JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Feeling aggrieved against the common award passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 as also the common judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, deciding the applications moved by the appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short the Act), instant appeals under Section 37 of the Act have been preferred by the National Highway Authority of India. Arising out of the common award passed by the learned Arbitrator and common judgment rendered by the learned  District  Judge  as also  involving  the  common questions, these appeals have been taken up together for decision. 2. Facts:- 2(i) These appeals arise out of acquisition of land by the appellant in Mohal Palthin, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur. 2(ii) Notification under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short the NH Act) was published in the official gazette on 21.04.2012 and 17.08.2012 for acquiring the subject land for four laning of NH-21 (between Bilaspur and Nerchowk Section) 2(iii)   Notification under Section 3D(1) of the NH Act was issued in the official gazette on 15.12.2012, 08.01.2013 and 15.03.2013. 2(iv)  Notification under Section 3G(3) of the NHAI Act inviting claims from interested persons was published in the newspapers on 14.03.2013 and 01.04.2013. 2(v) For the land covered by the above notifications the Competent Authority Land Acquisition (CALA) announced Award No. 17/2013-14 on 05.08.2013. In terms of the award, market value of the land was assessed at Rs. 18,00,000/- per bigha for all kind of lands irrespective of classification and nature in revenue village Palthin Hadbast No. 460 Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. In all, an area of 58 bighas, 18 biswa and 01 biswansee was acquired in the aforesaid revenue village. 2(vi)  Seeking enhancement in the market value of the acquired lands, the land owners filed claim petitions under Section 3G (5) of the NH Act before the notified Arbitrator. Learned Arbitrator passed the award on 05.09.2017 allowing the claim petitions. Market value of the acquired land was enhanced to Rs.21,21,000/- per bigha. The land owners were also held entitled to solatium @30% on compensation amount of acquired property and 9% interest on enhanced compensation amount from the date of taking possession of land till actual deposit. Learned Arbitrator passed the award on 05.09.2017 allowing the claim petitions. Market value of the acquired land was enhanced to Rs.21,21,000/- per bigha. The land owners were also held entitled to solatium @30% on compensation amount of acquired property and 9% interest on enhanced compensation amount from the date of taking possession of land till actual deposit. 2(vii)   Feeling aggrieved against the enhancement in the market value awarded by the learned Arbitrator, the appellant-NHAI took recourse to Section 34 of the Act and filed applications assailing the award passed in favour of the land owners before the District Judge Bilaspur. All these applications moved under Section 34 of the Act by NHAI were clubbed and vide common judgment passed on 04.09.2023, the same were dismissed. While dismissing the applications, learned District Judge also held that learned Arbitrator had inadvertently not awarded 12% interest per annum on the enhanced market value of the land from the date of the publication of notification under Section 3A till the award by the competent authority or till the date of taking possession of the land, whichever was earlier; This being a statutory interest payable under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, was also required to be awarded to the land owners; Award of such interest would not alter or modify the arbitral award as it was only a statutory interest component liable to be paid in view of mandate in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh & Ors., 2019 (9) SCC 304 Learned District Judge in addition to 30% solatium and 9% interest per annum awarded by the learned Arbitrator, accordingly also allowed 12% interest to the land owners under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is in the aforesaid background that NHAI has now taken recourse to Section 37 of the Act for assailing the common judgment passed by the learned District Judge on 04.09.2023 as also common arbitral award passed by learned Arbitrator on 05.09.2017. 3. Submissions: - 3(i) Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that: - (a). Sale deed relied upon by the learned Arbitrator (Ext.PW-2/B) dated 16.01.2012 registered on 01.02.2012 in Mohal Palthin was for a very small area i.e. 01 biswa as compared to large tract of land acquired under the questioned land acquisition process. 3. Submissions: - 3(i) Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that: - (a). Sale deed relied upon by the learned Arbitrator (Ext.PW-2/B) dated 16.01.2012 registered on 01.02.2012 in Mohal Palthin was for a very small area i.e. 01 biswa as compared to large tract of land acquired under the questioned land acquisition process. The said sale deed could not have been relied upon for assessing the market value of the large tract of land. (b) Learned Arbitrator had unreasonably equated the lands situated in Mohal Palthin with village Bhajwani. There was neither any basis nor evidence on record to compare land in village Palthin with that of land in village Bhajwani. Learned Arbitrator erred in treating villages Palthin and Bhajwani as one single unit, despite the fact that the nature, character of lands along with other necessary features of the lands in two villages were not similar. (c) Learned Arbitrator had not followed procedure and parameters laid down in Section 3G (7) of the NH Act. The award passed by him suffers from patent illegality and is required to be declared as void. (d) Learned District Judge erred in law in awarding further 12% interest per annum to the land owners on enhanced market value of land from the date of publication of notification under Section 3A of the NH Act, till the date of the award of competent authority or the date of taking possession of land, whichever was earlier. Award of 12% interest by invoking Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was not warranted in view of orders passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Highway Authority of India & Anr. Vs. Tehal Singh & Ors., Miscellaneous Application Diary No. 2572/2020 in Civil Appeal No. 7086/2019 decided on 30.07.2021 as also in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tarsem Singh & Ors., Miscellaneous Application No. 1773/2021 in Civil Appeal No. 7064/2019 decided on 04.02.2025 3(ii) Learned counsel for the respondents defended the award passed by the learned Arbitrator as also the judgment passed by the learned District Judge on all counts. 4. Consideration Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 4(i) Small tract of land/deduction. 4(i)(a)   The contention raised for the appellant is that sale deed relied upon was in respect of 01 biswa of land in Mohal Palthin, whereas the land acquired runs in several bighas (58-18-01 bigha). 4. Consideration Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the case file. 4(i) Small tract of land/deduction. 4(i)(a)   The contention raised for the appellant is that sale deed relied upon was in respect of 01 biswa of land in Mohal Palthin, whereas the land acquired runs in several bighas (58-18-01 bigha). The sale deed for small parcel of land could not have been made the basis for determining the market value for acquired large chunk of land. Learned Arbitrator as also the learned District Judge have appropriately considered the sale deed Ext. PW- 2/B executed on 16.01.2012 and registered in the office of Sub Registrar Ghumarwin on 01.02.2012. In terms of this sale deed, Sh. Husan Chand had purchased one biswa of land in Mohal Palthin from Sh. Onkar s/o of Sh. Nand Lal for consideration of Rs.1,50,000/-. Sale deed has been duly proved on record. Learned Arbitrator had also examined the relevancy, admissibility & probative value of the sale deed and its effect on determining the market value of the acquired land. As noticed, Ext.PW-2/B was executed on 16.01.2012 and registered in the office of Sub Registrar Ghumarwin on 01.02.2012, whereas notification Section 3A of the NH Act for revenue village Palthin was issued on 17.08.2012. The sale deed was executed before the issuance of notification under Section 3A, it, therefore, was justly relied upon for the purpose of determining the compensation. 4(ii) Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon Horrmal (Deceased) through his LRs & Others Vs. State of Haryana Ors., SLP© No. 7963/2023 decided on 21.10.2024 more specifically on following para-33 thereof to contend that learned Arbitrator should have allowed deduction to the extent of 75% towards the developmental charges: - “33. On the face of these distinctive factors lies the challenge of ascertaining the appropriate extent of deduction to be made. As already established, judicial precedents dictate that the amount of deduction to be applied towards developmental charges can range from anywhere between 20% to 75%. On the one hand, we must acknowledge and recognise the stark disparity between the size of the land covered by the sale exemplar and the acquired land. On the other hand, it is incumbent that we take note of the various advantageous factors associated with the acquired land at the time of issuance of the Section 4 notification. On the one hand, we must acknowledge and recognise the stark disparity between the size of the land covered by the sale exemplar and the acquired land. On the other hand, it is incumbent that we take note of the various advantageous factors associated with the acquired land at the time of issuance of the Section 4 notification. A balanced approach in adjudicating this particular issue is therefore necessary. Considering these militating aspects, we cannot justify applying deduction at either extreme end of the spectrum. A prudent course of action might be to steer a middle path, aiming for a range approximately between 46% to 50%.” The judgment rendered in Horrmal relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant would not be attracted to the facts of the present case as in the said case, the lands were acquired for the purposes of carving out the residential and utility areas, whereas in the instant case, the lands has been acquired for four laning of the road. It would also be appropriate to take notice of Spl. Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. vs. M.K. Rafiq Saheb, (2011) 7 SCC 714 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no absolute rule that sale instances of smaller chunks of land cannot be considered when a large tract of land is acquired. In certain scenarios, such sale deeds pertaining to smaller pieces of land can be put to use for determining the value of acquired land which is comparatively large in area. The Court further held that it is hardly possible for a claimant to produce sale instances of large tracts of land as they are generally very far & few and normally the sale instances would relate to small pieces of land. The Apex Court noted that this limitation of sale transaction cannot operate to the disadvantage of the claimant. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment reads as under: - “19. The judgment of the High Court is well reasoned and well considered. We find no perversity in its reasoning. The only issue is that Ex. P-5, which was relied upon by the High Court, relates to a small piece of land, whereas the acquisition is of a larger piece of land. It is not an absolute rule that when the acquired land is a large tract of land, sale instances relating to smaller pieces of land cannot be considered. The only issue is that Ex. P-5, which was relied upon by the High Court, relates to a small piece of land, whereas the acquisition is of a larger piece of land. It is not an absolute rule that when the acquired land is a large tract of land, sale instances relating to smaller pieces of land cannot be considered. There are certain circumstances when sale deeds of small pieces of land can be used to determine the value of acquired land which is comparatively large in area, as can be seen from the judicial pronouncements mentioned hereunder. 20. It has been held in the case of Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village, Nizamabad District, Andhra Pradesh v. Nookala Rajamallu and Ors., (2003) 12 SCC 334 that:- "6. Where large area is the subject-matter of acquisition, rate at which small plots are sold cannot be said to be a safe criterion. Reference in this context may be made to few decisions of this Court in Collector of Lakhimour v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta, (1972) 4 SCC 236 : AIR 1971 SC 2015 Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P., AIR 1977 SC 1560 and Kausalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1984 SC 892 . 7. It cannot, however, be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rates fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material, it may in appropriate cases be open to the adjudicating Court to make comparison of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices." 21. In the case of Bhagwathula Samanna and Ors. v. Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, (1991) 4 SCC 506 it was held: "13. The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted." 22. In Land Acquisition Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor v. Smt. L. Kamalamma (dead) by Lrs. and others, AIR 1998 SC 781 this Court held as under:- "6  when no sales of comparable land was available where large chunks of land had been sold, even land transactions in respect of smaller extent of land could be taken note of as indicating the price that it may fetch in respect of large tracts of land by making appropriate deductions such as for development of the land by providing enough space for roads, sewers, drains, expenses involved in formation of a lay out, lump sum payment as also the waiting period required for selling the sites that would be formed." 23. Further, it has also been held in the case of Smt. Basavva and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 3168 that the court has to consider whether sales relating to smaller pieces of land are genuine and reliable and whether they are in respect of comparable lands. In case the said requirements are met, sufficient deduction should be made to arrive at a just and fair market value of large tracts of land. Further, the court stated that the time lag for real development and the waiting period for development were also relevant factors to be considered in determining compensation. The court added that each case depended upon its own facts. In the said case, based on the particular facts and circumstances, this court made a total deduction of 65% in determination of compensation. 24. It may also be noticed that in the normal course of events, it is hardly possible for a claimant to produce sale instances of large tracts of land. In the said case, based on the particular facts and circumstances, this court made a total deduction of 65% in determination of compensation. 24. It may also be noticed that in the normal course of events, it is hardly possible for a claimant to produce sale instances of large tracts of land. The sale of land containing large tracts are generally very far and few. Normally, the sale instances would relate to small pieces of land. This limitation of sale transaction cannot operate to the disadvantage of the claimants. Thus, the Court should look into sale instances of smaller pieces of land while applying reasonable element of deduction.” On deductions, the Apex Court in Lal Chand vs. Union of India & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 769 held, inter alia, that development of road is not necessary for widening the National Highway. In C.R.Nagaraja Shetty (2) vs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer and Estate Officer & Anr., (2009) 11 SCC 75 also, land was acquired for widening the highway. Deduction of Rs.25/- per sq.ft. made by the High Court was not accepted, as development of the land was not held necessary for widening the highway. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment read as under:- “12. That leaves us with the other question of deduction ordered by the High Court. The High Court has directed the deduction of Rs.25/- per square feet. Unfortunately, the High Court has not discussed the reason for this deduction of Rs.25/- per square feet nor has the High Court relied on any piece of evidence for that purpose. 13. It is true that where the lands are acquired for public purpose like setting up of industries or setting up of housing colonies or other such allied purposes, the acquiring body would be entitled to deduct some amount from the payable compensation on account of development charges, however, it has to be established by positive evidence that such development charges are justified. The evidence must come for the need of development contemplated and the possible expenditure for such development. We do not find any such discussion in the order of the High Court. 14. As if this is not sufficient, when we see the judgment of the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bangalore, Rural District, Bangalore in Reference proceedings, we find that there is no deduction ordered for the so-called development charges. We do not find any such discussion in the order of the High Court. 14. As if this is not sufficient, when we see the judgment of the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bangalore, Rural District, Bangalore in Reference proceedings, we find that there is no deduction ordered for the so-called development charges. We are, therefore, not in a position to understand as to from where such development charges sprang up. 15. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents was also unable to point out any such evidence regarding the proposed development. We cannot ignore the fact that the land is acquired only for widening of the National Highway. There would, therefore, be no question of any such development or any costs therefor. 16. In Nelson Fernandes and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa & Ors, (2007) 9 SCC 447 this Court has discussed the question of development charges. That was a case, where, the acquisition was for laying a Railway line. This Court found that the land under acquisition was situated in an area, which was adjacent to the land already acquired for the same purpose, i.e., for laying Railway line. In paragraph 29, the Court observed that the Land Acquisition Officer, the District Judge and the High Court had failed to notice that the purpose of acquisition was for Railways and that the purpose is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for fixing the compensation. 17. The Court in Nelson Fernandes(supra) relied on Viluben Jhalejar Contractor Vs. State of Gujarat, 2005(4) SCC 789 where it was held that:- “29. ……the purpose for which the land is acquired, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the market value and the deduction of development charges.” Further, in paragraph 30, the Court specifically referred to the deduction for the development charges and observed:- "30. We are not, however, oblivious of the fact that normally 1/3rd deduction of further amount of compensation has been directed in some cases. However, the purpose for which the land is acquired must also be taken into consideration. In the instant case, the land was acquired for the construction of new BG line for the Konkan Railways   In the instant case, acquisition is for laying a railway line. However, the purpose for which the land is acquired must also be taken into consideration. In the instant case, the land was acquired for the construction of new BG line for the Konkan Railways   In the instant case, acquisition is for laying a railway line. Therefore, the question of development thereof would not arise." The Court made a reference to two other cases, viz., Hasanali Khanbhai & Sons Vs. State of Gujarat, 1995 (5) SCC 442 and Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Nookala Rajamallu, 2003 (12) SCC 334 where, the deduction by way development charges, was held permissible. 18. The situation is no different in the present case. All that the acquiring body has to achieve is to widen the National Highway. There is no further question of any development. We again, even at the cost of repetition, reiterate that no evidence was shown before us in support of the plea of the proposed development. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has erred in directing the deduction on account of the developmental charges at the rate of Rs.25/- per square feet out of the ordered compensation at the rate of Rs.75/- per square feet. We set aside the judgment to that extent.” In V.Hanumantha Reddy (dead) by LRs vs. The Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal R. Officer, (2003) 12 SCC 642 the Apex Court held that the land might be having high potentialities or proximity to developed area, but that by itself would not be a reason for not deducting developmental charges. The Court relied upon its judgment rendered in Kasturi & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 354 wherein it was held that there may be various factual factors which may have to be taken into consideration while deducting the compensation towards developmental charges. In some cases, deduction may be more than 1/3rd and in some cases less than 1/3rd. There is difference between a developed area and an area having potential value, but is yet to be developed. The fact that an area is developed or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso facto make every land situated in the area also developed to be valued as a building site or plot, particularly when vast tracts are acquired for development purposes. While deciding Mala etc. The fact that an area is developed or adjacent to a developed area will not ipso facto make every land situated in the area also developed to be valued as a building site or plot, particularly when vast tracts are acquired for development purposes. While deciding Mala etc. vs. State of Punjab & Ors., Civil Appeal No.3992-4000 of 2011, decided on 17.08.2023 the Apex Court reiterated that while determining the deduction for development charges, the Court should keep in mind the nature of land, area under acquisition, whether the land is developed or not, if developed, to what extent, the purpose of acquisition etc. The percentage of deduction or the extent of area required to be set apart has to be assessed by the Courts having regard to the size, shape, situation, user etc. of the land acquired. It is essentially a kind of guess-work, the Courts are expected to undertake. In the instant case, learned Arbitrator has allowed 33% deduction in the market value of the land determined by him. It would also be in place to notice here that while dismissing the applications preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act, learned District Judge held that in somewhat similar award arising from the neighbouring revenue estate namely Behna Jatta etc., learned Arbitrator had made deduction of 15% from the comparable sale deed being small in size, though in the instant case, deduction to the extent of 33% was ordered. Learned District Judge had categorically expressed the view that deduction should have been the same even in the present award, but for want of any legal challenge by the land owners/respondents to the arbitral award in this regard and in view of mandate of law as expressed in Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited Vs. Applied Electronics Limited, (2017) 2 SCC 37 the deduction of 33% even though held to be excessive and discriminatory vis-a-vis other similar award, was not interfered with. In view of above, the reliance placed upon by learned Arbitrator upon the sale deed Ext. PW-2/B, as well as the deductions in value by 33% while determining the market value of the acquired land, cannot be faulted. 4(iii)    Equation with revenue village Bhajwani. In view of above, the reliance placed upon by learned Arbitrator upon the sale deed Ext. PW-2/B, as well as the deductions in value by 33% while determining the market value of the acquired land, cannot be faulted. 4(iii)    Equation with revenue village Bhajwani. Learned Arbitrator relied upon the sale deed that was available on record for village Palthin i.e. Ext.PW-2/B executed on 16.01.2012, whereby 01 biswa of land in village Palthin was sold for consideration of Rs.1,50,000/-. On this basis, the market value of the acquired land was assessed at Rs.30,00,000/- per bigha. After allowing 33% deduction, the market value of the acquired land came to Rs.20,10,000/- per bigha. Learned Arbitrator, thereafter, observed that the acquired land of revenue estate Palthin, Bhajwani and Auhar were to be treated as single unit as land in these revenue estates had almost same agriculture potential and irrigation status. In case of revenue estate Bhajwani, the market value of the acquired land had been assessed at Rs.21,21,000/- per bigha. Learned Arbitrator further observed that acquired land in question was situated in five different villages. They could be consolidated into one single unit with little to chose between one stretch of land and another as entire area was in stage of development and different villages were capable of being developed in the same manner as land comprised in village Palthin. The above reasoning of the learned Arbitrator finds support in Union of India Vs. Harinder Pal Singh & Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 564 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court upheld the decision of Hon’ble Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, whereby the market value of the lands forming the subject matter of the acquisition proceedings was fixed at a uniform rate keeping in view the sketch plan of the area in question, depicting that though the lands were situated in five different villages, but they had, in fact, been consolidated into one single unit with little to choose between one stretch of land and another. Relevant para from the decision reads as under:- “15. Relevant para from the decision reads as under:- “15. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and we see no justification to interfere with the decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which, in our view, took a pragmatic approach in fixing the market value of the lands forming the subject matter of the acquisition proceedings at a uniform rate. From the sketch plan of the area in question, it appears to us that while the lands in question are situated in five different villages, they can be consolidated into one single unit with little to choose between one stretch of land and another. The entire area is in a stage of development and the different villages are capable of being developed in the same manner as the lands comprised in Kala Ghanu Pur where the market value of the acquired lands was fixed at a uniform rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court discarded the belting method of valuation having regard to the local circumstances and features and no cogent ground has been made out to interfere with the same.” It would also be pertinent to take note of the award passed by the CALA on 05.08.2013, which records that revenue villages Palthin, Dharyana, Auhar and Bhajwani were adjacent to each other, fell within the same Patwar Halqa and that the land in all these villages was almost similar and comparable in terms of location, nature and classification. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon following paragraph of Horrmal (Deceased) through his LRs & Others Vs. State of Haryana Ors.(supra) in support of her submission that market value for land in village Bhajwani could not have been adopted for land in village Palthin: - “24. Apart from these sale deeds that were not proximate temporally, we also deem it appropriate to exclude the sale deeds that are not comparable geographically. It is now a firmly entrenched principle of law that, in the ordinary course, sale exemplars of lands located in the surrounding villages should generally not be relied upon, as land valuation may vary significantly by locality. It is now a firmly entrenched principle of law that, in the ordinary course, sale exemplars of lands located in the surrounding villages should generally not be relied upon, as land valuation may vary significantly by locality. In the landmark decision of Kanwar Singh v. Union of India, (1998) 8 SCC 136 this Court held that sale exemplars of lands situated in an adjacent village cannot be used to determine the market value of the acquired land since such lands may differ in terms of quality and other attributes. On this ground, the sale deeds enumerated Ex. R8 to Ex. R16 and Ex. R18 shall also have to be excluded from consideration, as they pertain to a different village, namely Gwarka, whereas the acquired land is situated in village Tauru. The aforesaid decision has no applicability to the facts of the instant case as the subject land parcels in the villages in question were acquired in a linear manner for construction of four lane road and not for development & utilization of residential and utility area as was acquired in the said case. It would also be pertinent to take note of the fact that this objection was admittedly not pressed by the appellant before the learned District Judge as would be apparent from the perusal of the common judgment dated 04.09.2023. Even in the present appeal, no such objection has been raised. Objection has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant only during hearing, therefore, it is even otherwise doubtful, as to whether, the appellant can even be permitted to raise the said contention in this appeal for the first time during hearing [Ref. M/s C & C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International Ltd., 2025 SCC Online SC 218] In view of above, enhancing the market value of the acquired land in village Palthin on the basis of assessment of the market value of revenue estate Bhajwani, does not call for any interference. 4(iv). M/s C & C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International Ltd., 2025 SCC Online SC 218] In view of above, enhancing the market value of the acquired land in village Palthin on the basis of assessment of the market value of revenue estate Bhajwani, does not call for any interference. 4(iv). The procedure not followed by the Arbitrator as per parameters laid down in Section 3G(7) of the NH Act and Patent illegality in the Award/re-appreciation of evidence/jurisdiction: - Section 3G(7) of the NH Act reads as under:- “3G.(7)  The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration— (a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under section 3A; (b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land; (c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession  of  the  land, by reason  of  the        acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings; (d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change.” As per Section 3G(7), the Arbitrator is to determine market value of the land as on date of publication of notification under Section 3A of the Act. Damage to land/person/property & reasonable expenses for change of residence etc. are also to be considered. The stipulated parameters were duly considered by the Arbitrator. It is by now well-settled that the scope of Appellate Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act to review the findings in an award, is narrow/limited, if the award has been upheld or substantially upheld under Section 34. [Ref. Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India, Civil Appeal No.3798 of 2023, decided on 11.08.2023]. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking, 2023(9) SCC 85 it was held that jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the Act is akin to that under Section 34 of the Act. The Courts ought not to interfere with arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. In Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking, 2023(9) SCC 85 it was held that jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the Act is akin to that under Section 34 of the Act. The Courts ought not to interfere with arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. Mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of contract does not entitle Courts to reverse findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. Relevant paragraphs from the decision are as follows:- “19. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction., UHL Power Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 401, para 15. See also: Dyna Technologies Pvt Ltd v. Crompton Greaves Limited (2019) 20 SCC 1 , para 24, 25. It is well- settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal., ibid; Ssangyong Engineering. & Construction Company Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) (2019) 15 SCC 131 ; Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 236 , para 11.1. In Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited, (2019) 20 SCC 1 this Court held: “24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated. 25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.” XX XX XX 25. The principle of interpretation of contracts adopted by the Division Bench of the High Court that when two constructions are possible, then courts must prefer the one which gives effect and voice to all clauses, does not have absolute application. The said interpretation is subject to the jurisdiction which a court is called upon to exercise. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, the Court is concerned about the jurisdiction that the Section 34 Court exercised while considering the challenge to the Arbitral Award. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act is exercised only to see if the Arbitral Tribunal’s view is perverse or manifestly arbitrary. Accordingly, the question of reinterpreting the contract on an alternative view does not arise. If this is the principle applicable to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, a Division Bench exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act cannot reverse an Award, much less the decision of a Single Judge, on the ground that they have not given effect and voice to all clauses of the contract. This is where the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error, in re-interpreting a contractual clause while exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act. In any event, the decision in Radha Sundar Dutta (supra), relied on by the High Court was decided in 1959, and it pertains to proceedings arising under the Village Chaukidari Act, 1870 and Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation of 1819. In any event, the decision in Radha Sundar Dutta (supra), relied on by the High Court was decided in 1959, and it pertains to proceedings arising under the Village Chaukidari Act, 1870 and Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation of 1819. Reliance on this judgment particularly for interfering with the concurrent interpretations of the contractual clause by the Arbitral Tribunal and Single Judge under Section 34 of the Act is not justified.” In Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Samir Barain Bhojwani, (2024) 7 SCC 218 the Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that supervisory role of Courts is very restricted in dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Act. Scope of interference in a petition under Section 34 of the Act is very narrow. Jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act is narrower. By their own volition, the parties choose to go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead of availing remedy before the traditional Civil Courts. Therefore, Courts must be very conservative while dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Act. 4(v) Award of interest @12% per annum under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act by the learned District Judge. There is considerable force in the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents-land owners were not entitled to the award of 12% interest per annum on the enhanced market value of the land from the date of publication of notification under Section 3A till the date of award by the competent authority or till the date of taking possession of land, whichever was earlier. The land owners had already been awarded 30% solatium on the compensation amount of the acquired land, along with 9% interest on the enhanced amount from the date of taking possession of the land till actual deposit, under the award passed by the learned Arbitrator. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarsem Singh & Ors.2 had declared Section 3J of the NH Act as unconstitutional. It was further held that the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, relating to the assessment of solatium and interest as contained in Section 23(1-A) and 23(2) as well as the interest payable in terms of proviso to Section 28 of the NH Act, would ipso facto apply to the acquisition made under NH Act. However, subsequently, the appellant-NHAI sought a clarification in Tehal Singh & Ors. However, subsequently, the appellant-NHAI sought a clarification in Tehal Singh & Ors. on the ground that benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act had not been claimed before any authority or the Court in the facts of those cases. The said plea of appellant was accepted and vide order dated 30.07.2021, the decision in Tehal Singh & Ors. was modified by deleting the expression ‘(1-A)’. It would also be pertinent to notice that the aforesaid decision dated 30.07.2021 was followed by a Division Bench of Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in National Highway Authority of India Vs. Resham Singh, LPA No. 4965/2018 decided a/w connected matters on 12.04.2023. wherein it was held that all land owners, whose lands were acquired by invoking the provisions of the NH Act were though entitled to solatium and interest under Section 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but not to the additional market value contemplated under Section 23(1-A) of the said Act. While deciding miscellaneous application in Tarsem Singh & Ors.2, the Hon’ble Apex Court dismissed Raj Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., SLP© Diary No. 52538/2023. Raj Kumar( supra) had arisen from a decision rendered by the Punjab & Haryana High Court that was based upon Resham Singh33 case, whereby landowners’ claim for award of Additional market value was declined. Hon’ble Apex Court held that the challenge therein pertained to the High Court’s refusal to grant additional market value as another component of the compensation, even though solatium and interest had already been awarded. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as under: - “3. Additionally, SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023 titled ‘Raj Kumar and another v. Union of India and others’, has been preferred by a private party whose lands were acquired by NHAI. In this instance, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has rejected their claim for the award of ‘Additional Market Value’ relying upon its decision in National Highway Authority of India v. Resham Singh29 whereby the landowners were held entitled to ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’, but their claim for the grant of ‘Additional Market Value’ was declined. These benefits were granted / partly declined in terms of Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act), which were read into the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 (NHAI Act). 25. These benefits were granted / partly declined in terms of Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act), which were read into the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 (NHAI Act). 25. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no merit in the contentions raised by the Applicant, NHAI. We reaffirm the principles established in Tarsem Singh (supra) regarding the beneficial nature of granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ while emphasising the need to avoid creating unjust classifications lacking intelligible differentia. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the present Miscellaneous Application. 26. Leave is granted in the other connected matters, and all the appeals are disposed of with a direction to the Competent Authority to calculate the amount of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ in accordance with the directions issued in Tarsem Singh (supra). In this context, the appeal arising out of SLP (C) Diary No. 52538/2023 is dismissed, as the challenge therein pertains to the High Court’s refusal to award Additional Market Value as another component of the compensation, while ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ have already been granted.” In view of above, landowners were not entitled to market value under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act. 5. In the backdrop of above discussion, the award passed by the learned Arbitrator cannot be said to be suffering from any patent illegality, necessitating interference by the Court, however, the judgment passed by the learned District Judge on 04.09.2023 is set aside to the extent it grants 12% interest per annum to the land owners/ respondents on the enhanced amount of market value of the land. Instant appeals under Section 37 of the Act are disposed of in above terms. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.