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2025 DAILYLAW 3875 (HP)

Mangu Khan v. State of H. P.

2025-10-31

Virender Singh

body2025
JUDGMENT : VIRENDER SINGH, J. 1. Applicant Mangu Khan has filed the present application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the B.N.S.S.’) for releasing him, on bail, during the pendency of the trial, in case FIR No. 316 of 2023, dated 18.11.2023, registered under Sections 22, 29, 61 and 85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS’) with Police Station, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. 2. As per the applicant, he has falsely been implicated in this case, as, he, in no manner, is connected with the commission of the alleged offences. 3. Investigation, in the present case, is stated to be completed and the applicant is in judicial custody since 23.4.2024. 4. According to the applicant, despite filing of the charge-sheet on 5.8.2024, the learned trial Court has yet not framed the charges, against the applicant and the case is now stated to be listed for consideration on charge. 5. Highlighting the fact that there is no criminal history of the applicant, the applicant has given certain undertakings, for which, he is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released on bail. 6. The applicant has tried his luck by moving bail application No. 119-S/22 of 2024, before the learned Special Judge-II, Solan, District Solan, H.P. However, the said application has been dismissed, vide order dated 27.8.2024.Thereafter, he has approached this Court by moving Cr. MP(M) No. 2145 of 2024, which was dismissed on 25.10.2024. Thereafter, he has again approached this Court by moving Cr.MP(M) No. 2922 of 2024, however, the same was dismissed on 31.12.2024. 7. According to the applicant, both these applications were mainly dismissed on the ground that quantity, involved in the present case, is commercial quantity, whereas, he has been implicated, in the present case, merely on the basis of statement of his co-accused, which, according to learned counsel for the applicant is not admissible. 8. It is the specific case of the applicant that rigors of Section 37 are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as he was not found at the spot, nor alleged contraband was found from his conscious and exclusive possession. 9. On the basis of above facts, Mr. 8. It is the specific case of the applicant that rigors of Section 37 are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, as he was not found at the spot, nor alleged contraband was found from his conscious and exclusive possession. 9. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Y.P. Sood, Advocate, appearing for the applicant, has given certain undertakings, for which, the applicant is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released on bail. 10. When, put to notice, Police has filed the status report, disclosing therein, that on 18.11.2023, Drugs Inspector, Promila Thakur, submitted a complaint to the Police, disclosing therein, that on 10.2.2023, premises of Unnamed Clinic/Store, in village Saini Majra, P.O. Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. was raided. During inspection, one Sahil S/o Darshan Singh was found present at the spot, but, proprietor of the said firm was not present at the time of inspection. 10.1 According to the Drugs Inspector, during inspection, loose blue coloured, green coloured capsules alongwith other Allopathic Drugs were found at the premises. It has been averred that during inspection, a customer came to the premises and asked the person present in the shop counter to give blue coloured capsules. During his statement, he disclosed that he has also purchased blue coloured capsules from M/s Khushi medical store , two months ago. 10.2 Thereafter, all the medicines were seized as per Form 16 and packed in a khakhi coloured box, as, the person present in the shop failed to produce a valid Drugs License along with the sale/purchase of the drugs and samples of the medicines were taken in Form 17, coded as Raid/23-01, Raid/23-02, Raid/23-03 and Raid/23-04) including the Blue coloured capsules coded as Raid/23-02 and green coloured capsules coded as Raid/23-03, along with other allopathic medicines. 10.3 The application for custody order was also moved on 13.2.2023. The custody order of the seized contraband was passed on 13.2.2023 by the learned JMFC, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. The samples of the contraband, were sent to RDTL for analysis. 10.3 The application for custody order was also moved on 13.2.2023. The custody order of the seized contraband was passed on 13.2.2023 by the learned JMFC, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. The samples of the contraband, were sent to RDTL for analysis. 10.4 On 21.4.2023, owner of the premises was contacted, on which, he visited the office of the Drug Inspector and disclosed in his statement that he has rented out his premises to medical store naming ‘Khushi Medicos’ and Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant) is the proprietor of the firm and produced certified rent agreement and copy of Fard. 10.5 As per the status report, the reports from the RDTL have been received and it has been found from the report that the loose blue coloured capsules coded as Raid/23-02, contained Tramadol Hydrochloride. Similarly, the loose green coloured capsules coded as, Raid/23-03 also contained Tramadol Hydrochloride. 10.6 During further investigation, it was found that the particular area was raided on 10.2.2023 and there is medical store naming ‘M/s Khushi Medicose’ and Mangu Khan @ Naushad Ali (applicant) is the proprietor of the firm ‘M/s Khushi Medicose’, Sainimajra. On 26.4.2023, it was confirmed in the statement of applicant that he is the proprietor of the firm ‘M/s Khushi Medicose’, Sainimajra, P.O. Manjholi, Distt. Solan and his license got expired, which was raided by the team of Drugs Inspector and ANTF. 10.7 It has further been mentioned in the status report that the letter has been issued to the proprietor in this regard, which has not been replied till date. As per the status report, on 2.8.2023, again a notice under Section 22 (1) (cca) of Drugs and Cosmetic was sent to the child in conflict with law and Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant), as last opportunity, but, no reply has been received till date. 10.8 It has been mentioned in the status report that Tramadol Hydrochloride is a prescription drug used to relieve moderate to moderately severe pain. However, it is having dual presence in NDPS and Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940 due to its potential for abuse and addiction and its sale without proper authorization is illegal. 10.9. On the basis of above facts, Police registered the FIR. Criminal machinery swung into motion. Thereafter, on 13.2.2023, the contraband, so taken into possession, by the Drug Inspector, was taken into possession by the Police. 10.9. On the basis of above facts, Police registered the FIR. Criminal machinery swung into motion. Thereafter, on 13.2.2023, the contraband, so taken into possession, by the Drug Inspector, was taken into possession by the Police. Thereafter, the contraband was produced before the competent Court of law and inventory was got prepared. The contraband, so recovered, was sent to SFSL, Junga. 10.10. In the laboratory, the contraband, so sent, was found to be the sample of Tramadol capsule, weighing 316.278 grams. 10.11. It is the further case of the Police that on 23.4.2024, the child in conflict with law, who was found in the shop, was associated in the investigation. His matriculation certificate was taken into possession, according to which, at the time of alleged incident, he was found to be 17 years and 2 months of age. During investigation, he has also disclosed to the Police that the original owner of the said shop was Mangu Khan (applicant), and on his direction, he used to sell the medicines, in the store. He has further disclosed that Mangu Khan (applicant) used to purchase the same. On 23.4.2024, the applicant was arrested. 10.12 After completion of investigation, the Police found a prima-facie case, against the applicant, for the commission of offence, under Sections 22 and 29 of the NDPS Act. As such, the Challan has been submitted in the competent Court of law and the case was listed on 1.9.2025 for Consideration on Charge. 10.13 On the basis of the above facts, including the fact that the contraband, so recovered, falls within the definition of ‘commercial quantity’, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 11. As per the record, when the Drugs Inspector raided the unnamed clinic, then, CCL was found present, who, as per the case of the Police, was working under Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant), the proprietor of the Firm. Meaning thereby, the applicant was not present, at the spot. 12. As per the further perusal of the record, Drugs Inspector, alongwith the team of ANTF (FU), Shimla, raided the unnamed clinic in Sainimajra, where huge quantity of allopathic medicines (tablets/capsules) were found. During search, CCL was found sitting on the counter in open shop. When, said CCL was directed to produce any valid drugs license or any other registration certificate, he could not produce the same. During search, CCL was found sitting on the counter in open shop. When, said CCL was directed to produce any valid drugs license or any other registration certificate, he could not produce the same. As such, the medicines were seized, as per form No. 16. 13. Thereafter, the Drugs Inspector on 13.2.2023 moved an application for custody before the learned Addl. C.J.M., Nalagarh, with a prayer to allow her to keep the safe custody of the drugs. On this application, the learned Addl. CJM, Nalagarh passed the following order: “Drugs inspector filed an application for custody order under Section 23 (5)(b) and 23(6) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 2. In this application. it is submitted by the Drugs Inspector that on the basis of complaint received. The applicant on dated 10.02.2023 along with team of ANTF Shimla visited the premises Unnamed Clinic, Village Sainimajra, Post Office Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarli, District Solan, HP. During inspection, huge number of allopathic drugs have been found stocked in the premises and accused Sahil Ahmad was present in the said premises. 3. That further during the course of investigation applicant asked Sahil Ahmad to produce drugs license or a valid certificate of R.M.P. But he could not produce the same so the applicant seized all the allopathic drugs in a brown colored box sealed from two sides bearing impression of seal P.T. of the Drugs Inspector of Himachal Pradesh on Form, 16 for contravention of Section 18 (C) and 18 A. It is therefore, prayed that Drugs Inspector may kindly be allowed to keep the custody of these seized drugs. 4. Precisely, the applicant intends to take the custody of the drugs seized in the aforesaid case under section 23 (5)(b) of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, where the Drugs inspector takes any action under clause C of Section 22, if he seizes the stock of the drugs or cosmetic, he shall as soon as may be inform a Judicial and take orders as to the custody thereof. It is absolutely clear from the perusal of Section 23 Sub Clause 5(b) whenever Drugs Inspector seizes any drugs or cosmetics then he is bound to obtain the custody order from the concerned Judicial Magistrate of the jurisdiction. It is absolutely clear from the perusal of Section 23 Sub Clause 5(b) whenever Drugs Inspector seizes any drugs or cosmetics then he is bound to obtain the custody order from the concerned Judicial Magistrate of the jurisdiction. In view of the aforesaid section, the application for taking the custody of drugs and cosmetic is allowed and the brown colored box containing the seized drugs as mentioned on form No. 16, sealed with seal having impression P.T. is ordered to be given in the custody of Drugs Inspector. He is further directed to keep this brown colored box in safe custody and produced in this Court as and when is required. Application is disposed off accordingly. It be tagged with the main case file.” 14. Thereafter, the legal opinion was sought from the District Attorney, Solan, vide order dated 17.10.2023. In response to the said letter, the District Attorney, Solan, vide order dated 21.10.2023, has informed the Drugs Inspector, State Drugs Controller, Baddi about the fact that tramadol salt comes under the provisions of NDPS Act. Thereafter, the FIR in question was registered. 15. After seizure of the drugs by the Drugs Inspector on 10.2.2023, notices were issued by the Drugs Inspector to CCL and Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant) by giving the description of the shop as M/s Khushi Medical Store, Sainimajra, P.O. Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. to produce the following documents: 1) Produce sale/purchase and distribution records of seized Medicine on Form 16; 2) Produce the sale/Purchase records of loos blue and green colored capsules or name the wholesaler/Manufacturer/distributor from whom you procured these capsules; 3) Produce the Self-attested copy of the Adhaar Card of Sahil and Naushad Ali/Mangu Khan; and 4) Produce the self attested copy of expired license of your firm M/s Khushi Medicose, Sainimajra, P.O. Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarh, Distt. Solan, H.P. 16. In response to the said notices, the Drugs Inspector, on the basis of alleged disclosure/revelations made by applicant, concluded that he is the proprietor of the Firm M/s Khushi Medicose, Sainimajra. 17. As per the report, prepared by the Drugs Inspector, on 26.4.2023, license of the shop had expired, at the relevant time. 18. It is the admitted case of the Police that at the time of alleged raid on 10.2.2023, Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant), Proprietor of the Firm was not present, in the shop in question. 17. As per the report, prepared by the Drugs Inspector, on 26.4.2023, license of the shop had expired, at the relevant time. 18. It is the admitted case of the Police that at the time of alleged raid on 10.2.2023, Naushad Ali @ Mangu Khan (applicant), Proprietor of the Firm was not present, in the shop in question. In the FIR, name and address of the person, who was found present in the shop, at the time of the raid by the Drugs Inspector, on 10.2.2023, is stated to be of CCL, S/o Darshan Singh, whereas, in the application, which was moved on 13.2.2023, the person, who was present in the shop, his name has been mentioned as CCL and the same has been mentioned in the order dated 13.2.2023, passed by the Court of learned JMFC, Nalagarh, on the application. 19. The Police has recorded the statement of Kuldeep Kaur, who allegedly was associated in the investigation by the Drugs Inspector on 10.2.2023 and she has also disclosed that the person, who was found present there, on inquiry, has disclosed his name as CCL S/o Darshan Singh, R/o Village Maganpura, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan. Similar version has been given by Avtar Singh, who has been associated in the raid, which was conducted by the Drugs Inspector, on 10.3.2023. The statements of these witnesses were recorded by the I.O. on 12.3.2024, whereas, on 23.4.2024, as per the case of the Police, CCL has been arrested and thereafter, when his father produced the relevant documents, i.e. Aadhar Card and photo copy of the matriculation certificate, his date of birth was found to be 10.12.2005, and on the date of raid, i.e. on 10.2.2023, his age was found to be 17 years and two months. 20. Thereafter, he was produced before the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Solan, from where, he was released on bail. 21. During investigation, Police has also taken into possession the rent agreement, allegedly executed between one Safi Mohd. and M/s Khushi Medicos, through Mangu Khan (applicant). The said document was executed on 21.2.2018. By way of this document, the tenancy was created w.e.f. 1.2.2018 to 31.1.2023, whereas, raid was allegedly conducted on 10.2.2023. 21. During investigation, Police has also taken into possession the rent agreement, allegedly executed between one Safi Mohd. and M/s Khushi Medicos, through Mangu Khan (applicant). The said document was executed on 21.2.2018. By way of this document, the tenancy was created w.e.f. 1.2.2018 to 31.1.2023, whereas, raid was allegedly conducted on 10.2.2023. In such situation, when the involvement of the applicant has been found, on the basis of alleged revelations made by CCL, as well as, on the basis of alleged agreement, executed between the owner of the shop and the applicant, this Court is of the view that the applicant is able to make out a case, for his release on bail. 22. In view of the notification issued by the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), dated 26.4.2018, the Tramadol has been entered at serial No. 110 Y, in the list of psychotropic substances, which are specified in the Schedule to the NDPS Act. The small quantity is stated to be 5 grams and commercial quantity is stated to be 250 grams. Meaning thereby, the contraband, which was allegedly recovered, in the present case, falls within the definition of ‘commercial quantity’. 23. In a case, involving commercial quantity, it is incumbent upon the Court to record the reasons, which should be more than prima-facie reasons, by holding that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and while on bail, he may not commit any offence. These two conditions existing in favour of the person, involved in commercial quantity, is a sine quo non. 24. The term ‘reasonable conditions’ has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent decision, in case titled as Narcotics Control Bureau versus Mohit Aggarwal, reported in AIR 2022 SC 3444 . The relevant paras 10 to 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act read as follows: “[37. The relevant paras 10 to 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act read as follows: “[37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable.– (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail. 11. It is evident from a plain reading of the nonobstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions imposed in subsection (2) of Section 37 that there are certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be factored in. The conditions imposed in sub- section (1) of Section 37 is that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira”, (2004) 3 SCC 549 , a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus: “7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance so far as the present accused respondent is concerned, are: the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.” [Emphasis added] 13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs. Rajesh and others” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this Court has observed as below: “20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [Emphasis added] 14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe that the accused person would not have committed such an offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an application for bail in the context of the Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required to record a finding that the accused person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not. The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he has been charged with and he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail.” (Self emphasis supplied) 25. The view of this Court has further been supported by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5544 of 2024, titled as Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif, 2024 INSC 1045 , wherein, it has been held that in case of commercial quantity of the contraband, the accused shall generally be not released on bail, until or unless, the conditions, as per Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are held to be existed in favour of the applicant. Relevant paragraphs 8 and 39 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “8. There has been consistent and persistent view of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is punishable with minimum sentence of ten years, the accused shall generally be not released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. Negation of bail is the rule and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. The recording of finding as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act. Apart from the granting opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor, the other two conditions i.e., (i) the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that (ii) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, are the cumulative and not alternative conditions. xxx xxx xxx xxx 39. The upshot of the above discussion may be summarized as under: (i) The provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object and purpose of the Act; as also the impact on the society as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally and not liberally, which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and Preamble of the Act. (ii) While considering the application for bail, the Court must bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act which are mandatory in nature. Recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is sine qua non is known for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act. (iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 52A lays down the procedure as contemplated in sub-section (1) thereof, and any lapse or delayed compliance thereof would be merely a procedural irregularity which would neither entitle the accused to be released on bail nor would vitiate the trial on that ground alone. (v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to have been committed in conducting the search and seizure during the course of investigation or thereafter, would by itself not make the entire evidence collected during the course of investigation, inadmissible. The Court would have to consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the accused.” (Self-emphasis supplied) 26. The Court would have to consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the accused.” (Self-emphasis supplied) 26. Being guided by Hon’ble Supreme Court, now this Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact whether there are reasonable grounds to conclude, at this stage, that the applicant is not guilty of such offence and while on bail, he will not commit any such offence. 27. As discussed above, the applicant was not found present with the alleged contraband, so recovered. His involvement is stated to be found on the basis of alleged revelations/disclosures made by the CCL, who, at the time of raid, was found present in the shop. Certainly, the CCL, when, allegedly disclosed about the ownership of the shop, in the name of the applicant, was in the police custody. Although, he was not formally arrested at that time, as such, whatsoever disclosed by him, is not liable to be taken into consideration. 28. Hon’ble Apex Court in Vikram Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1007 titled as have distinguish between the word ‘arrest’ and the word ‘custody’ as used in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Relevant Paras-12 & 16 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:- “12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word “arrest” used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover, in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are descriptive of a person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. Moreover, in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are descriptive of a person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion. xxx xxx xxx 16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been disposed of in the fields of village Daulatpur and the dead body was recovered and taken into possession by Memo Ex.PGGG signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar. We are unable to accept Mr. Sharan's bare submission that the evidence of Manohar Lal and Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar should not be believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of the prosecution, as no other material adverse circumstance has been brought to our notice.” 29. Full Bench of Hon’ble Lahore High Court in Hakam Khuda Yar vs. Emperor, AIR 1940 Lahore 129 , have also defined the word ‘custody’ and held that the police custody does not necessarily means custody after formal arrest. Relevant portion of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:- “......... As regards the first point, the term "custody" is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but the question is whether he can be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery when received from an accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is not in the custody of the police. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery when received from an accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is not in the custody of the police. If the information is relevant when it comes from a person in the custody of the police, there seems no good reason why it should not be so when it comes from an accused person, who is not in the custody of the police and therefore not under the influence of the police. The real intention of the Section very probably is to make information from an accused person which leads to discovery relevant even when the person is in police custody. But the language of, the Section makes such information relevant only when it comes from an accused person in the custody of the police. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended-- that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. However, apart from the above anomaly, the intention of the Section seems, I think, clear enough and that is to make information leading to a discovery relevant, even when it comes from an accused person who is in the custody of the police and thus subject to police influence. Ordinarily information coming from an accused person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. But if the information leads to the discovery of a relevant fact, that discovery is considered to be a guarantee of the truth of the information as has been pointed out already and hence such information is made relevant by Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. This Court has therefore put a wide interpretation on the word "custody" as used in Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. This Court has therefore put a wide interpretation on the word "custody" as used in Section 27. In AIR 1933 Lah 609, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shadi Lal and Coldstream J. that 'police custody' does not necessarily mean custody after formal arrest and that it also includes 'some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by the police. 30. In view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 , the said statement cannot be taken into account, in order to convict the accused, under the provisions of NDPS Act. Relevant paragraph 158.1 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “158.1 That the officers who are invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers’ within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.” 31. Moreover, this controversy has already been set rest by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case reported as AIR 1960 SC 1125 (Full Bench), titled as, State of U.P. vs. Deoman Upadhyaya: “7. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain forms of admissions made by persons accused of offences. Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with admissibility of confessions, i.e., of statements made by a person stating or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By S.24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession made by him is in- admissible if it appears to thecourt to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority. By s. 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. By s. 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The ban which is partial under s. 24 and complete under s. 25 applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, "accused person" in s. 24 and the expression "a person accused of any offence " have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Narayan Swamy v. Emperor, 66 Ind App 66:( AIR 1939 PC 47 ), by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, " s.25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation ". The adjectival clause " accused of any offence " is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person ,at the time of making the statement for the applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act by its first paragraph provides “No confession22 made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against a per. son accused of any offence." By this section, a confession made by a person who is in custody is declared not provable unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Whereas s. 25 prohibits proof .of a confession made by a person to a police officer whether or not at the time of making the confession, he was in custody, s. 26 prohibits proof of a confession by a person in custody made to any person unless the confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Whereas s. 25 prohibits proof .of a confession made by a person to a police officer whether or not at the time of making the confession, he was in custody, s. 26 prohibits proof of a confession by a person in custody made to any person unless the confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 which is in form of a proviso states "Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." The expression, " accused of any offence " in s. 27, as in s. 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned, i.e., against a person who is accused of an offence, s. 27 renders provable certain statements made by him while be was in the custody of a police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given byhim is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be untainted and is therefore declared provable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though s. 27 is in the form of a proviso to s. 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by s. 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By s. 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered. By s. 26, a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable in its entirety. 12. By s. 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered. By s. 26, a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable in its entirety. 12. There is nothing in the Evidence Act which precludes proof of information given by a person not in custody, which relates to the facts thereby discovered; it is by virtue of the ban imposed by s.162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that a statement made to a police officer in the course of the investigation of an offence under Ch. XIV by a person not in police 4 26custody at the time it was made even if it leads to the discovery of a fact is not provable against him at the trial for that offence. But the distinction which it may be remembered does not proceed on the same lines as under the. Evidence Act, arising in the matter of admissibility of such statements made to the police officer in the course of an investigation between persons in custody and persons not in custody, has little practical significance. When a person not in custody approaches a police officer investigating an offence and offers to give information leading to the discovery of a fact, having a bearing on the charge which may be made against him he may appropriately be deemed to have surrendered himself to the police. Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate any formality before a person can be said to be taken in custody: submission to the custody by word or action by a person in sufficient. A person directly giving to a police officer by word of mouth information which may be used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted himself to the custody " of the police officer within the meaning of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act: Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan 'Singh (1), Santokhi Beldar v. King Emperor (2). Exceptional cases may certainly be ima- gined in which a person may give information without presenting himself before a police officer who is investigating an offence. For instance, he may write a letter and give such information or may send a telephonic or other message to the police officer. Exceptional cases may certainly be ima- gined in which a person may give information without presenting himself before a police officer who is investigating an offence. For instance, he may write a letter and give such information or may send a telephonic or other message to the police officer. But in considering whether a statute is unconstitutional on the ground that the law has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced, it must be remembered that the legislature has to deal with practical problems; the question is not to be judged by merely enumerating other theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but is not applied. As has often been said in considering whether there has been a denial of the equal protection of the laws, a doctrinaire approach is to be avoided. A person who has committed an offence, but who is not in custody normally would not without surrendering himself to the police give information voluntarily to a police officer investigating the commission of that offence leading to the discovery of material evidence supporting a charge against him for the commission of the offence. The Parliament enacts laws to deal with practical problems which are likely to arise in the affairs of men. Theoretical possibility of an offender not in custody because the police officer investigating the offence has not been able to get at any evidence against him giving information to the police officer without surrendering himself to the police, which may lead to the discovery of an important fact by the police, cannot be ruled out; but such an occurrence would indeed be rare. Our attention has not been invited to any case in which it was even alleged that information leading to the discovery of a fact which may be used in evidence against a person was given by him to a police officer in the course of investigation without such person having surrendered himself Cases like Deonandan Dasadh v. King Emperor (1), Santokhi Balder v. King Emperor (2), Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor (3), In re Mottai Thevar (4), In re Peria Guruswami (5 ), Bharosa Ramdayal v. Emperor (6) and Jalla v. Emperor (7) and others to which our attention was invited are all cases in which the accused persons who made statements leading to discovery of facts were either in the actual custody of police officers or had surrendered themselves to the police at the time of, or before making the statements attributed to them, and do not illustrate the existence of a real and substantial class of persons not in custody giving information to police officers in the course of investigation leading to discovery of facts which may be used as evidence against those persons. 18. Counsel for the defence contended that in any event Deoman was not at the time when he made the statement attributed to him, accused of any offence and on that account also apart from the constitutional plea, the statement was not provable. This contention is unsound. As we have already observed, the expression “accused of any offence " is descriptive of the person against whom evidence relating to information alleged to be given by him is made provable by s. 27 of the Evidence Act. It does not predicate a formal accusation against him at the time of making the statement sought to be proved, as a condition of its applicability.” 32. This decision has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case Cr. Appeal 1396-1397 of 2008 Vikram Singh and others vs. State of Punjab. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “……….A bare reading of the provision would reveal that a "person must be accused of any offence" and that he must be "in the custody of a police officer" and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “……….A bare reading of the provision would reveal that a "person must be accused of any offence" and that he must be "in the custody of a police officer" and it is not essential that such an accused must be under formal arrest. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125 this is what a Constitution Bench had to say while examining the scope and applicability of Section 27. The Bench relying on the observations made by the Privy Council in Narayan Swami vs. Emperor( AIR 1939 PC 47 ) observed as under: "Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of a group of sections relating to the relevancy of certain forms of admissions made by persons accused of offences. Sections 24 to 30 of the Act deal with admissibility of confessions i.e. of statements made by a person stating or suggesting that he has committed a crime. By Section 24, in a criminal proceeding against a person, a confession made by him is inadmissible if it appears to the court to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge and proceeding from a person in authority. By Section 25, there is an absolute ban against proof at the 3 trial of a person accused of an offence, of a confession made to a police officer. The ban which is partial under Section 24 and complete under Section 25 applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was at the time of making the confession in custody. For the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession. The expression, "accused person" in Section 24 and the expression "a person accused of any offence" have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "Section 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation". As observed in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "Section 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation". The adjectival clause "accused of any offence" "is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of making the statement for the applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act by its first paragraph provides. "No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence". By this section, a confession made by a person who is in custody is declared not provable unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Whereas Section 25 prohibits proof of a confession made by a person to a police officer whether or not at the time of making the confession, he was in custody, Section 26 prohibits proof of a confession by a person in custody made to any person unless the confession is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 which is in the form of a proviso states "Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much 3 of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved". The expression, "accused of any offence" in Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned i.e. against a person who is accused of an offence, Section 27 renders provable certain statements made by him while he was in the custody of a police officer. The expression, "accused of any offence" in Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned i.e. against a person who is accused of an offence, Section 27 renders provable certain statements made by him while he was in the custody of a police officer. Section 27 is founded on the principle that even though the evidence relating to confessional or other statements made by a person, whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, is tainted and therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given by him is assured by the discovery of a fact, it may be presumed to be untainted and is therefore declared provable insofar as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered. Even though Section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Section 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with evidence of the same character. The ban imposed by Section 26 is against the proof of confessional statements. Section 27 is concerned with the proof of information whether it amounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery of facts. By Section 27, even if a fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received, only that much of the information is admissible as distinctly relates to the fact discovered. By Section 26, a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is made provable in its entirety." 12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in 3police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with `Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word "arrest" used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused in an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused in an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 "accused of any offence" are descriptive of the person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion.” 33. The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in a case reported as 1976 Cri. L.J. 1652 titled as Kanhiya vs. State of Rajasthan; have held that the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be discarded that the accused was arrested 30 minutes thereafter. Evolving the theory of ‘constructive custody’, Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court have in paras-8 and 11 held as under:- “8. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman this very question came up for the consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, whether before an actual arrest shown by the police authorities a person could be said to be in the custody of the police for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act? The learned Judges in that connection observed: “Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate any formality before a person can be said to be taken in custody; submission to the custody by word or action by a person is sufficient. A person directly giving to a police officer by word of mouth information which may be used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted himself to the 'custody' of the police officer within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. …………. 11. The Investigating Officer in the witness-box was not questioned by either party to explain the anomaly in the timings recorded in Ex. P-15 and Ex. P-16, but if we take it that the timings recorded by him in these two documents were correct even then it is difficult for us to accept Mr. Agarwal's contention that the accused was not in constructive custody of the police at the time when he passed on information when Ex. P-15 and Ex. P-16, but if we take it that the timings recorded by him in these two documents were correct even then it is difficult for us to accept Mr. Agarwal's contention that the accused was not in constructive custody of the police at the time when he passed on information when Ex. P-16 was prepared, because it was in the presence of the police that the information was given by him and therefore even if formal arrest had not been made and he was formally arrested after half an hour when the information was passed on to the Police Authorities it shall be deemed that the accused was in the constructive custody of the police and therefore the information recorded in Ex. P-16 in pursuance whereof discoveries of the silver articles were made shall be relevant in evidence and is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.” 34. Similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in a case reported as AIR 1948 Allahabad 7 titled as Mt. Maharani vs. Emperor. Para-17 of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “17. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a number of rulings which lay down that the word “custody” in S. 36 or 27, Evidence Act, does not mean formal custody but includes such state of affairs in which the accused can be said to have come into the hands of a police officer or can be said to have been under some sort of surveillance or restriction. We agree with this view. These cases are, AIR 1932 Lah. 609  : AIR 1938 Lah. 620 : AIR 1940 Lah. 129 : AIR 1933 Oudh 192 : 77 I.C. 429 and A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 308.” 35. Even otherwise, Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent decision reported as AIR 2010 SC 1007 titled as Vikram Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab; have distinguish between the word ‘arrest’ and the word ‘custody’ as used in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Relevant Paras-12 & 16 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that till the appellants had been arrested in accordance with the aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody. We see that Section 46 deals with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word “arrest” used in Section 46 relates to a formal arrest whereas Section 27 of the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly, also, they were in police custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension on the 14th February 2005. Moreover, in the light of the judgment in the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are descriptive of a person making the statement, the submission that this Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This argument does not merit any further discussion. 16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been disposed of in the fields of village Daulatpur and the dead body was recovered and taken into possession by Memo Ex.PGGG signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar. We are unable to accept Mr. Sharan's bare submission that the evidence of Manohar Lal and Sub-Inspector Jeevan Kumar should not be believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of the prosecution, as no other material adverse circumstance has been brought to our notice.” 36. Full Bench of Hon’ble Lahore High Court in a case reported as AIR 1940 Lahore 129 titled as Hakam Khuda Yar vs. Emperor have also defined the word ‘custody’ and held that the police custody does not necessarily means custody after formal arrest. Full Bench of Hon’ble Lahore High Court in a case reported as AIR 1940 Lahore 129 titled as Hakam Khuda Yar vs. Emperor have also defined the word ‘custody’ and held that the police custody does not necessarily means custody after formal arrest. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “……… As regards the first point, the term "custody" is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but the question is whether he can be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery when received from an accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is not in the custody of the police. If the information is relevant when it comes from a person in the custody of the police, there seems no good reason why it should not be so when it comes from an accused person, who is not in the custody of the police and therefore not under the influence of the police. The real intention of the Section very probably is to make information from an accused person which leads to discovery relevant even when the person is in police custody. But the language of, the Section makes such information relevant only when it comes from an accused person in the custody of the police. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended--that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. However, apart from the above anomaly, the intention of the Section seems, I think, clear enough and that is to make information leading to a discovery relevant, even when it comes from an accused person who is in the custody of the police and thus subject to police influence. Ordinarily information coming from an accused person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. Ordinarily information coming from an accused person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. But if the information leads to the discovery of a relevant fact, that discovery is considered to be a guarantee of the truth of the information as has been pointed out already and hence such information is made relevant by Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even before his formal arrest, an accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the police. This Court has therefore put a wide interpretation on the word "custody" as used in Section 27. In AIR 1933 Lah 609, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shadi Lal and Coldstream J. that 'police custody' does not necessarily mean custody after formal arrest and that it also includes 'some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by the police.” 37. So far as the agreement, which has been relied upon by the prosecution to connect the applicant with the crime in question, is concerned, the raid was conducted on 10.2.2023 and the rent agreement, which was executed on 21.2.2018, was valid upto 31.1.2023. Meaning thereby, on the date of raid, the tenancy, as per the document was not in existence. 38. Moreover, as per the initial case, set up by the Drugs Inspector, as well as, by the Police, one Sahil, S/o Darshan Singh, R/o Darshan Singh, R/o Village Maganpura, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., whereas, the person, who was arrested has been named as CCL, S/o Vasi Ahmad, R/o Shahjahanpur, Uttar Pradesh. This ambiguity would be cleared by the prosecution, during the course of the trial. However, at this stage, this Court is of the view that the applicant is entitled to be released on bail, as, at this stage, on the basis of above discussion, it can be said that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and while on bail, he will not commit any offence. In order to ensure the compliance the condition, i.e. while on bail, he will not commit any offence, reasonable conditions can be imposed. 39. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 40. In order to ensure the compliance the condition, i.e. while on bail, he will not commit any offence, reasonable conditions can be imposed. 39. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 40. Consequently, the applicant is ordered to be released on bail in case FIR No. 316 of 2023, dated 18.11.2023, registered under Sections 22, 29 and 61 and 85 of the NDPS Act, with Police Station, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/-, with one surety, in the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 41. This order, however, shall be subject to the following conditions:- a) Applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; b) Applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; c) Applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer, and d) Applicant shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court. f) The applicant shall furnish affidavit, in the first week of every month, before the learned trial Court, disclosing therein that he has not been named, as accused, in any crime, during that period. 42. Any of the observations, made herein above, shall not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations are confined, only to the disposal of the present application. 43. It is made clear that the respondent-State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions is found to be violated by the applicant. 44. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. through e-mail, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prison software. 45. 44. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. through e-mail, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prison software. 45. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. The Superintendent of Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. is further directed that if the applicants fail to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court. 46. Records be returned to the quarter concerned.