Page No.# 1/11 GAHC030006042025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Crl.)/41/2025 Union of India R/b Asst. Commissioner, Customs Division Aizawl VERSUS Smt. Bawlthangpuii W/o Lalhmingmawii, H.No.177, Near Zoram Baptist Church, Zokhawthar, Champhai District Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Johny L Tochhawng Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu Linked Case : Crl.A./25/2025 Union of India R/b Asst. Commissioner Customs Division Aizawl VERSUS Smt. Bawlthangpuii W/o Lalhmingmawia H.No. 177 Near Zoram Baptist Church Zokhawthar Champhai District Page No.# 2/11 Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Johny L Tochhawng Advocate for the Respondent : Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI ORDER 02.09.2026 Heard Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned counsel appearing for the applicant. Also heard Mr. Lalrokunga Pautu, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. By way of this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the applicant is seeking condonation of delay of 406 days in filing special leave application for setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 25.01.2024 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Champhai, Judicial District, in Criminal Complaint No. 22 of 2021, whereby the respondent/accused was acquitted under Section 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 [hereinafter referred to as the 1962 Act]. 3. It is the specific case of the applicant that there had been no intentional or willful negligence on the part of the applicant in filing the application for leave belatedly and that the delay occurred on account of inadvertent procedural checks, movement of files and other administrative processes. 4. Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that the delay was beyond the control of the Page No.# 3/11 applicant and, therefore, warrants a liberal consideration by this Court. 5. He relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132. 6. Per contra, Mr. Pautu, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submits that there is no explanation whatsoever for the period between the receipt of the judgment and order by the applicant on 15.03.2024 and the letter dated 05.07.2024 issued by the applicant to the counsel seeking legal opinion. He further submits that although some explanation has been furnished for the subsequent period, the same does not satisfactorily account for the delay. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent further draws the attention of this Court to the order dated 11.05.2026, whereby the applicant was specifically granted an opportunity to file an additional affidavit explaining the aforesaid periods of delay. He submits that although an additional affidavit was filed on 09.06.2026, there is still no explanation whatsoever for the period between 15.03.2024 and 05.07.2024. He further submits that the explanation furnished with regard to the subsequent period is vague and inadequate and cannot constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the Apex Court has repeatedly held that the State Government has no inherent right to seek condonation of delay and that the law of limitation applies equally to the State Government. In support of his submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of Bihar & Ors. v. Deo Kumar Singh & Ors., reported in (2022) 16 SCC 483. Page No.# 4/11 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. I have also duly considered the decisions relied upon at the Bar. 10. It appears that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Champhai Judicial District, in Criminal Complaint No. 22 of 2021, by judgment and order dated 25.01.2024, acquitted the respondent under Section 135(1) of 1962 Act. 11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the present application seeking leave to file a criminal appeal has been preferred. There is, however, a delay of 406 days in filing the same. 12. The explanation furnished by the applicant, in substance, is that the judgment and order dated 25.01.2024 was received by the office of the Assistant Commissioner, Customs Division, Aizawl, on 15.03.2024; thereafter, a request for legal opinion was made to the Departmental Counsel on 05.07.2024 and the legal opinion was furnished on 08.08.2024. The grounds of appeal were subsequently approved by the competent authority on 16.04.2025, followed by further departmental and procedural steps for preparation, approval, compilation and filing of the appeal and the application for condonation of delay. The applicant has attributed the intervening periods to departmental procedures, obtaining approvals, leave of the Departmental Counsel, preparation and finalisation of the necessary papers and other administrative formalities. 13. This Court, by order dated 11.05.2026, having noticed that the delay between 15.03.2024 and 05.07.2024, as well as the delay between Page No.# 5/11 08.08.2024 and 16.04.2025, had not been satisfactorily explained, granted an opportunity to the applicant to file an additional affidavit explaining the aforesaid periods. 14. Pursuant thereto, an additional affidavit was filed on 09.06.2026. In the said affidavit, the applicant has explained the steps taken after receipt of the legal opinion and has sought to account for the subsequent period leading up to the approval of the grounds of appeal. However, even in the additional affidavit, there is no explanation whatsoever as to what transpired between 15.03.2024, when the judgment and order was received by the applicant, and 05.07.2024, when the request for legal opinion was made. 15. Mr. Johny L. Tochhawng, learned counsel for the applicant, in his usual fairness, submits that despite several communications addressed to the applicant seeking an explanation for the aforesaid period, no information was furnished to him. Thus, it is fairly conceded that, out of the total delay of 406 days, the delay of almost 113 days remains unexplained. 16. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Apex Court has clearly held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and that the length of delay is not the criterion; rather, it is the acceptability of the explanation which is the decisive consideration. Thus, while a liberal and justice-oriented approach may be adopted, the exercise of discretion necessarily rests upon the existence of sufficient cause. 17. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgement reads as under: Page No.# 6/11 “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation. fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Page No.# 7/11 limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari1 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality2. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 18. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court has to consider whether the explanation furnished by the applicant is sufficient to account for the delay sought to be condoned. The applicant has furnished some explanation for the subsequent period. However, the period between 15.03.2024 and 05.07.2024, accounting for almost 113 days, remains wholly unexplained. The significance of this omission is fortified by the fact that the applicant was specifically afforded an opportunity by this Court to explain the said period, but has failed to do Page No.# 8/11 so even thereafter. 19. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has held as under:- “11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice- oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or Page No.# 9/11 give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.” 20. The aforesaid decision undoubtedly recognizes that having regard to the impersonal nature of governmental functioning and the procedural red tape involved in decision-making, a certain amount of latitude may be permissible while considering an application filed by the State. However, such latitude does not dispense with the requirement of sufficient cause. In Chandra Mani (supra), the delay was condoned as the circumstances relied upon were found sufficient to explain the delay. In the present case, even upon adopting a pragmatic approach, the applicant has been unable to account for the initial period of almost 113 days. 21. Likewise, in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Deo Kumar Singh & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has held as under: “2. We are of the view that a clear signal has to be sent to the Government Authorities that they cannot approach the Court as and when they please, on account of gross incompetence of their officers and that too without taking any action against the officers concerned. No detail of this delay of 728 days has been given as if there is an inherent right to seek condonation of delay by State Government. The law of limitation apparently does not apply to the State Government according to its conduct.” Page No.# 10/11 22. The aforesaid decision reiterates that the State cannot claim condonation of delay as an inherent right merely because the delay is attributable to departmental processes. While a pragmatic approach may be adopted, the State must nevertheless satisfy the Court that sufficient cause existed for the period sought to be condoned. 23. This Court is conscious that refusal to condone delay may result in the applicant losing an opportunity to pursue the proposed appeal on merits. However, the present application does not fail merely on account of the length of the delay. The applicant has furnished an explanation for portions of the subsequent period, but almost 113 days out of the total delay of 406 days remain wholly unexplained. More importantly, the said period remains unexplained even after a specific opportunity was granted by this Court to account for it. 24. In the above circumstances, this Court is unable to record its satisfaction that sufficient cause has been shown for the entire delay of 406 days. The unexplained period of almost 113 days, in the facts of the present case, is sufficient to decline the discretionary relief sought by the applicant. 25. Accordingly, the application seeking condonation of delay stands dismissed. Consequently, the application seeking leave to file the criminal appeal also does not survive for consideration. 26. With the above observations, the instant interlocutory application stands disposed of. Page No.# 11/11 JUDGE Comparing Assistant