1 2025:CGHC:25649-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1679 of 2021 Lalit Kumar Vishwakarama S/o Jageshwar Vishwakarma Aged About 42 Years R/o Village Khurshipahar, P.S.- Basna, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ...Appellant versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through-P.S. Basna, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr.Pritam Tiwari, Advocate For Respondent : Mr.Sakib Ahmed, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 19.06.2025 1. Heard Mr.Pritam Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr.Sakib Ahmed, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State. 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2025.06.19 18:43:04 +0530 2 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.10.2021 passed by learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.) in Sessions Case No.13 of 2019, whereby the appellant/accused has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for committing murder of deceased Lala Vishwakarma and for offence under Section 323 of the IPC for causing injury to Smt.Vishwakarma (wife of the deceased) and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for six months and rigorous imprisonment for two months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.12.2018 at about 8 P.M. the complainant was in her house when her husband deceased Lalaram came home from outside and asked the complainant about the appellant bringing money for Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna, to which the complainant replied that the appellant has brought money, then the deceased told his wife/complainant that he himself will also bring money for his Awas Yojna. On hearing the above conversation of the deceased and the complainant, appellant Lalit came to the spot with a bamboo stick and saying that what they are talking about him, assaulted the complainant on thigh with a stick, on which the complainant left from there with her children. The complainant 3 came back to her house after some time and saw that the appellant killed her husband Lala Vishwakarma by assaulting him on his head, face and mouth with a bamboo stick. The report of the incident was lodged by complainant Mrs.Vishwakarma in Basna Police Station. Inquest was prepared the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-2. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-3. Dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to the Community Health Center, Basna where Dr.B.R.Malik (PW-4) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased and found following injuries:- “Blue coloured injury on upper part of neck, torn and swollen wound on upper part of left cheek measuring 2 x 3 cm and torn wound measuring 2 x 1 cm upto bone depth. Upper jaw was fractured and swollen. Swelling on right cheek bone measuring 5 x 5 cm. Torn wound measuring 10 x 4 cm on chin. Frontal bones of lower jaw were broken. Torn wound measuring 3 x 1 cm on left side of mouth. Torn wound measuring 2 x 1 cm upto bone surface on upper lip. Both incisors and canines of upper jaw and lower jaw were absent (broken and came out). Torn wound measuring 1 x 0.5 cm on tongue extending upto muscle. Deceased was stiff. The body of the deceased was not mutilated in any way except the head.” 4 The doctor has opined that cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to excessive loss of blood and asphyxia and death was homicidal in nature. Injured / complainant Smt.Vishwakarma (PW-4) was also sent for examination to Community Health Center, Basna where the same doctor was examined her vide Ex.P-5 and found bruise 16 x 5 cm lateral up 3rd of left thigh caused by hard blunt object. Memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P-7. On the basis of his memorandum, bamboo stick, full shirt and one jeans pant was recovered vide Ex.P-8. Bloodstained soil and plain soil were recovered from the spot vide Ex.P-9. The appellant was arrested on 6.12.2018 vide arrest memo Ex.P-10. Jeans pant and full shirt of the deceased were seized vide Ex.P-11. Patwari also prepared spot map vide Ex.P-12. FIR was registered vide Ex.P-15. Seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination and as per FSL report Ex.P22, human blood was found on soil, bamboo stick, full shirt and jeans pant seized from the appellant and full shirt seized from the deceased. 4. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Basna, who in turn, committed the case to the Court of of Sessions, Mahasamund, from where the First Additional Sessions Judge, Saraipali, received the case on transfer for trial. The appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely been implicated in 5 crime in question. 5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents. The appellant-accused examined none in his defence, however, exhibited Exs.D/1 & D/2 in support of his case. 6. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 20.10.2021, convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 323 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed by the accused / appellant. 7. Mr.Pritam Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant submits that learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 323 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and the dispute arose all of sudden and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, 6 therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Sakib Ahmed, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused murder of deceased Lala Vishwakarma and also caused injury to complainant Smt.Vishwakarma (PW-1), therefore, learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 323 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased Lala Vishwakarma was homicidal in nature ? 11. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, particularly relying upon the statement of Dr.B.R.Malik (PW-4), who conducted postmortem, has come to the conclusion that cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to excessive loss of blood and asphyxia and death was 7 homicidal in nature and also caused injury to injured Smt.Vishwakarma (PW-1). After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Lala Vishwakarma was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. We also affirm the finding recorded by learned trial Court that the appellant has caused injury to injured Smt.Vishwakarma. 12. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question ? 13. Smt.Vishwakarma (PW-1), who is wife of the deceased and also injured witness has stated that the incident took place 8-9 months ago. Her husband had gone to his in-law’s house. He returned on Wednesday at 8 P.M. and was knocking on the door. She was not felling well. Her husband came and asked if Lalit Kumar had brought the money or not. She said she did not know. Her husband said that Lalit must have brought the money from Pithora’s Adam, so he should also bring his money. When she was going to close the door, Lalit brought a stick from his house and assaulted her on her leg, then she fainted. In para 3 she has stated that her son took her unconscious to Virat Gautia’s house. When she regained consciousness, she heard that her brother-in- law has killed her husband. Her husband died on the spot on that 8 very night. 14. Deepak Vishwakarma (PW-2) (son of the deceased) has stated in para 2 of his evidence that about 3-4 months ago his father came back from another village at night. On knocking on the door his sister Deepanjali opened the door and his father came inside the house. His father said to ask Chote if he has brought money from Adam or not. His father started saying that if he had brought his money from Adam then his house would have been built. At that time his mother was going out after opening the door when Lalit came with a stick and assaulted his mother on her leg and mother became unconscious. He pushed Lalit and took his mother to Virat Gautia’s house. In para 2 of his evidence, this witness has stated that he came running back and by then his uncle Lalit had knocked her father down. His father had died. Virat called the police and the police arrived at the scene. The police had prepared a panchnama of his father’s body. 15. Tara Vishwakarma (PW-5) (wife of the appellant) has stated in her evidence that the incident occurred lat year in the month of Agahan at 8 P.M. Her husband and Lala Vishwakarma were drunk and were arguing about money. Her husband assaulted her brother-in-law Lala with a stick. When she went to rescue him, he said run away or else he will beat her. She ran away from there and did not return. The police came to the spot and questioned her, then she told them that her husband had beaten him. 9 16. Considering the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who has caused injuries over the body of both the deceased due to which he died. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 17. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? 18. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of the deceased as already noticed was cardiorespiratory failure due to excessive loss of blood & asphyxia. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 10 intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 20. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being 11 a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 12 pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 22. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 13 history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 23. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 14 intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 24. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 15 exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 25. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of 16 knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 26. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 17 what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the 18 event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be 19 murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then 20 judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the 21 manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the 22 circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 28. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on 05.12.2018 at about 8 P.M. the complainant was in her house when her husband deceased Lalaram came home from outside and asked the complainant about the appellant bringing money for Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna, to which the complainant replied that the appellant has brought money, then the deceased told his wife/complainant that he himself will also bring money for his Awas Yojna. On hearing the above conversation of the deceased and the complainant, appellant Lalit came to the spot with a bamboo stick and saying that what they are talking about him, assaulted the complainant on thigh with a stick, on which the complainant left from there with her children. The complainant came back to her house after some time and saw that the appellant killed her husband Lala Vishwakarma by assaulting him on his head, face and mouth with a bamboo stick and ultimately, he died. Though there was no motive or premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased, but the incident took place all of a sudden and with intention to cause death of deceased caused such injuries to the deceased and by doing so, 23 he must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely to cause death of the deceased. As such, his case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of the appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 29. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into consideration that at present appellant- Jitendra Sahu is aged about 46 years, and he is in jail since 06.12.2018 and he has completed near about 06 years and 06 months, also considering the evidence of injured witness Smt.Vishwakarma (PW-1) and other mitigating circumstances, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. 30. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. His conviction and sentence under Section 323 of the IPC are hereby affirmed. 31. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated 24 hereinabove. 32. It is stated that the appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the remaining sentence as modified by this Court. 33. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- d/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu