JUDGMENT : RANJAN SHARMA, J. 1. Petitioner, Naresh Kumar, a compassionate appointee Clerk, on daily wages, at the relevant time, has come up before this Court, seeking the following relief:- (i) That a writ in the nature of certiorari may kindly be issued thereby quashing the impugned order dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4]. (ii). That a writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued and the respondent be directed to pay emoluments at par with the contract basis Clerk i.e. Rs.7800/- per month instead of Rs.4300/- from the date of appointment alongwith arrears thereto with interest at the rate of 12% per annum or alternatively to pay regular pay scales of Clerks as hundreds of posts are lying vacant in the respondent Department since long. (iii). That the respondents may kindly be directed to pay regular pay scale as the petitioner is working in vacant post.” 2. On instructions of the petitioner, Learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the alternative relief in prayer clause (ii) claiming regular pay scale of Clerk is not being pressed in the instant petition. FACTUAL MATRIX: 3. Grievance of the petitioner is that petitioner was appointed as Clerk on daily wage basis on 12.04.2007 on compassionate grounds. On appointment and joining, the petitioner was granted monthly emoluments based on daily wages of Rs. 4300/- per month whereas other similarly placed Clerks, who were appointed on compassionate grounds, on contract basis were given emoluments at Rs.7810/- per month including one Shri Man Singh, which was stated to be arbitrary, discriminatory and not in spirit of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is averred that petitioner submitted a representation on 05.07.2010 [Annexure P-1] and pursuant to this the Superintending Engineer, 1st Circle, HPPWD, Mandi, forwarded the case to Chief Engineer (NZ), PWD, Mandi on 14.10.2010 [Annexure P-2] but with no response. The petitioner filed CWP No. 3564 of 2011, claiming parity in emoluments/salary as granted to his counterpart, namely, Man Singh and aforesaid CWP was disposed of by this Court, with the direction to Chief Engineer [CZ], Mandi to consider the matter and take appropriate action in accordance with law. Resultantly, Chief Engineer, Mandi, Respondent No.2, passed an order on 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] rejecting the claim of the petitioner for parity in salary vis-à-vis Shri Man Singh, aforesaid. STAND OF RESPONDENT IN REPLY-AFFIDAVIT: 4. Resultantly, Chief Engineer, Mandi, Respondent No.2, passed an order on 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] rejecting the claim of the petitioner for parity in salary vis-à-vis Shri Man Singh, aforesaid. STAND OF RESPONDENT IN REPLY-AFFIDAVIT: 4. Pursuant to the issuance of notice on 29.03.2012 in these proceedings the Respondents-State Authorities filed a Reply-Affidavit dated 17.05.2012 of Superintending Engineer, 1st Circle, HPPWD, Mandi. (i). Perusal of Preliminary Submissions and Reply on Merits, states that, the petitioner had applied on compassionate grounds to Executive Engineer, Ghumarwin, HPPWD Division, upon death of his father who was working as work charge Beldar in the said division. Pursuant to his application, the Competent Authority accorded the necessary sanction and appointed the petitioner as Clerk on daily wage basis and he joined as such on 12.04.2007. Reply-Affidavit states that as per Clause 11 of the Policy on Compassionate Appointment dated 18.01.1990 [Annexure R-1], once, the petitioner has accepted his appointment as Clerk on daily wage basis, therefore, the petitioner has no right to seek parity in emoluments-salary vis-à-vis emoluments-salary given to Shri Man Singh, who was appointed as Clerk on compassionate grounds on contract basis on 01.10.2007. Reply-Affidavit indicates that the petitioner submitted a representation, on which the matter was referred to the higher office on 24.07.2010 and while the matter was under consideration the petitioner filed CWP No. 3564 of 2011 and the same was decided on 23.05.2011, directing the Respondent No. 2 -Chief Engineer [CZ], HPPWD, Mandi to take appropriate action in the matter. Reply-Affidavit further indicates that in compliance to the directions dated 23.05.2011, passed by the High Court, the Respondent No.2-Chief Engineer [CZ] gave hearing to the petitioner and after examining the matter in consultation with Finance Department, the case of the petitioner was rejected by Principal Secretary, [Public Works] to the Government of Himachal Pradesh on 10.01.2012 [Annexure R-II] and based on this the Respondent No. 2 Chief Engineer [CZ] rejected the case of the petitioner on 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4]. In this backdrop, the State Authorities have opposed the claim of the petitioner. 5. Heard Mr. Ashil Bhushan Rehalia, Advocate., Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Hemant Verma, Learned Deputy Advocate General for the Respondents-State. ANALYSIS: 6. In this backdrop, the State Authorities have opposed the claim of the petitioner. 5. Heard Mr. Ashil Bhushan Rehalia, Advocate., Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Hemant Verma, Learned Deputy Advocate General for the Respondents-State. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] and the communication dated 10.01.2012 [Annexure R-II,] denying parity in pay-salary-employments to the petitioner vis-à-vis another compassionate appointee Clerk [Man Singh] by applying two different yardsticks for purposes of pay-salary-emoluments amongst Clerks appointed on compassionate grounds, who performed same work, job, function, duties, responsibilities, needs to be interdicted, for the following reasons:- (i). Perusal of communication dated 10.01.2012 [Annexure R-II] issued by Principal Secretary [Public Works] and the resultant rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] reveals that the claim of petitioner for parity in pay-salary-emoluments as Clerk as granted to Shri Man Singh another compassionate appointee-Clerk was rejected by invoking Clause-11 of Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 18.01.1990 [Annexure R-I]. CLAUSE 11 OF POLICY ERRONEOUSLY INVOKED: The above plea of the State Authorities in the rejection orders is vitiated by non-application of mind, for the reason, that Clause 11 of the policy dated 18.01.1990 [Annexure R-I] was not attracted in the instant case. Clause 11 of the policy applied in a situation where a compassionate appointee was seeking change in appointment from a lower post to a higher post. In instant case, the petitioner has not claimed any change in post but a perusal of representation dated 05.07.2010 [Annexure P-1] reveals that the petitioner has claimed parity in pay-salary-emoluments with Man Singh, another compassionate appointee Clerk on contract basis who was given pay-salary-emoluments at Rs.7810/- per month whereas the petitioner despite being a compassionate appointee Clerk on daily basis was given pay-salary-emoluments at lower rate of Rs.4300/- per month. Thus, the rejection orders passed by erroneously invoking Clause-11, which was neither attracted nor applicable in fact situation of instant case vitiates the rejection orders. (ii). Thus, the rejection orders passed by erroneously invoking Clause-11, which was neither attracted nor applicable in fact situation of instant case vitiates the rejection orders. (ii). Rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4], was passed on the plea that the petitioner was appointed as Clerk on compassionate grounds in view of the policy dated 18.01.1990 [Annexure R-I] and the Instructions dated 16.08.2005, which provided for appointing a dependent on compassionate ground on daily wages in case the deceased employee at the time of death was work-charge or was a daily wager with more than 7 years service and since the father of petitioner was work charge employee at the time of his death, therefore, the petitioner Naresh Kumar was appointed as Clerk on daily wage and was given pay-salary-emoluments of Rs.4300/- per month as was admissible to daily wagers. (ii-a) For the purpose of testing the validity of the above stand of State Authorities, as contained in the Reply-Affidavit and in the rejection orders, it is necessary to have a recap of Clause 2(b)(ii) of the Policy dated 18.01.1990, as amended on 16.08.2005, which reads as under:- “Government of Himachal Pradesh, Department of Personnel Appointment-II No. (AP-II)F(4)-4/89-V dated 16.08.2005 Office Memorandum “Subject: Appointment of sons/daughters/near relations of a Government servant who dies in harness leaving his family in immediate need of assistance- modification thereof. Accordingly, para-2(b) of this Department O.M. of even number dated 18.1.1990 may be deemed to have been amended as under:- 2(b)(ii) A work Charged Beldar on daily waged with 7 year continuous service who dies in harness, one dependent may be appointed on daily wages. Appointment will be done by Deputy Commissioner, Superintending Engineers of Public Works Department, Irrigation & Public Health Department, H.P.S.E.B., Conservators of Forest, Chief Medical Officers, Deputy Director of Horticulture/Agriculture Department and other equivalent Regional/District level officers as the case may be. These instructions will come into force with immediate effect.” Sd/- Principal Secretary [Personnel] to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.” CLAUSE 2(b)(ii) OF POLICY CANNOT FORM BASIS TO DEFEAT PARITY IN PAY-SALARY- EMOLUMENTS: (ii-b). These instructions will come into force with immediate effect.” Sd/- Principal Secretary [Personnel] to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.” CLAUSE 2(b)(ii) OF POLICY CANNOT FORM BASIS TO DEFEAT PARITY IN PAY-SALARY- EMOLUMENTS: (ii-b). Reliance placed by the State Authorities on the Office Memorandum dated 16.08.2005 and Clause 2(b)(ii) cannot be made the basis for giving a lesser pay-salary-emoluments to petitioner as compassionate appointee Clerk on daily wages of Rs.4300/- per month vis-à-vis higher pay-salary- emoluments granted to one Shri Man Singh, a compassionate appointee-Clerk on contractual basis of Rs.7810/- per month, from the date of initial appointment during the year 2007. Reliance placed on Office Memorandum dated 16.08.2005 for giving lesser pay-salary-emoluments cannot sustain, for the reason, that Clause 2(b)(ii) only enables the State Authorities to appoint a dependent on compassionate ground on daily wages in case the deceased employee at the time of death was work charge employee or was daily waged Beldar with 7 years continuous service. Clause 2(b)(ii) nowhere enables the State Authorities to prescribe or grant a lesser pay-salary-emoluments to the petitioner who was appointed as Clerk on daily wages. Clause 2(b)(ii) only enables the State Authorities to make appointment on daily wages and this Clause cannot be invoked/applied in such a manner so as to give leverage to the State Authorities to prescribe or grant a lesser pay-salary-emoluments vis-à-vis the other compassionate appointee contractual Clerks who was appointed in the same department and that too in the same year 2007. Giving lesser pay-salary- emoluments under the garb of Clause 2(b)(ii) also defeats the very intent-concept of equal pay for equal work. Even by virtue of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules notified on 26.08.2009 as applicable w.e.f. 01.01.2006 the State Authorities have in principle prescribed the minimum/initial pay of Clerk of Rs.7810/- per month. Once in principle the State Authorities have fixed the minimum-initial pay of Clerks at Rs.7810/- per month applicable w.e.f. 01.01.2006 [by virtue of Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Revised Pay Rules 2009], therefore, the State Authorities were bound to prescribe and grant this minimum-initial pay of Rs.7810/- per month to all Clerks, irrespective of the source of recruitment or birthmark so as to ensure parity in pay. Action of the State Authorities in prescribing lesser pay-scale-emoluments for daily waged Clerks due to the inaction of the State Authorities in not raising the daily rates, in tune with the minimum initial pay prescribed for post of Clerk, is ex-facie violative of the principle of parity in pay or equal pay for equal work by carving out artificial and superfluous methodology amongst one homogenous class of Clerks [even though appointed on compassionate on daily basis vis-à-vis contract or the like], who perform the same work, job, duties, function and responsibilities. It is the nature of work, job, duties and function which is determative of the legal entitlement for equal pay for equal work. The constitutional right of an employee for equal pay for equal work cannot be defeated under the garb or pretext that such person was appointed on daily basis. Invoking the source of increment or birthmark so as to give different pay-salary-emoluments between Clerks, who were appointed in the same year and in same departments and who performed same work, job, duties, function, etc. cannot be permitted to operate so as to deprive petitioner of his legal entitlement of parity or equal pay at par with others, including Man Singh, as referred to above. Thus, the plea of the State Authorities in invoking Clause 2(b)(ii) of the Instructions dated 16.08.2005 cannot be permitted to operate so as to defeat, deny and deprive the petitioner of constitutional right of parity in pay [based on minimum initial pay] at Rs.7810/- per month instead of lesser pay-salary-emoluments of Rs.4300/- per month given to him since his initial appointment on 12.04.2007 vis-à-vis pay of others including Man Singh appointed on 01.10.2007, as revised/enhanced from time to time. 7. Case of the petitioner for parity in pay-salary- emoluments as Clerk needs to be tested from another angle also. (i). Stand of the State Authorities in rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 and Reply- Affidavit is that once the petitioner has accepted his daily waged appointment without any demur or protest in terms of the policy dated 18.01.1990 [Annexure R-I] and the instructions dated 16.08.2005, then, the petitioner is entitled to salary as per the accepted condition and he could not turn around and claim salary-emoluments at par other compassionate appointee. MERE ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT NOT A GROUND TO DENY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PARITY IN PAY: (i-a). MERE ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT NOT A GROUND TO DENY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PARITY IN PAY: (i-a). The above stand of the State Authorities cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny, for the reason, that firstly, mere acceptance of appointment on daily wage basis as Clerk at Rs.4300/- on compassionate grounds cannot be the basis for denying parity in salary-emoluments to the petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh who was appointed as Clerk on compassionate grounds; and secondly, any unconscionable condition(s), even if, accepted by a person either by signing on dotted lines or by conduct cannot be a ground to defeat the constitutional right of equal pay for equal work or parity in pay-salary- emoluments vis-à-vis other similarly placed incumbents; and thirdly, carving out discrimination or artificial or erroneous classification by denying parity in pay, merely on the basis of designation or source of recruitment or birthmark is unconscionable and opposed to public policy when the nature of work, job, functions duties, responsibilities performed by daily waged vis-à-vis contract compassionate appointee Clerks [petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh] is similar in all respects. That being so, the State Authorities cannot escape its obligation of ensuring parity in pay-salary- emoluments amongst the persons appointed on compassionate grounds; and lastly, even the State Authorities in the Reply-Affidavit or rejection orders have not been able to indicate as to on what basis and on what grounds the differential has been carved out for purposes of salary of the petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh. MERE DESIGNATION CANNOT FORM BASIS FOR GIVING DIFFERENT PAY-SALARY-EMOLUMENTS: 8. Mere designation being a daily waged or a contractual Clerk cannot form basis for carving out an artificial distinction amongst one homogenous class of Clerks appointed on compassionate grounds. Such an artificial distinction cannot be permitted to stand the test of judicial scrutiny. An artificial distinction carved out, on the basis of mere designation, by terming the petitioner as daily wage Clerk and by terming Shri Man Singh as contractual Clerk cannot be permitted to form the basis for differential treatment, when minimum essential qualifications, nature of work, job, duties functions and the responsibilities performed by the petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh as Clerk was similar/ identical in all respect. Even, nothing has been placed on record by the State Authorities to establish dissimilarity in work, job, functions and responsibilities between petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh who were appointed as Clerks on compassionate grounds in the same department and in the same year (2007). Such an action of the respondents in prescribing or governing the compassionate appointee Clerks differently and dissimilarly is not only unconscionable but is also opposed to public policy being violative of Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India, as per the mandate of the Supreme Court, in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , in the following terms: 93. The Contract Act does not define the expression "public policy" or "opposed to public policy". From the very nature of things, the expressions "public policy", "opposed to public policy" or "contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the courts and similarly where there has been a well- recognized head of public policy, the courts have not shirked from extending it to new transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There are two schools of thought - "the narrow view" school and "the broad view" school. According to the former, courts can not create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenances judicial law-making in this area. The adherents of "the narrow view" school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy unless that particular ground had been well-established by authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Uriefontein Consolidated Mines Limited [1902] A.C. 484, 500 "Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision." That was in the year 1902. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Uriefontein Consolidated Mines Limited [1902] A.C. 484, 500 "Public policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision." That was in the year 1902. Seventy-eight years earlier, & Burros, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, [1824] 2 Bing. 229, 252; S.C 130 E.R. 294, 303 and [1824-34] All E.R. Reprint 258, 266, described public policy as "a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you." The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a-man to shy away from unmanageable horses and in words which conjure up before our eyes the picture of the young Alexander the Great taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderyby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Association Ltd., [1971] Ch. 591, 606. "With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles." Had the timorous always held the field, not only the doctrine of public policy but even the Common Law or the principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his "History of English Law", Volume III, page 55, has said : "In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to supress practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them. It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. If there is no head of public policy which D covers a case, then the court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution. 95. We will now test the validity of Rule 9(i) by applying to it the principle formulated above. Each of the contesting Respondents was in the service of the Rivers Steam Navigation Company Limited and on the said Scheme of arrangement being sanctioned by the Calcutta High Court, he was offered employment in the Corporation which he had accepted. Even had these Respondents not liked to work for the Corporation, they had not much of a choice because all that they would have got was "all legitimate and legal compensation payable to them either under the Industrial Disputes Act or otherwise legally admissible". These Respondents were not covered by the Industrial Disputes Act for they were not workmen but were officers of the said company. It is, therefore, difficult to visualize what compensation they would have been entitled to get unless their contract of employment with their previous employers contained any provision in that behalf. So far as the original terms of employment with the Corporation are concerned, they are contained in the letters of appointment issued to the contesting Respondents. These letters of appointment are in a stereotype form. Under these letters of appointment, the Corporation could without any previous notice terminate their service, if the Corporation was satisfied on medical evidence that the employee was unfit and was likely for a considerable time to continue to be unfit for the discharge of his duties. The Corporation could also without any previous notice dismiss either of them, if he was guilty of any insubordination, intemperance or other misconduct, or of any breach of any rules pertaining to his service or conduct or non- performance of his duties. The above terms are followed by asset of terms under the heading "Other Conditions". One of these terms stated that "You shall be subject to the service rules and regulations including the conduct rules". Undoubtedly, the contesting Respondents accepted appointment with the Corporation upon these terms. They had, however, no real choice before them. The above terms are followed by asset of terms under the heading "Other Conditions". One of these terms stated that "You shall be subject to the service rules and regulations including the conduct rules". Undoubtedly, the contesting Respondents accepted appointment with the Corporation upon these terms. They had, however, no real choice before them. Had they not accepted the appointments, they would have at the highest received some compensation which would have been probably meagre and would certainly have exposed themselves to the hazard of finding another job. 97. The said Rules as also the earlier rules of 1970 were accepted by the contesting Respondents without demur. Here again they had no real choice before them. They had risen higher in the hierarchy of the Corporation. If they had refused to accept the said Rules, it would have resulted in termination of their service and the consequent anxiety, harassment and uncertainty of finding alternative employment. 101. The Corporation is a large organization. It has offices in various parts of West Bengal, Bihar and Assam, as shown by the said Rules, and possibly in other States also. The said Rules form part of the contract of employment between the Corporation and its employees who are not workmen. These employees had no powerful workmen's Union to support them. They had no voice in the framing of the said rules they had no choice but to accept the said Rules as part of their contract of employment. There is gross disparity between the Corporation and its employees, whether they be workmen or officers. The Corporation can afford to dispense with the services of an officer. It will find hundreds of others to take his place but an officer cannot afford to lose his job because if he does so, there are not hundreds of jobs waiting for him. A clause such as clause (i) of Rule 9 is against right and reason. It is wholly unconscionable. It has been entered into between parties between whom there is gross inequality of bargaining power. Rule 9(i) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated by us above. Several statutory authorities have a clause similar to Rule 9(i) in their contracts of employment. Rule 9(i) is a term of the contract between the Corporation and all its officers. It affects a large number of persons and it squarely falls within the principle formulated by us above. Several statutory authorities have a clause similar to Rule 9(i) in their contracts of employment. As appears from the decided cases, the West Bengal State Electricity Board and Air India International have it. Several Government companies apart from the Corporation (which is the First Appellant before us) must be having it. There are 970 Government companies with paid-up capital of Rs.16,414.9 crores as stated in the written arguments submitted on behalf of the Union of India. The Government and its agencies and instrumentalities constitute the largest employer in the country. A clause such as Rule 9(i) in a contract of employment affecting large sections of the public is harmful and injurious to the public interest for it tends to create a sense of insecurity in the minds of those to whom it applies and consequently it is against public good. Such a clause, therefore, is opposed to public policy and being opposed to public policy, it-is void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Based on the factual matrix and the mandate of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Brojo Nath Ganguly [supra] this Court cannot permit the State to resort to different and discriminatory treatment in terms of pay-salary-emoluments amongst the incumbents appointed as Clerk on compassionate grounds in same year [2007]. Mere acceptance of an appointment as Clerk on daily wage basis cannot form basis for differential treatment for purposes of salary between the petitioner vis-à-vis Man Singh. Had the petitioner not accepted terms and conditions of appointment as Clerk on daily wage emoluments at relevant time in 2007, then, the respondents would have deprived him even of his appointment. It is due to the unequal or no bargaining power that the petitioner had no other option, than to accept the appointment as Clerk on daily wage basis. Even, source of recruitment or birthmark cannot be pleaded as a defence by the Employer-State Authorities so as to deprive the petitioner of his constitutional right of parity in pay or equal pay. Even, source of recruitment or birthmark cannot be pleaded as a defence by the Employer-State Authorities so as to deprive the petitioner of his constitutional right of parity in pay or equal pay. Legal entitlement of parity in pay-salary-emoluments cannot be defeated, denied or negated by the State Authorities, when, in principle, the minimum-initial pay for Clerks has been prescribed w.e.f. 01.01.2006 Clerks at Rs.7810/- per month. The inaction of the Respondents in giving pay-salary-emoluments at Rs.4300/- per month to the petitioner due to the inaction of not revising the daily wage so as to bring the same in tune with or inconfirmity with the minimum/initial pay given to other Clerks speaks volumes of arbitrariness and unreasonableness in State action, when, the qualifications, work, job, duties, functions are similar in all respects. An artificial and superfluous distinction cannot be carved out between one homogenous class of Clerks who were appointed on compassionate grounds in the same department and in the same year. Denial of parity in pay is ex facie violative of Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India. The rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] and the fundamental communication inter-se the State Authorities dated 10.01.2012 [Annexure R-II] and the plea in Reply- Affidavit cannot sustain, so as to defeat the Constitutional rights of parity in pay or equal pay for equal work and the legal entitlement of the petitioner for minimum initial pay-salary-emoluments as Clerk on compassionate grounds his appointment on 12.04.2007 at par with his counterpart, namely, Man Singh, who was appointed as Clerk on 01.10.2007 but was given pay-salary-emoluments of Rs.7810/- per month vis-à-vis the lesser pay-salary-emoluments of Rs.4300/- per month to the petitioner from 13.04.2007 and thereafter. MANDATE OF LAW AFFIRMING PARITY IN PAY: 9. In State of Punjab and others vs. Jagjit Singh and others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 , the denial of minimum of pay as is granted to others similarly situated appointees of the same post was negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following terms: 57. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. There is no room for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded through a large number of judgments rendered by this Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of the principle, have been summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work- charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary employees, has been summarized by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterated by us, yet again. 58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post. 61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay-scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post. (i). 61. In view of the position expressed by us in the foregoing paragraph, we have no hesitation in holding, that all the concerned temporary employees, in the present bunch of cases, would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay-scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post. (i). Grant of different pay between the adhoc appointees vis-à-vis the contractual appointees who performed same work, job, duties and function by giving a go bye to the constitutional right of equal pay for equal work was deprecated, entitling the temporary employees to minimum of pay, as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sabha Shanker Dube versus Divisional Forest Officer, (2019) 12 SCC 297 , in the following terms: 12. In view of the judgment in Jagjit Singh (supra), we are unable to uphold the view of the High Court that the Appellants- herein are not entitled to be paid the minimum of the pay sales. We are not called upon to adjudicate on the rights of the Appellants relating to the regularization of their services. We are concerned only with the principle laid down by this Court initially in Putti Lal (supra) relating to persons who are similarly situated to the Appellants and later affirmed in Jagjit Singh (supra) that temporary employees are entitled to minimum of the pay scales as long as they continue in service. (ii). Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shah Samir Bharatbhai and others versus State of Gujarat and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1788, had accepted the prayer for parity in pay between regular or adhoc vis-à-vis contractual employees who performed same duties and performed same functions by deprecating the differential treatment in terms of salary in the following terms: 27. The appellants filed writ petitions in 2018 seeking parity with regular or ad hoc Assistant Professors on the ground that as contractual employees undertake similar duties and perform the same functions. The writ petitions were allowed by the learned single Judge by his order dated 05.07.2023. The learned single Judge, however, gave full relief by directing that the appellants should get pay scale and other benefits equivalent to that of the Assistant Professors appointed regularly. Learned single Judge also granted annual increments and other benefits at par with the regularly appointed Assistant Professors from the date of initial appointment. 28. The learned single Judge, however, gave full relief by directing that the appellants should get pay scale and other benefits equivalent to that of the Assistant Professors appointed regularly. Learned single Judge also granted annual increments and other benefits at par with the regularly appointed Assistant Professors from the date of initial appointment. 28. The State filed a Letter Patents Appeal before the Division Bench, contending that the single Judge could not have exceeded the relief granted in the earlier batch and directed parity, particularly when the appellants were appointed on a contractual basis. More importantly, the State argued that the single Judge was bound by the decisions of the Division Bench in Gohel Vishal Chhaganbhai (Supra), Acharya Madhavi (Supra). It was argued that in these decisions, the Division Bench only granted minimum of pay scale of Assistant Professors and therefore the single Judge committed a serious error in not following the binding precedent. 31. The appellants were seeking parity of pay. The prayer for regularization, though made in the earlier rounds of litigation was never accepted. The facts of the present case are rather egregious. Assistant professors appointed on contractual basis during 2011 to 2025 have been working at abysmally low monthly emoluments for the last two decades. While there is no material whatsoever drawing out a distinction between the duties and functions performed by them and that of their colleagues appointed regularly or on ad hoc basis, they continue to draw monthly salary of Rs. 30,000/-. 33. It is disturbing that Assistant Professors are getting monthly emoluments of Rs. 30,000/-. It is high time that the State takes up the issue and rationalize the pay structure on the basis of functions that they perform. For the present we have followed the decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Acharya Madhavi (supra) and Gohel Vishal Chhaganbhai (supra) to grant appellants the same relief as in those cases. We leave it open to the appellants and such similarly placed Assistant Professors to work out their remedies before the High Court in view of their continued service for a long period. It is for the High Court to consider the same and pass orders as per law. 34. We leave it open to the appellants and such similarly placed Assistant Professors to work out their remedies before the High Court in view of their continued service for a long period. It is for the High Court to consider the same and pass orders as per law. 34. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court passed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 1371 of 2023 dated 20.12.2023 as well as by the single Judge in R/Special Civil Application No. 11567 of 2018 dated 05.07.2023. Allowing the appeals in part, we direct that the contractually appointed Assistant Professors, shall be entitled to the minimum pay scale admissible to Assistant Professors. Arrears calculated at the rate of 8% shall be paid from three years preceding the date of filing of the writ petitions. With these directions the appeals stand allowed. In facts of instant case and in view of the mandate of law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sabha Shanker Dube, Jagjit Singh, Shah Samir Bharatbhai [supra], this Court is of the considered view, that once the State Authorities have in principle prescribed the minimum-initial pay-salary-emoluments for the category of Clerks at Rs.7810/- per month as per the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules 2009, applicable w.e.f. 01.01.2006, and this minimum/initial pay was granted to another similarly placed incumbent, Shri Man Singh, [a contractual Clerk] w.e.f. 01.10.2007 therefore, the petitioner who was also appointed as Clerk [on daily wage basis] on 12.04.2007 cannot be given a lesser pay-salary-emoluments of Rs.4300/- per month. When the nature of work, duties and functions performed by both these incumbents was identical/similar. Action of the State Authorities in giving salary and employments to the petitioner at Rs.4300/- per month while giving the minimum initial pay-emoluments at Rs.7810/- per month to another compassionate appointee-Clerks cannot pass the test of judicial scrutiny. Denial of parity in pay, leads to travesty of justice by resorting to discrimination in terms of pay-salary-emoluments amongst Clerks, who were appointed, on compassionate grounds in the same department and in the same year. 10. Learned State Counsel submits that the instant petition suffers from delay and laches, as the petition was filed in the year 2012 claiming relief from 2007. 10. Learned State Counsel submits that the instant petition suffers from delay and laches, as the petition was filed in the year 2012 claiming relief from 2007. The above contention of the Learned State Counsel is misconceived, for the reason that the petitioner made a representation in 2010 [Annexure P-1] but no decision was taken thereon. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed CWP No. 3564 of 2011, which was disposed of on 23.05.2011 leading to the passing of rejection orders on 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4]. The aforesaid rejection orders have been assailed by filing the instant petition on 27.03.2012. In these circumstances, the plea of delay and laches is not made out on facts and the same is accordingly turned down. CONCLUSION: 11. For ensuring parity and to give effect to the constitutional right of equal pay for equal work; the artificial and superfluous dissimilarity sought to be carved out within one homogenous class of Clerks appointed on Compassionate ground(s) in same year and in same department who possesses same essential qualifications and perform same work, job, duties and functions merely on the basis of source of recruitment or birthmark on designation [regular- contract-daily wages] appointed under same policy of compassionate grounds and the rejection order dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4] are perverse and bad in law. Consequently, the action of State Authorities and rejection orders are set-aside and the petitioner is held entitled for parity in pay-salary-emoluments as granted to another similarly placed Clerk [Man Singh] who was appointed on compassionate basis from date of initial appointment. DIRECTIONS: 12. In view of above discussion and for reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition, is allowed, in the following terms: (i) Rejection orders dated 16.03.2012 [Annexure P-4], is quashed and set- aside; (ii). Communication dated 10.01.2012 [Annexure R-II], which led to passing of rejection order being contrary to law is declared inoperative for all intents and purposes; (iii). State Authorities are directed to grant parity in pay-salary-emoluments to the petitioner, Naresh Kumar, as a Clerk w.e.f. 12.04.2007 vis-à-vis Man Singh, who was appointed as Clerk and was given Rs.7810/- per month w.e.f. 01.10.2007 till the date such anomaly in pay-salary-emoluments continued thereafter from time to time; (iv). State Authorities shall give differential pay-salary-emoluments to the petitioner w.e.f. 12.04.2007 onwards with all consequential arrears; (v). State Authorities shall give differential pay-salary-emoluments to the petitioner w.e.f. 12.04.2007 onwards with all consequential arrears; (v). State Authorities shall extend benefits in terms of this judgment on or before 31.12.2025, failing which the petitioner shall be entitled for interest @ 6% per annum till realization; (vi). Parties to bear respective costs. In aforesaid terms, the instant petition stands disposed of alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.