1 2025:CGHC:32584 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 2216 of 1998 Vijay Kumar Yadu, S/o Late Rama Yadu, Aged 46 years, R/o Shri Ram Chowk, Tikrapara, Post – Tikrapara, Raipur (M.P.) ... Appellant(s) versus The State Of MP through C.B.I., Jabalpur ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sameer Rigri alongwith Mr. Sachin Nidhi, Advocates. For Respondent(s) : Mr. B.Gopa Kumar standing counsel for CBI alongwith Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Judgment on Board 14/07/2025 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.09.1998 passed by the Court of the Special Judge, C.B.I, Jabalpur passed in Special Case No.20/1996, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in following manner :- CONVICTION SENTENCE Under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.15,000/-, in default of payment ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Digitally signed by ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Date: 2025.07.24 11:55:16 +0530 2 of fine to further undergo RI for 1 year. Under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code RI for 4 years and fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 1 year. Under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code RI for 4 years and fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 1 year. Under Section 467/471 of the Indian Penal Code RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 6 months. Under Section 468/471 of the Indian Penal Code RI for 2 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 6 months. Under Section 477-A of the Indian Penal Code RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 6 months. Under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 RI for 3 years and fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 6 months. (All the sentences were directed to be run concurrently) 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that it is admitted that the accused, Vijay Kumar Yadu, was posted as a Special Assistant at 3 Bank of India, Raipur, while witness Govind Purohit was posted as Chief Officer at Bank of India, Zonal Office, Bhopal, and Moreswar Singh was posted as an Officer. It is also admitted that Upkar Kaur Dhariwal, Santosh Kumar Gupta, Vidhyasagar Devangan, and Ranjan Kumar Banerjee were posted at Bank of India, Raipur. It is further admitted that Moreswar Singh, Upkar Kaur Dhariwal, Santosh Kumar Gupta, Vidhyasagar Devangan, and Ranjan Kumar Banerjee worked alongside the accused. It is also admitted that witness Govind Purohit conducted a preliminary inquiry and recorded the statement of the accused, which bears the accused’s signature. It is admitted that Property (Ex.P- 6) amounting to Rs. 47,720 was paid in cash through Ex.P- 7 and 8. It is also admitted that Ex.P- 10 is a certified copy of the ledger of Account No. 7904. It is admitted that during the investigation, samples of the accused’s handwriting and signatures in Hindi and English were obtained from Ex.P- 89 to 239. The accused, V.K. Yadu, was posted as a Special Assistant at Bank of India, Raipur Branch, during the period from October 1990 to February 1991. During this period, while discharging his duties as a public servant, the accused, with the intent to dishonestly and fraudulently obtain wrongful gain, withdrew an amount of Rs. 47,600 from the Savings Bank Account No. 7904 of the account holder R.S. Thakur at Bank of India, Raipur, using cheque No. 322825 dated 19.01.1991 (Ex. P- 6) and obtained a demand draft in the name of Smt. Satyaprabha Thakur, Bilaspur, for the said 4 amount. All actions in this regard were carried out by the accused, despite the account having insufficient credit balance, and the accused himself cancelled the cheque and initialed it. 3. Similarly, the accused presented cheque No. 322826 dated 21.02.1991 for Rs. 28,050, and un-authorisedly made the first and second cancellations on the cheque, signing it in different ways, and obtained the said amount from the cashier on 21.02.1991. Further, on 28.01.1991, the accused presented cheque No. 322828, making the first and second cancellations himself, and received Rs. 28,050 from the cashier, V.S. Devangan. In this manner, the accused forged the cheques marked as Ex. P- 7 and Ex. P-8 and utilized these forged cheques as genuine, thereby dishonestly obtaining a total amount of Rs. 1,18,270/- from the account of R.S. Thakur (Account No. 7904) and defrauding the bank. 4. On detection of irregularities at Bank of India, Raipur Branch, Shri Govind Purohit (Witness No. 1) conducted a preliminary inquiry, during which the accused admitted his guilt in writing through Ex.P- 2. After the inquiry, Govind Purohit submitted his report marked as Ex. P- 1, and Rakesh Jamuna Das Sagar conducted a departmental inquiry and submitted his report marked as Ex.P- 10-A, holding the accused responsible. Upon receiving information, Superintendent of Police, CBI, Jabalpur, Shri S.R. Jaiswal, registered FIR No. RC 32-91 dated 19.07.1991 (Ex.P- 240). Nagendra Prasad Singh, Inspector, CBI, Jabalpur, was 5 authorized to investigate the matter. Narendra Prasad (Witness No. 11) seized the inquiry report submitted by Govind Purohit (Ex.P- 1) and the written admission by the accused (Ex.P- 2). Samples of the accused’s handwriting and signatures in Hindi and English were obtained from Ex.P- 89 to Ex.P- 239, and the admitted writings, disputed writings, and specimen writings were sent to the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Calcutta, for examination. V.G.S. Bhatnagar (Witness No. 10) examined the documents and submitted his opinion (Ex.P- 87) along with the reasoning report (Ex.P- 88) to the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Jabalpur. Upon finding sufficient evidence against the accused, a charge sheet was filed before the Court under Sections 420, 467, 471, and 477 IPC. Since the accused had already been dismissed from service and no sanction was required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the charge sheet was filed without obtaining sanction. It is alleged that the accused, on 19.01.1991, using a forged cheque, dishonestly obtained Rs. 47,720 from Account No. 7904 (in the name of R.S. Thakur) and defrauded the Bank, thereby committing an offence under Section 420 IPC. Similarly, on 31.01.1991, using a forged cheque, the accused dishonestly obtained Rs. 28,050 and on 28.01.1991, using cheque No. 322828, dishonestly obtained Rs. 28,050, thereby committing offences under Section 420 IPC. By forging the said cheques and using them as genuine, and by fraudulently cancelling the cheques, the accused committed 6 offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, and 477 IPC. Furthermore, while discharging duties as a public servant, the accused misused his official position and, through corrupt and illegal means, obtained a wrongful gain of Rs. 1,18,270/- from Account No. 7904 (in the name of R.S. Thakur) using forged cheques, thereby committing an offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused has denied the charges. 5. In order to prove the guilt of the accused/appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses and in defence DW-1, Rakesh Jamuna Das Sagar has been examined. 6. After consideration, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has taken the defence that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case. The accused, in his detailed statement, has stated that on 12.03.1991, Kulkarni called him to Hotel Madhuban, Raipur, where he went with his father-in-law, D.P. Yaduvanshi. After reaching, Govind Purohit asked his father-in-law to step out, and informed the accused about an incident in Raipur, to which the accused stated that he had no knowledge of the incident. Purohit then suggested that since most customers knew him and he was a senior employee, he should take responsibility to save the other staff, assuring him that no harm would come to him. Under this assurance and threat, Purohit and Kulkarni compelled him to give 7 a written statement admitting guilt, stating that he would not be allowed to leave unless he gave the statement, and his father-in- law was not allowed to enter. Under continuous pressure and in reliance on Purohit’s assurances, the accused provided the written statement. He maintains that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he is not pressing this appeal as far as it relates to conviction part of impugned judgment and is confining his argument to the quantum of sentence only. 8. In compliance of the Court’s order dated 09.07.2025 Medical Board was constituted and Medical Board has submitted its report, the relevant portion of which reads as under: “ We the members of District Medical Board Raipur have examined Shri Vijay Kumar Yadu, S/o Rama Yadu, 73 Yrs old male As per available medical records and physical examination he appears as a case of Systemic Hypertension with right sided hemiplegia due to cerebrovascular accident.” 9. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant under Section 420 of IPC to five years' rigorous imprisonment, under Section 420 of IPC to four years' rigorous imprisonment, under Section 420 of IPC to four years’ rigorous imprisonment, under Section 467/471 of IPC to five years' rigorous imprisonment, under Section 468/471 of IPC to two years' rigorous imprisonment, under Section 477-A of IPC 8 to three years' rigorous imprisonment, and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to three years' rigorous imprisonment, with a direction that all the sentences shall run concurrently. It is submitted that although the appellant has undergone actual incarceration for only 39 days, he faced the trial for approximately seven years, and the appeal has been pending for about 27 years. The appellant is presently aged about 73 years and is virtually bedridden due to multiple age-related ailments. Incarceration at this stage would cause undue hardship to him. It is further submitted that the appellant has already deposited the fine amount of Rs. 54,000/- as imposed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and order dated 17.09.1998. Therefore, it is prayed that the sentence awarded to the appellant may be reduced to the period already undergone by him, in the interest of justice. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the trial Court after considering all the documents and evidence adduced by the parties has passed the judgment, in which no interference is called for. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court including the impugned judgment. 12. The issue before this Court is whether the sentence of the appellant, as imposed by the learned trial court, warrants interference in light of the mitigating circumstances placed on record such as clean antecedents, the advanced age of the appellant, his deteriorating health condition and prolonged delay in the conclusion of 9 proceedings 13. In criminal jurisprudence, sentencing is not merely a mechanical exercise but involves a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. While aggravating circumstances highlight the gravity and impact of the offence, mitigating factors provide insight into the personal circumstances of the offender which may require a lesser punishment. 14. Mitigating factors may include the age of the accused, absence of prior criminal record, mental or physical health conditions, socio- economic background, duration of trial, and good conduct during incarceration. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Giasuddin vs State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287 inter alia held as under: "9.... It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti- social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation. Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is the individual, and the goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times. The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defence. We, therefore, consider a therapeutic, rather than an "in terrorem" outlook, should prevail in our criminal 10 courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind. … 16. … ‘ A proper sentence is the amalgam of many factors such as the nature of the offence, the circumstances extenuating or aggravating of the offence, the prior criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the offender, the record of the offender as to employment, the background of the offender with reference to education, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, the emotional and mental conditions of the offender, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the possibility of return of the offender to normal life in the community, the possibility of treatment or training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence may serve as a deterrent to crime by the offender or by others and the current community need, if any, for such a deterrent in respect to the particular type of offence. These factors have to be taken into account by the Court in deciding upon the appropriate sentence. [As observed in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190 at p. 191: 1976 SCC (Cri) 546]' 17. It will thus be seen that there is a great discretion vested in the Judge, especially when pluralistic factors enter his calculations. innovation, in all conscience, is in the field of judicial discretion." (Emphasis supplied) 15. Similarly, in Pramod Kumar Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1104, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while relying on the judgment of Mohammad Giasuddin (supra) reiterated the importance of considering mitigating factors while awarding 11 sentence, particularly in cases involving long-pending prosecutions. The Court observed that the incident in question therein had occurred nearly four decades ago and that the appellant had no prior criminal record. Therefore, the sentence of the appellant therein was reduced from 5 years to 3 years considering the mitigating circumstances. The operative portion reads as under: "10. It is a well-established principle that while imposing sentence, aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a case are to be taken into consideration. … Similarly, in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] (two-Judge Bench), while considering the settlement between the parties concerning an offence under Section 307IPC, observed: 13.1. The goal of sentencing can be a combination of incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, or restoration. 13.2. In India we do not have any such sentencing policy till date. The prevalence of such guidelines may not only aim at achieving consistency in awarding sentences in different cases, such guidelines normally prescribe the sentencing policy as well, namely, whether the purpose of awarding punishment in a particular case is more of a deterrence or retribution or rehabilitation, etc. In the absence of such guidelines in India, the courts go by their own perception about the philosophy behind the 12 prescription of certain specified penal consequences for particular nature of crime. 13.3. For some deterrence and/or vengeance becomes more important whereas another Judge may be more influenced by rehabilitation or restoration as the goal of sentencing. Sometimes, it would be a combination of both which would weigh in the mind of the court in awarding a particular sentence. However, that may be a question of quantum. … 16. More recently, in Jasbir Singh v. Tara Singh [Jasbir Singh v. Tara Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 441: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 514] (two-Judge Bench), this Court observed that it is not possible to have strict principles on sentencing in absence of a sentencing policy for the State, however certain mitigating factors like the gravity of the offence, motive for commission of the crime, the manner in which it was committed need to be borne in mind and thereafter sentence be imposed. ... 20. Having regard to the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the parties and findings of the courts below, it can be seen that 39 years have passed since the date of offence and both the other accused persons have come to be acquitted. From a reading of the impugned order [Pramod Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 7212), it is a matter of record that there was old enmity between the complainant and A-1 relating to the piece of land where the offence came to be committed, while pertinently, the appellant (A-2) is the nephew of A-1 13 21. There are no criminal antecedents of the appellant that have been brought on record. Further, from the record, it cannot be said that the appellant acted in a premeditated manner, whatsoever. 22. Therefore, in the interest of justice and in consideration of the abovementioned mitigating factors, this Court reduces the sentence imposed on the appellant-accused from 5 years rigorous imprisonment to 3 years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant shall pay a fine amount of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand) within a period of 6 weeks from today. In default of payment of fine, the appellant shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. The fine to be paid to the complainant by way of compensation." (Emphasis supplied) 16. From the aforesaid judgment(s) it is clear that the objective of sentencing has to be a combination of deterrence and rehabilitation. Both have to coexist and in the absence of one, the purpose of the other cannot be achieved. The list of mitigating factors has been enumerated above and the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive. No hard and fast formula or mechanism for combining deterrence with rehabilitation can be laid down. but the same has to be worked out on individual and case to case basis. 17. Though learned counsel for appellant has not challenged conviction of appellant and confined his prayer only with regard to reduction of sentence as undergone, but still this Court deems it appropriate to examine the impugned judgment of the trial Court. This Court has meticulously perused impugned judgment and evidence on record. 14 18. Perusal of impugned judgment reveals that the trial Court after elaborately considering evidence of each individual material witness, has observed that prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against appellant herein and that being the position, this Court is the opinion that the trial Court has not committed any mistake in arriving at a conclusion that appellant is guilty for offence punishable under Sections 420, 420, 420, 467/471, 468/471 and 477-A of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. 19. A vital mitigating factor in considering the sentence is the appellant’s advanced age. At 73 years old, suffering from serious health ailments, he is highly vulnerable to the physical and psychological impact of incarceration. Any such imprisonment would risk causing irreversible harm and would defeat the very objective of mitigating the sentence. As regards quantum of sentence, considering the fact the appellant has already suffered jail sentence of 39 days and has already deposited fine amount of Rs. 54,000/- imposed by the trial Court, learned counsel for the appellant has produced a photocopy of the amounts deposited before the Court concerned from the original receipt and a copy of the same is also supplied to the learned counsel for the CBI and State, therefore, the sentence already undergone by him may suffice to meet the ends of justice, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that ends of justice would be served if the sentence awarded to appellant is reduced to the period already undergone by him. 20. The High Court of Delhi in Surendra Kumar v. C.B.I, 15 (CRL.A.No.869/2002), decided on 8.7.2025 considering the mitigating circumstances has held as under:- “25. Considering the above circumstances, I am of the view that this is a fit case for reducing the quantum of sentence of the appellant considering the mitigating circumstances. Hence, the sentence of the appellant is reduced to the time already served.” 21. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Conviction of appellant under Section 420, 420, 420, 467/471, 468/471 and 477-A of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act is hereby affirmed. Sentences imposed upon the appellant under aforementioned Sections are hereby modified and reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant i.e., 39 days of jail sentence and fine as imposed by the trial Court, which he has already been paid. 22. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Abhishek