Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DAILYLAW 3851 (HP)

Rajesh Kumar v. State of H. P.

2025-10-30

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 6.6.2013, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 2.11.2011 and order of sentence dated 17.11.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police filed a charge sheet against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Giano Devi (PW1), her husband Nand Lal (PW2) and Veena Devi (PW3) were standing outside Civil Hospital, Ghumarwin, on 19.2.2003 at about 4.15 PM. A car bearing registration No. HP-23-0247 came from Ghumarwin at a high speed and hit Nand Lal, who sustained injuries. The driver sped away from the spot. Informant made a statement (Ex.PW1/A) which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW10/A) was registered. ASI Surender Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW11/C). Dr Arvind Tandon (PW6) conducted the medical examination of Nand Lal, who found that Nand Lal had suffered simple and grievous injuries which could have been caused within two hours of examination. He issued MLC (Ex.PW6/A). HC Prakash Chand (PW10) conducted the further investigation. He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP- 23-0247, along with documents vide memo (Ex.PW4/A). HHC Dev Raj (PW8) examined the vehicle and found that there was no defect in it which could have led to the accident. Statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Giano Devi (PW1) is the informant. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Giano Devi (PW1) is the informant. Nand Lal (PW2) is the victim, Veena Devi (PW3) is an eyewitness. Roop Lal (PW4), Rakesh Kumar (PW5) and Rajesh Kumar (PW9) did not support the prosecution’s case. Dr Arvind Tandon (PW6) medically examined the victim. Satpal (PW7) is the owner of the vehicle who proved that the accused was the driver of the vehicle. HHC Dev Raj (PW8) conducted a mechanical examination of the vehicle. HC Prakash Chand (PW10) and Surender Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the victim had sustained grievous injuries, the FIR was registered, the vehicle was seized, and the statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version. He stated that he was driving the vehicle, and the witnesses were related to the injured. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the informant, victim, and Veena Devi inspired confidence. The mere fact that Roop Lal, Rakesh Kumar and Rajesh Kumar did not support the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to discard it. The plea taken by the accused that the injured was hit by some other vehicle was not probable. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, and the victim sustained simple injuries in the incident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Under Section 279 of IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for three days, pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for three days. Under Section 337 of IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for three days, pay a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for two days Under Section 338 of IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for three days, pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for three days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the prosecution’s case could not be discarded because Roop Lal, Rakesh Kumar and Rajesh Kumar had turned hostile. The testimonies of Giano Devi, the victim and Veena Devi proved that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which led to the accident. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not excessive, and no interference was required with it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the material on record. The prosecution failed to complete the chain of circumstances and connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The story projected by the prosecution is unbelievable. The car had not sustained any marks of the accident, which falsifies the prosecution’s case that the car driven by the accused was involved in the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There was no proof of rashness or negligence. Mere high speed does not amount to negligence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that the incident had occurred in the year 2003. The accused has suffered the agony of trial and appeal. Hence, he prayed that the sentence be reduced. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendran v. Sub- Inspector of Police, Cr. Appeal No. 536 of 2021, decided on 30.6.2021 and Muthupandi Vs. The accused has suffered the agony of trial and appeal. Hence, he prayed that the sentence be reduced. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendran v. Sub- Inspector of Police, Cr. Appeal No. 536 of 2021, decided on 30.6.2021 and Muthupandi Vs. State 2024 SCC Online SC 3686 in support of his submission. 11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below and submitted that the learned Courts below had taken a reasonable view of the matter and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. It was proved on record that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, and his negligence caused injury to the victim. Therefore, he was rightly convicted. Learned Trial Court has already taken a lenient view, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.” 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of a charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986), SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) “27. 482-83, para 27) “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986), SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. 482-83, para 27) “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. *** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. *** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.” 17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge. 16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 17. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH (2008) 14 SCC 457 ], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The informant stated that she, her husband and her sister-in-law were standing outside the hospital towards their side. A Maruti Car bearing registration No. HP-23-0247 came from Dawadi Chowk at about 4.15 PM and hit her husband at high speed. Her husband sustained injuries. The accused, Rajesh Kumar, was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. She stated in her cross-examination that she and her husband were standing towards the gate. She admitted that the width of the road was around 100 ft. and the metalled portion was 40 ft. wide. She admitted that she and other persons were standing on the metalled portion of the road. She volunteered to say that they were standing at a distance of 3 ft. from the metalled portion. She admitted that the place of the accident had heavy traffic, and about 5-7 vehicles crossed per minute. Many vehicles had crossed the spot, and she could not tell their registration number. She admitted that she was unable to read the numbers of the moving vehicles. She denied that she made a false statement and that her husband had sustained injury due to his negligence. 20. Many vehicles had crossed the spot, and she could not tell their registration number. She admitted that she was unable to read the numbers of the moving vehicles. She denied that she made a false statement and that her husband had sustained injury due to his negligence. 20. Nand Lal (PW2) stated that he, his wife and sister- in-law were waiting for the vehicle outside the hospital gate. A Maruti car hit him. He sustained injuries. Accused Rajesh was driving the vehicle, and his negligence led to the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that the place of the incident had heavy traffic and 8-10 vehicles crossed the spot per minute. He admitted that the buses also stopped near the hospital gate. He admitted that 30-40 shops are located at the place of the incident. He admitted that the road was 30 ft. wide on the spot. He admitted that he was standing near the metalled road, and many people were standing on the road. He could not tell the registration number of the vehicles which had crossed the spot. He saw the accused the next day and not on the date of the incident. He denied that the accident occurred due to his negligence. He admitted that he had filed a claim regarding the accident. 21. Veena (PW3) also supported the prosecution’s case. She stated that she, the victim and the informant were standing near the hospital gate. A Maruti Car bearing registration No. HP- 23-0247 came to the spot and hit the informant. Rajesh was driving the vehicle, and the accident occurred due to his negligence. She stated in her cross-examination that they were standing towards the Bakery Shop. She did not know that the width of the road was around 100 ft. She denied that she had not seen the accused driving the vehicle or that the accident occurred due to the victim’s negligence. 22. Statements of these witnesses corroborate each other. These statements are corroborated by the statement of Dr Arvind Tandon (PW6), who found simple and grievous injuries on the victim’s body, which could have been caused within two hours in a motor vehicle accident. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony was not disputed by the defence. 23. The incident occurred at 4.15 PM. The matter was reported to the police at 5.00 PM, within 45 minutes of the incident. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony was not disputed by the defence. 23. The incident occurred at 4.15 PM. The matter was reported to the police at 5.00 PM, within 45 minutes of the incident. The statement made by the informant (Ex.PW1/A) contains the details of the incident, which are similar to the details narrated before the Court. This statement also corroborates the informant’s statement. 24. The accused asserted that he was not driving the vehicle; however, his father, Satpal (PW7), owner of the vehicle, stated that the accused, Rajesh, used to drive the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23-0247. It was not suggested to be incorrect. He stated in his cross-examination that the vehicle was parked at the home and was not driven anywhere on 19.2.2003. This part of his testimony is contrary to the evidence on record. The informant, the victim and Veena Devi categorically identified the vehicle bearing registration No. HP- 23-0247 and their testimonies cannot be discarded because of a statement made by Satpal that the vehicle was parked at home on 19.2.2003. 25. The site plan (Ex.PW11/C) shows that the incident had occurred towards the extreme left side of the road on the kacha portion. The witness admitted that the road is wide at the place of the incident. The witnesses stated that the place was heavily populated. Therefore, the driver of a motor vehicle should have been conscious of the fact that some pedestrians might be present on the road. He was supposed to drive the vehicle carefully to avoid any untoward incident. No explanation has been provided by the accused as to why the vehicle was taken towards the kucha portion of the road, when the road was wide and the vehicle could have been driven on the metalled portion of the road. Taking the vehicle to the kucha portion of the road was the proximate cause of the accident. Since the driver of a motor vehicle is supposed to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road and not outside the road; therefore, the accused was clearly negligent in driving the vehicle on the kacha portion of the road. 26. Roop Lal (PW4) stated that the victim had fallen on the road and he carried the victim to the hospital. He was permitted to be cross-examined. 26. Roop Lal (PW4) stated that the victim had fallen on the road and he carried the victim to the hospital. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He stated that he did not remember that vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23-0247 came to the spot. He denied that the car was being driven at a high speed and hit Nand Lal. He admitted that the police had seized the vehicle in his presence. He contradicted the previous statement recorded by the police. 27. HC Prakash Chand (PW10) recorded the statements of witnesses. He specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of Roop Lal (Ex.PW10/C) as per his version. A general suggestion was given to him that he had not recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version, but he denied it. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and the defence cannot derive any advantage from the denied suggestion. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve that the statement of Roop Lal (PW4) was recorded as his version. 28. Thus, Roop Lal is shown to have made contradictory statements before the police and the Court. He had stated to the police that the accident occurred due to negligence of the accused, and the vehicle was being driven by the accused at a high speed, whereas he denied this fact in the Court. Thus, he is shown to have made two inconsistent statements, both of which cannot stand together, and his credibility has been impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. 29. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 30. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony". 31. In the present case, the testimony of Roop Lal regarding the accident has been contradicted by his previous statement and cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 32. Rakesh Kumar (PW5) stated that nothing had happened in his presence. He was permitted to be cross- examined. 31. In the present case, the testimony of Roop Lal regarding the accident has been contradicted by his previous statement and cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 32. Rakesh Kumar (PW5) stated that nothing had happened in his presence. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He admitted in his cross-examination by learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that he had visited Ghumarwin on 10.2.2023 to inquire about his relative’s well-being. He admitted that he was going near the hospital gate. He denied that the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23-0247 came at a high speed and hit one person. He was not aware that the accused was driving the vehicle. He contradicted the previous statement recorded by the police. He admitted in his cross-examination by the defence that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 33. This witness has also been contradicted by his previous statement, and he denied the same. He had told the police that the accused was driving the vehicle, and his negligence led to the accident. He made a contrary statement before the Court. Hence, his credibility has also been impeached by showing that he had made inconsistent statements on two different occasions. Hence, no reliance can be placed upon his testimony. 34. Rajesh Kumar (PW9) stated that he was waiting for the bus. A car came to the spot at 2.00-2.30 PM and hit one person because the person ran suddenly after getting off the bus. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the victim was present on the edge of the road. He denied that he and other persons had taken the injured to the hospital. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 35. The testimony of this witness has also been contradicted by his previous statement. His statement in the Court that he was present on the spot at 2.00-2.30 PM and the person who got down from the bus sustained injuries is contrary to the prosecution’s case or the defence version. No person stated that the victim had got off the bus. Therefore, his testimony was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 36. The accused claimed that the witnesses were related to the victim and they deposed falsely against him; however, he has not given any reason why related witnesses should depose falsely against the accused. No person stated that the victim had got off the bus. Therefore, his testimony was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 36. The accused claimed that the witnesses were related to the victim and they deposed falsely against him; however, he has not given any reason why related witnesses should depose falsely against the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laltu Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2019) 15 SCC 344 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 275: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2 that a related witness is not an interested witness and his testimony cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedness. It was observed: “12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593; Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590 and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793, in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593 : (Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793), SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.…” 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465, wherein this Court observed : (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In the case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966): (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses, must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses, but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 37. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thoti Manohar vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 7 SCC 723 that the court cannot discard the testimony of a witness on the ground of a relationship. It was observed: “31. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 364 , wherein Vivian Bose, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows: - “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye- witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan (1952) SCR 377 at p. 390 = ( AIR 1952 SC 54 at page 59).” 32. In the said case, it was further observed that: “A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true that when feelings run high and there is a personal cause for enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such criticism, and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202 , it has been ruled that normally close relatives of the deceased would not be considered to be interested witnesses who would also mention the names of the other persons as responsible for causing injuries to the deceased. 34. In Hari Obula Reddi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 82 , a three-judge Bench has held that evidence of interested witnesses is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. It can be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to scrutiny and accepted with caution. If, on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon. 35. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614 , it has been opined that a close relative who is a natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness, for the term ‘interested’ postulates that the witness must have some interest in having the accused, somehow or the other, convicted for some animus or some other reason. 36. In Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 3010 , while dealing with the liability of interested witnesses who are relatives, a two- judge Bench observed that: “It is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or close relative to the deceased if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible.” The said evidence only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escapes nor the innocent is wrongly convicted. If, on such scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 38. If, on such scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, then it can be acted upon. “If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted.” 38. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav vs. State of Bihar 2022 Cr.L.J. 2986 (SC) as under: “28. A related witness cannot be termed as an interested witness per se. One has to see the place of occurrence along with other circumstances. A related witness can also be a natural witness. If an offence is committed within the precincts of the deceased, the presence of his family members cannot be ruled out, as they assume the position of natural witnesses. When their evidence is clear, cogent and withstands the rigour of cross- examination, it becomes sterling, not requiring further corroboration. A related witness would become an interested witness only when he is desirous of implicating the accused in rendering a conviction, on purpose. 29. When the court is convinced of the quality of the evidence produced, notwithstanding the classification as quoted above, it becomes the best evidence. Such testimony being natural, adding to the degree of probability, the court has to rely upon it in proving a fact. The aforesaid position of law has been well laid down in Bhaskarrao v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591 : “32. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were interrelated, and this Court should be cautious in accepting their statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the appreciation of evidence of a related witness. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465, Vivian Bose, J. for the Bench, observed the law as under (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted, and that usually means unless the witness has a cause, such as an enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true when feelings run high and there is a personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism, and the mere fact of relationship, far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 33. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133 : AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], a five-judge Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under (AIR pp. 209-210, para 14) “14. … There is no doubt that when a criminal court has to appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the evidence, whether or not the evidence strikes the court as genuine, whether or not the story disclosed by the evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken into account. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages and murders are committed as a result of enmity between such factions, criminal courts have to deal with evidence of a partisan type. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to the failure of justice. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. The judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence, but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.” 34. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1964) 3 SCR 397 : AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court held that evidence of an eyewitness who is a near relative of the victim should be closely scrutinised, but no corroboration is necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [ (2005) 9 SCC 195 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1213: 2005 Cri LJ 2199], this Court observed that: (SCC p. 227, para 6) “6. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.” 35. The last case we need to concern ourselves with is Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [ (2007) 14 SCC 150 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 773], wherein this Court, after observing previous precedents, has summarised the law in the following manner: (SCC p. 164, para 38) “38. … It is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an “interested” witness. He is a “natural” witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinised carefully. If, on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, a conviction can be based on the “sole” testimony of such a witness. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or the victim is no grounds to reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.” 36. A close relationship of the witness with the deceased or the victim is no grounds to reject his evidence. On the contrary, a close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one.” 36. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this Court, we may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a strong interest in the result, if allowed to be weighed in the same scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule, which remains the bulwark of this system and which determines the value of evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly, even if they earnestly desires to do so. Similarly, he may not be in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner when it involves his interests. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favourable colour. These are the most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony, and should never be overlooked in applying the rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under the facts and circumstances of each case.” 30. Once again, we reiterate with a word of caution, the trial court is the best court to decide on the aforesaid aspect, as no mathematical calculation or straightjacket formula can be made on the assessment of a witness, as the journey towards the truth can be seen better through the eyes of the trial judge. In fact, this is the real objective behind the enactment itself, which extends the maximum discretion to the court.” 39. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791 , wherein it was observed: “10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. Similar is the judgment in M Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2022 (5) SCC 791 , wherein it was observed: “10. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses -eye-witnesses/injured eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW6 has identified Accused Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW1, PW3 & PW5 were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses being relatives of the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/evidence of PW1, PW3, PW5 & PW6 and even PW7.” 40. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of Assam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1440, that relationship is no reason to discard the witnesses’ testimonies. The Court is required to see their testimonies with due care and caution. It was observed: 55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examined the credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence given in the court of Law. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court, in a number of cases, has had the opportunity to consider the said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the well- settled principle that just because the witnesses are related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies cannot be disregarded; however, it is also true that when the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinised with greater care and circumspection. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 , this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In the case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 , this Court held that the testimony of such related witnesses should be analysed with caution for its credibility. 56. In Raju alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 , this Court observed: “29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised, and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [ AIR 1953 SC 364 ] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 ] in the following words: (Sarwan Singh case [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 , p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require, as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses has a ring of truth, such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 57. Further delving into the same issue, it is noted that in the case of Ganapathi v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2018) 5 SCC 549 , this Court held that in several cases when only family members are present at the time of the incident and the case of the prosecution is based only on their evidence, Courts have to be cautious and meticulously evaluate the evidence in the process of trial. 41. This position was reiterated in Baban Shankar Daphal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 137, wherein it was observed: “27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased, and for prudence, the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitnesses as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly rejected such an approach and held that merely because there were some more independent witnesses, who had also reached the place of the incident, the evidence of the relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinised with care and caution. It has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments that merely if a witness is a relative, their testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone. 28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinised. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness “interested” or biased. The term “interested” refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A “related” witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy. 29. The distinction between “interested” and “related” witnesses has been clarified in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465, where this Court emphasised that a close relative is usually the last person to falsely implicate an innocent person. Therefore, in evaluating the evidence of a related witness, the court should focus on the consistency and credibility of their testimony. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in: i. Md. This approach ensures that the evidence is not discarded merely due to familial ties, but is instead assessed based on its inherent reliability and consistency with other evidence in the case. This position has been reiterated by this Court in: i. Md. Rojali Ali v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through secretary (2019) 19 SCC 567 ; ii. Ganapathi v. State of T.N. (2018) 5 SCC 549 ; iii. Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (2010) 1 SCC 199 . 30. Though the eyewitnesses who have been examined in the present case were closely related to the deceased, namely his wife, daughter and son, their testimonies are consistent with respect to the accused persons being the assailants who inflicted wounds on the deceased. As is revealed from the sequence of events that transpired, one of the family members was subjected to an assault. It was thus quite natural for the other family members to rush on the spot to intervene. The presence of the family members on the spot and thus being eyewitnesses has been well established. In such circumstances, merely because the eyewitnesses are family members, their testimonies cannot be discarded solely on that ground. 42. In the present case, no reason was elucidated by the cross-examination of the witnesses that they had any motive to depose against the accused. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be discarded due to the relationship alone. 43. Thus, the prosecution’s evidence clearly proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and his negligence led to the accident, causing simple and grievous injuries to the victim. Therefore, he was rightly convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. 44. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence, which should be reduced. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthupandi (supra) and Siremdram (supra). This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “13. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 45. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 46. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 47. Hon’ble Supreme Court reduced the sentence in Surendran (supra) and Muthupandi (supra) because of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, these judgments do not lay down that a lenient view has to be taken in the case of a motor vehicle accident. The manner in which the car was taken to the kucha portion of the road, causing injuries to the victim, shows a callous disregard for the safety of the people on the road. Hence, no leniency can be shown to the petitioner. The learned Trial Court has already taken a lenient view, and further leniency is not justified. 48. No other point was urged. 49. Hence, no leniency can be shown to the petitioner. The learned Trial Court has already taken a lenient view, and further leniency is not justified. 48. No other point was urged. 49. In view of the above, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are justified and sustainable and no interference is required with them. 50. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.