe one section with the aid of observations made by this Court in the interpretation of the other section. 9. Additional evidence may be necessary for a variety of reasons, which it is hardly necessary (even if it was possible) to list here. We do not propose to do what the legislature has refrained from doing, namely, to control the discretion of the appellate court under certain stated circumstances. It may, however, be said that additional evidence must be necessary not because it would be impossible to pronounce judgment but because there would be a failure of justice without it. The power must be exercised sparingly and only in suitable cases. Once such action is justified, there is no restriction on the kind of evidence which may be received. It may be formal or substantial. It must, of course, not be received in such a way as to cause prejudice to the accused, as, for example, it should not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against him. The order must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of it unless the requirements of justice dictate otherwise.” 25. This Court again, in Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra [Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 SCC 759 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 812], had noted the power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate court. The following was stated in paras 1 and 2 : (SCC p. 761) 1. There is available a very wide discretion is available in the matter of obtaining additional evidence in terms of Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A plain look at the statutory provisions (Section 391) would reveal the same… 2. The following was stated in paras 1 and 2 : (SCC p. 761) 1. There is available a very wide discretion is available in the matter of obtaining additional evidence in terms of Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A plain look at the statutory provisions (Section 391) would reveal the same… 2. A word of caution, however, ought to be introduced for guidance, to wit: that this additional evidence cannot and ought not to be received in such a way as to cause any prejudice to the accused. It is not a disguise for a retrial or to change the nature of the case against the accused. This Court in Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., AIR 1965 SC 1887 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] in no uncertain terms observed that the order must not ordinarily be made if the prosecution has had a fair opportunity and has not availed of it. This Court was candid enough to record, however, that it is the concept of justice which ought to prevail, and in the event, the same dictates exercise of power as conferred by the Code, there ought not to be any hesitation in that regard.” 26. From the law laid down by this Court as noted above, it is clear that there are no fetters on the power under Section 391 CrPC of the appellate court. All powers are conferred on the court to secure the ends of justice. The ultimate object of judicial administration is to secure the ends of justice. The court exists for rendering justice to the people.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. This position was reiterated in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 264 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 2256, and it was held that this power should not be exercised to fill up the gaps by the either side and especially to reverse the judgment of learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 586: “25. The High Court observed that the trial court erred in saying that the accused failed to prove the making of previous complaints against the prosecutrix. While saying so, the High Court referred to certain complaints made against the prosecutrix, including the one allegedly given on 21-7-1997, which were produced by the Bar at the time of arguments. The High Court observed that the trial court erred in saying that the accused failed to prove the making of previous complaints against the prosecutrix. While saying so, the High Court referred to certain complaints made against the prosecutrix, including the one allegedly given on 21-7-1997, which were produced by the Bar at the time of arguments. The power conferred under Section 391 CrPC is to be exercised with great care and caution. In dealing with any appeal, the appellate court can refer to the additional evidence only if the same has been recorded as provided under Section 391 CrPC. Any material produced before the appellate court to fill in the gaps by either side cannot be considered by the appellate court; more so, to reverse the judgment of the trial court.” 19. Similarly, it was held in H.N. Jagadeesh v. R. Rajeshwari, (2019) 16 SCC 730 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 450 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 758 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1813, that where the complainant had failed to produce the notice before the learned Trial Court, he could not be permitted to lead the evidence before the learned Appellate Court to prove it. It was observed at page 731: “6. We are unable to agree with this approach of the High Court, in the facts of this case, which is inappropriate in law. The service of the statutory notice calling upon the drawer of the cheque (after it has been disowned) to pay the amount of the cheque is a necessary precondition for filing the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the respondent to produce the said statutory notice on record to prove the same as well. In this case, this document was not even filed by the respondent along with the complaint, and the question of proving the same was, therefore, a far cry. In a case like this, we fail to understand how the aforesaid omission on the part of the respondent in not prosecuting the complaint properly could be ignored, and another chance could have been given to the respondent to prove the case by producing further evidence. It clearly amounts to giving an opportunity to the respondent to fill up the lacuna.” 20. It clearly amounts to giving an opportunity to the respondent to fill up the lacuna.” 20. It was laid down in Rajvinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2016) 14 SCC 671 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 421 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 971 that where it was possible to examine the Forensic Expert at the trial stage, an application to examine him at the appellate stage cannot be allowed. It was observed at page 677 “12. At the outset, we must deal with submissions as regards the application for leading additional evidence at the appellate stage. It has been the consistent defence of the appellant that the dead body found in agricultural fields in District Muzaffarnagar was that of Pushpa Verma, and he went to the extent of producing a photograph of the dead body in the present trial. He also examined Brahm Pal Singh, Sub-Inspector and other witnesses. It was certainly possible to examine a forensic expert at the trial court stage itself, and the High Court was right and justified in rejecting the prayer to lead additional evidence at the appellate stage. Nonetheless, we have gone through the report of the said forensic expert engaged by the appellant. The exercise undertaken by that expert is to start with the admitted photograph of Pushpa Verma on a computer, then remove the “bindi” by some process on the computer, then by the same process remove her spectacles and by computer imaging change the image as it would have looked if the lady was lying down in an injured condition. The computer image so changed was then compared with the photograph of the dead body. We have seen both the images, and we are not convinced at all about any element of similarity. We do not, therefore, see any reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court.” 21. It was held in Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 4 SCC 453 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 77, that the power under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised when the party was prevented from presenting the evidence despite the exercise of due diligence or the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light during the pendency of the appeal. It was observed at page 455: “8. It was observed at page 455: “8. At the outset, we may note that the law is well-settled by a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that power to record additional evidence under Section 391CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal and that non-recording of such evidence may lead to failure of justice.” 22. In the present case, the application does not mention that the applicant was prevented from leading the evidence before the learned Trial Court despite the exercise of due diligence, or that the evidence came to his notice during the pendency of the revision. It is apparent from the documents sought to be produced on record that they were executed by the applicant and came into existence before filing the complaint. The applicant was aware of their existence and could have produced them before the learned Trial Court. However, the documents were not produced before the learned Trial Court, and they are being sought to be produced to reverse the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that Malkiat Singh has not been proved to be the partner of the firm. Since the additional evidence cannot be taken to reverse the judgment of the Trial Court; hence, it is impermissible to take these documents on record. Consequently, the present application fails, and it is dismissed. 23. The complainant, Malkiat Singh (CW-1), asserted that he is a partner in the firm M/s Gee Ess Trading Company. He admitted that M/s Gee Ess Trading Company was a partnership firm which had a partnership deed and that he had not produced the partnership deed on record. He denied that he was not a partner in Gee Ess Trading Company. He admitted that he had not produced any document on record to show that he was authorised by M/s Gee Ess Trading Company to file the complaint before the Court. 24. Learned Trial Court held that the examination of the complainant was not sufficient to show that he was a payee or holder in due course. Therefore, the complaint filed by the complainant was not maintainable. 24. Learned Trial Court held that the examination of the complainant was not sufficient to show that he was a payee or holder in due course. Therefore, the complaint filed by the complainant was not maintainable. However, the learned Trial Court ignored the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The accused specifically admitted in reply to question No.2 that Malkiat Singh (CW1) deals in sanitary hardware items, and he was a partner in M/s Gee Ess Trading Company; therefore, the accused had never disputed the fact that M/s Gee Ess Trading Company was a partnership firm and the complainant was a partner in it. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 : 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused made under section 313 Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari [ (1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95]. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari [ (1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95]. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. [1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468 ] held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730], this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (Emphasis supplied) Sub-Section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 25. This question was again considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, and it was held that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but a part of such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: - 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar [ (1969) 1 SCC 347 : AIR 1969 SC 422 ]: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book and his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (Emphasis supplied) 26. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 27. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761:- 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. It was held at page 761:- 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [ (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705] held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh [Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933] held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1964) 1 Cri LJ 730 : (1963) 3 SCR 678 ], this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh [(2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514] held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla [ (2005) 9 SCC 15 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185] and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam [ (2007) 11 SCC 467 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766]. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 28. It is apparent from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court can rely upon the statement of the accused made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to lend assurance to the prosecution’s case. 29. Thus, the learned Trial Court was required to read the statement of the complainant together with the statement of accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and once both the statements of the complainant and the accused are read together, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the complainant is a partner in M/s Gee Ess Trading Company and the complaint could not have been dismissed on the ground that complainant has failed to show his relationship to M/s Gee Ess Trading Company. 30. The cheque was issued in the name of M/s Gee Ess Trading Company, and once the fact that the complainant is a partner was proved, he was competent to file the complaint on behalf of the firm, even in the absence of written authority, because a partner is an agent of the firm as per Section 18 of the Partnership Act, and he can file the complaint on behalf of the firm. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Reshmi Constructions v. Laxman Vithal Chunekar, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2894 : (2014) 5 Mah LJ 537 that the partner of a firm can file a complaint on behalf of the firm without any authorisation. It was observed at page 541: “17. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Reshmi Constructions v. Laxman Vithal Chunekar, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2894 : (2014) 5 Mah LJ 537 that the partner of a firm can file a complaint on behalf of the firm without any authorisation. It was observed at page 541: “17. From the above provisions of the Act, it is clear that every partner is an agent of the Firm and his other partners for the purpose of business of the firm, and the acts of every partner bind the firm and his partners, unless, of course, the partner had, in fact, no authority to act for the firm and his other partners. The learned trial Magistrate relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Alka Toraskar v. State of Goa, 2007 (1) Goa L.T. 159, which pertains to a Co-operative Society. The trial Magistrate further relied upon Fragrant Leasing and Finance Co. Ltd. v. Jagdish Katuria, 2008 All Mr. (Cri.) Journal 3 and the judgment in the case of Chico Ursula D'Souza v. Goa Plast Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (6) Mh. L.J. 353: 2008 (3) Mh. L.J. (Cri.) 323: 2009 (1) All Mr. 290, both of which pertain to Company. Admittedly, a Company is a separate juristic person distinct from its directors or shareholders, and the Company acts through the resolution passed by the Board of Directors. Because of the above, a person who claims to represent another is bound to produce an authority or power which entitles him to appear. The above is not the case with the Partnership Firm. As has already been seen above, each partner is an agent of the Firm. In the present case, it is not that some person, on the strength of a power of attorney, had filed a complaint and had deposed on behalf of the complainant. In the present case, the complaint was not filed by PW 1, but it was filed by the Firm, through PW 1, as a partner of that Firm. The person who deposed on behalf of the complainant was one of the partners of the said Complainant-Firm. In fact, the agreement dated 5-4-2005 was signed by the same partner, Shri Pandharinath Chafadkar (PW 1), for himself and as attorney of the other two partners, Arun Chafadkar and Narayan Nigalye. The person who deposed on behalf of the complainant was one of the partners of the said Complainant-Firm. In fact, the agreement dated 5-4-2005 was signed by the same partner, Shri Pandharinath Chafadkar (PW 1), for himself and as attorney of the other two partners, Arun Chafadkar and Narayan Nigalye. In the circumstances above, the finding of the Trial Magistrate that there was no authority for PW 1 to file the complaint or to depose on behalf of the complainant is not correct. 31. Thus, the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complaint was not filed by an authorised person. 32. The learned Trial Court did not go into the other aspects and dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that it was not filed by a competent person. Therefore, there is no option but to remit the matter to the learned Trial Court for recording the finding on merits. This Court can also record a finding on the merit, but doing so would deprive an aggrieved party of a right to prefer an appeal against the finding recorded by this Court and therefore, such a course is not advisable. 33. The reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Shirgul Filling Station vs. Kamal Sharma, 2025:HHC:21725-DB is misplaced because in Shirgul Filling Station (supra), no material was brought on record to show that the complainant was the payee or the holder of the cheque whereas in the present case the accused has not disputed the fact in the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the Shirgul Filling Station (supra) by the complainant. 34. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 15.10.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Shimla, is ordered to be set aside, and the matter is remitted to the learned Trial Court for its fresh disposal as per the law. The parties, through their respective learned counsel, are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on November, 2025. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith so as to reach the learned Trial Court well before the date fixed. 35. It is expressly made clear that this Court has not given any finding on merits except on the maintainability of the complaint.