JUDGMENT : Ranjan Sharma, J. Petitioner, Yogeshwar Singh Thakur, a retired Veterinary Officer filed Original Application No. 335 of 2016 before Learned State Administrative Tribunal and upon abolition of Tribunal and transfer of the matter to this Court, as CWPOA No. 7729 of 2019, seeking the following relief(s):- (i) That the respondents may kindly be directed to give step up in the pay of applicant to bring him at par to that juniors, respondent No. 3 and 4 w.e.f. due date that is the date from which the anomaly has arisen and the arrears accrued may kindly be ordered to be paid with the interest. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Case set up by Learned Counsel is that the petitioner was initially appointed as Veterinary Stockiest in department of Animal Husbandry on 24.04.1982 and was appointed promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis in pay scale of Rs.7880-13500 [pre-revised] on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. Grievance of the petitioner is that the Respondents No. 3 and 4, who were appointed as Veterinary Officer on regular basis alongwith the petitioner on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] were given higher pay ignoring the fact that petitioner was senior leading to anomaly in pay of the petitioner-senior vis-à-vis the higher pay given to the Respondents No. 3 and 4-junior, resulting in financial loss. Petitioner is stated to have made representations on 12.07.2012 and 20.10.2015 [Annexure A-2 and Annexure A-3] but in vain. Case of the petitioner is that the anomaly in pay needs to be redressed in terms of communication issued by Finance Department on 5.10.2010 [Annexure A-4]. In this background, the instant petition was filed with the prayer for removing the anomaly and by stepping up the pay of petitioner [senior] vis-à-vis the pay of respondents No. 3 and 4 [juniors] from the date of issuance of the notification on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] with all consequential benefits. STAND OF RESPONDENT IN REPLY-AFFIDAVIT: 3. Pursuant to the issuance of notice on 24.02.2016, Respondents No. 1 and 2 have filed the Reply-Affidavit dated 05.07.2016 of Director, Animal Husbandry, Himachal Pradesh. 3(i). Perusal of the Reply-Affidavit indicates that the respondents-State have taken the objection with respect to delay and laches including limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act alleging that the petition was filed after about 7 years. 3(i). Perusal of the Reply-Affidavit indicates that the respondents-State have taken the objection with respect to delay and laches including limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act alleging that the petition was filed after about 7 years. In Para 3 to 8 of the Reply-Affidavit the Respondents have taken a stand that the post of Veterinary Officer is to be filled from incumbents who passed the degree of BVSc & AH [Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry] and the petitioner was sponsored as a departmental candidate for undergoing BVSc & AH Degree on 03.09.1998 and he could not complete the aforesaid degree within prescribed duration of five years prescribed and he completed the said degree on 22.07.2007. It was further averred that on the other hand, the Respondents 3 and 4 were sponsored for undergoing BVSc & AH Degree in the year 2000 & 1999 and they passed their degree on 22.09.2005 and 04.08.2006 i.e. prior to the passing of the degree by the petitioner. 3(ii). Reply-Affidavit further indicates that after passing BVSc & AH Degree on 22.09.2005 and 04.08.2006, the Respondents No. 3 and 4 being eligible for post of Veterinary Officer were promoted/ appointed as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006. Pursuant to their adhoc promotion the Respondents No. 3 and 4 had earned increments of higher post of Veterinary Officer during their adhoc service and such adhoc promotion of Respondents No. 3 and 4 continued till their regular appointment-promotion on same post on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. Reply states that the petitioner completed BVSc & AH Degree on 22.07.2007 and after possessing this degree the petitioner became eligible for promotion/appointment as Veterinary Officer but the petitioner could not be promoted as Veterinary Officer in view of communication dated 17.01.2008 [Annexure R-2] keeping the promotion(s) in abeyance in view of the 85th Constitutional Amendment. However, after the removal of restriction, relating to 85th Constitutional Amendment, the petitioner was promoted as Veterinary Officer alongwith Respondents No. 3 and 4 on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. 3(iii). However, after the removal of restriction, relating to 85th Constitutional Amendment, the petitioner was promoted as Veterinary Officer alongwith Respondents No. 3 and 4 on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. 3(iii). The State Authorities have stated that the anomaly in pay of the petitioner-senior vis-à-vis the pay of the Respondents 3 and 4 -juniors had occurred on account of earlier acquisition of BVSc & AH Degree and the earlier adhoc appointment-promotion of the Respondents 3 and 4 as Veterinary Officer on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 whereas the petitioner, who acquired the BVSc & AH Degree in July, 2007 and he was never promoted as adhoc Veterinary Officer but was promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009. It was stated that the Respondents 3 and 4-juniors drew higher pay on account of increments granted by virtue of adhoc appointment- promotion as Veterinary Officer which was followed by regular appointment-promotion whereas the petitioner was never promoted on adhoc basis [being ineligible] but was promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009. In these circumstances, the claim of the petitioner for stepping up of the pay was not sustainable and a prayer was made for dismissal of the writ petition. REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER: 4. Petitioner filed a rejoinder reiterating the averments made in writ petition. In Paras 6(iii) to (v) of rejoinder, the petitioner has asserted that as per the Seniority List of Deputy Directors/Assistant Directors/Senior Veterinary Officer and Veterinary Officers [Class-I Gazette] issued by Animal Husbandry Department on 12.05.2016, the petitioner was placed as senior to the Respondents 3 and 4 and therefore, the case for removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of petitioner was made out. 5. Based on pleadings, the following question arises for determination:- Whether the higher pay drawn by Respondents 2 and 3 by virtue of adhoc promotion which was followed by regular appointment/promotion will confer a right on the petitioner for stepping up of pay ? 6. Heard, Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Parav Sharma and Vishali Advocates, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Navlesh Verma, Additional Advocate General for respondents- State. ANALYSIS: 7. 6. Heard, Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Parav Sharma and Vishali Advocates, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Navlesh Verma, Additional Advocate General for respondents- State. ANALYSIS: 7. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioner for removal of anomaly by stepping up of his pay vis-à-vis the respondents No. 3 & 4 on his appointment-promotion as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1], does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and the claim of petitioner for stepping up of pay with Respondents 3 & 4 is untenable for the following reasons:- INELIGIBILITY DISENTITLED PETITIONER FOR ADHOC APPOINTMENT-PROMOTION: 7(i). Indisputed facts indicate that the petitioner joined service as Veterinary Stockiest on 24.04.1982. The Respondent-department sponsored the petitioner for undergoing BVSc & AH Degree on 03.09.1998 and the petitioner could not complete the aforesaid degree during the span of five years but he completed the same on 22.02.2007. Notably, BVSc & AH Degree is a pre-requisite for appointment-promotion as Veterinary Officer in the respondent-department. After acquiring BVSc & AH Degree on 22.07.2007, the petitioner became eligible and was appointed-promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] in pay scale of Rs.7880-13500 [pre- revised]. On the other hand, the respondents 3 and 4 were sponsored for undergoing BVSc & AH Degree in the year 2000 & 1999 and they passed their respective degrees on 22.09.2005 and 04.08.2006 and being eligible for the post of Veterinary Officer, they were appointed-promoted as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 respectively. Thus, for want of BVSc & AH Degree, the petitioner being ineligible was neither considered nor appointed/ promoted as Veterinary Officer [adhoc] at the time, the Respondents-juniors 3 & 4, being eligible, were appointed/promoted as Veterinary Officer [adhoc] by the Respondent-department. EARLIER ELIGIBILITY AND EARLIER ADHOC APPOINTMENT/PROMOTION AND INCREMENTS GIVEN TO RESPONDENTS 3 & 4-JUNIORS RESULTED IN HIGHER PAY THAN PETITIONER- SENIOR: 7(ii). Due to their earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc appointment/promotion of Respondents 3 and 4 and the increments earned and the fact that the adhoc service was followed by regular appointment on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] the respondents 3 & 4 drew higher pay than the petitioner. Due to their earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc appointment/promotion of Respondents 3 and 4 and the increments earned and the fact that the adhoc service was followed by regular appointment on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] the respondents 3 & 4 drew higher pay than the petitioner. Factual matrix reveals that due to earlier eligibility of respondents 3 & 4, they were promoted-appointed as Veterinary Officer and they earned annual increments for adhoc service which was followed by regular promotion-appointment as Veterinary Officer on 11.09.2009, whereas, the petitioner due to his ineligibility was neither considered nor promoted-appointed on adhoc basis who was promoted-appointed as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009. Thus, the earlier eligibility and the earlier adhoc appointment-promotion and grant of increments to respondents 3 & 4, which was followed by regular appointment- promotion has resulted in giving more pay to respondents 3 & 4 and less pay to the petitioner. NON-FULFILMENT OF OTHER CONDITIONS- DISENTITLES PETITIONER FOR STEPPING UP OF PAY: 7(iii). Claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay as Veterinary Officer from September, 2009 i.e. the date of appointment-promotion of petitioner and respondents No. 3 and 4 as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] has been claimed on the basis of Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules, 2009 [Taken on Record] and Note 6 and Rule 11-A inserted in aforesaid rules. 7(iii-a). In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, it is necessary to have a recap of Note-6 as inserted below Rule 7 by virtue of notification 13.10.2009 as under: “GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (PAY REVISION SECTION) Dated Shimla-171002, the 13th October, 2009 No. Fin-(PR)B(7)-1/2009 In exercise of the powers conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and proviso to sub-rule (1) of rule 10 of the Vidhan Sabha (Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1974, as amended from time to time), the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to make the following rules further to amend the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009, namely:- 1. Short title and commencement. -(1) These rules may be called the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) (First Amendment) Rules, 2009. (2) They shall be deemed to have come into force on and with effect from the first day of January, 2006. 2. Short title and commencement. -(1) These rules may be called the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) (First Amendment) Rules, 2009. (2) They shall be deemed to have come into force on and with effect from the first day of January, 2006. 2. In Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the "said rules"), in rule 5, the third proviso, excepting Explanation-1 and Explanation-2, shall be omitted. 3. In the "said rules" in rule 7 :- (a) In clause (i), for the words, signs and figures ''as on 01.01.2006 or thereafter," the words, signs and figures ''as on the first day of January, 2006 to the date of publication of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009" shall be substituted; (b) For clause (iii) the following clause shall be substituted, namely:- "(iii) an employee, who reaches at the maximum of the Pay Band, shall be placed in the higher pay band after one year without any change in the Grade Pay. At the time of such placement, benefit of one increment shall be given and thereafter, the employee shall continue to draw increment in the higher Pay Band till his pay reaches at the maximum of Pay band 5." (c) In Note 1 J for the words "Pay Band", the words "Pay Structure" shall be substituted; and (d) For Note 6, the following Note shall be substituted, namely:- "Note-6 In case, where a senior Government employee, promoted to a higher post before the first day of January, 2006, draws less pay in the revised pay structure than his junior, who is promoted to a higher post on or after the first day of January, 2006, the pay, in the Pay Band of the senior Government employee, will be stepped up to an amount, equal to the pay in the pay band, as fixed for his junior in that higher post. The stepping up will be done with effect from the date of promotion of the junior Government employee subject to the fulfillment of the following conditions, namely: - (a) The junior and the senior Government employees should belong to the same cadre and the posts, in which they have been promoted, it should also be identical and in the same cadre; (b) The pre-revised scale and the revised scales/pay band and grade pay of the lower and higher posts, in which they are entitled to draw pay, should be identical; (c) The senior Government employee at the time of promotion to the higher post should have been drawing equal or more pay than the junior. However, no relief will be given, if the senior employee exercises an option to get his pay fixation/promotion, postponed or opts for revised scale from the date other than the date of option of his junior; (d) The anomaly should be directly as a result of application of the provisions of these rules or any other rule or order regulating pay fixation on such promotion in the revised pay structure. However, if in the lower post, the junior officer was drawing more pay in the pre-revised pay scale than his senior by virtue of any advance increment(s) granted to him or due to any inflation in pay other than by way of normal pay fixation, the provisions of this note shall not be applied for stepping up the pay of the senior employee. Provided that the benefit of stepping up of pay even can be allowed to the senior employee second time, if the anomaly has arisen with reference to the pay of the same junior, in respect of whom, the pay of the senior was stepped up first time: Provided further that the senior employee shall be entitled to earn next increment on the same date as that of his junior with respect to whom, he had got stepped up his pay. (e) For the purpose of granting step up under these rules, the competent authority shall be the Administrative Department in consultation with the Finance Department.” 7(iii-b). (e) For the purpose of granting step up under these rules, the competent authority shall be the Administrative Department in consultation with the Finance Department.” 7(iii-b). Likewise, Rule 11-A was inserted to the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules by way of the Notification dated 13.10.2009 providing for stepping up of pay in the following terms:- 5 In the "said rules' namely:- after rule the following new rule shall be inserted "11-A Protection of benefits under the existing Assured Career Progression Schemes:- Where a government employee was drawing the benefit of increment(s) and lor higher pay scale(s) under the unrevised pay scale before the date of publication of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009, on account of progression under the Assured Career Progression Schemes of the Government of Himachal Pradesh, he shall be entitled to draw such benefits under the revised pay structure, and there shall be no need to assess his eligibility afresh or to pass a formal revised order for this purpose. His pay on the date of grant of such progression, shall be fixed by grant of increment(s) at the rate specified in rule-9, and the grade pay of the such higher corresponding scale(s) will thereafter be granted in addition to the pay admissible in the pay band. Provided that in the case of those Government employees, who are entitled to the benefits of increments(s) and lor next higher pay scale(s) under the unrevised pay scales on account of progression under the existing Assured Career Progression Schemes of the government of Himachal Pradesh, but their cases have not been finalized before the date of publication of Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009, such cases will be dealt in accordance with the provisions of existing Assured Career Progression Schemes and they shall also be entitled to the benefits of protection of pay as envisaged in this rule." BY ORDER Sd/- AJAY TYAGI, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY (FINANCE) TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 7(iii-c). Petitioner relies upon a communication dated 5.10.2010 [Annexure A-4], dealing with the claim for stepping up, which reads as under:- “No. Fin-(PR)B(7)-1/2009 Government of Himachal Pradesh Finance (Pay Revision) Department From The Pr. Secretary (Finance) to Government of Himachal Pradesh. To 1. All Administrative Secretaries to the Govt. of H.P. 2. All Heads of Departments in Himachal Pradesh. 3. The Registrar General, H.P. High Court, Shimla-171001. 4. Secretary (Finance) to Government of Himachal Pradesh. To 1. All Administrative Secretaries to the Govt. of H.P. 2. All Heads of Departments in Himachal Pradesh. 3. The Registrar General, H.P. High Court, Shimla-171001. 4. The Secretary, H.P. Vidhan Sabha, Shimla-171004. 5. All Deputy Commissioner in Himachal Pradesh. 6. All District and Session Judges in Himachal Pradesh. Dated, Shimla-171002, the 5th October, 2010 Subject: Removal of Anomaly by stepping up the pay of senior Government employees drawing less pay than their juniors due to the operation of the provisions of rule 11- A of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009. Sir, I am directed to refer to the subject cited above and to say that it has been brought to the notice of the Government that due to operation of the provisions of rule 11-A of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009, the pay of some senior Government employees are getting less pay as compared to that of the pay of their juniors. 2 The matter was under consideration of the Government and after careful consideration, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order that if due to normal application of provisions of Rule 11-A of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009, the pay of a senior employee is fixed at a level lower than his junior employee, the pay of such senior employee shall be stepped up to the level of the pay of his junior employee subject to the following conditions:- (a) The junior and senior Government employee should belong to the same cadre and the posts in which they have been promoted should also be identical and in the same cadre. (b) The pre-revised and revised scale/pay band and grade pay of the lower and higher post, in which they are entitled to draw pay, should be identical. (c) The senior Government employee at the time of his promotion to the higher level had been drawing pay equal to or more than the pay of the junior. No relief will be given under these instructions if the senior employee exercises an option to get his pay fixation/promotion postponed or opts for revised pay structure from a date different than the date of option of the junior. No relief will be given under these instructions if the senior employee exercises an option to get his pay fixation/promotion postponed or opts for revised pay structure from a date different than the date of option of the junior. However, if the options for fixation of pay exercised by the senior and junior employee is under different clauses of O.M. No. Fin(PR)B(7)-1/2009 dated 19th September, 2009 read with rule 11 of the of Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009 and at the time of the promotion of the junior employee the pay of such junior is fixed at a level higher than the pay of the senior, the senior employee may, if it is advantageous to him, get his pay refixed subject to resultant financial adjustment, as if he had exercised the option as per provisions of O.M. No. Fin(PR)B(7)-1/2009 dated 19th September, 2009 read with rule 11 as has been exercised by the junior employee. (d) The anomaly should be directly as a result of application of the provisions of rule 11-A of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2009. However, if in the lower post, the junior officer was drawing more pay in the pre- revised/revised pay scale than his senior by virtue of any advance increments) granted to him or due to any inflation in pay other than by way of normal pay fixation, the benefit of step-up envisaged under these instructions shall not be admissible. (e) The next increment to senior Government employee shall be admissible on the same date as that of his junior, in respect to whom, he has got his pay stepped up. (f) The benefit of stepping up of pay can be allowed to the senior employee for the second time, if the anomaly has again arisen with reference to the pay of the same junior, in respect of whom, the pay of the senior was stepped up for the first time. 3. For the purpose of grant of step-up under these instructions, the Competent Authority shall be the Administrative Department in consultation with the Department of Finance. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Special Secretary (Finance) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. 7(iii-d). 3. For the purpose of grant of step-up under these instructions, the Competent Authority shall be the Administrative Department in consultation with the Department of Finance. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Special Secretary (Finance) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. 7(iii-d). Even by taking into account the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay vis-à-vis the pay of Respondents 3 and 4 juniors is not tenable for the reasons: Firstly, the provision of Note 6 below Rule 7 in the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Revised Pay First Amended Rules notified on 13.10.2009 cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner. Secondly, the aforesaid Note 6 deals with an eventuality providing for stepping up of pay where a senior government employee was promoted to the higher post before 01.01.2006. Perusal of the writ petition and Affidavit reveals that the petitioner, who asserts himself to be senior was promoted- appointed to higher post of Veterinary Officer on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. Thus, once the petitioner- senior was never promoted to the higher post before 01.01.2006, therefore, the condition(s) contemplated in Note-6 below Rule 7, is infact, neither attracted nor applicable in case of the petitioner. Thirdly, the petitioner does not fulfil the pre-conditions prescribed in Clause (a) to (d) below Note 6, inserted under Rule 7. Fourthly, the plea for stepping up cannot be granted, when, the petitioner has not established on record that the petitioner is senior vis-à-vis Respondents 3 and 4 as Veterinary Officer, in view of the fact that private Respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 and such adhoc service was followed by regular appointment-promotion on 11.09.2009 and in these circumstances, Respondents 3 and 4 turn out to be senior vis-à-vis the petitioner. Fifthly, even the petitioner has not placed any material on record to establish that the pre- revised scale and the revised pay scale of the feeder post and the higher post of Veterinary Officer was identical. In absence of any material on record to establish parity in pay scales between the lower post and higher post the claim of petitioner for stepping up cannot be acceded to. In absence of any material on record to establish parity in pay scales between the lower post and higher post the claim of petitioner for stepping up cannot be acceded to. Sixthly, for the purposes of claiming stepping up, the sine qua non is that senior should have been drawing equal or more pay than the junior at the time of appointment-promotion to the higher post. Petitioner has failed to place on record any material to establish that the petitioner drew equal or more pay than the pay of the respondents 3 and 4, at the time of their appointment-promotion as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006. Seventhly, the plea of stepping up of pay is permissible, in case, anomaly accrues directly as a result of application of the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules or any other Rules or order regulating pay fixation on such promotion in revised pay structure. In instant case, the petitioner has nowhere established that the anomaly in pay of the petitioner vis-à-vis the pay of respondents 3 and 4 has arisen directly due to the application of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Revised Pay Rules dated 13.10.2009 or had occurred due to the application of any other rule or order regulating pay fixation on promotion in revised pay structure, which ought to have been rectified-removed by allowing the benefit of stepping up. In these circumstances, the petitioner having failed to establish the fundamental facts that the anomaly had occurred due to application of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules or any other rule or order regulating pay fixation on promotion in revised pay structure, therefore, the claim of the petitioner for stepping up of his pay with the pay of respondents 3 and 4 cannot sustain. For non-fulfilment of the conditions in Clause (a) to (d) below Note 6 to Rule 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules dated 13.10.2009, the claim for stepping up is devoid of merit and is accordingly turned down. For non-fulfilment of the conditions in Clause (a) to (d) below Note 6 to Rule 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules dated 13.10.2009, the claim for stepping up is devoid of merit and is accordingly turned down. Ninthly, the reliance placed by petitioner on Rule 11-A as in Notification dated 13.10.2009, which was reiterated on 05.10.2010 [Annexure A-4], is neither attracted nor applicable in the instant case, in view of the fact, that Rule 11-A, as reproduced above, provides for stepping up of pay, in case, the anomaly in pay had arisen due to grant of benefit of increment or higher pay scale on account of progression under the Assured Career Progression Scheme(s) of the Government of Himachal Pradesh. It is not the case of the petitioner that the anomaly in pay of petitioner vis-à-vis pay of Respondents 3 & 4-juniors had occurred due to grant of increments or higher pay scale on account of progression(s) under ACP Scheme, which necessitated the invocation of stepping up of pay of the petitioner. In the absence of any such assertion, the claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay is misconceived and is accordingly disallowed. Lastly, a cumulative analysis goes on to establish that the petitioner despite claiming to be senior does not fulfil the pre-conditions as prescribed in the Himachal Pradesh Civil Services [Revised Pay] Rules, reproduced above, so as to invoke the principle of stepping up of pay vis-à-vis the higher pay granted to respondents 3 & 4. As discussed hereinabove, absence of material, negates the claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay. GRANT OF ADHOC PROMOTION AND INCREMENT TO RESPONDENTS 3 & 4 CANNOT CONSTITUTE ANAMOLY ENABLING STEPPING UP: 8. Case of the petitioner needs to be examined from another angle. Petitioner was appointed/ promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009, after acquiring BVSc & AH Degree on 22.07.2007, which is a pre-requisite for holding the post of Veterinary Officer. GRANT OF ADHOC PROMOTION AND INCREMENT TO RESPONDENTS 3 & 4 CANNOT CONSTITUTE ANAMOLY ENABLING STEPPING UP: 8. Case of the petitioner needs to be examined from another angle. Petitioner was appointed/ promoted as Veterinary Officer on regular basis on 11.09.2009, after acquiring BVSc & AH Degree on 22.07.2007, which is a pre-requisite for holding the post of Veterinary Officer. On the other hand the Respondents 3 and 4 acquired the BVSc & AH Degree earlier on 22.09.2005 and 04.08.2006 and by virtue of their earlier eligibility for the post of Veterinary Officer, the respondents 3 and 4 were appointed/promoted on the post of Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 and based on adhoc appointment-promotion the respondents 3 and 4 have earned increments and were granted higher pay till their regular appointment as Veterinary Officer on 11.09.2009. 8(i). For better analysis, reference is made to Fundamental Rule 22 (I), which reads as under:- FR 22. (I) The initial pay of a Government servant who is appointed to a post on a time-scale of pay is regulated as follows: - (a) (1) Where a Government servant holding a post, other than a tenure post, in a substantive or temporary or officiating capacity is promoted or appointed in a substantive, temporary or officiating capacity, as the case may be, subject to the fulfilment of the eligibility conditions as prescribed in the relevant Recruitment Rules, to another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attaching to the post held by him, his initial pay in the time-scale of the higher post shall be fixed at the stage next above the notional pay arrived at by increasing his pay in respect of the lower post held by him regularly by an increment at the stage at which such pay has accrued or [rupees one hundred only] which ever is more. [Save in case of appointment on deputation to an ex adre post, or to a post on adhoc basis or on direct recruitment basis], the Government servant shall have the option, to be exercised within one month from the date of promotion or appointment, as the case may be, to have the pay fixed under this rule from the date of such promotion or appointment or to have the pay fixed initially at the stage of the time scale of the new post above the pay in the lower grade or post from which he is promoted on regular basis which may be refixed in accordance with this rule on the date of accrual of next increment in the scale of the pay of the lower grade or post. In cases where an ad hoc promotion is followed by regular appointment without break, the option is admissible as from the date of initial appointment or promotion, to be exercised within one month from the date of such regular appointment: Provided that where a Government servant is, immediately, before his promotion or appointment on regular basis to a higher post, drawing pay at the maximum of the time-scale of the lower post, his initial pay in the time scale of the higher post shall be fixed at the stage next above the pay notionally arrived at by increasing his pay in respect of the lower post held by him on regular basis by an amount equal to the last increment in the time scale of the lower post or [rupees one hundred], whichever is more. In the backdrop of FR 22 (I) (a) (1), as reproduced above, the Respondents 3 and 4 were appointed-promoted as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis [which included temporary capacity] from lower- feeder post and by virtue of fundamental rule, they drew increment(s) and the resultant higher pay and such adhoc appointment-promotion was followed by regular appointment-promotion on 11.09.2009. In the backdrop of FR 22 (I) (a) (1), as reproduced above, the Respondents 3 and 4 were appointed-promoted as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis [which included temporary capacity] from lower- feeder post and by virtue of fundamental rule, they drew increment(s) and the resultant higher pay and such adhoc appointment-promotion was followed by regular appointment-promotion on 11.09.2009. Once the respondents 3 and 4 drew higher pay, by virtue of increments granted on adhoc appointment-promotion as Veterinary Officer which was followed by regularization, whereas, due to ineligibility of petitioner, he was not given adhoc promotion alongwith respondents 3 & 4 but was promoted as Veterinary Officer on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1], then, less pay given to the petitioner due to his belated appointment/ promotion as Veterinary Officer due to his ineligibility, cannot constitute anomaly, so as to entitle the petitioner-ineligible for stepping up of pay with the private respondents-eligibles who were promoted- appointed on adhoc earlier and were thereafter regularized as such. MANDATE OF LAW: DISENTITLING PETITIONER OF STEPPING UP DUE TO ADHOC PROMOTION- APPOINTMENT OF JUNIORS AND GRANT OF HIGHER PAY TO JUNIORS: 9. Issue as to whether a senior, who drew less pay vis-à-vis the junior, who was granted higher pay due to earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc promotion/appointment could be treated as anomaly for the purpose of stepping up of pay of petitioner- senior stands answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the following judgements: 9(i). While dealing with the claim of senior for stepping up of pay vis-à-vis the pay of juniors, who were granted higher pay due to their earlier officiating promotion was negated by Three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India and another versus R.Swaminathan and others (1997) 7 SCC 690 , in the following terms: 10. According to the aggrieved employees, this has resulted in an anomaly. Government Order bearing No. F.2 (78)E. III (A)/66 dated 4th of February, 1996, has been issued for removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of senior on promotion drawing less pay that his junior. According to the aggrieved employees, this has resulted in an anomaly. Government Order bearing No. F.2 (78)E. III (A)/66 dated 4th of February, 1996, has been issued for removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of senior on promotion drawing less pay that his junior. It provides as follows: “(10) Removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of Senior on Promotion drawing less pay than his junior.--(a) As a result of application of F.R. 22-C. -- In order to remove the anomaly of a Government servant promoted or appointed to a higher post on or after in that post than another Government servant junior to him in the lower grade and promoted or appointed in the lower grade and promoted or appointed subsequently to another identical post, it has been of the decided that such cases the pay of the senior officer in the higher post should be stepped upto a figure equal to the pay as fixed for the junior officer in that higher post. The stepping up should be done with effect from the date of promotion or appointment of the junior officer and will be subject to the following conditions. namely:- (a) Both the junior and senior officers should belong to the same cadre and the posts in which they have been promoted or appointed should be identical and in the same cadre: (b) The scale of pay of the lower and higher posts in which they are entitled to draw pay should be identical: (c) the anomaly should be directly as a result of the application of F.R. 22-C. For example, if even in the lower post the junior officer draws from time to time a higher rate of pay than the senior by virtue of grant of advance increments, the above provisions will not be invoked to step up the pay of the senior officer. The orders refixing the pay of the senior officers in accordance with the above provisions shall be issued under F.R.27. The orders refixing the pay of the senior officers in accordance with the above provisions shall be issued under F.R.27. the next increment of the senior officer will be drawn on completion of the requisite qualifying service with effect from the date of refixation of pay.: As the order itself states, the stepping up is subject to three conditions: (1) Both the junior and the senior officers should belong to the same cadre and the posts in which they have been promoted should be identical and in the same cadre; (2) the scales of pay of the lower and higher posts should be identical and ; (3) anomaly should be directly as a result of the application of Fundamental Rule 22-C which is now Fundamental Rule 22(I) (a) (1). We are concerned with the last condition. The difference in the pay of a junior and a senior in the cases before us is not a result of the application of Fundamental Rule 22(1) (a) (1). The higher pay received by a junior is on account of his earlier officiation in the higher post because of local officiating promotions which he got in the post. Because of the proviso to Rule 22 he may have earned increments in the higher pay-scale of the post to which he is promoted on account of his past service and also, his previous pay in the promotional post has been taken into account in fixing his pay on promotion. it is these two factors which have increased the pay of the juniors. This cannot be considered as an anomaly requiring the stepping of the pay of the seniors. 11. The Officer Memorandum dated 4.11.1993, Government of India, Department of Personnel & Training, has set out the various instances where stepping of pay cannot be done. It gives, inter alia, the following instances which have come to the notice of the department with a request for stepping up of pay. There are: "(a) Where a senior proceeds on Extra Ordinary Leave which results in postponement of Date of Next Increment in the lower post, consequently he starts drawing less pay than his junior in the lower grade itself. There are: "(a) Where a senior proceeds on Extra Ordinary Leave which results in postponement of Date of Next Increment in the lower post, consequently he starts drawing less pay than his junior in the lower grade itself. He, therefore, cannot claim pay parity on promotion even though he may be promoted earlier to the higher grade: (b) If a senior foregoes/refuses promotion leading to his junior being promoted/appointed to the higher post earlier, junior draws higher pay than the senior. The senior may be on deputation while junior avails of the ad hoc promotion in the cadre. The increased pay drawn by a junior either due to ad hoc officiation/regular service rendered in the higher posts for periods earlier than the senior, cannot, therefore, be an anomaly in strict sense of the term. (c) If a senior joins the higher post later than the junior for whatsoever reasons, whereby he draws less pay than the junior, in such cases senior cannot claim stepping up of pay at par with the junior." (d) ................... ................. There are also other instances cited in the Memorandum. The Memorandum makes it clear that in such instance a junior drawing more pay than his senior will not constitute an anomaly and, therefore, stepping up of pay will not be admissible. The increased pay drawn by a junior because of ad hoc officiating or regular service rendered by him in the higher post for periods earlier than the senior is not anomaly because pay does not depend on seniority alone is seniority alone a criterion for stepping up of pay. 12. The aggrieved employees have contended with some justification that local officiating promotions within a Circle have resulted in their being deprived of a chance to officiate in the higher post. If such chance of officiation arises in a different Circle. They have submitted that since there is an All India seniority for regular promotion. this All Indian seniority must prevail even while making local officiating appointments within any Circle. The question is basically of administrative exigency and the difficulty that the administration may face if even short-term vacancies have to be filled on the basis of All India seniority by calling a person who may be stationed in a different Circle in a region remote from the region where the vacancy arises, and that too for a short duration. The question is basically of administrative exigency and the difficulty that the administration may face if even short-term vacancies have to be filled on the basis of All India seniority by calling a person who may be stationed in a different Circle in a region remote from the region where the vacancy arises, and that too for a short duration. This is essentially a matter of administrative policy. But the only justification for local promotions is their short duration. If such vacancy is of a long duration there is no administrative reason for not following the all India seniority. Most of the grievances of the employees will be met if proper norms are laid down for making local officiating promotions. One thing, however, is clear, Neither the seniority nor the regular promotion of these employees is affected by such officiating local arrangement. The employees who have not officiated in the higher post earlier, however, will not get the benefit of the Proviso to Fundamental Rule 22. 13. The employees in question are, therefore, not entitled to have their pay stepped up under the said Government Order because the difference in the pay drawn by them and the higher pay drawn by their juniors is not as a result of any anomaly: nor is it a result of the application of Fundamental Rule 22(I)(a)(1). 9(ii). Claim for removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay where the juniors drew higher pay because of earlier adhoc appointment-promotion was negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Union of India and others versus Sushil Kumar Paul and others (1998) 5 SCC 268 , in the following terms:- 6. In this case what had happened was that the respondents and Mishra were appointed as typists clerks on different dates but were promoted to the post of Welfare Inspector Grade -III on the same date. Mishra was promoted to Grade II earlier than the respondents on ad hoc basis. He was promoted as Welfare Inspector Grade II on 1.2.1981 on adhoc basis and worked continuously on the higher post upto 1.1.84 on which date the two respondents and Mishra were promoted as Welfare Inspectors Grade II on regular basis. At that time he was getting a higher pay than the respondents because of his earlier adhoc promotion. He was promoted as Welfare Inspector Grade II on 1.2.1981 on adhoc basis and worked continuously on the higher post upto 1.1.84 on which date the two respondents and Mishra were promoted as Welfare Inspectors Grade II on regular basis. At that time he was getting a higher pay than the respondents because of his earlier adhoc promotion. Mishra was again promoted as Welfare Inspector Grade I on adhoc basis and worked on that post continuously from 28.7.86 to 13.1.93. On 13.1.93 the respondents and Mishra were promoted to Grade I on regular basis. On that date also Mishra was getting a higher pay because of his adhoc promotion as Welfare Inspector Grade I. It was for that reason that Mishra, even though was a junior, was getting more pay than the respondents. In view of these facts, the Circular governing stepping up of pay issued by the Railway Board and the law laid down by this Court in Union of India & Others Vs. O.P. Saxena ( 1997 (6) SCC 360 ) the respondents were not entitled to the benefit of stepping up. The Tribunal, thus committed an error in granting that benefit to the respondents. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders of the Tribunal. 9(iii). The claim for stepping up of pay of senior vis-à-vis junior who were granted adhoc promotion was disapproved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus M. Suryanarayana Rao, (1998) 6 SCC 400 in the following terms: 4. The judgment of the Tribunal is assailed by the appellant on the ground that principle of stepping up will not apply in the case where junior had been promoted earlier to a higher post on adhoc basis and on account of such adhoc promotion the junior got his pay fixed at a higher scale. In support of this contention reliance is placed by the appellant on a judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. R.Swaminathan & Ors. [ 1997 (7) SCC 690 .]. A bench of three Judges considered F.R. 22(1) and also the Government office memorandum dated 4.11.93 which sets out various instances where stepping up of pay cannot be done. In support of this contention reliance is placed by the appellant on a judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. R.Swaminathan & Ors. [ 1997 (7) SCC 690 .]. A bench of three Judges considered F.R. 22(1) and also the Government office memorandum dated 4.11.93 which sets out various instances where stepping up of pay cannot be done. The Bench pointed out that in that case the higher pay was fixed for the juniors not because of any promotion under FR 22 but because of an earlier ah-hoc promotions given to the juniors for certain periods. The following observation of the Bench will be relevant: "The memorandum makes it clear that in such instances a junior drawing more pay than his senior will not constitute an anomaly and, therefore, stepping up of pay will not be admissible. The increased pay drawn by a junior because of ad hoc officiating or regular service rendered by him in the higher post for periods earlier than the senior is not an anomaly because pay does not depend on seniority alone nor is seniority alone a criterion for stepping up of pay. The aggrieved employees have contended with some justification that local officiating promotions within a Circle have resulted in their being deprived of a chance to officiate in the higher post, if such chance of officiation arises in a different circle. They have submitted that since there is all- India seniority for regular promotions, this all-India seniority must prevail even while making local officiating appointments within any Circle. The question is basically of administrative exigency and the difficulty that the administration may face it even short- term vacancies have to be filled on the basis of all-India seniority by calling a person who may be stationed in a different circle in a region remote from the region where the vacancy arises, and that too for a short duration. This is essentially a matter of administrative policy. But the only justification for local promotions is their short duration. If such vacancy is of a long duration there is no administrative reason for not following the all-India seniority. Most of the grievances of the employees will be met if proper norms are laid down for making local if proper norms are laid down for making local officiating promotions. One thing, however, is clear. If such vacancy is of a long duration there is no administrative reason for not following the all-India seniority. Most of the grievances of the employees will be met if proper norms are laid down for making local if proper norms are laid down for making local officiating promotions. One thing, however, is clear. Neither the seniority nor the regular promotion of these employees is affected by such officiating local arrangements. The employees who have not officiated in the higher post earlier, however, will not get the benefit of the proviso to Fundamental Rule 22. 10. One of the reasons given by the Tribunal in support of its order is that when adhoc promotion were made, the respondent was not considered therefor or offered the same and it was not as if he refused to take up higher responsibility. The reasoning is highly fallacious. As pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant adhoc promotions are made within the circles where vacancies arose and the respondent who was working in a different circle could not have been considered for such adhoc promotion or offered the same. The fact that ad hoc promotions are made within the circles has been noticed by the Bench in R.Swaminathan’s case. 9(iv). While dealing with a situation, where a junior was granted benefit of senior scale/Selection Grade, based on adhoc service followed by regular service, the claim of the senior for stepping up who was appointed/promoted subsequently resulting in less pay was negated, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel and another versus State of Gujarat and others, (2025) 1 SCC 490 in the following terms:- 2. The matters pertain to the issue whether or not the principle of stepping up of pay of an employee on the basis of the pay of his junior, is applicable in the present case, where the appellants are put on a lesser pay scale than the Assistant Professors who were appointed before them as adhoc lecturers and subsequently regularized. The genesis of controversy goes back to the period of 1984-95 when 111 persons came to be engaged as Lecturers on adhoc basis in various Government Colleges. 36. It is to be noted that in the present case, the anomaly in pay is not a direct result of Rule 21. The genesis of controversy goes back to the period of 1984-95 when 111 persons came to be engaged as Lecturers on adhoc basis in various Government Colleges. 36. It is to be noted that in the present case, the anomaly in pay is not a direct result of Rule 21. Rather, the alleged anomaly arose because the 85 Assistant Professors [1984-95 Group] have been granted the benefit of Senior Scale/Selection Grade Pay by taking into account the adhoc services that they have rendered in the past. Therefore, Rule 21 becomes inapplicable in the present case. 38. The case laws cited by the Appellants are not applicable to the instant case as they are distinguishable on facts. More specifically, Madhava Murthy (supra), it was a case where a junior was drawing more pay on account of upgradation under the ACP Scheme and there was an anomaly and therefore, the pay of senior was required to be stepped up. However, the said junior had not rendered any adhoc services, which is not quite the case at hand. Similarly, Gurcharan Singh Grewal (supra) was also not a case involving ad hoc services. It was a matter wherein the Appellant was merely seeking to step up his pay as was done for another appellant situated similarly. Lastly, in Ashok Ram Parhad (supra), the grant of monetary benefit was not under contention. Rather, that matter was with regards to the inter se seniority which is not a point of dispute in the instant case. Hence, none of the case laws relied on by the Appellants help their case. 40. The case of R. Swaminathan (supra) is a matter with very similar factual matrix wherein certain employees claiming seniority were claiming step up if their juniors are getting more pay on account of their adhoc services being counted. Certain junior employees had officiated on a promotional post on an ad hoc basis due to administrative exigencies., due to which their pay on their regular promotion was fixed higher than their senior. 43. We, thus, hold that Rule 21 of the 2002 Pay Rules is inapplicable in the instant case(s) and no relief can be granted to the appellants. The present appeals deserve to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly. 43. We, thus, hold that Rule 21 of the 2002 Pay Rules is inapplicable in the instant case(s) and no relief can be granted to the appellants. The present appeals deserve to be dismissed. It is ordered accordingly. In backdrop of the declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Swaminathan, Sushil Kumar Paul, M. Suryanarayana Rao and Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel [supra], once the respondents 3 and 4-juniors due to their earlier eligibility [on acquiring BVSc & AH Degree] were promoted on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 as Veterinary Officer [adhoc] and by virtue of earlier adhoc promotion were given incremental benefits and they drew higher pay vis-à-vis the pay of the petitioner-senior, who was ineligible for appointment/promotion to the post of Veterinary Officer till 22.07.2007 and was thereafter appointed-promoted, as such, on regular basis on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] therefore, grant of higher pay to the Respondents 3 & 4 will not constitute an anomaly so as to invoke stepping up of pay of the petitioner with the juniors. Admissibility of higher pay to the juniors, in view of their earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc promotion and the incremental benefits granted to juniors will not confer a legally tenable claim for stepping of pay by the petitioner herein. In these circumstances, the claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay is not tenable, on facts as well as in law and the same is disallowed. CONTENTION(S) OF STATE AUTHORITIES OBJECTING TO CLAIM DUE TO DELAY AND LACHES: 10. Learned State Counsel objects to the claim on ground of delay and laches, stating that the anomaly arose on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1], whereas, the petitioner filed the instant petition on 22.02.2016 after a delay of more than seven years. The objection of Learned State Counsel has force, for the reason, that the stepping up of pay is claimed from the date of issuance of the appointment-promotion Notification dated 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1]. The petitioner slept over his rights/remedies for about 7 years till 2016. The cause of action arose in 2009. Then also, the claim was to be asserted within a reasonable period. Even repeated representations dated 12.07.2012 and 20.10.2015 [Annexures A-2 and Annexure A-3] cannot be a ground to either to extend limitation or to revive stale or dead claims, when, the petitioner slept over his rights/remedies for about 7 years. The cause of action arose in 2009. Then also, the claim was to be asserted within a reasonable period. Even repeated representations dated 12.07.2012 and 20.10.2015 [Annexures A-2 and Annexure A-3] cannot be a ground to either to extend limitation or to revive stale or dead claims, when, the petitioner slept over his rights/remedies for about 7 years. The claim having become stale, [relating to subject matter in 2009] suffers from delay and laches. 10(i). Negligence or inaction cannot be made the basis for condoning the delay in availing legal remedies in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 in the following terms: 5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi , it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.......... 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 ). 8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave Petition with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same, in accordance with law. 10(ii). While dealing with the issue as to whether mere filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action and consideration thereof and the restriction of limitation or delay and laches cannot obliterate in service matters as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus C.Girija and others (2019) 15 SCC 633 , in the following terms: 17. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated representation laid down following, which is extracted below:- “15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.” 18. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh following was laid down:- “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time. 23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 , this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para 16) “16. … filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and 28, following was laid down:- “26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two- Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 , wherein it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” 20. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” 20. On the preposition as noticed above, it is clear that the claim of the applicant for inclusion of her name in the panel, which was issued on 09.01.2001 and for the first time was raked up by her, by filing representation on 25.09.2007, i.e., after more than 06 and half years. The claim of inclusion in the panel had become stale by that time and filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action. Thus, mere fact that representation was replied by Railways on 27.12.2007, a stale claim shall not become a live claim. Both Tribunal and High Court did not advert to this important aspect of the matter. It is further to be noted from the material on record that after declaration of panel on 09.01.2001, there were further selection under 30% promotion by LDCE quota, in which the applicant participated. In selection held in 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With regard to her non- inclusion in panel in 2005 selection, she also filed O.A. No. 629 of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. After participating in subsequent selections under 30% quota and being declared unsuccessful, by mere filing representation on 27.09.2007 with regard to selection made in 2001, the delay and laches shall not be wiped out. 10(iii). While negating the claim relating to denial of service benefits which accrued in the year 2008 against which the remedy was invoked in the year 2017 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer and others versus S.Lalitha and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916, has held that an unexplained delay and laches in service disputes which were triable, within limitation prescribed under Administrative Tribunals Act cannot be ventilated beyond limitation period in the following terms:- 21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench in State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have in availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench in State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have in availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. Taking note of multiple precedents in the field on the subject of delay or laches disentitling a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46 (forty-six) years after final publication was grossly belated and that no relief could have been made available to the respondents/ writ petitioners. 24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay or laches is considered one of the factors which could assume significance in denying relief when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case, a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the applicant’s negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal. 36. On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have, if she felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately after her rights were affected. She ought not to have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing of such belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time. 10(iv). While negating the belated claim in service matters the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. ANSWER TO QUESTION FORMULATED AND CONCLUSION: 11. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. ANSWER TO QUESTION FORMULATED AND CONCLUSION: 11. With reference to the Question formulated as to whether the higher pay drawn by Respondents 2 and 3 by virtue of adhoc promotion which was followed by regular appointment/promotion will confer a right on the petitioner for stepping up of pay is answered in the negative, for the reason that drawl of higher pay by the Respondents 3 and 4 juniors due to their earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc appointment-promotion granted to them as Veterinary Officer on 18.08.2006 and 13.11.2006 and the resultant incremental benefits granted to them till their regularization vis-à-vis the non- promotion of the petitioner as Veterinary Officer on adhoc basis due to his ineligibility and his promotion on regular basis on 11.09.2009 will neither constitute anomaly in pay nor receipt of higher pay by the juniors confer a right for stepping up of pay to the petitioner- junior. The claim for stepping up cannot be claimed in vacuum. For asserting a right for stepping up of pay, the anomaly has to accrue from the Revised Pay Rules or other Rules or Orders governing the fixation of pay i.e. revised pay structure. Once neither pay fixation Rules i.e. Himachal Pradesh Civil Services Revised Pay Rules dated 13.10.2009, applicable w.e.f. 01.01.2006 nor the Fundamental Rules 22 (I) (a) (1) or any other Rules or Orders provide for stepping up of pay of petitioner-senior vis-à-vis the pay of junior, who was granted higher pay by virtue of their earlier eligibility and earlier adhoc promotion and the incremental benefits earned till regularization will not constitute anomaly. Besides this, though petitioner claims to be senior but once he did not fulfil the other preconditions enabling him to assert a claim for stepping up of pay with pay of Respondents 3 & 4-juniors. In absence of any such eventuality, the claim for stepping up of pay by the petitioner is neither made out on facts nor is the same tenable in law, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Swaminathan, Sushil Kumar Paul, M. Suryanarayana Rao and Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel [supra]. DIRECTIONS: 12. In absence of any such eventuality, the claim for stepping up of pay by the petitioner is neither made out on facts nor is the same tenable in law, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.Swaminathan, Sushil Kumar Paul, M. Suryanarayana Rao and Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel [supra]. DIRECTIONS: 12. In view of above discussion and for reasons recorded hereinabove, the petition is dismissed, in the following terms: (i) Claim of the petitioner for stepping up of pay as Veterinary Officer from the date of appointment/promotion as Veterinary Officer on 11.09.2009 [Annexure A-1] is disallowed ; (ii). Higher pay drawn by Respondents 3 and 4 by virtue of adhoc promotion as Veterinary Officer which was followed by regular promotion will neither constitute anomaly in pay nor confer a right for stepping up of pay of petitioner-senior, in terms of mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Swaminathan, Sushil Kumar Paul, M. Suryanarayana Rao and Maheshkumar Chandulal Patel [supra]; (iii). Parties to bear respective costs. In aforesaid terms, instant petition and all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.