Judgment : Romesh Verma, J. The present appeal arises out of judgment, as passed by the learned Special Judge-IV, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 18- D/VII/2013, dated 23.8.2014, whereby the accused- respondent has been acquitted of the charges under Sections 15 and 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the Act) in case FIR No. 1/13, dated 16.1.2013, registered at Police Station State CID Bharari, Shimla. 2 The case of the prosecution is that on 16.1.2013, Inspector Ramesh Kumar, SI Subhash Chand, HC Vinay Kumar and Constable Ravinder Singh, CID Crime Branch, Dharamshala were going in a private vehicle bearing registration No. HP40B-0102 and at about 4:45 P.M. in the evening, they were present at Sukhar Bharana. At the relevant time, Vice-President Harbans Singh and Ward Member Kewal Singh were interacting with them and in the meantime one private vehicle came from Rehan side and it was going towards Gangath (Indora) and in the said vehicle, there was only driver. When they tried to stop the vehicle on the suspicion that the said vehicle must be carrying  illicit wood or liquor etc. the driver of the vehicle ran away from the spot and the police officials along with independent witnesses chased the vehicle in question, which was found about 2 ½ kms away from the spot and the driver of the vehicle after leaving the vehicle ran away towards jungle Kher. It was stated that while the said driver was running, the witnesses Harbans Singh and Kewal Singh recognized/identified the driver of the vehicle to be Rajesh Kumar  alias Gullabu,  son  of   Sh. Karam  Chand, resident of Village Chattroli. The police party tried their level best to intercept the driver, however on account of dense forest, he managed to flee away from the spot. Inspector Ramesh Kumar along with other police officials gave their personal search to the aforesaid witnesses and thereafter the Bolero vehicle bearing temporary registration No. HP-33T-9277 was inspected and copy of insurance, invoice bills, sale letter in the name of one Rajeev Thakur, son of Sh. Narinder Singh, having been kept in a black coloured bag, along with four booklets, one mobile phone and pen drive were recovered from the dash board of the vehicle. Narinder Singh, having been kept in a black coloured bag, along with four booklets, one mobile phone and pen drive were recovered from the dash board of the vehicle. From the dickey of the said vehicle at the back side, one carton box was recovered and on opening the same, 19 packets of parvon Spas capsules, each packet containing 200 capsules, total 3800 capsules; 80 pouches of pyremol spasm each containing 100 capsules total 8000 capsules, two black polythene bags of poppy husk weighing one kilogram and 25 injections of Brufen were found. Thereafter NCB forms, in triplicate, were prepared and the case property was taken into possession and sealed in a gunny bag, in which ‘Sarswati Sugar Canb’ Sugar was written, with seven seals of seal impression “H”. The aforesaid vehicle was taken into possession vide seizure memo in the presence of witnesses. After obtaining specimen seal impression on a separate piece of cloth, seal after use was handed over to witness Harbans Singh. 3 The Investigating Officer, after preparing the rukka, sent the same through FAX to State CID Bharari Shimla, on the basis of which formal FIR came to be registered against the accused. During the investigation, the Investigating Officer prepared the spot map and recorded the statements of the witnesses. Special report was submitted to the Dy.S.P. State CID Dharamshala and the accused was accordingly arrested. 4 The case property was also sent to SFSL Junga for chemical analysis and on receipt of the SFSL report and after completing all codal formalities, final report was filed in the court. 5 On finding a prima facie case, the accused was charged for offences punishable under Sections 15 and 22 of the Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6 In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses in support of its case. Thereafter, the respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him and claimed himself to be innocent. However, the respondent did not lead any evidence in his defence. 7 The learned trial court, after evaluating the oral as well as documentary evidence, acquitted the respondent, as aforesaid, constraining the appellant-State to file the instant appeal. 8 Mr. However, the respondent did not lead any evidence in his defence. 7 The learned trial court, after evaluating the oral as well as documentary evidence, acquitted the respondent, as aforesaid, constraining the appellant-State to file the instant appeal. 8 Mr. Y. W. Chauhan, learned Senior Additional Advocate General would argue that the findings recorded by the learned Court below are totally perverse and therefore, deserve to be set aside. 9 On the other hand, Mr. Narender Singh Thakur, Advocate, has supported the impugned judgment and urged that since the same is based on evidence, it warrants no interference. 10 We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case in detail. 11 In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to securitize the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution. 12 In the instant case, PW12 Ramesh Kumar is the Investigating Officer, who was examined on 3.6.2014. He deposed that in the year 2013, he was posted as Incharge, Crime Cell, CID Unit, Dharamshala. On 16.1.2013 he along with  PW5 SI Subhash Chand,  PW4 HC Vinay Kumar, PW3 Constable Harvinder Singh, was on patrolling duty for crime detection at Sukhar Bharana in the area of Police Station Nurpur. He stated that they were in a private vehicle No. HP- 40B-0102 at Sukhar Bharana, UP Pradhan PW1 Harbans Singh Rajput and PW2 Ward Member Kewal Singh met them where a bolero vehicle, which was not clearly visible, was intercepted by the police. On suspicion, the police party signalled to stop the vehicle, but the driver of the vehicle did not stop the same and drove it towards Indora side. The said vehicle was chased along with witnesses and after about 2-3 kms, the driver of the vehicle stopped the same and fled away from the scene. Despite efforts, the driver of the vehicle could not be traced, but the witnesses Harbans Singh and Kewal Singh identified him to be Rajesh Kumar alias Gulabu, son of late Shri Karam Chand, resident of Village Chhatroli, Tehsil and Police Station Nurpur. PW12 gave his personal search to witnesses and thereafter the bolero vehicle was  searched in the presence of the witnesses. The registration number of the vehicle was HP-33(T)-9277. PW12 gave his personal search to witnesses and thereafter the bolero vehicle was  searched in the presence of the witnesses. The registration number of the vehicle was HP-33(T)-9277. On checking the vehicle, one mobile, documents of the vehicle, one pen drive and four manuals of the vehicle were recovered from the dash board of the vehicle. On checking the dickey of the vehicle, cardboard carton  was  found,  in  which  19  packets  of  Parvon  Spas capsules each containing 200 capsules, total 3800 capsules, 80 pouches of pyremol spasm each containing 100 capsules, total 8000 capsules, 25 injections of Brufen and poppy husk were recovered. On weighing, poppy husk was found to be 1 kg. All the aforesaid drugs and poppy husk were kept in the same parcel and sealed in a gunny bag with seven seals of seal impression ‘H’. The specimen samples of seal ‘H’ were obtained on three pieces of cloth. The sample seal is Ext. PW12/A. NCB form, in triplicate, was filled in. The copy of NCB form is Ext. PW8/E. 13 The seal after use was handed over to witness Harbans Singh. The case property so recovered was taken into possession vide seizure memo, Ext. PW1/A in the presence of the witnesses. Rukka Ext. PW8/H, was drawn on the spot and the same was sent along with case property to Police Station CID Bharari though HC Vinay Kumar for registration of the case. PW12 also deposed that prior to this, rukka, Ext.PW8/H through FAX No. 01893 220577 was also sent to Police Station CID Bharari. PW12 stated that during the investigation, he prepared the spot map, Ext. PW12/B and sent special report, Ext. PW7/A, to Dy.S.P. CID Unit Dharamshala through Constable Rajinder Singh. PW12 identified the case property in the court to be the same which was recovered from  cardboard carton, Ext.P112 kept in the dickey of the Bolero vehicle and stated that the case property was sealed in parcel, Ext. P113. He further deposed that the accused was searched in his house as well as in the house of his relatives, but could not be traced. During the investigation, the accused failed to produce any licence qua the aforesaid drugs as well as poppy husk. P113. He further deposed that the accused was searched in his house as well as in the house of his relatives, but could not be traced. During the investigation, the accused failed to produce any licence qua the aforesaid drugs as well as poppy husk. The owner of the bolero vehicle was found to be one Rajeev Thakur, son of Shri Narinder Singh, resident of Village Bhatech, Tehsil Shahpur, who produced the documents of the vehicle, which were taken into possession vide seizure memo, Ext. PW 10/A. Copies of R.C. and contract permit of the vehicle are Ext.PA and Ext. PB, respectively. He stated that after completion of the investigation, the case file was handed over to SHO, Police Station Bharari. 14 In his cross-examination, PW12 stated that distance of Sukhar Bharana from Nurpur may be 15-20 kms. The police party signaled to stop the vehicle in question, but the driver of the vehicle did not stop the same and fled away. He further stated that they could not identify the driver of the aforesaid vehicle. He stated that the witnesses Harbans Singh and Kewal Singh identified the accused in the presence of HC Vinay Kumar and all of them were present at the spot. He admitted that Rajeev Thakur was found on 4.2.2013 on which date his statement was recorded. He stated that during investigation certificate, Mark R was procured by the police from Rajeev Thakur and he denied that the certificate is false and incorrect. He admitted that he did not record the statement of any such witness, who could say that the accused was the driver of the jeep of Rajeev Thakur. He further stated that he did not procure any entry in this behalf from any toll barrier showing the accused as a driver of the aforesaid jeep. 15 It is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused at the relevant date and time sped away with the vehicle from the spot, when he was signaled to stop and on suspicion, was chased by the police along with independent witnesses in a private vehicle and at a distance of about 2 ½ kms, the vehicle of the accused was found parked idle on the road. 16 PW1 Harbans Singh and PW2 Kewal Singh are the independent witnesses, who, according to the prosecution, had noticed and identified the accused in the presence of HC Vinay Kumar and police party when he fled away towards the jungle after leaving his vehicle on the road. 17 Adverting to the statement of PW1 Harbans Lal, he deposed that on 16.1.2013, he was present at his home. PW1 stated that he was summoned  by the police through  a Constable and thereafter he reached the road at Sukhar Bharana. He stated that one vehicle was parked there on road. He did not remember the number of the said vehicle. He stated that the vehicle was searched in his and Kewal Singh’s presence and before search of the vehicle nothing happened in his presence. Though he has admitted that some capsules, poppy husk and injections were recovered from the vehicle in his presence, however, he deposed that he had not seen the said articles. He again stated that the capsules, poppy husk and injections were seen by him, which were sealed in the parcel. He stated that he did not know the person, who was driving the vehicle because no other person was present there. He stated that he had not seen the accused at the spot. At this stage, PW1 was found to have resiled from the his previous statement and accordingly was permitted to be cross- examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. 18 In his cross-examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, PW1 denied that on 16.1.2013 he along with Kewal Singh was present at place Sukhar Bharana along with police party. He further denied that a vehicle bearing No. HP- 33(T)-9277 came at spot being driven by the accused present in the court and the police had given the signal to stop the vehicle and that the accused  had fled away with the vehicle towards Gangath side. He stated that it is incorrect the police officials gave their personal search to them. He admitted that in total 11800 capsules of Parvon Spas were recovered from the vehicle, which were kept in a box. He admitted that 25 injections of Brufen and poppy husk kept in two separate polythene bags were also recovered from the vehicle. He admitted that poppy husk was weighed at the spot and its weight was found to be 1 kg. He admitted that 25 injections of Brufen and poppy husk kept in two separate polythene bags were also recovered from the vehicle. He admitted that poppy husk was weighed at the spot and its weight was found to be 1 kg. He denied that  the documents of the vehicle were also recovered from the vehicle itself in his presence. He further denied that other articles like pen drive, mobile phone and key of the vehicle were also recovered in his presence. He also denied that the accused was identified by him, who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. He voluntarily stated that he had seen the accused for the first time in the Court only. 19 Sh. Kewal Singh, entered the witness box as PW2 and stated that on 16.1.2013, he remained associated in the investigation by the police. He deposed that vehicle No. HP- 33(T)-9277 was searched at a place Sukhar Bharana and recovery was effected. He stated that 19 packets of Parvon Spas, Ex.P1 to Ext. P19, 80 pouches of Pyremol Spasm, Ext. P20 to Ext.99, two bags of poppy husk, Ext. P100 and Ext. P101 and 10 injections of buprenorphine were recovered from the vehicle in his presence. He stated that in total 25 injections were recovered and the above articles were found in a box Ext. P112. He also stated that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the spot. PW1 was also permitted to be cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor as he had resiled from his previous statement. 20 In his cross-examination conducted by the Public Prosecutor, PW2 stated that it is incorrect that when he along with Harbans and police officials was present at Sukhar Bharana, the accused came there with the vehicle from which the recovery was effected. He denied that the accused fled away with the vehicle from the spot when police signaled him to stop the vehicle. He denied that before search, the police officials had given their personal search to him. He denied that the accused was well known to him and in order to save him, he was deposing falsely in the Court. He also denied that the accused was known to him personally. Self stated that he had seen the accused for the first time in the Court only. He denied that the accused was well known to him and in order to save him, he was deposing falsely in the Court. He also denied that the accused was known to him personally. Self stated that he had seen the accused for the first time in the Court only. 21 In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PW3 HHC Ravinder Singh, who stated that on 16.1.2013 he along with Inspector Ramesh Kumar, SI Subhash Chand, HC Vinay was on patrolling duty at Sukhar Bharana. Harbans Singh and Kewal Singh were also present  at Sukhar Bharana. A vehicle came from Rehan side, which was being driven by the accused. Inspector Ramesh Kumar gave signal to stop the vehicle, but the vehicle was not stopped there. They chased the vehicle and about 2 ½ kms away from the spot, the accused left the vehicle on the road and fled away towards the jungle. He specifically stated that the accused/respondent was identified by the local witnesses Harbans Singh and Kewal Singh. He stated that on reaching the spot, the police officials gave their personal search to the aforesaid witnesses, but nothing incriminatory was found from them. During the search of the vehicle, a box was recovered, which was containing 19 packets of parvon spas capsules, 80 pouches of Pyremol Spasm capsules, two polythene bags of poppy husk and 25 injections of buprenorphine. 22 In his cross-examination, PW3 deposed that he had stated about the name of of the accused in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and that he had not identified the accused. 23 PW4 HC Vinay Kumar has deposed on the same and similar lines as stated by PW3. He stated that he did not know as to who was driving the vehicle as the vehicle was not stopped and the accused fled away from the spot. 24 In his cross-examination, he stated that they had checked about 6-7 vehicles during the nakka and the Bolero which was checked by them was owned by a person from Shahpur, however his name was Jimmi. 25 PW5 SI Subhash Chand has also reiterated the statements of PW3 and PW4. He has stated that PW1 Harbans Singh had identified driver of the vehicle as Rajesh Kumar present in the Court. He did not state that the accused was also identified by PW2 Kewal Singh. 25 PW5 SI Subhash Chand has also reiterated the statements of PW3 and PW4. He has stated that PW1 Harbans Singh had identified driver of the vehicle as Rajesh Kumar present in the Court. He did not state that the accused was also identified by PW2 Kewal Singh. 26 In his cross-examination, PW5 has stated that the Bolero had come at the spot at about 4:45 P.M. and the witnesses were not called, but they were already present on the spot. He has admitted that he had not recorded the statement of any witness who could say that the accused used to drive the vehicle i.e. Bolero. He stated that they had not made any investigation from any check post to ascertain that accused was driving the said vehicle. 27 PW6 Sunil Thakur, who owns a printing press at Nurpur, deposed that one person had come to his printing press at 7:15 PM. and made a request to send the message through FAX to Police Station, CID Bharari (Shimla). 28 PW7 HHC Ravinder Kumar, Reader to Dy.S.P. CID, has deposed that on 17.1.2013 Dy.S.P. Rajeev Attri had given him one special report, Ext.PW7/A at about 9:30 A.M. for entering the substance in the register. 29 The prosecution examined HC Prakash Chand as PW8, who stated that he remained posted as MHC, Police Station State CID Bharari since November 2009. On 16.1.2013 at about 7:30 P.M. he had received rukka which was sent by Inspector Ramesh Kumar from Nurpur through FAX. He handed over the rukka Ext.PW8/A to SHO, SI Chet Ram, who directed him to register the case FIR, Ext. PW8/B. 30 Rajeev Kumar, who is owner of Bolero Jeep No. HP- 01-D-3946, was examined by the prosecution as PW9. He stated that he is the owner of the aforesaid Bolero jeep and its temporary number was HP-33 (T)-9277. He stated that he had given his aforesaid jeep to his friend Rajesh Sharma, resident of Bohad, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. He could not tell the parentage of Rajesh Sharma. He stated that accused Rajesh Kumar present in the Court is not the same person to whom he had handed over his aforesaid vehicle. He stated that he has no knowledge about the case. 31 Learned Public Prosecutor requested to declare PW9 as hostile and made prayer to cross-examine him. He stated that accused Rajesh Kumar present in the Court is not the same person to whom he had handed over his aforesaid vehicle. He stated that he has no knowledge about the case. 31 Learned Public Prosecutor requested to declare PW9 as hostile and made prayer to cross-examine him. In his cross-examination, he stated that he did not issue certificate, Mark R, however  he admitted that he had signed  the same. He stated that it is incorrect that when he went to the spot, the accused was also there along with police. He has admitted that the accused is resident of Village Chhatroli. He has denied that the accused/respondent is his friend to whom he had given his aforesaid jeep. 32 PW10 Akhil Rana deposed that Rajeev Thakur had handed over the documents of Bolero Jeep No. HP-01D-3946 to the police vide memo, Ext.PW10/A. 33 PW11 HC Balbir Singh, stated that he was posted as I.O. at Police Station, CID Bharari. On 23.1.2013 HC Parkash, MHC Police Station handed over a parcel sealed with seven seals of ‘H’ and six seals of ‘R’ vide R.C. No.5/13 to be deposited with SFSL Junga, which he deposited at SFSL Junga. 34 Sub Inspector Chet Ram was examined as PW13, who stated that in the year 2013 he was posted as SHO in Police Station State CID Bharari (Shimla). On 16.1.12013 at about 7.30 P.M., MHC Parkash, Police Station State CID Bharari, produced before him one rukka sent by Inspector Ramesh Kumar from Nurpur through FAX message, Ext. PW8/A. He directed the MHC to register the case. On the basis of which, FIR, Ext.PW8/B was got registered. On 17.1.2013, HC Vinay Kumar produced before him original rukka, PW8/H along with case property i.e. one plastic bag sealed with 7 seal impressions of seal ‘H’ containing 19 boxes of Parvon Spas drug, each box of parvon Spas was containing 200 capsules, total 3800 capsules, 80 boxes of Pyremol Spasm each containing 100 capsules, total 8000 capsules along with 25 injections of Brufen and one kilogram of poppy husk. He checked the seals affixed on the parcel and thereafter resealed the parcel, Ext. P113 by putting six seal impressions of seal ‘R’. 35 The learned court below has acquitted the respondent since the prosecution has failed to prove its case and connect the respondent to the offences for which he was charged. He checked the seals affixed on the parcel and thereafter resealed the parcel, Ext. P113 by putting six seal impressions of seal ‘R’. 35 The learned court below has acquitted the respondent since the prosecution has failed to prove its case and connect the respondent to the offences for which he was charged. 36 In the present case, prime and most important fact is about the identity of the respondent. The specific case of the prosecution is that the respondent was driving the vehicle in question and after seeing the police officials, he fled away from the scene and disappeared in a jungle and thereafter the police officials searched the said vehicle and 19 packets of parvon Spas capsules, total 3800 capsules; 80 pouches of pyremol spasm each containing 100 capsules total 8000 capsules, two black polythene bags of poppy husk weighing one kilogram and 25 injections of Brufen were recovered from the vehicle. 37 PW12 I.O. Ramesh Kumar in his statement has categorically stated that  the witnesses PW1 Harbans Singh and PW2 Kewal Singh had identified the accused to be Rajesh Kumar alias Gulabu, son of late Shri Karam Chand, resident of Village Chhatroli, Tehsil and Police Station Nurpur, however perusal of the statements of PW1 and PW2 shows that they have categorically and specifically denied the said fact. 38 PW1 Harbans Singh, in his examination-in-chief, has stated that he does not know the person, who was driving the vehicle because no other person was present there. He had not seen the accused at spot. Even in his cross-examination conducted by the learned Public Prosecutor, he has stated that it is incorrect that accused was identified by him, who was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. He has voluntarily deposed that the accused was seen by him only in the court for the first time. 39 To the similar effect is statement of PW2 Kewal Singh, who has not supported the case of the prosecution against the accused. In his cross-examination conducted by the learned Public Prosecutor,  he has voluntarily stated that he had seen the accused for the first time in the court only. 40 Story of the prosecution in this case is demolished by the testimonies of PW1 and PW2, because the police officials, PW4, PW5 and PW12 have stated that the accused was identified by PW1 and PW2, whereas they have denied this fact. 40 Story of the prosecution in this case is demolished by the testimonies of PW1 and PW2, because the police officials, PW4, PW5 and PW12 have stated that the accused was identified by PW1 and PW2, whereas they have denied this fact. The prosecution has failed to establish its case and the witnesses on which, it was relying upon, have not corroborated or proved the case of the prosecution beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 41 Identity of the accused was very material in the present case, but the said fact has not been proved or established by the prosecution and on that account, the story, as projected by the prosecution, could not be believed. 42 The prosecution ought to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence, as reproduced supra, clearly demonstrates that the accused was not seen while he was fleeing away from the spot towards jungle. The vehicle in question was found parked and at the relevant time, driver of the vehicle had already fled away and as such he was not seen by anyone while he was fleeing away. 43 From the record, it reveals that the accused/respondent was identified only by PW1 and PW2, however they have categorically stated contrary to the story as projected by the prosecution. 44 Apart from the statements of PW1 and PW2, PW9 Rajeev Thakur, owner of the vehicle in question, has also not supported the case of the prosecution. He has denied that he had given the vehicle to the accused and further that he had issued certificate, mark R. This witness was very material to connect the accused as driver of the vehicle in question, but he has not supported the prosecution, as such the prosecution case becomes doubtful and on this score also the judgment as passed by the learned Court below is sustainable and there is no infirmity in the same. 45 The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its various decisions, has held that in the case of acquittal, scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. The Apex Court has held that unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible   or  perverse,  only in those circumstances interference can be done by the appellate court. The Apex Court has held that unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible   or  perverse,  only in those circumstances interference can be done by the appellate court. It is  not permissible to interfere with the findings of acquittal and equally, if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the appellate court finds the  way of  conviction  to be more  probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all. 46 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2119/2010, titled as State of Rajasthan vs. Kistoora Ram, decided on 28.7.2022, has held as under:- “The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible,  it  is  not permissible  to  set  aside  an  order  of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 47 Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Constable 907 Surendra Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433 , has held as under:- “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ 40. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent  perversity;  that  the  same  is  based  on  a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. In the instant case, the learned trial judge on the basis of ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses has held that the accused No.1-Jagdish Singh is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC as well as under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act. Since the appeal of the said accused No.1-Jadgish Singh is disposed of as abated, we did not go into the findings against the said accused.” 48 In Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 (4) Scale 513, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “9. Apart from that, it is to be noted that the present case is a case of reversal of acquittal. The law with regard to interference by the Appellate Court is very well crystallized. Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Though, there are a catena of judgments on the issue, we will only refer to two judgments which the High Court itself has reproduced in the impugned judgment, which are as reproduced below: “13. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P. (2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that:- "In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and !aw. In case of Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P. (2016) 4 SCC 397, the Supreme Court has held that:- "In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and !aw. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Appellate Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded." 14. Similar, In case of Harljan Bhala Teja vs. State of Gujarat (2016) 12 SCC 665 , the Supreme Court has held that:- "No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open far the appellate court to express the right conclusion after reappreciating the evidence If the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused." 49 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Dy. 23115/2025, titled as Brijesh Singh vs. State of U.P., decided on 18.6.2025, has held as under:- “Law is well settled that interference in an appeal against acquittal should be made only if the view taken by the Courts below is perverse or if no two views are possible and the only logical conclusion from the evidence is to record the guilt of the accused. In the present case, we do not find any view other than that taken by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court acquitting the respondents of the charges is permissible.” 50 Perusal of the judgments, as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, demonstrates that the scope of interference in the case of acquittal is very limited. It has been held that the prosecution in order to prove its case must establish the guilt of the accused from the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. It has been held that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. The facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has been further held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude  every possible  hypothesis  except the one to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. 51 It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 52 In the present case, the prosecution has failed to point out an error in the judgment passed by the learned court below. The learned court below has rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record after thrashing the entire evidence and material for the determination of the case and thus has rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges framed against him. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Court below has rightly passed the judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent. The view taken by the learned trial court is plausible as well as possible one. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Court below has rightly passed the judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent. The view taken by the learned trial court is plausible as well as possible one. 53 Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. 54 The bails bonds furnished by the accused/respondent are discharged. 55 Records be sent down.