[2025:RJ-JP:44091] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 4844/2019 Ramesh Chand S/o Shri Bodhan Ram, R/o Mohalla Nagli, Ashok Police Station Kotwali, District Alwar. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp. 2. Station House Officer, Anti Electricity Theft, Police Station Dausa, Raj. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3676/2019 Mahendra Kumar S/o Shri Ram Karan, R/o Plot No.18, Ward No.2, Bandikui, Police Station Bandikui, District Dausa. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp. 2. Station House Officer, Anti Electricity Theft, Police Station Dausa, Raj. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : None in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 4844/2019 Mr. Deen Dayal Sharma, Adv. in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3676/2019 For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vivek Choudhary, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment 03/11/2025 1. Aggrieved by order dated 16.04.2019 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Dausa, District Dausa, whereby application for extension of period of limitation [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (2 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] filed by the prosecution has been allowed and cognizance has been taken against the petitioners under Sections 135, 136 and 150 of Electricity Act has been taken, the petitioners have filed the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions, as also prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.646/2011 registered at Police Station Anti-Electricity Theft (APTPS), Dausa. 2. Facts in this case are not much disputed. One FIR No.646/2011 was registered in Police Station APTPS, Dausa with the allegation with regard to illegally installing transformer of 25 KVA without following the proper process. It was further found that such act was done in conspiracy with Ramkishore Sharma, Store Keeper, Ramesh Chand Saini officiating an Assistant Engineer, Junior Engineer Mahendra Kumar and Vishram Meena who was a contractor. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the FIR has been registered for the offence under Sections 135 and 136 of Electricity Act, 2003, in which the maximum punishment provided is sentence of 3 years. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per Section 468 Cr.P.C., no court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of period of limitation and sub section 2 clause (c) of the Code prescribes for a period of limitation which shall be 3 years for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. By relying upon the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the instant case, the limitation for taking cognizance was 3 years, which was to be computed from the date of lodging of FIR. In the instant case as FIR was lodged on 28.05.2011, therefore, the limitation of 3 years expired on 27.05.2014, however, in the [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (3 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] instant case, challan was filed by the Police Authorities on 15.11.2018 and cognizance was taken on 16.04.2019, which was beyond limitation and the court below had no jurisdiction whatsoever to take cognizance in view of specific provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. Application for extension of limitation has been illegally allowed by the court below. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. Vs. State of AP reported in (2003) 8 SCC 559 and Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions and stated that Section 473 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to take cognizance after extending the prescribed limitation period in case the delay occurred has sufficiently been explained by the prosecution authority. In the instant case, one specific application under Section 470(2), 4-B and 473 Cr.P.C. was filed by the Investigating Officer in which following reasons were given :- "1- ;g gS fd miHkksDrk muokuh izdj.k ,QvkbZvkj uEcj 646@11 fnukkad 01-06-11 /kkjk 135-136-150- fo- v- 2003 esa iaftc) gqvk FkkA 2- ;g gS fd blds ckn eqyfte }kjk vius xkao vyhiqj mi[k.M clok esa d`f"k dusD'ku ij Fkzh Qsl 25 dsoh, VªkalQkeZj lhf;y ua 13613 fuxe d lgefr ds fcuk LFkkfir dj fo|qr dh pksjh vius d`f"k dk;Z esa dj jgk FkkA 3- ;g gS fd Fkzh Qsl VkaªlQkeZj lhfj;y ua 13613 dks tCr fd;k x;k gSa 4- ;g gS fd eq> I/O dk LFkukUr.k fnukad 23-7-013 dks Fkkukf/kdkj fo|qr pksjh fujks/kd iqfyl Fkkuk nkSlk ls iqfyl eq[;ky; t;iqj gks x;k FkkA 5- ;g gS fd eq> vuqla/kkku vf/kdkj dk iqu% fnukad 30-10-14 dks LFkkukUrj.k gksdj Fkkukf/kdkj ds in ij fu;qfDr gqbZ Fkh bl i'pkr eqyfte dh irkjlh ds iz;kl djrk jgkA [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (4 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] 6- ;g fd 25 dsoh, Fkzh Qsl VªkalQkeZj lhfj;y ua 13613 dk fjdkMZ Hk.Mkj fu;a=d nkSlk o lgk;d vfHk;ark iol clok dk;kZy; ls fjdkMZ izkIr gksus o eqyfte irkjlh gksus esa nsjh uk gqvk gS 7- ;g gS fd U;k;ky; esa ckn vUos"k.k pkyku is'k fd;k tk jgk gS tks le; vo/kh esa foyEc ls is'k fd;k tk jgk gS izdj.k esa le; fjdkMZ izkIr ugha gksus o eqyfte ds ugha feyus ds dkj.kh; foyEc gqvk gS" 4. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that application was duly considered by the court below and it was found that the reasons for delay have been sufficiently explained by the Investigating Officer and the court below has also considered that the offence committed by the petitioner was relating to public property, therefore, court below has committed no mistake in condoning the delay. Hence, no error whatsoever has been committed by the court below in taking cognizance against the petitioner. 5. Perused the record and carefully heard the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 6. As the controversy revolves around the provisions of Section 468 and 473 of Cr.P.C., 1973, the same are being reproduced hereunder:- "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.—(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.] [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (5 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] 473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice." 7. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, provisions makes it clear that although, there is limitation for taking cognizance and Section 468 specifically bars the Court to take cognizance after a lapse of period of limitation, yet Section 473 provides for an extension of period of limitation if the court is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has properly been explained and it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. 8. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, this Court examined the application for seeking condonation of delay filed by the Investigating Officer. However, a perusal of the same does not reveal any sufficient cause which could have prompted the court below to condone the delay of 4 years. It has been mentioned in the application that the investigation of the case was assigned to the Investigating Officer in respect of FIR lodged on 28.05.2011. It was further stated in the application that the Investigating Officer was transferred on 23.07.2013. However, nothing has been mentioned with regard to the details of the investigation conducted by him from 28.05.2011 to date of his transfer i.e. 23.07.2013. It has been further mentioned in the application that Investigating Officer was re-transferred to the same place on 30.10.2014, however, he was unaware about the whereabouts of the accused, therefore, the delay has occurred in investigation concerning whereabouts of the accused petitioners as well as in [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (6 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] getting the record from the office of store in-charge, Dausa and office of Assistant Engineer, Baswa. Such reasons are totally vague, evasive, unexplained and unconvincing. Nothing has been placed on record to show the efforts made by the Investigating Officer during 7 years following the date of lodging of FIR. Merely stating that Investigating Officer was transferred in the meantime on 23.07.2013 and was re-transferred to the same place on 30.10.2014 would not support the contention of the Investigating Officer for seeking condonation and such justification cannot be said to be reasonable in the eye of law. As far as whereabouts of the petitioners are concerned, admittedly they were holding the posts of Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer at the same place. Therefore, assertion that the Investigating Officer could not assertain the whereabouts of the petitioners is totally baseless and unfounded. Merely for the reasons that the offence is relating to public property would not make the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. redundant and otiose. In the case of Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the provisions of Section 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. and has observed that for the purpose of computing the limitation from the date of complaint is material. It was also held that the provisions of penal statutes must be strictly construed. 9. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered opinion that no reasonable or satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the Investigating Officer for not concluding investigation for a period of 7 years from the date of lodging of FIR and for filing of challan after inordinate delay of 7 years. Period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. for offence under [2025:RJ-JP:44091] (7 of 7) [CRLMP-4844/2019] Sections 135 and 136 of Indian Electricity Act is 3 years. However, in the instant petitions, cognizance has been taken by the court below after expiry of limitation of 3 years without assigning any cogent reasons and in complete disregard of the facts that the explanation for delay offered by the Investigating Officer were neither reasonable nor justified. 10. Accordingly, in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The order extending the period of limitation and taking cognizance dated 16.04.2019 passed by the learned court below is quashed and set aside. 11. Ordered accordingly. (ANAND SHARMA),J Jatin /21-22