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2025 DAILYLAW 3849 (HP)

Atul Vohra v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-10-16

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 19 of 2025, dated 8.7.2025, registered at Police Station New Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner hails from a respectable family and commands good respect in the society. He was arrested on 8.7.2025 in FIR No. 19 of 2025 dated 8.7.2025. The petitioner is innocent and has not committed any crime. There is nothing to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. The co-accused was released on bail by this Court on 29.7.2025. The petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Two FIRs have been registered against the petitioner. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 08.07.2025. The police received a secret information at 04:45 pm that Atul Vohra and his friend were selling heroin from their house, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by a search of their house. The information was credible. It was reduced to writing and was sent to the Supervisory Officer. The police associated Anil Kaundal and went to the house where Mahesh Thakur and the petitioner, Atul Vohra, were present. The police searched the house and recovered the burnt currency note of Rs. 10/- kept on the mattress, a pouch containing 45.350 grams of heroin, a bundle of currency notes worth Rs. 44,000/-, and a weighing machine. The police arrested the petitioner and Mahesh Thakur. FIR Nos. 148 of 202 (sic), dated 17.7.2025 and FIR No. 10 of 2024, dated 17.4.2024 and FIR No. 163 of 2024, dated 23.9.2024, are pending against the petitioner. The result of the analysis shows that the exhibit was a sample of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). The blood sample of the petitioner and co-accused contained Dextromethorphan, Levorphanol, Codeine and Morphine. Hence, Section 27 of the NDPS Act was added. The charge sheet was filed before the Court, and the matter was listed before the learned Additional Special Judge (CBI), Shimla, on 23.9.2025. The petitioner would threaten the witnesses and indulge in the commission of similar offences if released on bail. Hence, the status report. 4. Hence, Section 27 of the NDPS Act was added. The charge sheet was filed before the Court, and the matter was listed before the learned Additional Special Judge (CBI), Shimla, on 23.9.2025. The petitioner would threaten the witnesses and indulge in the commission of similar offences if released on bail. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. Grounds of arrest were not supplied to the petitioner. There is no evidence that the petitioner was residing alone in the house, and his exclusive possession has not been proved. The quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered from the house is less than a commercial quantity. Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The grounds of the arrest were not supplied to him. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was found with co-accused Mahesh Thakur in his house at the time of the recovery. Prima facie, he was in possession of the heroin, and the burden lies upon him to establish that possession was not conscious. The petitioner was involved in a similar offence earlier, and the possibility of his indulging in the commission of a similar offence if released on bail cannot be ruled out. The grounds of arrest were supplied to the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report shows that the police received secret information that the petitioner, Atul Vohra, was selling heroin from his house. The police reduced the information to writing and went to the petitioner’s house with Anil Kaundal. The petitioner and Mahesh Thakur were found in the house. The police found a burnt currency note of Rs. 10/-, currency notes worth Rs. 44,000/-, 45.350 grams of heroin and a weighing machine. The police report is specific in saying that the petitioner and the co-accused were found in the house. Thus, prima facie, the petitioner was able to exercise control over the heroin, burnt currency note, weighing machine, and currency notes worth Rs. 44,000/-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, that a person is in possession if he is in a position to exercise control over the article. It was observed at page 111: 25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn. The respondent has been accused of an offence under Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under Sections 21, 27-A, 29, and 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664] this Court held that : (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 & 26) “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. In Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664] this Court held that : (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 & 26) “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniform[ly] applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. *** 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also a presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.” 26. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also a presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.” 26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab [Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431], where it was held that the knowledge of possession of contraband has to be gleaned from the facts and circumstances of a case. The standard of conscious possession would be different in the case of a public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to a private vehicle with a few persons known to one another. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 881], this Court also observed that the term “possession” could mean physical possession with animus; custody over the prohibited substances with animus; exercise of dominion and control as a result of concealment; or personal knowledge as to the existence of the contraband and the intention based on this knowledge. 11. The petitioner was present in the house, which belonged to him, and from where recovery was effected. Thus, he is to be treated to be in possession and the burden lies upon him to prove that his possession was not conscious as per Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. 12. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not supplied to the petitioner. The status report shows that the petitioner was apprehended with a polythene packet containing 45.350 grams of heroin. It was laid down by three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC 292 : 1968 SCC OnLine SC 374, that if the accused is arrested red- handed, there is no need to explain the grounds of arrest: it was observed at Page 298: “Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. “There is no need to explain the reasons for arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven.” 13. “There is no need to explain the reasons for arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven.” 13. It was held in Balbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2009) 15 SCC 795 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 997: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1258, that where the accused knew that she was being searched for the contraband, the plea taken by her regarding non- communication of the reason of arrest is technical in nature. It was observed at page 802: “20. In view of the concurrent findings of the trial court and as also the High Court holding that the appellant was in conscious possession of the said contraband goods, the allegation of non-disclosure of the purpose of the search and the grounds of arrest to her is of a technical nature and without there being any material force in them. The appellant herself knew that she was being searched for possession of contraband goods, and therefore, she had also sought protection as provided under Sections 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act. 21. The appellant was being searched and arrested on account of possession of contraband goods. The violation of the provisions of the NDPS Act was clearly known to her. The allegation that she herself asked for such protection instead of prosecution, giving her the option to be searched before a gazetted officer, as required under the law, would not in any manner adversely affect her conviction and order of sentence passed by both the courts below. No prejudice could be shown by the appellant against the DSP, who was a gazetted officer and the lady officer present at the time of the search.” 14. The matter is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024, and nothing more is required to be said regarding this aspect at this stage. 15. The arrest memo filed by the petitioner mentions the offence committed by him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narayanaswamy Ravishankar v. Asstt. Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2002) 8 SCC 7 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1865: 2002 SCC Online SC 948, that when the arrest memo mentions the offence committed by the accused, the plea taken by him regarding non-communication of arrest is not acceptable. It was observed at page 9: “6. Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2002) 8 SCC 7 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1865: 2002 SCC Online SC 948, that when the arrest memo mentions the offence committed by the accused, the plea taken by him regarding non-communication of arrest is not acceptable. It was observed at page 9: “6. It was also contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the ground on which the appellant was arrested was not communicated to him. We find no merit in this because the arrest memo clearly indicates the offence stated to have been committed by the appellant under the NDPS Act. Further, the record also shows that a copy of the arrest memo Ext. P-20 was received by the appellant.” 16. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to bail on the ground that his arrest is illegal because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. 17. It was submitted that the co-accused, Mahesh Thakur, was released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission is not acceptable. The co-accused was released on bail as he was found to be a casual visitor, whereas the petitioner is the owner of the house. The co- accused, Mahesh Thakur, was sought to be implicated based on the statement made by the present petitioner, which was held to be inadmissible. Thus, the allegations against the co-accused are different from the allegations made against the petitioner, and the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused. It was laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Nanha v. State of U.P., 1992 SCC OnLine All 871: 1994 All LJ 328: 1993 Cri LJ 938 that parity means that two persons are situated in the same situation. It was observed at page 332: 14. Before proceeding with the desirability of parity in the matter of granting bail, it would be better to draw our attention to the exact meaning of parity. In Chambers English Hindi Dictionary 1981, the word “parity” has been stated to mean lerk] cjkcjh] lekurk] eqY;rk] vuq:irk] lkE;] lkn~';] le&eqYrk and in New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary 1987 edition, the word parity has been stated to mean equality in status, values’ etc. 15. In ‘Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ 1936 ‘parity’ has been stated to mean, ‘The state or condition of being equal or on a level, Equality, Equality of rank or Status’. 16. 15. In ‘Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ 1936 ‘parity’ has been stated to mean, ‘The state or condition of being equal or on a level, Equality, Equality of rank or Status’. 16. Thus, the word ‘parity’ connotes a state when a person is placed on the same footing as the other person….” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that parity requires a focus on the role of the accused. It was observed at page 246: “26…The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.” 19. This  position  was  reiterated  in  Tarun  Kumar  v. Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486, wherein it was observed: “18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co-accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.” 20. In the present case, the allegations against the petitioner and the co-accused are different and the petitioner cannot claim parity with the co-accused Mahesh Thakur. 21. It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to have been found in possession of the petitioner was intermediate, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. 21. It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to have been found in possession of the petitioner was intermediate, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed: “8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril. 9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re- indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.” 22. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case. 7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.” 23. The status report shows that FIR No. 148 of 2004 (sic), FIR No. 10 of 2024 and FIR No. 163 of 2024 are pending against the petitioner out of which FIR No. 163 of 2024 was registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of NDPS Act, which shows that the apprehension of the State that the petitioner is likely to indulge in the commission of similar offences has some basis. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024: HHC: 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 24. It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, she should not be released on bail. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 25. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 25. Similarly,  it  was  held  in  Union  of  India  v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: - “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA. 26. Similarly,  it  was  held  in  Union  of  India  v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: - “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion, the High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA.” 27. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion, the High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA.” 27. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed on page 384: “65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti- collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 28. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents as well. 29. No other point was urged. 30. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 31. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.