STATE OF HP AND ORS v. Surjeet Singh, S/o Late sh. Babu Ram
CMP.M/1588/2025 · 2025-12-03
Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Jiya Lal Bhardwaj
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 38841 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 38841 (HP) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
2025:HHC:41874 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CMP(M) No. 1588 of 2025 and LPA No. 827 of 2025 Decided on: 03
rd December
, 2025
____________________________________________________ __ State of Himachal Pradesh and others ....Applicants Versus Surjeet Singh
...Respondent ________________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the applicants: Mr. Rakesh Dhaulta, Additional Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)
CMP(M) No. 1588 of 2025 Keeping in view the averments made in the application, duly supported by an affidavit of the official, delay of 107 days’ in filing the appeal is condoned. The application stands disposed of.
2. Appeal be registered. LPA No. 827 of 2025
3. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 2063 of 2023 titled Surjeet Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, whereby the learned Single Judge has quashed the order dated 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 2025:HHC:41874 05.08.2022, whereby the request of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds for the post of Beldar has been rejected on the ground that as per the revised policy dated 07.03.2019, if one or more members of the family are already in Government service or in defence or Para Military Forces etc., the said person would not be eligible for consideration for compassionate appointment. The learned Single Judge was of the considered opinion that the revised policy would not be applicable, keeping in view the fact that father of the petitioner had died in harness on 15.09.2015 and therefore, on the ground that brother was serving in Military Forces (BSF) his case could not have been rejected. It was accordingly held that policy which was in vogue on the date of the death of the father had to be kept in mind and not the subsequent policy. Learned Single Judge has relied upon two judgments of the Apex Court in Secretary to Government Department of Education (Primary) and others vs. Bheemesh alias Bheemappa, (2021) 20 SCC 707, and State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Asish Awasthi, (2022) 2 SCC 157, to come to the conclusion that the policy prevalent at the time of death of the deceased employee is required to be considered and not the subsequent policy.
4. Similar circumstances had arisen in LPA No. 797 of 2025, where, we, while dismissing the appeal of the State have taken a
3 2025:HHC:41874 similar view while noticing the contention of the State, keeping in view the judgment in N.C. Santosh vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2020) 7 SCC 617, and another three Judge Bench judgment which has taken the contrary view in State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496, which was subsequent to the
judgment in N.C. Santosh case (supra). The relevant portion of our reasons to take the said view reads as under:-
“14. In spite of that the attitude of the State to pursue the litigation continue. The law as such has also been relied upon by the State primarily, placing reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in N.C. Santhosh Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2020) 7 SCC 617, wherein it has been held that consideration should be done as per the policy in force. 15. However, counsel for the respondent has fallen back on another three-Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496, decided on 29.09.2020, subsequent of the judgment of N.C. Santhosh case (supra), which was decided on 04.03.2020. The observations in subsequent judgment as such would go on to show that it is the date of demise which has to be seen, unless a subsequent policy is made applicable retrospectively. The relevant pragraph reads as under:-
“16. It is trite to say that there cannot be any inherent right to compassionate appointment but rather, it is a right based on certain criteria, especially to provide succour to a needy family. This has to be in terms of the applicable policy as existing on the date of demise, unless a subsequent policy is made applicable retrospectively. Insofar as providing succour is concerned, unfortunately, since the demise of the late father of the respondent, 11 years have passed and really speaking, the aspect of providing succour to the family immediately does not survive. We have still examined the matter in the conspectus of the
4 2025:HHC:41874 applicable policy. It is not in question that the Policy prevailing was one dated 18- 8-2008. Clause
12.1
clearly
prescribes workcharge/contingency fund and daily wager employees from compassionate appointment. The gravemen of the submission of the respondent is based on the classification of his late father as a permanent employee on account of having worked for more than 15 years and the consequent regularisation of his service.”
16. It is also to be noticed that in the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Bheemesh (2021) 20 SCC 707, while taking into consideration the three- Judge Bench judgment of N.C. Santhosh case (supra) another two Judge of the Apex Court as such had come to the conclusion that the fixed factor is only the date of death that does not change and therefore on account of the fact that the date of application and the date of
consideration of the policy would be different, the differential treatement should not be given to the employees. The relevant paragraph reads as under:-
“20. The important aspect about the conflict of opinion is that it revolves around two dates, namely, (i) date of death of the employee; and (ii) date of consideration of the application of the dependant. Out of these two dates, only one, namely, the date of death alone is a fixed factor that does not change. The next date, namely, the date of consideration of the claim, is something that depends upon many variables such as the date of filing of application, the date of attaining of majority of the claimant and the date on which the file is put up to the competent authority. There is no principle of statutory interpretation which permits a decision on the applicability of a rule, to be based upon an indeterminate or variable factor. Let us take for instance a hypothetical case where 2 government serviant dies in harness on 1-1-
2020. Let us assume that the dependants of these 2 deceased government servants make applications for appointment on 2 different dates say 29-5-2020 and 2-6-2020 and a modified Scheme comes into
5 2025:HHC:41874 force on 1-6-2020. If the date of consideration of the claim is taken to be the criteria for determining whether the modified Scheme applies or not, it will lead to two different results, one in respect of the person who made the application before 1-6-2020 and another in respect of the person who applied after 1-6-2020. In other words, if two employees die on the same date and the dependants of those employees apply on two different dates, one before the modified Scheme comes into force and another thereafter, they will come in for differential treatment if the date of application and the date of
consideration of the same are taken to be the deciding factor. A rule of interpretation which produces different results, depending upon what the individuals do or do not do, is inconceivable. This is why, the managements of a few banks, in the cases tabulated above, have introduced a rule in the modified scheme itself, which provides for all pending applications to be decided under the new/modified scheme. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the interpretation as to the applicability of a modified Scheme should depend only upon a determinate and fixed criteria such as the date of death and not an indeterminate and variable factor.”
17. Faced with this situation, the appellants-State has fallen back on the judgment of a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Others Vs. Abhishek Kumar (2024) 5 SCC 280, to point out that the view in N.C. Santhosh case (supra), was held to be correct.
18. We have gone through the above said judgment in which the judgment in Amit Shrivas case (supra) also of a three-Judge Bench, had been passed, subsequent to the
judgment in N.C. Santhosh case (supra) had not been brought to the notice of the said Bench as such.
19. It is in such circumstances, keeping in view the law on precedent, we are of the considered opinion that once there is a conflict as such between the two Benches of equal strength of the Apex Court the judgment which lays
6 2025:HHC:41874 down the law more elaborately is to be followed.
20. Reference can be made to the judgment of the FullBench in Indo Swiss Time Limited Vs. Umrao and Others AIR 1981 (Punjab & Haryana) 213, wherein it was observed as under:-
“23. Now the contention that the latest judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence irrespective of any other consideration does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior Court are of coequal Benches and therefore of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority are extant than both of them cannot be binding on the courts below. Inevitably a choice, though a difficult one, has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the superior Court are earlier or later is a
consideration which appears to me as hardly relevant.”
21. Resultantly, we are of the considered opinion that the
order dated 31.07.2024, passed by the learned Single Judge, in such circumstances is well justified and therefore we not only uphhold the same but also quash the order dated 16.09.2025, passed by the Additional Secretary (PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh during the pendency of the appeal, whereby the rejection had been done as noticed above.
22. It is also pertinent to notice that the same view has been followed by us in LPA No.214 of 2025 titled State of Himachal Pradesh & others Vs. Sh. Radha Mohan, decided on 06.05.2025.
7 2025:HHC:41874
23. Resultantly, the present appeal stands dismissed.
24. Pending miscellaneous application(s) if any, are accordingly disposed off.”
5. Thus, a consistent view has been followed by us and therefore, we do not see any plausible reason to take a different view from the above mentioned view, since our view is supported by the observations of the Apex Court, that the date of death is one date which remains fixed, whereas the date of consideration and the revised policies will always keeps on changing, which can put the employee at a disadvantage, only on account of the delay in consideration in many cases.
6. Resultantly, we dismiss the present Letters Patent Appeal, along with other miscellaneous application(s), if any.
( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice 03 rd December
, 2025
( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (Anurag) Judge